خاندانی عدالتیں ایکٹ ، 1964 کے ایس.17-اے کا التزام [جیسا کہ پنجاب فیملی کورٹس (ترمیم) ایکٹ ، 2015 کے ذریعہ داخل کیا گیا ہے] ایک مخصوص شق ہے جو ...........

 2026 CLC 12

خاندانی عدالتیں ایکٹ ، 1964 کے ایس.17-اے کا التزام [جیسا کہ پنجاب فیملی کورٹس (ترمیم) ایکٹ ، 2015 کے ذریعہ داخل کیا گیا ہے] ایک مخصوص شق ہے جو خاندانی دعووں کے ایک خصوصی زمرے کے طور پر دیکھ بھال کے مقدمے سے نمٹتی ہے ۔ - ایس.17-اے کی فراہمی 18-03-2015 کو پنجاب فیملی کورٹس (ترمیم) ایکٹ ، 2015 کے ذریعے متعارف کرائی گئی ہے ، جس نے بیوی اور بچوں کی دیکھ بھال کو دیگر خاندانی دعووں سے زیادہ اونچے مقام پر رکھا ہے---دیکھ بھال الاؤنس ایک ذریعہ کے طور پر کام کرتا ہے ۔ بیوی اور بچوں کے لئے روزی روٹی اور بقا ، آرٹس کے تحت ضمانت شدہ زندگی کے ان کے حق سے جڑا ہوا ہے ۔ آئین کے 4 اور 9-خاندانی عدالت کو صوابدیدی اختیارات فیملی کورٹس ایکٹ ، 1964 کے ایس.17-اے کے تحت بھی دیئے گئے ہیں [جیسا کہ پنجاب فیملی کورٹس (ترمیم) ایکٹ ، 2015 کے ذریعہ شامل کیا گیا ہے] تاکہ افراط زر کے لحاظ سے بیوی اور بچوں کی مستقبل کی ضروریات اور ضروریات کو پورا کرنے کے ساتھ ساتھ کرنسی کی قیمت میں گراوٹ کو پورا کرنے کے لئے دیکھ بھال میں سالانہ اضافہ تجویز کیا جاسکے ۔-- خاندانی عدالت کے اختیار سے کوئی انتباہ نہیں لگایا گیا ہے کہ وہ کمپاؤنڈ یا غیر کمپاؤنڈ کی بنیاد پر دیکھ بھال میں اس طرح کا سالانہ اضافہ تجویز کرے ۔-- خاندانی عدالت ہر معاملے کے حقائق اور حالات کے لحاظ سے اس طرح کا معقول حکم جاری کرنے کے لئے آزاد ہے ۔

اظہار "عدالت کی طرف سے مقرر کردہ دیکھ بھال خود بخود ہر سال دس فیصد کی شرح سے بڑھ جائے گی" --قابل اطلاق-- خاندانی عدالت کے ذریعہ طے شدہ دیکھ بھال کی وصولی کے حکم نامے پر عمل درآمد کے دوران ، اس طرح طے شدہ دیکھ بھال میں سالانہ اضافے کی مقدار کے بارے میں تنازعہ پیدا ہوا تھا ۔ "عدالت کی طرف سے مقرر کی گئی دیکھ بھال میں ہر سال دس فیصد کی شرح سے خود بخود اضافہ ہو جائے گا" عام طور پر اس کا مطلب یہ ہے کہ حکم نامے کے تحت طے شدہ دیکھ بھال کی مقدار مستحکم یا مستقل نہیں رہتی بلکہ یہ ایک متغیر اعداد و شمار ہے جس میں ہر سال کے بعد اضافہ ہوتا ہے ۔ پہلے سال کے اختتام پر 10% کے اضافے کے بعد ، دیکھ بھال کی ایک نئی مقدار میدان میں آتی ہے اور یہ رقم عدالت کے ذریعہ طے شدہ دیکھ بھال کی مقدار میں ضم یا ضم ہوجاتی ہے-اس طرح کا عمل ہر سال کے بعد دہرایا جاتا ہے جب تک کہ فرمان کے تحت بیوی یا بچوں کا قانونی حق حاصل نہ ہو ۔ - ہر سال کا سالانہ اضافہ پچھلے پچھلے سال کی ضم شدہ رقم پر شمار کرنا ضروری ہے اس وجہ سے کہ 10% اضافہ اندرونی طور پر اصل رقم سے منسلک ہے اور یہ حکم نامے کا ایک لازم و ملزوم حصہ ہے ۔ - ہائی کورٹ نے پھانسی دینے والی عدالت کو قانون کے مطابق پھانسی کے تحت حکم نامے کو نافذ کرنے کی ہدایت کی اور مدعا علیہ کی اعتراض کی درخواست کو مسترد کر دیا گیا - اس طرح کا اضافہ زیر التواء کارروائی پر لاگو ہوگا اور ماضی اور بند کارروائی پر لاگو نہیں ہوگا جس نے حتمی حیثیت حاصل کرلی تھی ۔

Suit for maintenance---Interim maintenance---Right to life---Provision of S.17-A of Family Courts Act, 1964 [as inserted by Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015] is a specific provision dealing with suit for maintenance as a special category of family claims---Provision of S.17-A is introduced through Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 on 18-03-2015, which has placed maintenance of wife and children at a higher pedestal than other family claims---Maintenance allowance serves as a means of subsistence and survival for wife and children, intrinsically connected to their right to life guaranteed under Arts. 4 & 9 of the Constitution---Discretionary powers on Family Court have also been conferred under S.17-A of Family Courts Act, 1964 [as inserted by Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015] to prescribe annual increase in maintenance to cater for future needs and requirements of wife and children as well as depreciation in value of currency in terms of inflation---No caveat is attached to the power of Family Court to prescribe such annual increase in maintenance on compound or non-compound basis---Family Court is free to pass a reasonable decree in such behalf depending on facts and circumstances of each case.
Expression "the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten percent each year"---Applicability---During execution of decree for recovery of maintenance fixed by Family Court, dispute had arisen as to quantum of annual increase in the maintenance so fixed---Validity---Expression "the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten percent each year" ordinarily implies that quantum of maintenance fixed under a decree does not remain static or constant but is a variable figure which is meant to increase after each year---After increase of 10% at the end of first year, a new quantum of maintenance comes in field and the amount gets merged or amalgamated in the quantum of maintenance fixed by Court---Such process is repeated after each year till the legal entitlement of wife or children under the decree---Annual increase of each year is required to be calculated on merged amount of last preceding year for the reason that 10% increase is intrinsically linked with the principal amount and is an inseparable part of the decree---High Court directed Executing Court to enforce decree under execution in accordance with law and objection petition of respondent was dismissed---Such increase would be applied to pending proceedings and was not applicable to past and closed proceedings which had attained finality---

