The custom of Swara or Vani, or any other custom or practice under any name in which the females are given as consideration for settling a civil dispute or criminal liability.......

 The custom of Swara or Vani, or any other custom or practice under any name in which the females are given as consideration for settling a civil dispute or criminal liability is clearly an un-Islamic, unconstitutional and illegal practice which is punishable with imprisonment and fine in accordance with the Pakistan Penal Code.

This nefarious practice of Swara has been in vogue in different parts of Pakistan under different names and different pretexes; according to such practice girls or females are given and taken in Nikah or otherwise as consideration for compromise. This evil practice of forced marriages of girls in the name of compensation of murder, raping and settling of other disputes has been in prevalence in different parts of Pakistan by different names like vani, swara, sharam, khoon baha, sang chatti and karo-kari, etc. All such evil practices in which females are given in Nikah or otherwise to the victim party in the name of consideration for compromise or badal-i-sulh are un-Islamic and against the principles of Holy Quran and Sunnah۔
After the promulgation of 25th Constitutional amendment resultantly the erstwhile Federally Administration Tribunal Areas has already been merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan. Consequently, the constitutional and legal status of the Kurram Agency is changed. The Frontier Crime Regulations are abrogated from FATA, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 and other laws are now applicable in that area.

SHARIAT PETITION NO. 02/I OF 2014
M/s Najaat Welfare Foundation, P-756-A, Kot Khan Muhammad, Satiana Road, Faisalabad through its General Secretary Muhammad Ilyos son of Muhammad Ali Javed. VERSUS Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs, Central Secretariat, Sharah-e-Dastoor, Islamabad and others.
Decoded on 25-10-2021














