فیملی مقدمات میں غیر ضروری اور طویل جرح پر لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا انتہائی سخت ردعمل۔\ قانون یہ طے کرتا ہے کہ جب ایک گواہ سے...........

 PLJ 2026 Lahore 474

فیملی مقدمات میں غیر ضروری اور طویل جرح پر لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا انتہائی سخت ردعمل۔\
قانون یہ طے کرتا ہے کہ جب ایک گواہ سے غیر ضروری طور پر طویل جرح کی جاتی ہے ، جس میں بہت سے غیر متعلقہ اور غلط سوالات بھی ہوتے ہیں ، تو تضاد ، اگر کوئی ہو ، اپنی اہمیت کھو سکتا ہے ۔ اس قسم کی جانچ پڑتال کی بار بار حوصلہ شکنی کی جاتی ہے ۔
جرح کا مقصد ایسے معاملات کو ظاہر یا واضح کرکے سچائی کو منظر عام پر لانے میں عدالت کی مدد کرنا ہے جو گواہان جانبداری کے محرکات سے چھپانا یا الجھانا چاہتے ہیں ۔ مؤثر کراس امتحان کو ایک تنگ کمپاس کے اندر محدود کیا جا سکتا ہے ۔ سوال معقول حدود سے باہر نہیں جانا چاہیے ۔
ثبوت ریکارڈ کرنے کا طریقہ کار مغربی پاکستان فیملی کورٹس ایکٹ 1964 (فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ) کی دفعہ 11 میں دیا گیا ہے ۔ فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ کے سیکشن 11 کا دوسرا پروویسو واضح طور پر فراہم کرتا ہے کہ فیملی کورٹ کسی بھی ایسے سوال کو منع کر سکتی ہے جسے وہ غیر مہذب ، بدنام یا فضول قرار دیتی ہے یا جو اسے توہین یا ناراض کرنے یا شکل میں غیر ضروری طور پر جارحانہ ہونے کا ارادہ رکھتی ہے ۔
نہ صرف غیر مہذب اور بدنام سوالات ممنوع ہیں بلکہ ساتھ ہی ساتھ فضول ، توہین آمیز ، پریشان کن اور جارحانہ سوالات کو بھی اہل خانہ کی عدالت سے منع کیا جا سکتا ہے ۔ فیملی کورٹ کو فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ کی دفعہ 11 (3-اے) کے تحت خود بھی یہ اختیار حاصل ہے کہ وہ کسی بھی نقطہ کی وضاحت کے مقاصد کے لیے گواہوں سے سوالات کرے جسے وہ کیس میں مواد سمجھتی ہے ۔ قانون کی ان مخصوص دفعات کا مقصد اس بات کو یقینی بنانا ہے کہ خاندانی تنازعات یا نابالغوں کی سرپرستی سے پیدا ہونے والے معاملات کو کچھ حدود میں رہتے ہوئے حل کیا جائے ۔ دوسری صورت میں بھی ، ثبوت کا قانون مدعیوں یا ان کے وکلاء کو گواہوں کے ساتھ بے عزتی کے سلوک کو بے نقاب کرنے سے روکتا ہے اور گواہوں کو فریقین کے معروف وکلاء کے ہاتھوں ذلت یا دھمکیوں کا شکار نہیں ہونا چاہیے ۔ جب ضرورت ہو تو عدالتوں کو مداخلت کرنی چاہیے ، جو گواہوں کو اس طرح کی صورتحال کا سامنا کرنے پر تحفظ فراہم کرنے کے لیے کافی اختیارات رکھتی ہیں ۔
اس مرحلے پر ، میں ان معاملات میں بڑھتے ہوئے رجحان کو بھی اجاگر کرنا چاہوں گا جو خاندانی دائرہ اختیار سے نکلتے ہیں اور فریقین کے درمیان متعلقہ معاملات میں (i) استدعا کے قانون سے ہٹ کر ، (ii) گواہوں اور شواہد کو پیش کرنا جن کی کوئی مطابقت نہیں ہے اور (iii) امتحان کو لمبا کرنا ، جیسا کہ موجودہ میں ہے ۔ اس کے نتیجے میں یہ ان مضامین پر قوانین کو جاری کرنے کے مقصد اور مقصد کو شکست دے رہا ہے ۔ فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ کا مقصد شادی ، خاندانی امور اور اس سے منسلک معاملات سے متعلق تنازعات کے جلد حل اور حل کے لیے عدالتیں قائم کرنا ہے ۔ مقننہ سے توقع کی جاتی ہے کہ علمی خاندانی عدالتیں قیام کی تاریخ سے چھ ماہ کے اندر تنازعات کو حل کریں گی ۔ مقننہ کی طرف سے استدعا سے شروع ہونے والی کارروائی کے ہر مرحلے کے لیے رہنما خطوط دیے گئے ہیں ۔
لفظ "مواد" فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ کی دفعہ 7 (2) میں مغربی پاکستان آرڈیننس نمبر 1 کے ذریعے داخل کیا گیا ہے ۔ X 1966 مورخہ 04.04.1966. فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ کے سیکشن 7 کی ذیلی دفعہ 2 میں کہا گیا ہے کہ شکایت تنازعہ سے متعلق تمام مادی حقائق پر مشتمل ہوگی اور اس میں ایک شیڈول ہوگا جس میں شکایت کی حمایت میں پیش کیے جانے والے گواہوں کی تعداد ، گواہوں کے نام اور پتے اور ان حقائق کا مختصر خلاصہ جس پر وہ گواہی دیں گے ۔ اسی طرح ، کوڈ آف سول پروسیجر-1908 کا آرڈر VI-رول 2 فراہم کرتا ہے کہ ہر التجا پر مشتمل ہوگا ، اور صرف اس پر مشتمل ہوگا ؛ مادی حقائق کی ایک مختصر شکل میں ایک بیان جس پر فریق اپنے دعوے یا دفاع کے لیے انحصار کرتا ہے ، جیسا کہ معاملہ ہو ، لیکن وہ ثبوت نہیں جس کے ذریعے انہیں ثابت کیا جانا ہے ، اور جب ضروری ہو تو ، پیراگراف میں تقسیم کیا جائے گا ، جو لگاتار نمبر پر ہوں گے ۔