JUDGMENT

.--- This constitutional Petition is directed against the impugned Order and Judgment dated 13.09.2023 and 31.10.2023 passed by Judge Family Court / Executing Court and Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, respectively.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the Petitioners instituted a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dowry articles against Respondent No. 3 (the "Respondent") which was partially decreed by the Family Court vide Judgment and Decree dated 03.09.2018. The Petitioners and the Respondent preferred cross appeals against the said Judgment and Decree. The Appellate Court dismissed appeal of the Respondent while appeal of the Petitioners was partially allowed vide consolidated Judgment and Decree dated 18.03.2019, thereby, ordering modification in the Decree of the Family Court. Both the parties filed separate Writ Petitions. Nos. 22863 and 23430 of 2019 before this Court which were partially allowed and the Judgment and Decree stood further modified. Statedly, the matter has attained finality up to the level of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
3. During execution proceedings, the Respondent filed an Objection Petition before the Executing Court seeking calculation of paid amount of maintenance allowance with reference to 10% annual increase awarded to the minors in the final Decree under execution by alleging that the Petitioners are calculating the annual increase on compound basis which is unlawful since there is no such stipulation in the Decree or the law. It was maintained that maintenance allowance once decreed by the Court remains constant and static which merely increases by 10% each year in terms of Section 17-A(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (the "Act"). Reliance was placed on cases titled, "Mir Muhammad Khan and 2 others v. Haider and others" (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 233); "Muhammad Anwar v. Bashir Ahmad and another" (2014 CLC 1819); and "Kashif Mahmood v. Additional District Judge and others" (2022 MLD 1762). The said application was resisted by the Petitioners on the ground that maintenance allowance fixed by Court is enhanced by 10% after first year and increase thereupon in the second year is applicable on the cumulative amount of preceding year, as such, 10% annual enhancement is leviable on compound basis as contemplated by Section 17-A(3) of the Act. The Courts below by relying upon the case of Kashif Mahmood (supra) opined that rate of annual increment in each year is to be calculated on base value of the maintenance allowance fixed by the Court and not on the enhanced maintenance amount of previous year arrived at by adding annual increment. Hence, this Petition.
4. During proceedings of this case, it transpired that two separate single Benches of this Court in cases titled, "Mian Muhammad Latif v. Additional District Judge and others" (W. P. No. 77557/2022) decided on 07.12.2022; and "Sohaib Umar Ilyas v. Judge Family Court and others" (W. P. No. 15888/2021) decided on 02.02.2023 expressed the view that annual increase in maintenance allowance is required to be calculated on compound basis in terms of Section 17-A(3) of the Act in contrast to the view taken by another learned Single Bench of this Court in the case of Kashif Mahmood (supra). Accordingly, constitution of a larger Bench was recommended vide order dated 30.04.2024, whereafter, the matter was referred to this Bench. Notice was issued on 16.05.2024 to the Attorney General of Pakistan and Advocate General of Punjab under Order XXVII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the "C.P.C.") seeking assistance to determine the following question:-
Whether the statutory annual increase of 10% in maintenance allowance ordained in Section 17-A(3) of the Act will apply on compoundable or non-compoundable basis?
5. Learned counsel for the Petitioners and learned Federal Law Officer favored compound calculation of annual increase on the decreed amount of maintenance. It was submitted that Section 17-A of the Act is required to be interpreted in the context of overall scheme of law enshrined in the Act which is not only beneficial in nature but also emphasizes the importance of maintenance allowance as the only source of subsistence of women and children. The provision caters for changed circumstances in terms of their needs and protects them against inflation and price hike. The mandatory annual increase of 10% is applicable at a minimum to all maintenance decrees although the Court is vested with discretion to prescribe a higher rate. There is no specific stipulation therein regarding calculation of annual enhancement on base or aggregate value of maintenance. However, the intent and import of the said provision is that annual increase of each year is required to be imposed on the cumulative or aggregate amount of maintenance allowance of the previous year. This is an obvious conclusion since the Act, in general, and Section 17-A(3) thereof, in particular, is a beneficial legislation aimed to hedge inflation and devaluation of currency. Women and children are oppressed class who are entitled to beneficial interpretation of law which is the intent of legislature in line with the directive Principles of Policy enunciated under Articles 34, 35 and 37 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the "Constitution") as emphasized by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled, "Saif-ur-Rehman v. Additional District Judge, Toba Tek Singh and 2 others" (2018 SCMR 1885).
6. Learned counsels further submitted that annual rent increments under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (the "Rent Act") as a widely accepted general practice are calculated on compound basis reflecting real value of money and property appreciation. The Courts in foreign jurisdictions employ compound or index-linked payments in long-term financial obligations, such as maintenance, to ensure fairness and alignment with inflation. In case titled, "Sempra Metals Limited (formerly Metallgesellschaft Limited v. Her Majesty's Commissioners of Inland Revenue and another", (2007 UKHL 34), the House of Lords ruled in favor of compound interest on the ground that it accurately reflects the true value of money over time. In contrast, it was noted that flat interest rates fail to account for real time inflation and time value of money. Although a custodial parent can institute a subsequent suit or approach the Executing Court by filing an application for enhancement in maintenance allowance in changed circumstances yet the purpose of introducing Section 17-A(3) of the Act is to protect the decree holder against annual real-time inflation, thus reducing the occasions to frequently resort to Court seeking enhancement in maintenance on the ground of increase in inflation and growing needs of minors. Therefore, by implementing automatic compound increases, the Court can streamline adjustments in maintenance in a manner that reduces the need for frequent litigation. This will save costs, time, resources and emotional stress for decree holders. Such an interpretation would bring certainty in fixation of maintenance allowance and would lead to financial stability for the decree holders to meet their evolving needs. Therefore, the ambiguity in Section 17-A(3) of the Act regarding flat versus compound annual increase should be resolved in favor of compound calculations which is a more equitable and efficient approach of adjusting maintenance over time against inflationary trends and growing needs.
7. Learned Counsel for the Respondent and Provincial Law Officer advanced arguments in support of annual increase in maintenance on non-compoundable or linear basis. It was stated that the Decree under execution was passed under Section 17-A(2) of the Act which provides for 10% annual increase and like all family decrees, is required to be executed under Section 13 thereof. Hence, Section 17-A(3) of the Act is not attracted as the Decree was passed under Section 17-A(2) of the Act. The former comes into play only when the Family Court fails to prescribe annual increase. Without prejudice to the above, the intention of legislature to induct Section 17-A(3) in the Act is express and clear that if the Family Court does not prescribe the annual increment, the 'maintenance fixed by the Court' would automatically increase by 10% each year, thus providing for in-built hedging against inflation. The Family Court is empowered to determine the quantum of maintenance allowance which remains fixed till legal entitlement and the said amount annually increases by 10% thereon, thereby, adequately providing for statutory cushion against price hike and inflation. In case, the intention of legislature was to provide for compound annal increase, it could have been expressly specified therein. As such, the conspicuous and conscious omission cannot be substituted by the Court. Islamic jurisprudence derived from the Holy Quran as well as case law on the subject emphasize the importance to strike a balance between the responsibility to pay maintenance to wife and children on the one hand and the financial capacity to pay the same on the other hand. Therefore, the provision of Section 17-A(3) of the Act must be interpreted in a manner to maintain a balance and proportionality between competing rights. Hence, the levy of 10% annual increase on compound amount would lead to injustice.
8. It was further contended that the Rent Act does not provide for automatic 10% compound increase, rather, it is always with the mutual consent of landlord and tenant based on lease agreement. Hence, annual increase in rent does not take effect by operation of any law in contrast to Section 17-A(3) of the Act. As such, the former cannot be equated with the latter. Moreover, the comparative example is misconceived inasmuch as the landlord offers the demised premises against a definite rent which is fixed with the mutual consent of landlord and tenant but in contrast, payment of maintenance allowance is a personal right rooted in love and affection of a person towards his wife and children. Hence, the concept of increase in rent on compound basis cannot be employed in interpretation of Section 17-A(3) of the Act. Therefore, the moot point under consideration has been rightly determined in the case of Kashif Mahmood (supra) particularly, when in the cases of Mian Muhammad Latif and Sohaib Umar Ilyas (supra), no definitive finding on the question of law was rendered. This is particularly so when in cases titled, "Muhammad Iqbal v. Mst. Nasreen Akhtar" (2012 CLC 1407) and "Muhammad Akram v. Additional District Judge and others" (PLD 2008 Lahore 560), the Court opined that the principle of res judicata embodied in the C.P.C. is not a bar to institute a fresh suit for enhancement in maintenance allowance due to changed circumstances. Therefore, if the 10% automatic increase on non-compound basis as per Section 17-A(3) of the Act is found inadequate in any particular case, the option to institute a fresh suit for enhancement in maintenance allowance can be exercised. Hence, the 10% increase in maintenance on compound basis would be highly unjustified as the same is not the intent and import of Section 17-A(3) of the Act.
9. Arguments heard. Record perused.
10. The relevant part of modified final Decree qua maintenance amount subject of Objection Petition with respect to calculation of annual increase of 10% reads as under:
"The plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 being minor children of the defendant are held entitled to recover maintenance allowance from the defendant @ Rs. 150,000/- each per month from the date of institution of suit till their legal entitlement with 10% annual increment."
11. The Decree thus contemplates payment of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150,000/- for each minor from the date of institution of suit i.e. 29.03.2014 with 10% annual increase. It did not specify if the annual increase shall take effect on compound or non-compound basis, thus triggering the moot question framed for determination. As the pro and contra arguments revolve around interpretation of Sections 13 and 17-A of the Act, therefore, it would be advantageous to reproduce the same as under:
"13. Enforcement of decrees.- (1) The Family Court shall pass a decree in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and shall enter its particulars in the prescribed register.
(2) If any money is paid or any property is delivered in the presence of the Family Court, in satisfaction of the decree, it shall enter the fact of payment or the delivery of property, as the case may be, in the aforesaid register.
(3) Where a decree relates to the payment of money and the decretal amount is not paid within time specified by the Court not exceeding thirty days, the same shall, if the Court so directs be recovered as arrears of land revenue, and on recovery shall be paid to the decree-holder.
(4) The decree shall be executed by the Court, passing it or by such other Civil Court as the District Judge may, by special or general order, direct.
(5) A Family Court may, if it so deems fit, direct that any money to be paid under a decree passed by it be paid in such installments as it deems fit.
17A. Suit for maintenance.- (1) In a suit for maintenance, the Family Court shall, on the date of the first appearance of the defendant, fix interim monthly maintenance for wife or a child and if the defendant fails to pay the maintenance by fourteen day of each month, the defence of the defendant shall stand struck off and the Family Court shall decree the suit for maintenance on the basis of averments in the plaint and other supporting documents on record of the case.
(2) In a decree for maintenance, the Family Court may:
(a) fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint due to afflux of time or any other relevant circumstances; and
(b) prescribe the annual increase in the maintenance.
(3) If the Family Court does not prescribe the annual increase in the maintenance, the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten percent each year.
(4) For purposes of fixing the maintenance, the Family Court may summon the relevant documentary evidence from any organization, body or authority to determine the estate and resources of the defendant."
12. Section 12(2) of the Act empowers the Family Court to pronounce its judgment and pass the decree after conclusion of trial. Section 13 of the Act is another general provision of law which relates to the enforcement of all decrees passed under the Act. It obligates the Family Court to pass a decree in the prescribed form and manner. It also mandates to record and maintain necessary particulars qua payments and delivery of property. This is imperative since family decrees by their very nature involve payment of money on monthly basis and receipt of multiple dowry articles. Further provisions are made in the Family Courts Rules, 1965 including prescribing of uniform Forms for recording of decrees and maintaining of the Register of Receipts and Disbursements. Section 13 of the Act also empowers the Executing Court to direct recovery of unpaid amounts as arrears of land revenue including the power to effect recovery of money in installments to ensure execution of decrees.
13. In contrast, Section 17-A of the Act is a specific provision dealing with suit for maintenance as a special category of family claims. Section 17-A of the Act in its present form was introduced in the Act through the Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 (XI of 2015) dated 18.03.2015. It places maintenance of wife and children at a higher pedestal than other family claims because maintenance allowance serves as a means of subsistence and survival for them, intrinsically connected to their right to life guaranteed under Articles 4 and 9 of the Constitution. Section 17-A(1) provides for fixation of monthly interim maintenance allowance for wife or a child on the date of the first appearance of the defendant and failure of the defendant to pay the same by fourteenth day of each month entails penal consequences in terms of striking off his defence, thereby, paving the way for passing of decree for maintenance on the basis of averments in the plaint and other supporting documents on record of the case. Section 17-A(2) of the Act postulates that in a decree of maintenance, the Family Court may fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint due to afflux of time or any other relevant circumstances and prescribe the annual increase in the maintenance. It is evident that necessary discretion has been vested in the Family Court to cater for the time consumed in decision of the suit for maintenance and address other relevant circumstances in order to ensure that an adequate quantum of maintenance is fixed. This provision also confers discretionary powers on the Family Court to prescribe an annual increase in maintenance to cater for future needs and requirements of plaintiffs as well as depreciation in the value of currency in terms of inflation. No caveat is attached to the power of the Family Court to prescribe such annual increase in maintenance on compound or non-compound basis and the Family Court is free to pass a reasonable decree in this behalf depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.