عدالتی خلع کی شرعی حییثیت کے بارے وفاقی شرعی عدالت کا تفصیلی فیصلہ

P L D 2014 Federal Shariat Court 43

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---
----Art. 203-D(c)---Federal Shariat Court, jurisdiction of---Declaration of a law/provision to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam---Fatwas, verdicts and views of scholars, relevancy of---Federal Shariat Court was vested with the power to declare laws/provisions of laws against Injunctions of Islam as defined in Art. 203-B(c) of the Constitution, on the touchstone of only the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h)---As such scope and jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court was limited only to the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h)---Federal Shariat Court could not declare any law or provision of law repugnant to Injunctions of Islam merely on the basis of views, verdicts and Fatawa issued by the scholars whosoever they might be---Unless there was .a clear specific "Nass" of the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h) prohibiting or enjoining commission or omission of any particular act, Federal Shariat Court could not declare any law or provision of law as repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam.
(b) Islamic jurisprudence---
----Marriage---Objectives of marriage in Islam.
Following were the main objectives of marriage in Islam:
(i) Procreation of children, preservation and perpetuation of the human race, through legitimate sexual intercourse between a man and a woman whose relationship as husband and wife was publicly declared and made known to the society at large.
(ii) Protection of morals through legally justified satisfaction of natural biological urges and, resultantly, curbing pre-marital or extra marital sex.
(iii) Establishment of sound emotional, spiritual, happy, lovely and peaceful life-long companionship.
Al-Quran Verses 4.1; 2:223; 4:25; 5;5 and 30:21 ref.
(c) Islamic jurisprudence---
----Marriage---Scope---Civil contract---Mutual rights and obligations--Marriage was not a sacrament; it was not irrevocable but, in essence, it was a civil contract between husband and wife which credted mutual rights and obligations---Marriage contract was a life-long commitment, meant to last happily for the whole life between husband and wife.
Al-Qur'an Verse 4:21 ref.
(d) Islamic jurisprudence---
----Marriage, termination of--- "Divorce" and "khula "---Pre­conditions---Both divorce and khula were most undesirable options and were allowed only when the spouses genuinely came to the conclusion that continuation, of their union was harmful, making them unable to perform their mutual obligations amicably enough to live within the bounds prescribed by Almighty Allah.
(e) Constitution of Pakistan---
----Art. 203-D---Federal Shariat Court---Shariat petition--- Granting relief in personam to a petitioner---In view of the jurisdiction in connection with shariat petition, conferred upon the Federal Shariat Court, the prayer for granting relief in personam could not be allowed---Illustration.
(f) Islamic jurisprudence---
----Marriage, termination of---"Khula" without recourse to court---Scope---Word "khula' literally meant "to put off"---Khula denoted laying down by the husband of rights and authority over his wife, at her instance, on acceptance of consideration---Khula signified a conditional situation on the part of wife, entered into for the purpose of dissolving the marital tie at her instance, in lieu of a compensation paid or agreed to be paid by her to the husband out of her property---In case of mutual agreement on such an arrangement, the wife did not need to go to court and ask for dissolution of her marriage as in such a situation the husband would release her from the marital bond and the wife would be free to marry any other person after the iddat period, as would be required in her case, if she was or was not pregnant.
A1-Qur'an Sura Al-Baqara Verse 229 ref.
(g) Constitution of Pakistan---
----Art. 203-D---West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.10(4)---Shariat petition---Dissolution of marriage--- "Khula "---Pre-trial proceedings---Judge/Qazi empowered to pass decree for khula at pre-trial stage without approval of husband and without recording evidence---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Plea of petitioners that a Qazi/Judge before whom prayer for dissolution of marriage on basis of khula was made was not authorized to pass such decree in favour of wife if the husband was unwilling; that S.10(4) of Family Courts Act, 1964 was against Injunctions of Islam as it bound the Family Court to pass a decree (for khula) in case reconciliation failed at pre-trial stage without recording of evidence in respect of liking and disliking on the basis of which compromise between husband and wife was refused---Validity---Where the husband did not agree to accept compensation by his wife for purposes of khula and refused to release her from his marital tie and also declined to divorce her, question was what should be the course of action for the wife; would it be justified to leave such a wife in darkness who could not live happily or perform her marital obligations; should she be pushed back to her husband to remain tongue tied, tight-lipped, depressed, dejected, having a miserable survival throughout her whole life; should she be kept, at the mercy of her in laws, vulnerable to indecent immoral life; was such a situation morally justified on any standard; would not such a situation assigned to her defeat the very object of marital peace and tranquility; who would be considered responsible if she could not bear the mental agony in such state of affairs and put an end to her life by setting herself on fire or adopted any other method for committing suicide; who would stop her or what would prevent her from administering poison to her husband if she found herself entangled in a "holy dead lock"---Islam did not intend to force a wife to live a miserable life, in a hateful unhappy union, forever---If wife was unhappy and reconciliation failed, she should be entitled to get relief as this is what justice demanded---Courts were there to resolve the disputes that arose between the parties, and they could decide all type of matters including, admittedly, dissolution of marriage on certain grounds---In such circumstances it was not understandable as to why the courts would not be authorized to decide a case of khula, if a husband did not at all agree to divorce his wife and all reconciliatory efforts failed--- No specific verse or authentic ahadith existed which provided a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by a competent Qazi/judge to decree the case of khula agitated before him by a wife, after reconciliation failed (and husband refused to release her from marital tie by accepting compensation in lieu of khula)---Shariat petition was dismissed accordingly.
Al-Qur'an Verse 2:228; Huququz Zawjain by Syed Mawdudi, pp.58-80; Fiqhul Quran by Maulana Umar Ahmad Usmani Vol. III, pp.398-417 ref.
Al-Quran Verse 2:237; 2:228; 4:34 distinguished.
(h) Islamic jurisprudence---
----Marriage, termination of---"Khula" and "Mubarat"---Single irrevocable divorce---Re-marrying without any intermediary carriage/"halala"---"Khula" and "Mubarat" operated as a single, irrevocable divorce---Even thereafter both the spouses could contract fresh marriage with mutual consent, of course if they wanted to, without any intermediary marriage of the wife with another person, as was required in the case when a husband pronounced divorce for the third time; however, iddat shall to be incumbent on the wife if she wanted to contract marriage with someone else.

P L D 2014 Federal Shariat Court 43
Before Haziqul Khairi, C. J.,
Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan and Salahuddin Mirza, JJ
SALEEM AHMAD and others---Petitioners
Versus
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Attorney General of Pakistan and 2 others---Respondents
Shariat Petitions Nos.3/L of 2005, 2/L of 2006, 1/K, 2/K, 3/K, 1/I of 2007, decided on 28th May, 2009.



























--Husband had alleged the nikahnama to be forged for the reasons that entries made in columns Nos. 15, 16, 17 & 21 were filled later on and that the alleged nikahnama was registered much earlier than the solemnization of nikah-