کسی نہ کسی طرح ، یہ زیادہ عام ہوتا جا رہا ہے کہ اس طرح کے معاملے میں اختلاف کرنے والے اور ان کے وکیل مادی حقائق سے آگے بڑھ رہے ہیں اور حقیقی تنازعات سے ہٹ رہے ہیں جس کی بنیاد پر فریقین اپنے دعووں کو ختم کرنا چاہتے ہیں اور وہ دوسری طرف راحت حاصل کرنا چاہتے ہیں یا اس سے انکار کرنا چاہتے ہیں ۔ یہ قانون کا ایک اصول ہے کہ استدعاوں میں ہر تفصیل کا ذکر کرنے کی ضرورت نہیں ہے ۔ یہ ثبوت ہے جو دعووں کو ثابت کرتا ہے ۔ استدعاوں میں صرف مادی حقائق کا ذکر کرنا کافی ہے جس کے بارے میں فریقین کو مقدمے کی سماعت کے مرحلے پر اپنے ثبوت پیش کرنے کی ضرورت ہے ۔
یہ مشاہدہ کیا گیا ہے کہ فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ خصوصی قانون ہونے کی وجہ سے اس کی پختہ پابندی کی ضرورت ہوتی ہے ، بصورت دیگر قانون کا جوہر اور تاثیر مایوس ہو جائے گی ۔ اس لیے اہل خانہ/سرپرست عدالتوں کے لیے ضروری ہے کہ وہ خاموش تماشائی بننے اور فریقین یا ان کے وکیل کو خصوصی قانون سازی کے مقصد کو ناکام بنانے کی اجازت دینے کے بجائے ناپسندیدہ تاخیر کو فعال طور پر روکیں ۔
The law is settled that a witness when subjected to unduly lengthy cross-examination, which also consists of many irrelevant and misdirected questions, the contradiction, if any, can lose its significance. Such type of cross-examination is repeatedly discouraged.
The purpose of cross-examination is to assist the Court in bringing the truth to light by disclosing or clarifying matters which witnesses may wish to conceal or confuse from motives of partisanship…Effective cross-examination could be confined within a narrow compass. The question must not go beyond reasonable limits.
The procedure of recording evidence is given in section 11 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act-1964 (the ‘Family Court Act’). The second proviso of section 11 of the Family Court Act clearly provides that the Family Court may forbid any question which it regards as indecent, scandalous or frivolous or which appears to it to be intended to insult or annoy or be needlessly offensive in form.
Not merely indecent and scandalous questions are prohibited but at the same time frivolous, insulting, annoying and offensive questions can also be forbidden by the learned Family Court. The Family Court is also empowered under section 11(3-A) of the Family Court Act by itself to put questions to witnesses for the purposes of elucidation of any point which it considers material in the case. These specific provisions of law are intended to ensure that the cases arising out of the family disputes or for the guardianship of the minors should be settled while remaining within certain limits. Even otherwise, the law of evidence restricts the litigants or their pleaders from exposing the witnesses to undignified treatment and the witnesses must not suffer from humiliation or intimidation at the hands of the learned advocates for parties. The Courts, when so required, must interfere, which possess ample powers to provide protection to the witnesses when they are facing such situation.
At this stage, I would also like to highlight growing tendency, in the cases emanating out of the family jurisdiction and related matters amongst the parties of unduly prolonging the cases by (i) deviating from the law of pleadings, (ii) introducing the witnesses and evidence having no relevance and (iii) lengthening the examination, like in the present one. This as a result is defeating the very object and purpose of promulgating the statutes on these subjects. The Family Court Act is intended to establish the Courts for expeditious settlement and resolution of disputes relating to marriage, family affairs and for the matters connected therewith. The learned Family Courts are expected by legislature to resolve the disputes within six months from the date of institution. Guidelines have been given by the legislature for every step of the proceedings, starting from the pleadings.