14. In the instant case, however, the Court did not specify if annul increase would apply on compoundable or non-compoundable basis. In such situations, the operation of Section 17-A(3) of the Act comes into play. This provision stresses the importance and requirement of prescribing an annual increase in the maintenance. The provision is couched in negative covenant and provides that if the Family Court does not prescribe annual increase in the maintenance, the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of 10% each year. At the same time, it prescribes a statutory threshold or standard that was considered appropriate by the legislature in case, the Court does not specify the annual increase itself depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Decree under execution as well as Section 17-A(3) of the Act does not specifically state if the annual increase would be realized on compoundable or non-compoundable basis. Therefore, the argument that Section 17-A(3) of the Act has no relevance as Decree under execution was passed under Section 17-A(2) of the Act requiring execution under Section 13 thereof, is misconceived for the reason that a simple decree not providing for calculation of annual increase in maintenance on compoundable or non-compoundable basis requires interpretation of Section 17-A(3) of the Act which is vividly promulgated to supply omissions in the decrees for maintenance. This is particularly so when it is not the case of the Respondent that the Decree under execution required maintenance to be calculated on non-compound basis. Since the Decree in this respect is silent and Section 17-A(3) of the Act is ambiguous, therefore, interpretation of the latter is imperative to give effect to the Decree according to the mandate of Section 17-A(3) of the Act. Needless to reiterate that Section 13 of the Act only deals with the enforcement of decrees and has no relevance qua determination of annual increase on decreed amount of maintenance.
15. There is no cavil to the proposition that Islamic jurisprudence as interpreted by superior Courts unequivocally hold that maintenance is to be determined on equitable terms by balancing competing interests, as such, the financial status, income, resources and estate of a person liable to pay maintenance is required to be proportionally adjusted against the needs and requirements of wife and children while fixing the quantum of maintenance. Nevertheless, questions qua entitlement to maintenance as well as quantum of maintenance are settled on the basis of facts and evidence from case-to-case basis and the same exercise was undertaken in the instant case. However, the grant of annual increase on the quantum of decreed maintenance and its calculation on compound or non-compound basis is altogether a different question. The rationale to provide annual increase in maintenance fixed by the Court is rooted in hedging inflation and providing for anticipated future yet inevitable needs and requirements of wife and children. There is no doubt that quantum of maintenance once fixed after trial cannot remain stagnant. There may be a host of changed circumstances, such as, inflation, increased cost of existing needs or new requirements in wake of growing age when there is a need for revising the determined maintenance by the Court. It is in this context that the Courts in the cases of Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Akram (supra) held that the principle of res judicata in the C.P.C. is not applicable to a subsequent suit for enhancement in maintenance based on changed circumstances since such circumstances provide a fresh cause of action. In fact, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled "Lt. Col. Naseer Malik v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others" (2016 SCMR 1821) went as far as to hold that an application under Section 151 of the C.P.C. seeking enhancement in maintenance is maintainable in lieu of instituting a separate subsequent suit in the following words:-
"6 .Once a decree by the Family Court in a suit for maintenance is granted thereunder, if the granted rate for per month allowance is insufficient and inadequate, in that case, according to scheme of law, institution of fresh suit is not necessary rather the Family Court may entertain any such application and if necessary make alteration in the rate of maintenance allowance."
16. The right to institute a subsequent suit or filing of an application for enhancement in maintenance allowance, however, is always cumbersome entailing costs, resources and time, thus burdening the wife and children to frequently resort to Court. It is ostensibly clear that by introducing substituted Section 17-A in the Act, the legislature intended to stipulate a comprehensive arrangement with respect to maintenance, thus empowering the Court to fix interim monthly maintenance, pass a decree upon failure of the defendant to pay the same, fix maintenance higher than prayed amount due to afflux of time or upon consideration of relevant circumstances and prescribe annual increase. To top it all, Section 17-A(3) of the Act mandated automatic 10% annual enhancement by operation of law, if the Court failed to prescribe annual increase. This arrangement was put in place to reduce the occasions for wife and children to have frequent recourse to Court for enhancement in maintenance, thus accounting for inflation, rising cost of living and evolving requirements of wife and children.
17. The legislature while promulgating Section 17-A(3) of the Act did not specifically provide for compound or non-compound calculation of prescribed automatic annual increase. In financial transactions, both compound and non-compound standards are employed in our jurisprudence. Section 34(1) of the C.P.C. confers discretionary powers upon the Court to grant costs subject to such conditions and limitations, as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of law for the time being in force. Section 34(3) of the C.P.C. further ordains that the Court may give interest on costs at any rate not exceeding six per cent, per annum, and such interest shall be added to the costs and shall be recoverable as such." The Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled, "Najm Koreshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank Now Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Lahore and others" (2015 SCMR 1461), while interpreting Section 34 of the C.P.C. recognized the power of the Court to grant simple or compound interest and opined that interest pendente lite and further interest are both discretionary reliefs, therefore, unless expressly ordered in a decree, such interest accrues on principal amount adjudged and not on the aggregate of that amount with accumulated interest.
18. In contrast, Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 expressly provides for compound interest on adjudged compensation at the rate of eight percent from the date of possession of acquired property. Similarly, Section 5-A(1) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (since repealed) proclaimed that "the rent of a non-residential building shall stand automatically increased at the end of every three years of its tenancy by twenty-five percent of the rent already being paid by the tenant" thus, stipulating enhancement in rent on the immediately preceding or prevalent rent. However, Section 6(1)(c) of the Rent Act in vogue leaves the matters qua rate of rent, rate of enhancement due date and mode of payment of rent to the mutual consent of the landlord and the tenant to be determined through the tenancy agreement. Notwithstanding the same, practically and as a generally accepted trade practice, enhancement in rent is actualized on the last preceding rent and not on the original amount of rent fixed. It, therefore, follows that both compound and non-compound calculations are part of our jurisprudence. At times, it is expressly provided by law or otherwise it is left at the discretion of the Court depending upon the facts and circumstances of the transaction. Therefore, the ambiguity in Section 17-A(3) of the Act can be best resolved by analyzing the scheme of law enshrined in the Act in the context of nature of maintenance claim based on the guiding principles of fairness, equity and justice.
19. The Act has been promulgated for the establishment of Family Courts for expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage, family affairs and other matter connected therewith. In furtherance of the stated objective, a convenient and flexible procedure has been prescribed in the Act for time bound adjudication of a family suit. Strict rules of procedure are dispensed with as Section 17(1) of the Act postulates that save as otherwise expressly provided by or under the Act, the provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and the C.P.C., except Sections 10 and 11 thereof, shall not apply to proceedings before any Family Court in respect of Part I of Schedule to the Act. The superior Courts in view of the intent, purpose and objective of the Act have consistently adopted a liberal and beneficial approach in interpretation of various provisions of the Act. In Saif-ur-Rehman's case (supra), the Supreme Court of Pakistan while interpreting Section 14(2) of the Act underscored the need of purposive interpretation of the Act in the following words:
"10. .It is now settled law that a purposive rather than a literal approach to interpretation is to be adopted while interpreting Statutes. An interpretation which advances the purpose of the Act is to be preferred rather than an interpretation which defeats its objects. Reference, in this behalf, may be made to the judgments reported as Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and others v. M/s. Noori Trading Corporation (Private) Limited and 14 others (1992 SCMR 710) and Hudabiya Engineering (Pvt.) Limited v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan and 6 others (PLD 1998 Lahore 90).
11. The second aspect of the Family Courts Act, 1964 and the Rules framed thereunder as amended from time to time would reveal its gender sensitivity. A glance at Section 3 of the Act of 1964 reveals that women Judges are specifically catered for. The residence of the wife can be a determining factor for conferring territorial jurisdiction, in certain Suits as is evident from the provisions of Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965. There can be no escape from the fact that the tone and tenor of the Family Courts Act, 1964 and the Rules framed thereunder are beneficial in nature. It is an equally settled law that beneficial provisions in a Statute must be interpreted liberally in a manner so that the benefit conferred is advanced rather than frustrated or subverted. Reference, in this behalf, may be made to the judgments of this Court reported as Lahore Development Authority through D.G., Lahore and another v. Abdul Shafique and others (PLD 2000 SC 207) and Pakistan Engineering Co. Limited, Lahore through Managing Director v. Fazal Beg and 2 others (1992 SCMR 2166)."
12. The preamble of the Constitution highlights the importance of social justice and ordains that adequate provision shall be made to safeguard legitimate interests of depressed classes. The right to life is protected under Articles 4 and 9 of the Constitution. The right of maintenance of wife and children is undoubtedly an inseparable part of right to life as they are dependent on maintenance for their very survival in terms of their basic needs and requirements with respect to food, clothing, shelter, schooling and healthcare. The right to receive maintenance is a legal right granted by law and enforceable through the Court. It is not merely a personal right based on love and affection of a person towards his wife and children. Maintenance must be received by those held entitled to receive the same with dignity in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution. Even the non-discrimination clause embodied in Article 25 of the Constitution proclaiming equal protection of law for all citizens, creates a conscious and conspicuous exception by proclaiming that the State is not prevented from making any special provision for the protection of women and children. The directive Principles of Policy contained in Articles 34, 35 and 37 of the Constitution particularly call upon the State to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life; protect marriage, the family, the mother and the child; promote special care, educational and economic interests of backward classes; and ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice.
13. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that Section 17-A(3) of the Act is a beneficial, remedial or curative provision which calls for liberal interpretation. It is triggered when the Court omits to prescribe annual increase in maintenance or does not expressly specify if annual increase so prescribed will take effect on compound or non-compound basis while passing a decree under Section 17-A(2) read with Section 12(2) of the Act. If the legislature has not specifically provided for compound calculation in Section 17-A(3) of the Act, it is equally true that the legislature has also not provided otherwise. The expression "the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten percent each year" ordinarily imply that quantum of maintenance fixed under a decree does not remain static or constant but is a variable figure which is meant to increase after each year. After increase of 10% at the end of first year, a new quantum of maintenance comes in field and the amount gets merged or amalgamated in the quantum of maintenance fixed by Court. The process is repeated after each year till the legal entitlement of wife or children under the decree. Therefore, annual increase of each year is required to be calculated on the merged amount of last preceding year for the reason that 10% increase is intrinsically linked with the principal amount and is an inseparable part of the decree. If the rent is traditionally increased with reference to the last prevailing rent, there is no reason why maintenance should not be increased based on the same principle. The compound calculation of maintenance not only caters for inflation and rising cost of living but also allows to account for growing needs and requirements of wife and children, thus, reducing the occasions to resort to Court seeking enhancement in maintenance allowance. Hence, it is concluded that when a decree of maintenance does not prescribe an annual increase or is silent qua calculation of prescribed annual enhancement on principal or aggregate amount of maintenance, Section 17-A(3) of the Act will come into operation and the Executing Court shall calculate the due decreed amount on compound basis.
14. Before parting, we note that in the case of Kashif Mahmood (supra), it has been aptly held that Section 17-A(3) of the Act shall apply to all pending proceedings from the date of its promulgation and the finding contained therein to this extent is fully endorsed.
15. In view of the above, this Petition is allowed; the impugned Order and Judgment dated 13.09.2023 and 31.10.2023 are set aside; and consequently, the Objection Petition of the Respondent stand dismissed. The Executing Court is directed to enforce the Decree under execution in accordance with law. However, it is clarified that this Judgment will only apply to pending proceedings and shall not affect the past and closed proceedings which have attained finality.
16. The Registrar of this Court is directed to transmit a copy of this Judgment to all District Judges of the Province of Punjab for its circulation to all Family Courts within the jurisdiction of respective Districts for information. A copy of this Judgment shall also be sent to Secretary Law, Government of the Punjab for consideration of initiation of appropriate amendment in the Act to bring clarity in Section 17-A of the Act in the manner deemed appropriate by the Legislature.