 2020 CLC 910

(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----S. 5, Sched---Suit for recovery of dower---Entries in nikahnama alleged to be forged---Scope---Husband had alleged the nikahnama to be forged for the reasons that entries made in columns Nos. 15, 16, 17 & 21 were filled later on and that the alleged nikahnama was registered much earlier than the solemnization of nikah---Validity---Written statement filed by husband did not contain a single word about nikahnama having been forged rather it was admitted, however, its contents were attacked---Evidence showed that nikahnama was registered after solemnization of nikah---Husband himself had admitted nikahnama in his examination-in-chief, so it was required to be taken as a whole and not as per his whims and wishes---Husband could not be allowed to admit a portion of nikahnama as correct and the other as incorrect---Constitutional petition was dismissed.
(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----S. 5, Sched---Suit for recovery of dower---Scope---Husband assailed the findings of courts below whereby wife's claim of 5-1/2 tolas gold as outstanding dower was decreed---Validity---Husband himself had admitted outstanding dower as 5-1/2 tolas against him while cross-examining the Nikah Registrar---Appellate Court had rightly held that the wife was entitled to the outstanding dower of 5-1/2 tolas of gold---Constitutional petition was dismissed.
(c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----S. 5, Sched---Suit for recovery of dower---Failure to cross-examine on specific issue---Effect---Husband assailed the findings of courts below whereby wife's claim of four marla plot as dower was decreed---Husband had admitted the nikahnama in his examination-in-chief--- Wife, through her attorney, had categorically stated that it was agreed between the parties that four marla plot would be given to her as dower---Husband, during cross-examination, had not specifically questioned about the plot nor had he put any suggestion to her, as such the unchallenged/uncrossed portion of the statement had to be considered as admission of the husband---Constitutional petition, being devoid of merit, was dismissed.
Javed Khan v. Mst.Fozia Azam PLD 2005 Pesh. 89 rel.
(d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----S.5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance---Failure to cross-examine on specific issue---Scope---Husband challenged the decrees passed by courts below whereby wife's claim of maintenance was allowed---Contention of husband was that wife herself had deserted him---Validity---Wife, through her attorney, had stated in explicit terms that she was ousted by the husband and such statement was not cross-examined---Husband had contracted second marriage and when the wife was questioned she had showed her willingness to live with the husband but the husband had straightaway refused to live with her---Husband was legally bound to maintain his wife in order to meet daily needs like food, clothes, medicines, etc, which was his duty to bear from the date when she was ousted till she was in his nikah---Constitutional petition, being without merit, was dismissed.
(e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----S.5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of dower---Cross-examination---Double-edged weapon---Scope---Fundamental purpose of cross-examination is to sort out the truth by disclosing or clarifying the matter, for such purpose no mathematical procedure is prescribed and it is not necessary that witness should only reply question according to the whims of counsel who is cross-examining, as it is a double-edged weapon and a witness while replying the question can explain the matter for clarifying the question of dispute.
(f) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----S.5, Sched.---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.133(2)---Suit for recovery of dower---Cross-examination---Failure to cross-examine on specific issue---Scope---Portion of statement which remains unchallenged in cross-examination is deemed to be admitted.
(g) Constitution of Pakistan---
----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Jurisdictional defect---Effect---High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction can neither substitute findings of the facts recorded by the appellate court nor can give its opinion regarding adequacy and quality of evidence as the assessment and appraisal of the evidence is the function of lower court, which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction in this regard---Petitioner is required to show any illegality or jurisdictional defect committed by the lower courts in order to make his case entertainable by High Court, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction.
Muhammad Arif Khan for Petitioner.
Muslim Khan for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 7th October, 2019.

 2020 CLC 910
[Peshawar]
Before Muhammad Naeem Anwar, J
USMAN KHAN----Petitioner
Versus
Mst. SHEHLA GUL and 2 others----Respondents
W.P. No.1639-P of 2019, decided on 7th October, 2019.


JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, J.----This judgment in the instant petition shall also decide W.P. No.1651-P of 2019 not because parties in both the matters are the same but also these have been arisen out of common judgment dated 13.02.2019 of learned Additional District Judge-II, Takht Bhai.
2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No.1 filed suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of 5 1/2 tolas gold ornaments along with recovery of plot measuring 04 marlas (as dower), share of petitioner/defendant in joint property situated in Babu Khan Mohallah, Hathyan, recovery of amount of Rs.50,00,000/- and the amount of Rs.10,000/- per month as maintenance from 24.01.2015 till decision of the case and onward as well as recovery of dowry articles as per list or its market value worth Rs.2,95,870/-.
The suit was contested by petitioner/defendant by filing written statement. During pendency of suit, respondent/plaintiff preferred an application for withdrawal of her claim to the extent of dissolution of marriage. Said application was accepted and the learned trial court vide order dated 09.04.2018 dismissed the prayer of respondent/plaintiff for dissolution of marriage. After framing of issues and recording of evidence, the suit was partially decreed in favour of respondent/plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 13.09.2018 rendered by learned Judge Family Court/Civil Judge-III, Takht Bhai. Dissatisfied therewith, the petitioner preferred appeal whereas the respondent/plaintiff filed objection petition. After hearing the parties, the learned Additional District Judge-II, Takht Bhai held that the finding of learned trial court on issues Nos.1 and 5 were well reasoned requiring no interference whereas those on issues Nos.2, 3 and 4 were modified to the extent that the respondent/plaintiff was held entitled for recovery of 5 1/2 tolas gold ornaments, plot measuring 04 marlas situated at Babu Khan Mohallah, Hathyan and the amount of Rs.10,000/- per month as her maintenance from past 10 months prior to institution of suit till now and onwards with an annual increase of 10% whereas cross objection filed by petitioner/defendant was dismissed being not maintainable, hence this and the connection petition.
3. Main focus of arguments of worthy counsel for petitioner was that "Nikahnama" regarding which he contended that nikahnama was forged, fabricated, manipulated, concocted and against the fact for two fold reasons; firstly, that Nikah of parties solemnized on 08.06.2014 while the nikahnama was registered on 06.11.2011, secondly, the entries of nikahnama to the extent of column Nos.15, 16, 17 and 21 were wrong, to have been filed later on, as such no reliance could be placed on nikahnama (Ex.PW1/1). He also added that (Ex.PW1/1) was not signed by petitioner. Moreover, the dower was fixed as 10 tolas gold, which was given to respondent No.1, now nothing was outstanding against petitioner. In addition to above, he maintained that as respondent No.1 was not entitled for maintenance being willful self deserted lady. He also termed the findings of both the learned lower courts as against the law.
4. Worthy counsel for respondent No.1, submitted that in constitutional jurisdiction reappraisal of evidence was not permissible, because the facts were properly determined by the learned Judge Family Court and learned appellate court. Moreover, the execution of nikahnama and its registration was admitted by the petitioner before lower forums, hence this petition deserves dismissal.
5. Arguments heard and record gone through.
6. Substantially, the main grievance of the petitioner was the execution of nikahnama and its registration. Thus, it requires proper consideration. Written statement filed by the petitioner/defendant did not contain a single word about forged nikahnama rather it was admitted, however, its contents at serial Nos.15, 16, 17 and 20 were attacked as to have been filled later on. Statement of Maulana Haneefullah, Nikah Registrar was recorded as PW1, in whose cross-examination by petitioner, it was brought on record that;
Petitioner produced Nikah Khwan Fawad Ali as DW1, who in his examination-in-chief deposed that;
Petitioner himself appeared as DW3 and in his examination-in-chief in respect of nikahnama he deposed that;
7. Scanning the evidence to the extent of first objection of learned counsel for petitioner, it can safely be held that undoubtedly, undeniably and admittedly the Nikah was solemnized on 08.11.2014, while nikahnama was registered on 06.11.2016. Second objection was to the decree of 5-1/2 tolas gold on the plea taken in written statement by petitioner/defendant that 10 tolas gold was fixed as dower and the same was paid, nothing was outstanding. Plaintiff/respondent No.1 produced PW1 Nikah Registrar in his cross-examination, it was placed on record by petitioner that;
8. Similarly, in the statement of PW2, petitioner/defendant had admitted the factum of 5-1/2 tola gold such as;
9. Petitioner himself admitted outstanding dower as 5 1/2 tola against him, while cross-examining the witness of respondent/plaintiff. Fundamental purpose of cross-examination was to sort out the truth by disclosing or clarifying the matter, for this no mathematical procedure was prescribed and it was not necessary that witness should only reply question according to the whims of counsel who is cross-examining, as it was a double edged weapon and a witness while replying question, could explain the matter for clarifying question of dispute. From the witness of opposite party in cross-examination, admission was brought against him, which was disputed earlier, so it was rightly held by the learned appellate court that respondent/plaintiff was entitled for recovery of 5-1/2 tola gold, against petitioner.
10. Third objection was of four marla plot as claimed by respondent/plaintiff on the basis of Nikahnama (Ex.PW1/1). As discussed above, the petitioner himself admitted nikahnama (Ex.PW1/1) in his examination-in-chief, so it should be taken as whole and not as per the whims and wishes of petitioner/defendant. Respondent/plaintiff when appeared as PW5 through attorney had categorically stated that it was agreed that 4 marla plot would be given to her as dower, when she was cross-examined, neither any specific question about plot was asked nor any suggestion was put to her, as such the unchallenged/uncrossed portion of the statement shall be considered as admission of petitioner. Reliance is placed on the case titled Javed Khan v. Mst.Fozia Azam (PLD 2005 Peshawar 89), wherein, it was held that;
"It transpired from the record that at the time of marriage, gold ornaments weighing four tolas were given by the petitioner-husband to respondent-wife in lieu of dower which were subsequently taken back by the petitioner-husband. The statement of respondent-wife in this respect has remained unchallenged".
11. As the portion of the statement of respondent/plaintiff for four marla plot remained un-crossed then on the basis of general principle to the effect that portion of statement of a witness, which remained unchallenged in cross-examination, was to be deemed to have been admitted. Petitioner was not allowed to admit a portion of nikahnama as correct and the other as incorrect/wrong. The learned appellate court considered the matter from all the angles and has reached to correct conclusion that respondent/wife was entitled for recovery of 04 marla property as dower.
12. Insofar as the factum of maintenance allowance of respondent / plaintiff (wife) is concerned, when the statement of plaintiff-wife was recorded through attorney, wherein, she has stated in explicit term that she was ousted from the house by petitioner some one and half year ago, this portion of the statement was not cross-examined, which tantamounts to an admission on the part of petitioner/husband, however, he himself admitted that he had never paid Rs.10,000/- per month as maintenance to his wife. Indeed the respondent/wife is still in the Nikah of petitioner, who had also contracted second marriage, respondent/wife when asked as to whether she could live with petitioner/defendant, showed her willingness, however, the petitioner/husband had refused straightaway despite the fact that wife had withdrawn her claim for dissolution of marriage. Thus, in accordance with the injunctions of Islam, the petitioner is legally duty bound to maintain respondent/wife in order to meet daily needs like food, clothes, medicine, etc, which was his duty to bear from the date when she was ousted till she is in his Nikah.
13. Learned counsel for petitioner/husband has failed to point out any misreading and non-reading of evidence available on record to set aside the judgment and decree of learned appellate court. Even, otherwise, High Court in its extra ordinary jurisdiction can neither substitute findings of the facts recorded by the learned appellate court nor can give its opinion regarding adequacy and quality of evidence as the assessment and appraisal of the evidence was the function of lower court, which was vested with exclusive jurisdiction in this regard. The petitioner was required to show any illegality or jurisdictional defect committed by the learned lower courts in order to make his case entertainable by this court, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction.
14. For the reasons mentioned above, this and the connected petition, being without any merit, are dismissed with no order as to cost.
SA/285/P
Petitions dismissed.