The word “material” has been inserted in section 7(2) of the Family Court Act through the West Pakistan Ordinance No. X of 1966 dated 04.04.1966. Sub-section 2 of section 7 of the Family Court Act reads that the plaint shall contain all material facts relating to the dispute and shall contain a Schedule giving the number of witnesses intended to be produced in support of the plaint, the names and addresses of the witnesses and brief summary of the facts to which they would depose. Likewise, Order VI-Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure-1908 provides that every pleading shall contain, and contain only; a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved, and shall when necessary, be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively.
Somehow, it is becoming more common that the disputants in such matter and their pleaders are going beyond the material facts and deviating from the real disputes on the basis of which the parties do want to rest their claim(s) and they want to seek relief or deny it on the other hand. It is a principle of law that in pleadings each and every detail is not required to be mentioned. It is evidence which proves the pleadings. Mere mentioning of material facts in the pleadings is sufficient regarding which the parties are required to produce their evidence at the trial stage.
It is observed that the Family Court Act being the special law requires firm adherence, otherwise the essence and effectiveness of the law will be frustrated. The learned Family / Guardian Courts, therefore, are required to actively curb the undesireable delays instead of becoming silent spectators and permitting the parties or their pleader to frustrate very purpose of special enactment(s).
Writ Petition No. 64981 of 2025
Harris Rasheed and another Versus The Learned Guardian Judge

خاندانی عدالتیں ایکٹ ، 1964 کے ایس.17-اے کا التزام [جیسا کہ پنجاب فیملی کورٹس (ترمیم) ایکٹ ، 2015 کے ذریعہ داخل کیا گیا ہے] ایک مخصوص شق ہے جو ...........

 2026 CLC 12

خاندانی عدالتیں ایکٹ ، 1964 کے ایس.17-اے کا التزام [جیسا کہ پنجاب فیملی کورٹس (ترمیم) ایکٹ ، 2015 کے ذریعہ داخل کیا گیا ہے] ایک مخصوص شق ہے جو خاندانی دعووں کے ایک خصوصی زمرے کے طور پر دیکھ بھال کے مقدمے سے نمٹتی ہے ۔ - ایس.17-اے کی فراہمی 18-03-2015 کو پنجاب فیملی کورٹس (ترمیم) ایکٹ ، 2015 کے ذریعے متعارف کرائی گئی ہے ، جس نے بیوی اور بچوں کی دیکھ بھال کو دیگر خاندانی دعووں سے زیادہ اونچے مقام پر رکھا ہے---دیکھ بھال الاؤنس ایک ذریعہ کے طور پر کام کرتا ہے ۔ بیوی اور بچوں کے لئے روزی روٹی اور بقا ، آرٹس کے تحت ضمانت شدہ زندگی کے ان کے حق سے جڑا ہوا ہے ۔ آئین کے 4 اور 9-خاندانی عدالت کو صوابدیدی اختیارات فیملی کورٹس ایکٹ ، 1964 کے ایس.17-اے کے تحت بھی دیئے گئے ہیں [جیسا کہ پنجاب فیملی کورٹس (ترمیم) ایکٹ ، 2015 کے ذریعہ شامل کیا گیا ہے] تاکہ افراط زر کے لحاظ سے بیوی اور بچوں کی مستقبل کی ضروریات اور ضروریات کو پورا کرنے کے ساتھ ساتھ کرنسی کی قیمت میں گراوٹ کو پورا کرنے کے لئے دیکھ بھال میں سالانہ اضافہ تجویز کیا جاسکے ۔-- خاندانی عدالت کے اختیار سے کوئی انتباہ نہیں لگایا گیا ہے کہ وہ کمپاؤنڈ یا غیر کمپاؤنڈ کی بنیاد پر دیکھ بھال میں اس طرح کا سالانہ اضافہ تجویز کرے ۔-- خاندانی عدالت ہر معاملے کے حقائق اور حالات کے لحاظ سے اس طرح کا معقول حکم جاری کرنے کے لئے آزاد ہے ۔

اظہار "عدالت کی طرف سے مقرر کردہ دیکھ بھال خود بخود ہر سال دس فیصد کی شرح سے بڑھ جائے گی" --قابل اطلاق-- خاندانی عدالت کے ذریعہ طے شدہ دیکھ بھال کی وصولی کے حکم نامے پر عمل درآمد کے دوران ، اس طرح طے شدہ دیکھ بھال میں سالانہ اضافے کی مقدار کے بارے میں تنازعہ پیدا ہوا تھا ۔ "عدالت کی طرف سے مقرر کی گئی دیکھ بھال میں ہر سال دس فیصد کی شرح سے خود بخود اضافہ ہو جائے گا" عام طور پر اس کا مطلب یہ ہے کہ حکم نامے کے تحت طے شدہ دیکھ بھال کی مقدار مستحکم یا مستقل نہیں رہتی بلکہ یہ ایک متغیر اعداد و شمار ہے جس میں ہر سال کے بعد اضافہ ہوتا ہے ۔ پہلے سال کے اختتام پر 10% کے اضافے کے بعد ، دیکھ بھال کی ایک نئی مقدار میدان میں آتی ہے اور یہ رقم عدالت کے ذریعہ طے شدہ دیکھ بھال کی مقدار میں ضم یا ضم ہوجاتی ہے-اس طرح کا عمل ہر سال کے بعد دہرایا جاتا ہے جب تک کہ فرمان کے تحت بیوی یا بچوں کا قانونی حق حاصل نہ ہو ۔ - ہر سال کا سالانہ اضافہ پچھلے پچھلے سال کی ضم شدہ رقم پر شمار کرنا ضروری ہے اس وجہ سے کہ 10% اضافہ اندرونی طور پر اصل رقم سے منسلک ہے اور یہ حکم نامے کا ایک لازم و ملزوم حصہ ہے ۔ - ہائی کورٹ نے پھانسی دینے والی عدالت کو قانون کے مطابق پھانسی کے تحت حکم نامے کو نافذ کرنے کی ہدایت کی اور مدعا علیہ کی اعتراض کی درخواست کو مسترد کر دیا گیا - اس طرح کا اضافہ زیر التواء کارروائی پر لاگو ہوگا اور ماضی اور بند کارروائی پر لاگو نہیں ہوگا جس نے حتمی حیثیت حاصل کرلی تھی ۔