تیس سال سے زیادہ پرانے دستاویز میں صداقت کا مفروضہ ہونے کا دعوی کیا گیا ہے لیکن اس مفروضے کی سچائی پر سوال اٹھانے والی فریق ہمیشہ تردید کرتی ہے ۔ درحقیقت کسی.........

 تیس سال سے زیادہ پرانے دستاویز میں صداقت کا مفروضہ ہونے کا دعوی کیا گیا ہے لیکن اس مفروضے کی سچائی پر سوال اٹھانے والی فریق ہمیشہ تردید کرتی ہے ۔ درحقیقت کسی دستاویز کی غیر مشکوک نوعیت ، اس کی مناسب تحویل اور دیگر حالات اس پر عمل درآمد کے مفروضے کو بڑھانے کی بنیاد ہیں ، تاہم ، اگر پہلی نظر میں ، اس پر عمل درآمد اور مناسب تحویل کا تنازعہ اٹھایا جاتا ہے تو یہ عدالت کا فرض بن جاتا ہے کہ وہ اس کی صداقت کے سوال کا تعین کرے ۔ اس طرح یہ مفروضہ صوابدیدی ہے اور اللہ دتا بمقابلہ ایمنا بی بی (2011 ایس سی ایم آر 1483) کے معاملے کے لحاظ سے لازمی نہیں ہے ۔ مذکورہ بالا کے تابع ، تیس سال پرانی دستاویز کے سلسلے میں حکم قانون 1984 کے تحت دستیاب دستاویز کی درستگی کا مفروضہ صرف ایک خاص شخص کی تحریر میں دستخط اور اس کے ہر دوسرے حصے کے حوالے سے ہے ۔ باقی مواد جو تحریر میں نہیں ہیں پھر ثبوت کا موضوع بن جائیں گے ۔ اس معاملے کا دوسرا پہلو جو قانون کے تقاضے کو پورا کرتا ہے وہ یہ ہے کہ اس موضوع کی دستاویز کو قانون شہادت آرڈر ، 1984 کے آرٹیکل 100 کے مطابق مناسب تحویل میں رکھنے والے شخص کے ذریعہ پیش کیا جانا چاہئے ۔ "مناسب تحویل" سے تیس سال پرانی یا ثابت شدہ دستاویز پیش کرنا شرط کی مثال تھی ؛ جب تک کہ اس طرح کی شرط پوری نہ ہو جائے ، دستخط ، مواد یا اس طرح کے دستاویز کے کسی حصے کے بارے میں کوئی مفروضہ پیدا نہیں ہوگا جس پر باضابطہ طور پر عمل درآمد/تصدیق کی جائے ۔ درحقیقت موضوعاتی دستاویز اسکرائبر نے پیش کی تھی جس کے پاس موجودہ تنازعہ کے مقاصد کے لیے مناسب تحویل نہیں ہے ۔

The dower deed which is more than thirty years old claimed to have presumption of genuineness but that presumption is always rebuttable by the party questioning genuineness thereof. Indeed the unsuspicious character of a document, its proper custody and other circumstances are the foundation to raise presumption of its execution, however, if prima-facie, the dispute to its execution and proper custody is raised then it becomes the duty of the court to determine the question of its genuineness. The presumption is thus discretionary and not mandatory in terms of the case of Allah Ditta v. Aimna Bibi (2011 SCMR 1483). The presumption of correctness of a document available under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 in respect of thirty years old document, subject to above, is only in respect of a signature and every other part thereof in handwriting of a particular person. Rest of the contents which are not in the handwriting would then become the subject matter of proof. The other aspect of the matter which germane to the requirement of law is that the subject document should be produced by person having proper custody in terms of Article 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Production of document purported or proved to be thirty years old from “proper custody” was the condition precedent; until and unless such condition is met, no presumption as to the signature, contents or any part of such document to be duly executed/attested, would arise. Indeed the subject document was produced by scriber who, for the purposes of the present controversy does not have a proper custody.

C.A.156-P/2013
Muhammad Israr v. Jehanzeb & others
Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui
24-02-2025
03-03-2025






دیکھ بھال ، موخر کرایہ ، اور جہیز کے سامان کی وصولی کے لیے سوٹ - - شادی کے فورا بعد بیوی کو نکال دیا گیا-- سابقہ شادیوں کو چھپانا --- اس کے بعد غیر قانونی ............

 2026 YLR 1338

دیکھ بھال ، موخر کرایہ ، اور جہیز کے سامان کی وصولی کے لیے سوٹ - - شادی کے فورا بعد بیوی کو نکال دیا گیا-- سابقہ شادیوں کو چھپانا --- اس کے بعد غیر قانونی کثرت ازدواج --- جائز موجودہ شادی---علیحدگی کا اثر ؛ اگر کوئی ہو-- - درخواست گزار (بیوی) نے دیکھ بھال ، موخر کرایہ اور جہیز کے سامان کی وصولی کے لیے مقدمہ دائر کیا ، جس کا جزوی حکم فیملی کورٹ نے دیا تھا لیکن اپیلٹ کورٹ نے دیکھ بھال اور کرایہ سے انکار اور جہیز کی قیمت کو کم کرکے اس میں ترمیم کی تھی ۔ --تنازعہ سابقہ شادیوں کو چھپانے ، غیر قانونی کثرت ازدواج ، اور شادی کے فورا بعد درخواست گزار کو ملک بدر کرنے کے الزامات سے پیدا ہوا ۔ --ہائی کورٹ کے سامنے تعین کے لیے بنیادی مسئلہ یہ تھا کہ کیا درخواست گزار ، ثابت شدہ طلاق کی عدم موجودگی میں لیکن غیر قانونی کثرت ازدواج اور جبری علیحدگی کی موجودگی میں ، دیکھ بھال ، موخر کرایہ کی فوری ادائیگی ، اور جہیز کی اشیاء کی مکمل وصولی کا حقدار تھا ؟ --- ہولڈ: مدعا علیہ کی طرف سے دوسری شادی کا انکشاف نہ کرنے اور اس کے بعد چوتھی شادی کرنے کی حقیقت ریکارڈ پر قائم کی گئی تھی --- اس نے درخواست گزار کو مدعا علیہ کے ساتھ چھپانے اور دھوکہ دہی کا معاملہ اٹھانے کا ایک قانونی بہانہ فراہم کیا ۔ --ان حالات میں ، مدعا علیہ کی طرف سے اس کے اخراج کو مدعا علیہ کی طرف سے پیش کردہ کسی ٹھوس ثبوت کی عدم موجودگی میں اس سے منسوب نہیں کیا جا سکتا تھا تاکہ یہ ثابت ہو سکے کہ درخواست گزار نے بغیر کسی جائز وجہ کے گھر چھوڑ دیا ہے---لہذا ، بطور شوہر مدعا علیہ کی اپنی بیوی کو برقرار رکھنے کی قانونی اور اخلاقی ذمہ داری تھی ۔ اس قائم شدہ حقیقت کی روشنی میں کہ درخواست گزار شادی کے ایک ماہ کے اندر مدعا علیہ سے الگ ہو گیا تھا اور اس کے بعد سے الگ رہ رہا تھا اور اس بات کا کوئی قابل اعتماد ثبوت نہیں تھا کہ اس طرح کی علیحدگی اس کی اپنی بدانتظامی یا نافرمانی کی وجہ سے تھی ، وہ قانونی طور پر دیکھ بھال الاؤنس حاصل کرنے کی حقدار تھی ۔ --- اس طرح ، وہ ایک لاکھ روپے میں دیکھ بھال الاؤنس حاصل کرنے کی حقدار تھی ۔ 15, 000/- ہر ماہ w.e.f. 27.12.2021 i.e. شادی کی تاریخ کے ایک ماہ بعد اس کی قانونی استحقاق تک 10% سالانہ اضافے کے ساتھ چونکہ مدعا علیہ نے لازمی قانونی تقاضے کو پورا کیے بغیر شادی کا معاہدہ کیا تھا ، اس لیے فریقین کے درمیان شادی کے وجود سے قطع نظر ، پورے موخر ڈیوور کی ادائیگی کی ذمہ داری واجب الادا ہو گئی تھی ۔ جہیز کی اشیا کو مکمل طور پر ، خاندانی عدالت نے عدالتی احتیاط کا استعمال کیا اور صرف ان جہیز کی اشیا کو ایوارڈ دیا جو تسلی بخش طور پر قائم کی گئی تھیں ، یا متبادل طور پر ، ان کی تخمینی قیمت 2 لاکھ روپے تھی ۔ 1, 000,500/----درخواست گزار کو بحالی الاؤنس کی وصولی کا حقدار قرار دیا گیا تھا ۔ 15, 000/- ہر ماہ 27.12.2021 سے 10% سالانہ اضافے کے ساتھ جب تک کہ اس کی قانونی استحقاق اور موخر ڈوور Rs. 1, 000,000/- ؛ اسے خاندانی عدالت کے حکم کے مطابق جہیز کے سامان کی وصولی کا بھی حق حاصل تھا