- Trial Court has rightly decreed suit for recovery of dower-

 PLJ 2021 AJ&K 25

Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)--

----Art. 42(10)--Suits for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance and recovery of dower--Decreed and dismissed to extent of gold ornaments--Allegation regarding physically and sexually fitness of plaintiff--Application for medical examination of plaintiff by defendant/appellant--Report of medical board--Adoptation of deviated procedure--Entitlement of wife--Deferment of payment of dower--Competency of wife to demand of dower--Binding on husband--Financial position of defendant--Modification in judgment--It is observed here that defendant has given authority to his counsel by way of signing Vakalatnama to prosecute case on his behalf including filing Iqbal dawa(cognovit), compromise and even for taking oath on behalf of defendant/ appellant therefore, proceeding conducted by trial Court are quite in accordance with law, as act of counsel is always considered an act of party--If a party opts to adopt a deviated procedure and an order is passed on basis of such offer, deviated procedure or undertaking, subsequently that party is not allowed to resile from such statement, undertaking etc.--Appellant lambasted and castigated her and made her life miserable and depressed--Trial Court has rightly passed impugned judgment and decree in accordance with law for dissolution of marriage on basis of cruelty and non-maintenance--In present case, to make allegation against a physically and sexually fit woman of being non-productive and that of incomplete woman itself causes a great torture to that woman--Although in her suit, plaintiff claimed that gold ornaments were also snatched during matrimonial life, however, she failed to prove her claim with regard to snatching of same, thus, trial Court has rightly dismissed her suit to this extent--Deferment of payment of dower to a wife with her consent is not prohibited, but if in column of deferred dower a stipulated period is not mentioned for payment of dower, wife is competent to demand dower from her husband, who is bound under law to pay dower to wife whenever it is demanded or in case of divorce dower becomes payable instantly-- Trial Court has rightly decreed suit for recovery of dower--Record shows that, it is proved that appellant is working abroad and it has not been brought on record by defence side that he is not a man of good financial means--Although financial position of defendant is also to be considered but in case in hand it is not established that prayed amount is beyond financial means of appellant/defendant--Lower Court while fixing maintenance allowance has made an error and fixed a very meager amount of Rs. 500/- therefore, maintenance allowance is liable to be enhanced and in my opinion Rs. 3000/-p.m is just, fair and appropriate amount--Appeals disposed of accordingly.                                                                  

                                 [Pp. 29, 30, 31 & 32] A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I & J

2014 SCR 718, 2014 SCR 504 and PLJ 2001 Lah. 472 ref.

Sardar Azhar Arif, Advocate for (Saba Sarwar) Appellant/ Respondent.

Sardar Bilal Shakeel, Advocate for (Imran Ashraf) Appellant/ Respondent.

Date of hearing: 24.9.2020.


 PLJ 2021 AJ&K 25
[Shariat Appellate Bench]
Present: Muhammad Sheraz Kiani, J.
Mst. SABA AKHTAR etc.--Appellants
versus
IMRAN ASHREF etc.--Respondents
Family Appeal No. 146 & C.A. No. 150 of 2019, decided on 24.9.2020.