Suit for maintenance---Interim maintenance---Right to life---Provision of S.17-A of Family Courts Act, 1964 [as inserted by Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015] is a specific provision dealing with suit for maintenance as a special category of family claims---Provision of S.17-A is introduced through Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 on 18-03-2015, which has placed maintenance of wife and children at a higher pedestal than other family claims---Maintenance allowance serves as a means of subsistence and survival for wife and children, intrinsically connected to their right to life guaranteed under Arts. 4 & 9 of the Constitution---Discretionary powers on Family Court have also been conferred under S.17-A of Family Courts Act, 1964 [as inserted by Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015] to prescribe annual increase in maintenance to cater for future needs and requirements of wife and children as well as depreciation in value of currency in terms of inflation---No caveat is attached to the power of Family Court to prescribe such annual increase in maintenance on compound or non-compound basis---Family Court is free to pass a reasonable decree in such behalf depending on facts and circumstances of each case.
Expression "the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten percent each year"---Applicability---During execution of decree for recovery of maintenance fixed by Family Court, dispute had arisen as to quantum of annual increase in the maintenance so fixed---Validity---Expression "the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten percent each year" ordinarily implies that quantum of maintenance fixed under a decree does not remain static or constant but is a variable figure which is meant to increase after each year---After increase of 10% at the end of first year, a new quantum of maintenance comes in field and the amount gets merged or amalgamated in the quantum of maintenance fixed by Court---Such process is repeated after each year till the legal entitlement of wife or children under the decree---Annual increase of each year is required to be calculated on merged amount of last preceding year for the reason that 10% increase is intrinsically linked with the principal amount and is an inseparable part of the decree---High Court directed Executing Court to enforce decree under execution in accordance with law and objection petition of respondent was dismissed---Such increase would be applied to pending proceedings and was not applicable to past and closed proceedings which had attained finality---

JUDGMENT

.--- This constitutional Petition is directed against the impugned Order and Judgment dated 13.09.2023 and 31.10.2023 passed by Judge Family Court / Executing Court and Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, respectively.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the Petitioners instituted a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dowry articles against Respondent No. 3 (the "Respondent") which was partially decreed by the Family Court vide Judgment and Decree dated 03.09.2018. The Petitioners and the Respondent preferred cross appeals against the said Judgment and Decree. The Appellate Court dismissed appeal of the Respondent while appeal of the Petitioners was partially allowed vide consolidated Judgment and Decree dated 18.03.2019, thereby, ordering modification in the Decree of the Family Court. Both the parties filed separate Writ Petitions. Nos. 22863 and 23430 of 2019 before this Court which were partially allowed and the Judgment and Decree stood further modified. Statedly, the matter has attained finality up to the level of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
3. During execution proceedings, the Respondent filed an Objection Petition before the Executing Court seeking calculation of paid amount of maintenance allowance with reference to 10% annual increase awarded to the minors in the final Decree under execution by alleging that the Petitioners are calculating the annual increase on compound basis which is unlawful since there is no such stipulation in the Decree or the law. It was maintained that maintenance allowance once decreed by the Court remains constant and static which merely increases by 10% each year in terms of Section 17-A(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (the "Act"). Reliance was placed on cases titled, "Mir Muhammad Khan and 2 others v. Haider and others" (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 233); "Muhammad Anwar v. Bashir Ahmad and another" (2014 CLC 1819); and "Kashif Mahmood v. Additional District Judge and others" (2022 MLD 1762). The said application was resisted by the Petitioners on the ground that maintenance allowance fixed by Court is enhanced by 10% after first year and increase thereupon in the second year is applicable on the cumulative amount of preceding year, as such, 10% annual enhancement is leviable on compound basis as contemplated by Section 17-A(3) of the Act. The Courts below by relying upon the case of Kashif Mahmood (supra) opined that rate of annual increment in each year is to be calculated on base value of the maintenance allowance fixed by the Court and not on the enhanced maintenance amount of previous year arrived at by adding annual increment. Hence, this Petition.