Suit for recovery of maintenance, deferred dower, and dowry articles--- Wife expelled shortly after marriage --- Concealment of prior marriages --- Subsequent unlawful polygamy --- Valid subsisting marriage --- Effect of separation; if any --- Petitioner (wife) filed a suit for recovery of maintenance, deferred dower and dowry articles, which was partially decreed by the Family Court but modified by the Appellate Court by denying maintenance and dower and reducing dowry value --- The dispute arose from allegations of concealment of prior marriages, unlawful polygamy, and expulsion of the petitioner shortly after marriage --- The core issue for determination before the High Court was whether the petitioner, in absence of proven divorce but in presence of unlawful polygamy and forced separation, was entitled to maintenance, immediate payment of deferred dower, and full recovery of dowry articles?---Held: The fact of non-disclosure of second marriage and subsequently contracting fourth marriage by the respondent was established on the record --- This provided a lawful excuse to the petitioner to raise the issue of concealment and cheating with the respondent --- Under these circumstances, her expulsion by the respondent could not be attributed to her in absence of any cogent evidence produced by the respondent to establish that the petitioner left the house without lawful cause --- Hence, the respondent as husband had the legal and moral obligation to maintain his wife --- In light of the established fact that the petitioner was separated from the respondent within one month of the marriage and had since been residing apart and there being no convincing proof that such separation was due to her own misconduct or disobedience, she was legally entitled to receive maintenance allowance --- As such, she was entitled to receive maintenance allowance @ Rs. 15,000/- per month w.e.f. 27.12.2021 i.e. one month after the date of marriage till her legal entitlement with 10% annual increase --- Since the respondent contracted marriage without fulfilling the mandatory legal requirement, the liability to pay the entire deferred dower had become due, irrespective of the subsistence of the marriage between the parties --- Instead of allowing the claim viz. dowry articles in its entirety, the Family Court rightly exercised judicial caution and awarded only those dowry articles which were satisfactorily established, or in the alternative, their assessed depreciated value amounting to Rs. 1,000,500/- --- Petitioner was held entitled to recover maintenance allowance @ Rs. 15,000/- per month since 27.12.2021 with 10% annual increase till her legal entitlement and deferred dower Rs. 1,000,000/-; she was also held entitled to recover her dowry articles as decreed by the Family Court

تیس سال سے زیادہ پرانے دستاویز میں صداقت کا مفروضہ ہونے کا دعوی کیا گیا ہے لیکن اس مفروضے کی سچائی پر سوال اٹھانے والی فریق ہمیشہ تردید کرتی ہے ۔ درحقیقت کسی دستاویز کی........

 2025 SCMR 841

تیس سال سے زیادہ پرانے دستاویز میں صداقت کا مفروضہ ہونے کا دعوی کیا گیا ہے لیکن اس مفروضے کی سچائی پر سوال اٹھانے والی فریق ہمیشہ تردید کرتی ہے ۔ درحقیقت کسی دستاویز کی غیر مشکوک نوعیت ، اس کی مناسب تحویل اور دیگر حالات اس پر عمل درآمد کے مفروضے کو بڑھانے کی بنیاد ہیں ، تاہم ، اگر پہلی نظر میں ، اس پر عمل درآمد اور مناسب تحویل کا تنازعہ اٹھایا جاتا ہے تو یہ عدالت کا فرض بن جاتا ہے کہ وہ اس کی صداقت کے سوال کا تعین کرے ۔ اس طرح یہ مفروضہ صوابدیدی ہے اور اللہ دتا بمقابلہ ایمنا بی بی (2011 ایس سی ایم آر 1483) کے معاملے کے لحاظ سے لازمی نہیں ہے ۔ مذکورہ بالا کے تابع ، تیس سال پرانی دستاویز کے سلسلے میں حکم قانون 1984 کے تحت دستیاب دستاویز کی درستگی کا مفروضہ صرف ایک خاص شخص کی تحریر میں دستخط اور اس کے ہر دوسرے حصے کے حوالے سے ہے ۔ باقی مواد جو تحریر میں نہیں ہیں پھر ثبوت کا موضوع بن جائیں گے ۔ اس معاملے کا دوسرا پہلو جو قانون کے تقاضے کو پورا کرتا ہے وہ یہ ہے کہ اس موضوع کی دستاویز کو قانون شہادت آرڈر ، 1984 کے آرٹیکل 100 کے مطابق مناسب تحویل میں رکھنے والے شخص کے ذریعہ پیش کیا جانا چاہئے ۔ "مناسب تحویل" سے تیس سال پرانی یا ثابت شدہ دستاویز پیش کرنا شرط کی مثال تھی ؛ جب تک کہ اس طرح کی شرط پوری نہ ہو جائے ، دستخط ، مواد یا اس طرح کے دستاویز کے کسی حصے کے بارے میں کوئی مفروضہ پیدا نہیں ہوگا جس پر باضابطہ طور پر عمل درآمد/تصدیق کی جائے ۔ درحقیقت موضوعاتی دستاویز اسکرائبر نے پیش کی تھی جس کے پاس موجودہ تنازعہ کے مقاصد کے لیے مناسب تحویل نہیں ہے ۔
The dower deed which is more than thirty years old claimed to have presumption of genuineness but that presumption is always rebuttable by the party questioning genuineness thereof. Indeed the unsuspicious character of a document, its proper custody and other circumstances are the foundation to raise presumption of its execution, however, if prima-facie, the dispute to its execution and proper custody is raised then it becomes the duty of the court to determine the question of its genuineness. The presumption is thus discretionary and not mandatory in terms of the case of Allah Ditta v. Aimna Bibi (2011 SCMR 1483). The presumption of correctness of a document available under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 in respect of thirty years old document, subject to above, is only in respect of a signature and every other part thereof in handwriting of a particular person. Rest of the contents which are not in the handwriting would then become the subject matter of proof. The other aspect of the matter which germane to the requirement of law is that the subject document should be produced by person having proper custody in terms of Article 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Production of document purported or proved to be thirty years old from “proper custody” was the condition precedent; until and unless such condition is met, no presumption as to the signature, contents or any part of such document to be duly executed/attested, would arise. Indeed the subject document was produced by scriber who, for the purposes of the present controversy does not have a proper custody.
C.A.156-P/2013
Muhammad Israr v. Jehanzeb & others

 P L D 2025 Supreme Court 853

شادی کے دوران پیدائش قانونی حیثیت کا فیصلہ کن ثبوت - نابالغ بیٹی کا ڈی این اے ٹیسٹ - - درخواست گزار نابالغ بیٹی کی پدرانہ حیثیت قائم کرنے کے لیے ڈی این اے ٹیسٹ کروانے سے انکار پر ناراض تھا - - جواز-- نابالغ بیٹی کی پدرانہ حیثیت سے متعلق مادی سوال کا تعین درج ذیل تین عدالتوں نے مقدمے کے پہلے دور میں ریکارڈ پر دستیاب شواہد کی بنیاد پر پہلے ہی کر دیا تھا ۔ - ایک طرفہ فیصلہ اور حکم نامہ جس پر درخواست گزار نے انحصار کیا تھا وہ خاندانی مقدمے کے فیصلے کے بعد تھا اور مجاز دائرہ اختیار کی عدالت کے ذریعے منظور کیے گئے پہلے فیصلے کو کالعدم نہیں کر سکتا تھا ، جس سے نابالغ کی قانونی حیثیت قائم ہوتی ہے ۔ سپریم کورٹ نے ہائی کورٹ کے اس نتیجے میں مداخلت کرنے سے انکار کر دیا جو نابالغ بیٹی کی قانونی حیثیت کے حق میں تھا ۔ قانونی حیثیت سے منسلک شرائط مسلم قانون کے تحت دوسرے نظاموں کے مقابلے میں زیادہ سخت ہیں لیکن مسلم قانون دان اور عدالتیں بھی عام طور پر کسی بچے کو ناجائز قرار دینے میں بہت ہچکچاتے رہے ہیں ۔ - جہاں تک ممکن ہو ہر مفروضہ قانونی حیثیت کے حق میں کیا جاتا ہے - - عدالتیں بچوں کو کمینے قرار دینے سے گریزاں ہیں اور عام طور پر جب آس پاس کے حالات سے قانونی حیثیت کا اندازہ لگایا جا سکتا ہے تو انہوں نے ناجائز حیثیت کو تسلیم کرنے سے انکار کر دیا ہے-- -

Birth during marriage conclusive proof of legitimacy---DNA test of minor daughter---Petitioner was aggrieved of denial of conducting DNA test to establish paternity of minor daughter---Validity---Material question relating to paternity of the minor daughter had already been determined by three courts below in earlier round of litigation, on the basis of evidence available on the record---Ex-parte judgment and decree relied upon by petitioner was subsequent to the judgment in family suit and could not nullify earlier judgment, passed by Court of competent jurisdiction, establishing legitimacy of the minor---Supreme Court declined to interfere with the conclusion reached at by High Court which was in favour of legitimacy of minor daughter---Conditions attached to legitimacy are more strict under Muslim Law than under other systems but Muslim jurists and also the Courts have generally been very reluctant to stigmatize a child as illegitimate---As far as possible every presumption is made in favour of legitimacy---Courts are reluctant to declare a child bastard and have generally refused to admit illegitimacy when legitimacy can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances---