Judgment

The above titled appeals have been addressed against the judgment and decrees passed by Additional District Judge/Judge Family Court, Rawalakot on 11.09.2019, whereby, the learned Court below has decreed the suits filed on behalf of Saba Sarwar.

2. Brief facts forming background of the appeals are that Saba Sarwar, plaintiff /appellant-respondent, herein filed (3) suits; one for dissolution of marriage, second for recovery of maintenance allowance third for recovery of dower amount. It was stated that the marriage of the spouses was solemnized according to Sharia, on 16.04.2016,in lieu of Rs. 2,70,000/- as dower and ornaments of Rs. 70,000/- were given to the plaintiff at the time of Nikah, whereas, the other amount of Rs. 200,000/- was termed as deferred dower. It was claimed that the plaintiff, after her marriage joined her husband and had been performing matrimonial obligations, however, the attitude of the defendant remained harsh and cruel with the plaintiff, few days after marriage. He started to abuse the plaintiff and beaten her and also tortured her mentally and finally, he deserted the plaintiff in August, 2017 while beating her and snatching the ornaments and since then, the plaintiff is residing with her parents, who have to bear her expenses. It is alleged that the defendant did not pay her maintenance during the desertion period because he wanted to contract second marriage, therefore, the defendant and his parents used to torture the. plaintiff, physically and mentally. According to the plaintiff, when, she filed suits for recovery of dower and maintenance, the defendant contracted second marriage and also leveled allegation that the plaintiff is not a fit woman and due to this allegation she also suffered from heavy mental torture, therefore, the decrees for dower, maintenance and dissolution of marriage on the basis of cruelty be passed in favor of the plaintiff, she prayed.

3. The defendant/appellant/respondent, herein, resisted all the three suits by filing written statement, wherein, he refuted the claim of the plaintiff and stated that the deferred dower was also paid to the plaintiff in installments. He alleged that the plaintiff did not perform matrimonial obligations and refused to do so. The defendant claimed that he spent a considerable amount on marriage with her and he wants to rejoin the plaintiff but she does not agree. It is alleged that the plaintiff stated that she is unable to beget child and refused to perform marital obligations, therefore, she did not join the defendant. The defendant claimed that he is ready to get her illness treated, but she has refused to live with the defendant and get her treatment, it is alleged that she is non-productive woman; therefore, a prayer was made for dismissal of the suits.

4. The learned trial Court, in the light of the pleadings of the parties framed issues and directed the parties to lead evidence, however, on the completion of evidence of plaintiff, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant/appellant, herein, filed an application that the plaintiff be directed to get medically examined herself and if she is declared sexually and physically fit with regard to her reproductive system, the suits filed by her be decreed in her favor. Upon this application, the learned trial Court recorded statements of the parties and referred the matter to the Medical Board, who, submitted its report and declared the plaintiff/appellant, herein as a healthy and fit woman in all respects the Medical board consist of Dr. Muhammad Ashraf (Senior Specialist/President), Dr. Sadia Hanif (Gynecologist/member) and Dr. Tahira Shakar (Gynecologist/member) gave its opinion as under;-

"The above mentioned examination as well as other investigation showed that she is a normal adult female."

Upon this report, the learned trial Court decreed the suit for dissolution of marriage, on account of cruelty, torture and non-maintenance, decreed the suit for maintenance @ Rs. 500/- from August 2017 till decision of the case and maintenance of Iddat period at the same rate. Decreed the suit for recovery of dower amount of
Rs. 2,00,000/-. The plaintiff/appellant, herein, has filed this appeal to the extent of enhancement in the maintenance allowance, whereas, Imran Ashraf, defendant/appellant, herein has sought abrogation and cancellation of all the decrees.

5. Sardar Bilal Shakeel Advocate, the learned counsel for Imran Ashraf, appellant, herein, while reiterating the contents of the appeal, contended that the plaintiff, opted to leave her house, with her free will and consent and she was never beaten or tortured by the defendant, therefore, the decree for dissolution of marriage has wrongly been decreed in favour of plaintiff. The learned counsel maintained that the learned trial Court also failed to consider the fact that the learned counsel for the defendant before the trial Court was not competent to move the application for decision on the basis of medical report of plaintiff. He submitted that the deferred dower was also paid to the plaintiff in installments and nothing is payable by the defendant, however, the learned Court below fell in grave error while granting the decree for recovery of dower. The learned counsel claimed that the defendant is, even now, ready and willing to resettle the plaintiff and maintain her, but, she is not willing to rejoin the defendant, therefore, she was not entitled to any maintenance.