4. During proceedings of this case, it transpired that two separate single Benches of this Court in cases titled, "Mian Muhammad Latif v. Additional District Judge and others" (W. P. No. 77557/2022) decided on 07.12.2022; and "Sohaib Umar Ilyas v. Judge Family Court and others" (W. P. No. 15888/2021) decided on 02.02.2023 expressed the view that annual increase in maintenance allowance is required to be calculated on compound basis in terms of Section 17-A(3) of the Act in contrast to the view taken by another learned Single Bench of this Court in the case of Kashif Mahmood (supra). Accordingly, constitution of a larger Bench was recommended vide order dated 30.04.2024, whereafter, the matter was referred to this Bench. Notice was issued on 16.05.2024 to the Attorney General of Pakistan and Advocate General of Punjab under Order XXVII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the "C.P.C.") seeking assistance to determine the following question:-
Whether the statutory annual increase of 10% in maintenance allowance ordained in Section 17-A(3) of the Act will apply on compoundable or non-compoundable basis?
5. Learned counsel for the Petitioners and learned Federal Law Officer favored compound calculation of annual increase on the decreed amount of maintenance. It was submitted that Section 17-A of the Act is required to be interpreted in the context of overall scheme of law enshrined in the Act which is not only beneficial in nature but also emphasizes the importance of maintenance allowance as the only source of subsistence of women and children. The provision caters for changed circumstances in terms of their needs and protects them against inflation and price hike. The mandatory annual increase of 10% is applicable at a minimum to all maintenance decrees although the Court is vested with discretion to prescribe a higher rate. There is no specific stipulation therein regarding calculation of annual enhancement on base or aggregate value of maintenance. However, the intent and import of the said provision is that annual increase of each year is required to be imposed on the cumulative or aggregate amount of maintenance allowance of the previous year. This is an obvious conclusion since the Act, in general, and Section 17-A(3) thereof, in particular, is a beneficial legislation aimed to hedge inflation and devaluation of currency. Women and children are oppressed class who are entitled to beneficial interpretation of law which is the intent of legislature in line with the directive Principles of Policy enunciated under Articles 34, 35 and 37 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the "Constitution") as emphasized by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled, "Saif-ur-Rehman v. Additional District Judge, Toba Tek Singh and 2 others" (2018 SCMR 1885).
6. Learned counsels further submitted that annual rent increments under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (the "Rent Act") as a widely accepted general practice are calculated on compound basis reflecting real value of money and property appreciation. The Courts in foreign jurisdictions employ compound or index-linked payments in long-term financial obligations, such as maintenance, to ensure fairness and alignment with inflation. In case titled, "Sempra Metals Limited (formerly Metallgesellschaft Limited v. Her Majesty's Commissioners of Inland Revenue and another", (2007 UKHL 34), the House of Lords ruled in favor of compound interest on the ground that it accurately reflects the true value of money over time. In contrast, it was noted that flat interest rates fail to account for real time inflation and time value of money. Although a custodial parent can institute a subsequent suit or approach the Executing Court by filing an application for enhancement in maintenance allowance in changed circumstances yet the purpose of introducing Section 17-A(3) of the Act is to protect the decree holder against annual real-time inflation, thus reducing the occasions to frequently resort to Court seeking enhancement in maintenance on the ground of increase in inflation and growing needs of minors. Therefore, by implementing automatic compound increases, the Court can streamline adjustments in maintenance in a manner that reduces the need for frequent litigation. This will save costs, time, resources and emotional stress for decree holders. Such an interpretation would bring certainty in fixation of maintenance allowance and would lead to financial stability for the decree holders to meet their evolving needs. Therefore, the ambiguity in Section 17-A(3) of the Act regarding flat versus compound annual increase should be resolved in favor of compound calculations which is a more equitable and efficient approach of adjusting maintenance over time against inflationary trends and growing needs.
7. Learned Counsel for the Respondent and Provincial Law Officer advanced arguments in support of annual increase in maintenance on non-compoundable or linear basis. It was stated that the Decree under execution was passed under Section 17-A(2) of the Act which provides for 10% annual increase and like all family decrees, is required to be executed under Section 13 thereof. Hence, Section 17-A(3) of the Act is not attracted as the Decree was passed under Section 17-A(2) of the Act. The former comes into play only when the Family Court fails to prescribe annual increase. Without prejudice to the above, the intention of legislature to induct Section 17-A(3) in the Act is express and clear that if the Family Court does not prescribe the annual increment, the 'maintenance fixed by the Court' would automatically increase by 10% each year, thus providing for in-built hedging against inflation. The Family Court is empowered to determine the quantum of maintenance allowance which remains fixed till legal entitlement and the said amount annually increases by 10% thereon, thereby, adequately providing for statutory cushion against price hike and inflation. In case, the intention of legislature was to provide for compound annal increase, it could have been expressly specified therein. As such, the conspicuous and conscious omission cannot be substituted by the Court. Islamic jurisprudence derived from the Holy Quran as well as case law on the subject emphasize the importance to strike a balance between the responsibility to pay maintenance to wife and children on the one hand and the financial capacity to pay the same on the other hand. Therefore, the provision of Section 17-A(3) of the Act must be interpreted in a manner to maintain a balance and proportionality between competing rights. Hence, the levy of 10% annual increase on compound amount would lead to injustice.