ORDER

---This petition for Leave to Appeal filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, has arisen out of the judgment and decree dated 11.06.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur, whereby and whereunder the Intra Court Appeal No.98 of 2022, filed against the order dated 23.06.2022 passed by the Single Judge in Chambers, dismissing the Constitution Petition No.4467 of 2022 of the petitioner, was dismissed in limine.
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner filed a Constitution Petition No.4467 of 2022 before the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur, seeking issuance of directions to the Medical Superintendent, District Head Quarter Hospital, Lodhran to decide his application, pending before him for the constitution of Medical Board to conduct DNA Test of the petitioner, as well as respondents Nos. 4 and 5 to ascertain as to whether the minor is his daughter or not. After providing right of audience to the learned counsel for the parties, the petition was dismissed, vide judgment dated 23.06.2022. Dissatisfied with the same, the petitioner filed Intra Court Appeal No.98 of 2022, which was dismissed in limine, vide judgment dated 11.06.2012. Hence this petition.
3. Heard and record perused.
4. We heard arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and examine the record with his valuable assistance. It appears from the impugned judgment that the Constitution Petition and Intra Court Appeal filed by the petitioner, seeking issuance of direction to the Medical Superintendent, District Head Quarter Hospital, Lodhran, for constitution of Medical Board to conduct DNA test of the petitioner and the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 to ascertain as to whether minor, Nibah Noor is daughter of the petitioner or not; firstly, on the ground that, before filing the Constitution Petition before the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur, the petitioner had moved an application before the Ilaqa Judicial Magistrate for conducting DNA Test of the minor, which was declined, vide order dated 02.05.2008. The said order of the Ilaqa Judicial Magistrate was not impugned before higher forum, thus the same has attained finality; secondly, that along with the reply of the petitioner, the respondent No.4 had appended copy of the consolidated judgment dated 25.09.2007 passed in family suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and maternity expenses titled "Mst. Nadia Khan and another v. Muhammad Akhtar Hussain" and the suit for restitution of conjugal rights instituted by the petitioner the learned Trial Court had framed a specific (issue No.4A) on the legitimacy of minor, Nibah Noor, and after recording findings on the said issue, the Trial Court held that the said Nibah Noor is the daughter of the petitioner in the light of the principles laid down in Islamic Law. The appeal filed against the said judgment of the Trial Court was dismissed, by the Appeal Court on 06.03.2008, thereagainst the petitioner filed Constitution Petition No.1523 of 2008, before the High Court, which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 08.10.2008 with the observation that the petitioner has failed to lead cogent evidence to prove that Nibah Noor was not his daughter and in presence of admitted Nikah between the parties presumption is that she (Nibah Noor) belongs to him.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner while arguing the case mainly relied on ex-parte judgment and decree dated 23.09.2019, passed by the Civil Judge, Kehror Pacca, whereby the suit of the petitioner denying paternity of the minor was decreed in his favour ex-parte, vide judgment and decree dated 23.09.2019 and went on to say that in the light of the said ex-parte judgment and decree the minor is not the legitimate child of the petitioner, therefore, the impugned judgments passed by the courts below are liable to be set aside. This contention of the petitioner seems to be misplaced.
6. We find from the record that the material question relating to the paternity of the minor Nibah Noor has already been determined by three courts below in the earlier round of litigation, on the basis of evidence available on the record. The ex-parte judgment and decree relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner being subsequent to the judgment in family suit referred to above, in our view, cannot nullify the earlier judgment, passed by the court of competent jurisdiction, establishing the legitimacy of the minor.
7. There is no reason made out for interference with the conclusion reached in the Constitution Petition as well as Intra Court Appeal below, which is in favour of legitimacy of the minor, Nibah Noor. In the case reported as "Shah Nawaz and another v. Nawab Khan",1 it has been ruled that:-
"It may be that conditions attached to legitimacy are more strict under Muslim Law than under other systems but the Muslim jurist-consults as also the Courts have generally been very reluctant to stigmatize a child as illegitimate and, therefore, as far as possible every presumption is made in favour of its legitimacy. Courts, therefore, have been reluctant to declare a child bastard and have generally refused to admit illegitimacy when legitimacy can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances."
8. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the instant petition, the same is hereby dismissed and leave declined. No order as to costs

فقہ جعفریہ کی طلاق کے بارے اسلام آباد ہائی کورٹ کا انتہائی معلوماتی فیصلہ (سرٹیفکیٹ)-فقہ جعفری-طلاق کے اعلان کے لیے............

 2026 C L C 1

[Islamabad]
طلاق کی تاثیر کا سرٹیفکیٹ جاری کرنا (سرٹیفکیٹ)-فقہ جعفری-طلاق کے اعلان کے لیے 2 مسلمان گواہوں کی موجودگی میں "سیگھا جات" کے اعلان کے تقاضوں کو پورا نہ کرنا-درخواست گزار/بیوی کی طرف سے قائم کی گئی دیکھ بھال کی وصولی کے مقدمے میں فیملی کورٹ کے سامنے فریقین کے درمیان سمجھوتہ کرنے کے بعد شوہر اور بیوی کے طور پر تعلقات کی بحالی - درخواست گزار نے اس بنیاد پر سرٹیفکیٹ کی منسوخی کے لیے درخواست دائر کی کہ چیئرمین آربٹریشن کونسل کی طرف سے جاری کردہ سرٹیفکیٹ غیر قانونی تھا ، کیونکہ فریقین نے اپنے تعلقات کو دوبارہ شروع کر دیا تھا ۔ حقیت-- عدالت جعفری سے تعلق رکھنے والا شخص رضاکارانہ طور پر اپنی مرضی سے خود یا باضابطہ طور پر مجاز وکیل/وکیل کے ذریعے ، کم از کم دو گواہوں کی موجودگی میں لفظی عربی الفاظ سیغازات بول کر ، آرٹ کی ذیلی شق (1) کے تقاضے کو پورا کر کے طلاق کا اعلان کر سکتا ہے ۔ 17 قانون شہادت ، 1984 ، اور شق کے مذکورہ طریقہ کار پر عمل کیے بغیر ، طلاق کی تاثیر کا سرٹیفکیٹ جاری نہیں کیا جاسکتا تھا - - تیسری طلاق پر بھی مطلوبہ سیغازات کا لفظی عربی تلفظ نہیں کیا گیا تھا ، اس طرح ، فقہ جعفری کے مطابق ، طلاق موثر نہیں تھی - - سیغازات کے اعلان کی تصدیق کیے بغیر سرٹیفکیٹ جاری کیا گیا تھا ، جو ایسے معاملات میں لازمی تقاضہ تھا جہاں فریقین کا تعلق فقہ سے تھا - - لفظ "ہو سکتا ہے" عدالت کو اجازت دیتا ہے کہ وہ اس پر "کرے گا" یا "ضرور" کے معنی میں غور کرے ۔ --اگر مسلم خاندانی قوانین آرڈیننس ، 1961 کی دفعہ 7 کی شق میں استعمال ہونے والے "ہو سکتا ہے" (آرڈیننس) کو "لازمی" نہیں بنایا گیا ہے تو یہ آرڈیننس میں 2021 کی دوسری ترمیم کے ذریعے شامل کردہ پروویسو کے پورے ارادے کو مایوس کرے گا ، اس طرح لفظ "ہو سکتا ہے" کو پورے متن کے حوالے سے سمجھا جائے گا اور مقننہ نے لفظ "ہو سکتا ہے" کو پروویسو میں استعمال کیا ہے جو کہ ایک عام قاعدے سے مستثنی ہے تاکہ ان فریقین کے حقوق کا تحفظ کیا جا سکے ، جن کا تعلق فقح جعفری سے ہے-- ہائی کورٹ نے اس دلیل سے اتفاق نہیں کیا کہ لفظ "ہو سکتا ہے" کو لازمی کے معنی کے ساتھ مجبور نہیں سمجھا جانا چاہیے ، اس طرح ، ہائی کورٹ نے ایک واضح ہدایت جاری کی ، جس میں ثالثی کونسل کے چیئرمین پر ایک سنگین فرض اور ذمہ داری عائد کی گئی ہے ، خاص طور پر عدالت عالیہ کے وضع کردہ اصولوں کی تعمیل کو یقینی بنانے کے لیے ، طلاق کے طریقہ کار کے ذریعے ۔ --ممنوع یا لازمی - - فطرت-- عام طور پر لفظ "ہو سکتا ہے" سے مراد صوابدید ہے لیکن اگر پورے سیاق و سباق پر غور کیا جائے کہ آرڈیننس کی دفعہ 17 (1) (اے) کے ذریعے فقح جعفری کے حوالے سے اس ترمیم کو شامل کرنے کے پیچھے مقننہ کا مقصد کیا تھا ، تو صوابدید کے طور پر "ہو سکتا ہے" کا پورا تصور مسترد ہو جاتا ہے ۔ کوئی مکمل طے شدہ امتحان نہیں ہے جو اس بات کا تعین کر سکے کہ آیا کوئی قانون 'صوابدیدی' ہے یا 'لازمی'-- یہ عدالت کا فرض ہے کہ وہ مقننہ کے ارادے اور قانون کے پورے دائرہ کار کو مدنظر رکھے کہ آیا یہ 'اجازت' ہے یا 'لازمی' نوعیت کا ہے ۔
لفظ "ہو سکتا ہے" ایک فعال لفظ ہونے کے ناطے - --اثر---اپنے اختیارات کو استعمال کرنے کے لیے اختیار یا عدالت کی تفریق - دائرہ کار-- لفظ "ہو سکتا ہے" ایک شق کو "قابل" بنا سکتا ہے اور یہ اتھارٹی یا عدالت کو اپنے اختیارات کا استعمال کرنے کی صوابدید دیتا ہے لیکن اسے عام طور پر "اجازت" کے طور پر سمجھا جاتا ہے نہ کہ "لازمی" - آرڈیننس کی دفعہ 7 کے التزام میں استعمال ہونے والے لفظ "ہو سکتا ہے" کو ایک قابل لفظ ہونے کی وجہ سے ایک جبر کا معنی دیا جائے گا جس کی پیروی کی جانی چاہیے ۔ - جب قانون کی کسی شق کے عام لغت کے معنی ایک مضحکہ خیز تشریح کی طرف لے جاتے ہیں اور قانون کے مقصد سے متصادم ہوتے ہیں ، تو ایسی صورت میں متن کی زبان کو مقننہ کے ارادے کو پورا کرنے کے لیے تبدیل کیا جا سکتا ہے ۔ اس طرح کی تبدیلیاں لفظ کے معنی کو تبدیل کر کے یا اسے مکمل طور پر نظر انداز کر کے کی جاتی ہیں ۔ اس طرح کی غیر معمولی تشریح کی ضرورت اس وقت ہوتی ہے جب ایک نادان مسودہ تیار کرنے والا شخص کسی لاپرواہ لفظ کا استعمال کرتا ہے جو پورے قانون کے ارادے کے خلاف جاتا ہے-اس طرح کی مثالیں درحقیقت غیر معمولی ہوتی ہیں اور عدالتیں کسی قانون میں کسی لفظ کو تبدیل کرنے یا شامل کرنے سے گریزاں ہوتی ہیں ، لیکن عدالتیں مضحکہ خیز سے بچنے کے لیے ضرورت پڑنے پر لفظی اصول سے الگ ہو سکتی ہیں ۔
Issuance of certificate of effectiveness of divorce (Certificate)---Fiqah-e-Jafria---Non-fulfillment of requirements of pronouncement of "seegha jaat" in presence of 02 Muslim witnesses for pronouncement of divorce---Resumption of relationship as husband and wife after compromise between the parties before the Family Court in a suit for recovery of maintenance instituted by the petitioner/wife---Petitioner filed application for cancellation of certificate on the ground that the certificate issued by the Chairman Arbitration Council was illegal, as the parties had resumed their relationship---Validity---Person belonging to Fiqah-e-Jafria can voluntarily with his own free will pronounce Talaq himself or through duly authorized attorney/Vakeel, uttering literal Arabic words seeghajaat in the physical presence of at least two witnesses, qualifying the requirement of Sub-Clause (1) of Art. 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, and without following the said procedure of proviso, the Talaq effectiveness certificate could not be issued---Literal Arabic pronouncement of required seeghajaat had not been pronounced even on the third Talaq, thus, as per Fiqah-e-Jafria, the Talaq was not effective---Certificate was issued without verifying the pronouncement of seeghajaat, which was a mandatory requirement in cases where parties belonged to the Fiqah-e-Jaferia---Word "may" permits the Court to consider it in sense of "shall” or "must"---If the "may" used in proviso to S. 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, (Ordinance) is not made "mandatory" it would frustrate the entire intent of the proviso added by Second Amendment of 2021 in the Ordinance, thus, the word "may" is to be considered with reference to the whole text and the legislature has used the word "may" in the proviso which is an exception of a general rule in order to protect the rights of those parties, who belong to Fiqah-e-Jafria---High Court did not agree with the contention that word "may" should not be considered as a compulsion with the meaning of "must", thus, High Court issued a clear directive, placing a serious duty and obligation upon the Chairman of the Arbitration Council, particularly in cases governed by Fiqah-e-Jafria, to adhere to the principles ensuring the effectiveness of divorce, and to adopt the procedure as future guidelines devised by High Court---
Word “may”---Permissive or mandatory---Nature---Ordinarily the word "may" refers a discretion but if the whole context is considered as to what was the purpose of the legislature behind incorporating this amendment with reference to Fiqah-e-Jafria through S. 17(1)(a) of the Ordinance, the entire concept of, "may" as to discretion stands negated---There is no absolute settled test which can determine whether a statute is 'discretionary or 'mandatory'---It is the duty of the court to take into consideration the intent of the legislature and the whole scope of the statute to determine whether it is 'permissive' or 'mandatory' in nature.
Word “may” being an enabling word---Effect---Discretion of authority or Court to exercise its powers---Scope---Word “may” makes a provision “enabling” and it gives the discretion to the authority or Court to exercise its power but it is usually construed as “permissive” and not “mandatory”---Word “may” used in proviso to S. 7 of the Ordinance being an enabling word would be given meaning of a compulsion that must be followed---When the ordinary dictionary meaning of a provision of law leads to an absurd interpretation and contradicts the purpose of the law,in such situation the language of the text can be modified to meet the intention of the legislature---Such modifications are done by changing the meaning of the word or ignoring it altogether---Such exceptional interpretation is required when a careless word is used by an ignorant draftsperson which goes against the intention of the whole statute---Such instances are indeed exceptional and courts are reluctant to substitute or add a word in a statute, but courts may depart from the literal rule when required to avoid absurdity.