6. On the contrary, Sardar Azhar Arif, Advocate, the learned counsel for Saba Sarwar plaintiff/appellant, herein, refuted the claim of the defendant and contended that the defendant leveled false and serious allegations upon the plaintiff/ appellant including that she is not a healthy and fit woman and she is non-productive, which, stood belied through medical examination. He contended that in this era of inflation and hikes in the prices of the utilities, it is impossible to maintain a person in Rs. 500/- therefore, by accepting the instant appeal, the maintenance allowance for the desertion and iddat period be fixed as Rs. 10,000/- per month.

7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and considered the controversy, carefully.

Description: ADescription: B8. In the present case, the plaintiff/appellant, Saba Sarwar filed the suit for dissolution of marriage and has taken a stance that after marriage, the defendant/respondent-appellant maltreated her and also leveled allegation that she is not a complete woman and unable to perform matrimonial obligations. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant, Imran Ashraf argued that the trial Court illegally and wrongly decreed the suit for dissolution of marriage after obtaining medical examination report of the plaintiff without considering the fact that at that time defendant was abroad and he was unaware of the proceedings, therefore, the decree for dissolution of marriage is liable to be set aside on this sole ground. In this regard, it is observed here that defendant has given the authority to his counsel by way of signing the Vakalatnama to prosecute the case on his behalf including filing Iqbal dawa(cognovit), compromise and even for taking oath on behalf of the defendant/appellant therefore, the proceeding conducted by the trial Court are quite in accordance with law, as the act of the counsel is always considered an act of the party. It is further held that if a party opts to adopt a deviated procedure and an order is passed on basis of such offer, deviated procedure or undertaking, subsequently that party is not allowed to resile from such statement, undertaking etc. Furthermore, in her suit, the appellant/plaintiff, Saba Sarwar has also claimed that she has developed severe hatred towards the respondent/defendant due to his act of mental torture, non-payment of maintenance allowance and on the basis of false allegations. In support of her contentions, the plaintiff also appeared before the Court and recorded her statement wherein she affirms the contentions made in the suit. The relevant caption of her statement is usefully reproduced as under:

"اس وجہ سے غیر آباد ہے کہ مدعا علیہ مار پیٹ کرتا تھا اور لڑکیوں سے فون پر باتیں کرتا تھا۔ مدعا علیہ نے تیسری شادی بھی کی ہوئی ہے مدعا علیہ نے مظہرہ کو مارا، بازو توڑا مظہرہ کے سارے کپڑے مظہرہ کی ساس نے آگ لگا کر جلا دئیے۔۔۔ ساس نے کہا کہ اس کو چھوڑ دو اور دوسری شادی کر لو اس کو کون پوچھنے والا ہے۔ مدعا علیہ مظہرہ پر غلط اور بے بنیاد الزام بھی لگانا تھا۔ یہ درست ہے کہ شادی کے بعد دوسرے تیسرے دن ہی مدعا علیہ نے مظہرہ پر الزامات لگانا شروع کر دئیے"

Thus, in this view of the matter after overall analysis of the evidence produced by the parties, it is proved that the appellant lambasted and castigated her and made her life miserable and depressed. In my view if a plaintiff proves any of the grounds incorporated in Section 2 of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, that is sufficient to dissolve the marriage on the basis of that single ground even (cruelty, non-maintenance for 2 years etc.), therefore, in such circumstances the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and decree in accordance with law for dissolution of marriage on the basis of cruelty and non-maintenance. It is to be noted here that a wife is entitled to a decree for dissolution of her marriage if the husband treats her with cruelty or makes her life miserable, by cruelty or conduct even if such conduct does not amount to physical ill-treatment a mental/verbal torture is considered as a cruel attitude of the husband. In the present case, to make allegation against a physically and sexually fit woman of being non-productive and that of incomplete woman itself causes a great torture to that woman and in various judgments it has been held that even the mental torture also amounts to cruelty. In the case reported as "Mohammad Sabeel Khan and another vs. Saima Inshad (2014 SCR 718), wherein it was held as under:

Description: EDescription: DDescription: C"The terms ''cruelty” with reference to matrimonial matters is to be judged within the parameters of statutory provision of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, which speaks of different kinds and natures of cruelty. The term ‘cruelty’ is not only confined to physical assault or infliction of physical injuries rather it being a comprehensive terms as elaborated in the statutory provisions which includes all types of cruelty which may be classified as legal, mental and physical."

It is further held in a case reported as 2014 SCR 504 that:

"The cruel attitude is not confined only to the extent of physical violence, it includes the mental torture, hateful attitude of husband or other inmates of the house and also includes other circumstances, in presence of which the wife is forced to abandon the house of her husband.”