8. It was further contended that the Rent Act does not provide for automatic 10% compound increase, rather, it is always with the mutual consent of landlord and tenant based on lease agreement. Hence, annual increase in rent does not take effect by operation of any law in contrast to Section 17-A(3) of the Act. As such, the former cannot be equated with the latter. Moreover, the comparative example is misconceived inasmuch as the landlord offers the demised premises against a definite rent which is fixed with the mutual consent of landlord and tenant but in contrast, payment of maintenance allowance is a personal right rooted in love and affection of a person towards his wife and children. Hence, the concept of increase in rent on compound basis cannot be employed in interpretation of Section 17-A(3) of the Act. Therefore, the moot point under consideration has been rightly determined in the case of Kashif Mahmood (supra) particularly, when in the cases of Mian Muhammad Latif and Sohaib Umar Ilyas (supra), no definitive finding on the question of law was rendered. This is particularly so when in cases titled, "Muhammad Iqbal v. Mst. Nasreen Akhtar" (2012 CLC 1407) and "Muhammad Akram v. Additional District Judge and others" (PLD 2008 Lahore 560), the Court opined that the principle of res judicata embodied in the C.P.C. is not a bar to institute a fresh suit for enhancement in maintenance allowance due to changed circumstances. Therefore, if the 10% automatic increase on non-compound basis as per Section 17-A(3) of the Act is found inadequate in any particular case, the option to institute a fresh suit for enhancement in maintenance allowance can be exercised. Hence, the 10% increase in maintenance on compound basis would be highly unjustified as the same is not the intent and import of Section 17-A(3) of the Act.
9. Arguments heard. Record perused.
10. The relevant part of modified final Decree qua maintenance amount subject of Objection Petition with respect to calculation of annual increase of 10% reads as under:
"The plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 being minor children of the defendant are held entitled to recover maintenance allowance from the defendant @ Rs. 150,000/- each per month from the date of institution of suit till their legal entitlement with 10% annual increment."
11. The Decree thus contemplates payment of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 150,000/- for each minor from the date of institution of suit i.e. 29.03.2014 with 10% annual increase. It did not specify if the annual increase shall take effect on compound or non-compound basis, thus triggering the moot question framed for determination. As the pro and contra arguments revolve around interpretation of Sections 13 and 17-A of the Act, therefore, it would be advantageous to reproduce the same as under:
"13. Enforcement of decrees.- (1) The Family Court shall pass a decree in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and shall enter its particulars in the prescribed register.
(2) If any money is paid or any property is delivered in the presence of the Family Court, in satisfaction of the decree, it shall enter the fact of payment or the delivery of property, as the case may be, in the aforesaid register.
(3) Where a decree relates to the payment of money and the decretal amount is not paid within time specified by the Court not exceeding thirty days, the same shall, if the Court so directs be recovered as arrears of land revenue, and on recovery shall be paid to the decree-holder.
(4) The decree shall be executed by the Court, passing it or by such other Civil Court as the District Judge may, by special or general order, direct.
(5) A Family Court may, if it so deems fit, direct that any money to be paid under a decree passed by it be paid in such installments as it deems fit.
17A. Suit for maintenance.- (1) In a suit for maintenance, the Family Court shall, on the date of the first appearance of the defendant, fix interim monthly maintenance for wife or a child and if the defendant fails to pay the maintenance by fourteen day of each month, the defence of the defendant shall stand struck off and the Family Court shall decree the suit for maintenance on the basis of averments in the plaint and other supporting documents on record of the case.
(2) In a decree for maintenance, the Family Court may:
(a) fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint due to afflux of time or any other relevant circumstances; and
(b) prescribe the annual increase in the maintenance.
(3) If the Family Court does not prescribe the annual increase in the maintenance, the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten percent each year.
(4) For purposes of fixing the maintenance, the Family Court may summon the relevant documentary evidence from any organization, body or authority to determine the estate and resources of the defendant."
12. Section 12(2) of the Act empowers the Family Court to pronounce its judgment and pass the decree after conclusion of trial. Section 13 of the Act is another general provision of law which relates to the enforcement of all decrees passed under the Act. It obligates the Family Court to pass a decree in the prescribed form and manner. It also mandates to record and maintain necessary particulars qua payments and delivery of property. This is imperative since family decrees by their very nature involve payment of money on monthly basis and receipt of multiple dowry articles. Further provisions are made in the Family Courts Rules, 1965 including prescribing of uniform Forms for recording of decrees and maintaining of the Register of Receipts and Disbursements. Section 13 of the Act also empowers the Executing Court to direct recovery of unpaid amounts as arrears of land revenue including the power to effect recovery of money in installments to ensure execution of decrees.