JUDGMENT

---Through this writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 12.06.2024, passed by Respondent No. 1, whereby her application for cancellation of effectiveness of Talaq certificate issued by Chairman of Arbitration Council has been turned down.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that petitioner and Respondent No. 2 belong to Shia Sect and their divorce is to be regulated in accordance with Section 7 (1) of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, amended by the Act of 2021 dated 03.12.2021, whereby, procedure for Talaq of parties belong to Fiqah-e-Jafria has been explained separately. Learned counsel further contends that this section requires the pronouncement of seegah jaat talaq (Arabic expressions) to pronounce Talaq in accordance with Shia law which was not done in this case, and the certificate of effectiveness of divorce has also not been issued in accordance with the requirement laid down in Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Learned counsel further contends that the Talaq notice/divorce dated 18.12.2021, specifically refers to the words in Urdu, . Furthermore, the matter could not be concluded without establishing presence of two Muslim witnesses and fulfilling other legal requirements for effectiveness of divorce, especially in absence of the seegah jaat which were not pronounced by the respondent No.2 as a fundamental requirement in Fiqah-e-Jafria for pronouncement of Talaq. Learned counsel for petitioner further contends that the petitioner was ousted from the premises by the respondent No.2 and she went to her parents’ house and even filed a suit before the family judge Sargodha for maintenance, whereby a compromise was effected between the parties and the petitioner withdrew her suit for maintenance and started living with the respondent No.2 from 02.11.2022, till her second desertion i.e. 03.06.2023. Therefore, the certificate of effectiveness of divorce, which was issued by Chairman Arbitration Council is illegal, as the parties had resumed their relationship, though respondent No.2 has not disclosed the fact of resumption of the relationship of the parties.
3. Notice has been issued to the respondents, whereby, the Chairman Arbitration Council has submitted the original record of all the proceedings along with the report and respondent No. 2 also put appearance and opposed the maintainability of this petition primarily on the ground that a divorce certificate was issued by the Chairman, Arbitration Council after fulfilment of all the requirements. Therefore, the same could not be challenged.
4. Argument heard, record perused.
5. Perusal of record reflects that the petitioner and respondent No.2 were married to each other in accordance with Fiqah-e-Jafria on 02.02.2020, wherein, the petitioner was deserted from house as per her own stance along with the minor on 11.10.2021 and she moved to her parents' in Sargodha, where she filed a suit for maintenance on 11.01.2022. However, in the meanwhile, the respondent No.2 processed the case for issuance of effectiveness of divorce certificate and as per record of the Chairman Arbitration Council, the Arbitration Council has processed the case whereby, Arsalan Abdullah, respondent No.2, personally appeared before the Chairman Arbitration Council on 23.02.2022 and verifies the Talaq and recorded a statement that there is no chance of reconciliation between the parties. However, no one turned up on behalf of Bushra Hussain, the present petitioner, and as per record of the Arbitration Council, the matter was fixed for 16.03.2022, but only respondent No.2 put appearance and again reiterated his stance for non-reconciliation.
6. Another notice was issued to the petitioner and finally a notice has been published in newspaper for 22.04.2022. However, as per the report placed on record by the Arbitration Council the Council finally issued the certificate for effectiveness of divorce on 11.05.2024. It has also been highlighted in the report that there is no provision of law, which empowered the Chairman Arbitration Council to set aside the certificate or cancel the certificate for effectiveness of divorce.
7. While considering all these aspects, there is no cavil to the proposition that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, regulates the procedures and processes of Talaq irrespective of any particular sect. In Section 7 of Muslim Family Ordinance, 1969 an amendment, through the Act No. XXIX of 2021 by way of Muslim Family Laws (Second Amendment Act, 2021, was added whereb a proviso has been inserted which is reproduced as under:-
“Amendment of section 7, Ordinance VIII of 1961.- In the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961), in section 7,-
(i) in subsection (1), for the full-stop, occurring at the end, a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:-
"Provided that where the parties belong to Fiqah-e-Jafria,-
(a) the man may voluntarily and with his free will pronounce himself or through duly authorized attorney (Vakil) Talaq uttering in literal Arabic words (seegha) in the physical presence of at least two qualifying the requirements of clause (1) of Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 (P.O.No.1 of 1984);
(b) the pronouncement of Talaq shall be ineffective if it is done jokingly or under anger, intoxication, insanity, duress or coercion of any kind and from any corner whatsoever; and
(c) in case of dispute, with reference to paragraph (a) or (b) arising due to difference of opinion, the parties or any of the parties may have recourse to a court of competent jurisdiction or by approaching the "Mujtahid-e-Alam" and the decision of Mujtahid-e-Alam shall have a status of an Award and the same shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940).
Explanation.- The expression "Mujtahid-e-Alam" (Faqih-e-Azam) means a juris-consult/religious scholar / doctor of Shia school of thought well versed with Shariat having international repute and of such recognition. The Council of Islamic Ideology shall maintain a panel of Muitahid-e-Alam having aforesaid qualification.
[(1A) As enshrined in Article 227 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the divorce and matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto shall be decided according to the personal law interpreted by Fiqah-e-Jafria (Shia school of thought).]
(2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both.
(3) Save as provided in subsection (5), a talaq unless revoked earlier, expressly or otherwise shall not be effective until the expiration of ninety days from the day on which notice under subsection (1) is delivered to the Chairman.
(4) Within thirty days of the receipt of notice under subsection (1), the Chairman shall constitute an Arbitration Council for the purpose of bringing about a reconciliation between the parties, and the Arbitration Council shall take all steps necessary to bring about such reconciliation.
(5) If the wife be pregnant at the time talaq is pronounced, talaq shall not be effective until the period mentioned in subsection [(3)) or the pregnancy, whichever be later, ends.
(6) Nothing shall debar a wife whose marriage has been terminated by talaq effective under this section from re-marrying the same husband, without an intervening marriage with a third person unless such termination is for the third time so effective.”
8. From the plain reading of the above proviso, it is confirmed that any person who belongs to Fiqah-e-Jafria can voluntarily with his own free will pronounce Talaq, himself or through duly authorized attorney/Vakeel, uttering literal Arabic words seegah jaat in the physical presence of at least two witnesses, qualifying the requirement of sub-clause (1) of Article 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and without following the said procedure of proviso, the Talaq effectiveness certificate could not be issued.
9. In this case, the admitted position available on record has been considered in the light of the Talaq Nama; the divorce deed available with the Chairman Arbitration Council, wherein, the first notice of Talaq in writing was executed and issued by Arsalan Abdullah Respondent No. 2 on 13.10.2021, where-after, second Talaq notice was issued on 20.11.2021 and the third notice was issued on 18.12.2021. A specific note has been given at the end of the third talaq: -
10. The above referred phrase outrightly confirms that the literal Arabic pronouncement of required Seegha jaat has not been pronounced even on the third Talaq. Therefore, as per Fiqah-e-Jafria, the Talaq was not effective and this aspect has been fortified with the view rendered in PLD 2023 Lahore 38 (Syed Sajid Hussain Abidi v. Iram Shehzadi Abidi and others), 1984 CLC 1961 (Mst. Maryam Bano v. Hussain Ali and another), PLD 2025 Lahore 18 (Syed Zouzab Imran Kazmi v. Syeda Iffat Bukhari and 2 others), 2006 YLR 1753 (Mst. Saira Shaukat through Special Attorney v. District Collector ICT, Islamabad and 2 others), PLD 1965 West Pakistan Karachi 185 (The State v. Syedda Salma Begum and another).
11. All the judgments cited by both sides are clear in the requirement of Shia law whereby the effectiveness of Talaq could only be declared subject to pronouncement of Seegha Jaat directly or through representative/Vakeel in presence of female or her representative /Vakeel, or otherwise, whereafter, divorce will become effective. Such exercise could be undertaken in respect of a case even with the retrospective effect, as held in Syed Sajid Hussain Abidi’s case Supra. However, when the learned counsel for respondent No.2 has been confronted as to whether the Seegha Jaat have been pronounced by respondent No.2 accordingly in Arabic terms, the learned counsel has produced a certificate dated 20.06.2023, contents of which are as under:-