Description: F8. So far as the case with regard to recovery of dower is concerned, according to Nikah-nama at time of marriage, dower was fixed as Rs. 2,70,000/- out of which Rs. 70,000/- was fixed as prompt dower in shape of gold ornaments paid at the time of Nikah, while the remaining Rs. 200,000/- was fixed as deferred dower and it is also proved from the record that the same remained as outstanding against the appellant. Although in her suit, the plaintiff claimed that the gold ornaments were also snatched during matrimonial life, however, she failed to prove her claim with regard to snatching of the same, thus, the learned trial Court has rightly dismissed her suit to this extent. Furthermore, to the extent of deferred dower, it is worthwhile to mention here that Nikah-nama is a valid public document and it got the presumption of correctness. The deferment of the payment of dower to a wife with her consent is not prohibited, but if in the column of deferred dower a stipulated period is not mentioned for the payment of dower, the wife is competent to demand dower from her husband, who is bound under law to pay dower to the wife whenever it is demanded or in case of divorce dower becomes payable instantly. In this regard reliance can be placed from a case titled "Dr. Sabira Sultana vrs. Maqsood Sulehri" [PLJ 2001 (Lah) 472], wherein it is observed as under:

Description: G          "Having heard the learned counsel, I find that notwithstanding the controversy, whether the dower is prompt or deferred, it is established that the dower is an exclusive right of the wife. However, there are no bounds to the quantity or value of the dower, which is left entirely to the will of the husband and wife. The payment of dower should be specified in such a manner so as to remove uncertainty and the payment of dower is not obliged to surrender her person till she receives her dower. However, the position may be changed after the marriage is consummated, but in any case, the dower being the property of the wife, she can insist for its payment and use as per her right and a husband cannot justifiably deprive her while withholding the payment of dower for an indefinite period on the ground that the dower was Muwajjal or deferred. The only difference of Muwajjal and Muajjal i.e deferred and prompt dower is that deferred dower is not payable till the arrival of stipulated period whereas prompt dower is payable immediately on demand and if for the payment of deferred no stipulated time is fixed, it would be treated as prompt, payable on demand. Thus, the only distinction between a prompt and deferred dower is that payment of prompt dower cannot be postponed without the consent of the wife, whereas the payment of deferred dower cannot be demanded before the stipulated period and a woman in such case is not at liberty to refuse the embraces of her husband as she has dropped her right of payment of dower till a specified time and if no specified time is fixed the dower described as deferred shall be prompt in nature to be paid on demand. The deferred dower without specification of period or stipulation, shall be payable at any time and if the same is deferred till a particular date or time, it shall not be payable before that date.”

A contemplate perusal of the above mentioned case law reveals that a husband is bound to pay dower incorporated in "Nikahnama" as deferred dower even on wife's demand if no specific time is fixed and in the case in hand it became payable not only due to the demand of the plaintiff but also on account of dissolution of marriage which is also equal to Talaq in practical sense. Thus, the trial Court has rightly decreed the suit for recovery of dower.

Description: IDescription: H9. So far as the case with regard to the question; whether the maintenance allowance fixed in favour of appellant/plaintiff is sufficient to meet her needs or is fixed while not considering the financial position of the appellant. In this regard the record shows that, it is proved that appellant is working abroad and it has not been brought on record by the defence side that he is not a man of good financial means. Under the provisions of the Family Courts Act, the Court may grant appropriate maintenance allowance according to needs of the claimant and demands of the justice in each case and there is no limit or fixed amount of maintenance. Although financial position of the defendant is also to be considered but in the case in hand it is not established that the prayed amount is beyond the financial means of the appellant/defendant.

Description: J10. Under Sharia, appellant being husband is duty bound to maintain his wife in such a manner that she could live in a respectable way. It may be stated that in this age of prices hike, continuous inflation in prices of household items, medical and transportation, clothing expenses etc. and keeping in view the overall circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the learned lower Court while fixing the maintenance allowance has made an error and fixed a very meager amount of Rs. 500/- therefore, the maintenance allowance is liable to be enhanced and in my opinion Rs. 3000/-p.m is just, fair and appropriate amount.

The case law referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are not applicable due to distinguishable facts.

Crux of the above discussion is that, I partly accept Appeal No. 146 by modifying the impugned judgment and decree dated 11.09.2019 to the extent for recovery of maintenance allowance in the terms that appellant/plaintiff is entitled for maintenance allowance of Rs. 3000/-p.m instead of Rs. 500/- p.m from August, 2017 till institution of suit for dissolution of marriage. The other decrees i.e recovery of dower and dissolution of marriage are maintained as passed by the trial Court. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant, Imran Ashraf stands dismissed.

With the above modification, the appeals stand disposed of accordingly.

(Y.A.)  Appeals disposed of accordingly

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