13. In contrast, Section 17-A of the Act is a specific provision dealing with suit for maintenance as a special category of family claims. Section 17-A of the Act in its present form was introduced in the Act through the Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 (XI of 2015) dated 18.03.2015. It places maintenance of wife and children at a higher pedestal than other family claims because maintenance allowance serves as a means of subsistence and survival for them, intrinsically connected to their right to life guaranteed under Articles 4 and 9 of the Constitution. Section 17-A(1) provides for fixation of monthly interim maintenance allowance for wife or a child on the date of the first appearance of the defendant and failure of the defendant to pay the same by fourteenth day of each month entails penal consequences in terms of striking off his defence, thereby, paving the way for passing of decree for maintenance on the basis of averments in the plaint and other supporting documents on record of the case. Section 17-A(2) of the Act postulates that in a decree of maintenance, the Family Court may fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint due to afflux of time or any other relevant circumstances and prescribe the annual increase in the maintenance. It is evident that necessary discretion has been vested in the Family Court to cater for the time consumed in decision of the suit for maintenance and address other relevant circumstances in order to ensure that an adequate quantum of maintenance is fixed. This provision also confers discretionary powers on the Family Court to prescribe an annual increase in maintenance to cater for future needs and requirements of plaintiffs as well as depreciation in the value of currency in terms of inflation. No caveat is attached to the power of the Family Court to prescribe such annual increase in maintenance on compound or non-compound basis and the Family Court is free to pass a reasonable decree in this behalf depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.
14. In the instant case, however, the Court did not specify if annul increase would apply on compoundable or non-compoundable basis. In such situations, the operation of Section 17-A(3) of the Act comes into play. This provision stresses the importance and requirement of prescribing an annual increase in the maintenance. The provision is couched in negative covenant and provides that if the Family Court does not prescribe annual increase in the maintenance, the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of 10% each year. At the same time, it prescribes a statutory threshold or standard that was considered appropriate by the legislature in case, the Court does not specify the annual increase itself depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Decree under execution as well as Section 17-A(3) of the Act does not specifically state if the annual increase would be realized on compoundable or non-compoundable basis. Therefore, the argument that Section 17-A(3) of the Act has no relevance as Decree under execution was passed under Section 17-A(2) of the Act requiring execution under Section 13 thereof, is misconceived for the reason that a simple decree not providing for calculation of annual increase in maintenance on compoundable or non-compoundable basis requires interpretation of Section 17-A(3) of the Act which is vividly promulgated to supply omissions in the decrees for maintenance. This is particularly so when it is not the case of the Respondent that the Decree under execution required maintenance to be calculated on non-compound basis. Since the Decree in this respect is silent and Section 17-A(3) of the Act is ambiguous, therefore, interpretation of the latter is imperative to give effect to the Decree according to the mandate of Section 17-A(3) of the Act. Needless to reiterate that Section 13 of the Act only deals with the enforcement of decrees and has no relevance qua determination of annual increase on decreed amount of maintenance.
15. There is no cavil to the proposition that Islamic jurisprudence as interpreted by superior Courts unequivocally hold that maintenance is to be determined on equitable terms by balancing competing interests, as such, the financial status, income, resources and estate of a person liable to pay maintenance is required to be proportionally adjusted against the needs and requirements of wife and children while fixing the quantum of maintenance. Nevertheless, questions qua entitlement to maintenance as well as quantum of maintenance are settled on the basis of facts and evidence from case-to-case basis and the same exercise was undertaken in the instant case. However, the grant of annual increase on the quantum of decreed maintenance and its calculation on compound or non-compound basis is altogether a different question. The rationale to provide annual increase in maintenance fixed by the Court is rooted in hedging inflation and providing for anticipated future yet inevitable needs and requirements of wife and children. There is no doubt that quantum of maintenance once fixed after trial cannot remain stagnant. There may be a host of changed circumstances, such as, inflation, increased cost of existing needs or new requirements in wake of growing age when there is a need for revising the determined maintenance by the Court. It is in this context that the Courts in the cases of Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Akram (supra) held that the principle of res judicata in the C.P.C. is not applicable to a subsequent suit for enhancement in maintenance based on changed circumstances since such circumstances provide a fresh cause of action. In fact, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled "Lt. Col. Naseer Malik v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others" (2016 SCMR 1821) went as far as to hold that an application under Section 151 of the C.P.C. seeking enhancement in maintenance is maintainable in lieu of instituting a separate subsequent suit in the following words:-
"6 .Once a decree by the Family Court in a suit for maintenance is granted thereunder, if the granted rate for per month allowance is insufficient and inadequate, in that case, according to scheme of law, institution of fresh suit is not necessary rather the Family Court may entertain any such application and if necessary make alteration in the rate of maintenance allowance."
16. The right to institute a subsequent suit or filing of an application for enhancement in maintenance allowance, however, is always cumbersome entailing costs, resources and time, thus burdening the wife and children to frequently resort to Court. It is ostensibly clear that by introducing substituted Section 17-A in the Act, the legislature intended to stipulate a comprehensive arrangement with respect to maintenance, thus empowering the Court to fix interim monthly maintenance, pass a decree upon failure of the defendant to pay the same, fix maintenance higher than prayed amount due to afflux of time or upon consideration of relevant circumstances and prescribe annual increase. To top it all, Section 17-A(3) of the Act mandated automatic 10% annual enhancement by operation of law, if the Court failed to prescribe annual increase. This arrangement was put in place to reduce the occasions for wife and children to have frequent recourse to Court for enhancement in maintenance, thus accounting for inflation, rising cost of living and evolving requirements of wife and children.