12. The above-mentioned certificate clearly discloses that the Seegha Jaat were issued on 20.06.2023 to Mst. Bushra Hussain, the present petitioner, on behalf of respondent No.2, through Mr. Kausar Abbas Kummi in presence of two witnesses namely Syed Najmul Hassan and Iftikhar Hussain. The document has been placed on record and resultantly this Court is of the view that on the day of pronouncing the Seegha Jaat in Arabic, the Talaq becomes effective. Therefore, the primary question is whether the original Talaq certificate will remain in filed and effective or not without pronouncement of Seegha Jaat. The answer is negative, as the Talaq certificate was issued without verifying the pronouncement of Seegha Jaat , which is a mandatory requirement in cases where parties belong to the Fiqa Jafferia.
13. I have also gone through the words used by the legislature in the Amendment Act, 2021, wherein phrase “voluntarily” and “with his free will” are used; to pronounce talaq by himself or through duly authorized attorney/Vakeel uttering in literal Arabic words (Seegha Jaat .
14. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 contends that the word “may” is used in the proviso (a) of section 7 of MFLO, 1961, which signifies the discretion of the man and it is not mandatory rather permissive. But this Court is not in agreement with this interpretation. No doubt ordinarily the word “may” refer a discretion but if the whole context is considered as to what was the purpose of the legislature behind incorporating this amendment with reference to Fiqah-e-Jafriya through a proviso in subsection (1) of Section 7 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, the entire concept of “may” as to discretion stands negated. There are certain rules of statutory interpretation which courts apply while interpreting a statute or a provision of statute, however, it is settled position that there is no absolute or settled test which can determine whether a statute is ‘discretionary’ or ‘mandatory’. It is the duty of the court to take into consideration the intent of the legislature and the whole scope of the statute to determine whether it is ‘permissive’ or ‘mandatory’ in nature as held in 2001 SCMR 1001 (Ghulam Hassan v. Jamshaid Ali) and 2011 SCMR 420 (Syed Zia Haider Rizvi v. Deputy Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Lahore).
15. The word “may” make a provision “enabling” and it gives the discretion to the authority or court to exercise its power but it is usually construed as ‘permissive’ and not ‘mandatory’. I have gone through the Principles of Interpretation laid down by Lord Cairns in Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, (1874-80) All ER Rep. 43 where Lord Cairns enunciated Principles of Statutory Interpretation in the following words:-
“There may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise the power when called upon to do so.
Where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons specifically pointed out with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the Legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise, that power ought to be exercised and the Court will require it to be exercised.
The enabling words are construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right”
16. Relying on the above reasoning of Lord Cairns, the word “may” used in proviso to section 7 proviso being an enabling word would be given meaning of a compulsion that it must be followed. When the ordinary dictionary meaning of a provision of law leads to absurd interpretation and contradicts the purpose of the law; in such situation the language of the text can be modified to meet the intention of the legislature. Such modifications are done by changing the meaning of the word or ignoring it altogether. This exceptional interpretation is required when a careless word is used by an ignorant draftsperson which goes against the intention of the whole statute. Such instances are indeed exceptional and courts are reluctant to substitute or add a word in a statute (R. v. Trafford (1850) QB 200.) but courts may depart from the literal rule when required to avoid absurdity.
Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition page 234) says that:
“In ordinary usage, "may" is permissive and "must" is imperative, and, in accordance with such usage, the word "may" in a statute will not generally be held to be mandatory. In some cases, how-ever, it has been held that expressions such as "may," or "shall have power," or "shall be lawful," have to say the least a compulsory force, and so their meaning has been modified by judicial exposition.” (underlined for emphasis)
17. Similarly, I have also gone through Crawford on The Construction of Statutes1 (1940 edition, pages 519 to 522) which states that:
"Mandatory and directory are permissive words.
Ordinarily, the words 'shall' and 'must' are mandatory, and the word 'may' is directory, although they are often used interchangeably in legislation. This use without regard to their literal meaning generally makes it necessary for the courts to resort to construction in order to discover the real intention of the legislature. Nevertheless, it will always be presumed by the court that the legislature intended to use the words in their usual and natural meaning. If such a meaning, however, leads to absurdity, or great inconvenience or for some other reason is clearly contrary to the obvious intention of the legislature, then words which ordinarily are mandatory in their nature will be construed as directory or vice versa. In other words, if the language of the statute, considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended the words 'shall' and 'must' to be directory, they should be given that meaning. Similarly, under the same circumstances, the word 'may' should be given a mandatory meaning, especially where the statute concerns the rights and interests of the public, or where third persons have claim de jure that a power shall be exercised or whenever something is directed to be done for the sake of justice or the public good, or is necessary to sustain the statute's constitutionality.”
18. Keeping in view the above definitions and instances of interpreting statutory provisions as per the intent of the legislature it is settled now that the word “may” permit the Court to consider it in sense of “shall” or “must”. If the “may” used in proviso to section 7 is not made “mandatory” it would frustrate the entire intent of the proviso added by 2021 Amendment in MFLO, 1961. Thus, the word “may” is to be considered with reference to the whole text and the legislature has used the word “may” in the proviso which is an exception of a general rule in order to protect the rights of those parties, who belong to Fiqah-e-Jafria and this Court does not agree with the contention that word “may” should not be considered as a compulsion with the meaning of “must”. This Court further considers it appropriate to issue a clear directive, placing a serious duty and obligation upon the Chairman of the Arbitration Council, particularly in cases governed by Fiqah-e-Jafria, to adhere to the principles ensuring the effectiveness of divorce, and to adopt the following procedure as a future guideline:-
(i) Whenever any person who belongs to Fiqah-e-Jafria files a divorce deed before the Chairman Arbitration Council, the arbitration council shall follow the procedure provided in section 7 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (Second Amendment Act, 2021) and ensure that the man / husband shall pronounce the Seegha Jaat in Arabic before the Chairman Arbitration Council to his wife in presence of two witnesses qualifying the requirement of Clause 1 of Article 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.
(ii) If the requirement of presence of two witnesses or the Seegha Jaat pronouncement has not been conducted before the arbitration council, the husband may file certificate verifying the facts that Seegha Jaat have been pronounced before any religious scholar accordingly, however, no certificate for effectiveness of talaq shall be issued without verification of Seegha Jaat.
(iii) Chairman Arbitration Council can also direct the person/husband to call a Vakeel or the religious scholar along with two witnesses for declaration that those Seegha Jaat have been pronounced before them and to that extent a certificate shall be issued by referring that the relevant Seegha Jaat in Arabic have been pronounced and issued therefore, these two requirements must be fulfilled by the Chairman, Arbitration Council.
19. While considering the above discussion, instant writ petition is ALLOWED and the Chairman, Arbitration Council is directed to issue the amended certificate for effectiveness of divorce effective from 20.06.2023, to the petitioner/Bushra Hussain confirming the Talaq in accordance with the Fiqah-e-Jafria, while considering the certificate issued by Kausar Abbas Qummi, who has pronounced the Seegha Jaat in this case.
20. It is also pertinent to mentioned here that during the course of hearing, both the sides have presented the Code of Muslim Family Laws Book published by M. Mahmood of Pakistan Law Times Publication. But surprisingly, the amendment in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, through the Amendment Act of 2021 has been published and notified in Section 7 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, which is a law for institution of suits before the Family Court. Therefore, such mistake which is causing misrepresentation reflects the negligence of the publisher who printed the proviso of Section 7 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 in Section 7 of Family Courts Act, 1964. Therefore, office is directed to transmit copy of this judgment to the Pakistan Law Times Publication of Mr. M. Mahmood and all other such publishers who have misprinted or wrongly printed the amendment in Family Courts Act, 1964 instead of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, to correct the same accordingly.
BUSHRA HUSSAIN Versus CHAIRMAN, ARBITRATION COUNCIL, ISLAMABAD
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