17. The legislature while promulgating Section 17-A(3) of the Act did not specifically provide for compound or non-compound calculation of prescribed automatic annual increase. In financial transactions, both compound and non-compound standards are employed in our jurisprudence. Section 34(1) of the C.P.C. confers discretionary powers upon the Court to grant costs subject to such conditions and limitations, as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of law for the time being in force. Section 34(3) of the C.P.C. further ordains that the Court may give interest on costs at any rate not exceeding six per cent, per annum, and such interest shall be added to the costs and shall be recoverable as such." The Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled, "Najm Koreshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank Now Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Lahore and others" (2015 SCMR 1461), while interpreting Section 34 of the C.P.C. recognized the power of the Court to grant simple or compound interest and opined that interest pendente lite and further interest are both discretionary reliefs, therefore, unless expressly ordered in a decree, such interest accrues on principal amount adjudged and not on the aggregate of that amount with accumulated interest.
18. In contrast, Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 expressly provides for compound interest on adjudged compensation at the rate of eight percent from the date of possession of acquired property. Similarly, Section 5-A(1) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (since repealed) proclaimed that "the rent of a non-residential building shall stand automatically increased at the end of every three years of its tenancy by twenty-five percent of the rent already being paid by the tenant" thus, stipulating enhancement in rent on the immediately preceding or prevalent rent. However, Section 6(1)(c) of the Rent Act in vogue leaves the matters qua rate of rent, rate of enhancement due date and mode of payment of rent to the mutual consent of the landlord and the tenant to be determined through the tenancy agreement. Notwithstanding the same, practically and as a generally accepted trade practice, enhancement in rent is actualized on the last preceding rent and not on the original amount of rent fixed. It, therefore, follows that both compound and non-compound calculations are part of our jurisprudence. At times, it is expressly provided by law or otherwise it is left at the discretion of the Court depending upon the facts and circumstances of the transaction. Therefore, the ambiguity in Section 17-A(3) of the Act can be best resolved by analyzing the scheme of law enshrined in the Act in the context of nature of maintenance claim based on the guiding principles of fairness, equity and justice.
19. The Act has been promulgated for the establishment of Family Courts for expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage, family affairs and other matter connected therewith. In furtherance of the stated objective, a convenient and flexible procedure has been prescribed in the Act for time bound adjudication of a family suit. Strict rules of procedure are dispensed with as Section 17(1) of the Act postulates that save as otherwise expressly provided by or under the Act, the provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and the C.P.C., except Sections 10 and 11 thereof, shall not apply to proceedings before any Family Court in respect of Part I of Schedule to the Act. The superior Courts in view of the intent, purpose and objective of the Act have consistently adopted a liberal and beneficial approach in interpretation of various provisions of the Act. In Saif-ur-Rehman's case (supra), the Supreme Court of Pakistan while interpreting Section 14(2) of the Act underscored the need of purposive interpretation of the Act in the following words:
"10. .It is now settled law that a purposive rather than a literal approach to interpretation is to be adopted while interpreting Statutes. An interpretation which advances the purpose of the Act is to be preferred rather than an interpretation which defeats its objects. Reference, in this behalf, may be made to the judgments reported as Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and others v. M/s. Noori Trading Corporation (Private) Limited and 14 others (1992 SCMR 710) and Hudabiya Engineering (Pvt.) Limited v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan and 6 others (PLD 1998 Lahore 90).
11. The second aspect of the Family Courts Act, 1964 and the Rules framed thereunder as amended from time to time would reveal its gender sensitivity. A glance at Section 3 of the Act of 1964 reveals that women Judges are specifically catered for. The residence of the wife can be a determining factor for conferring territorial jurisdiction, in certain Suits as is evident from the provisions of Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965. There can be no escape from the fact that the tone and tenor of the Family Courts Act, 1964 and the Rules framed thereunder are beneficial in nature. It is an equally settled law that beneficial provisions in a Statute must be interpreted liberally in a manner so that the benefit conferred is advanced rather than frustrated or subverted. Reference, in this behalf, may be made to the judgments of this Court reported as Lahore Development Authority through D.G., Lahore and another v. Abdul Shafique and others (PLD 2000 SC 207) and Pakistan Engineering Co. Limited, Lahore through Managing Director v. Fazal Beg and 2 others (1992 SCMR 2166)."
12. The preamble of the Constitution highlights the importance of social justice and ordains that adequate provision shall be made to safeguard legitimate interests of depressed classes. The right to life is protected under Articles 4 and 9 of the Constitution. The right of maintenance of wife and children is undoubtedly an inseparable part of right to life as they are dependent on maintenance for their very survival in terms of their basic needs and requirements with respect to food, clothing, shelter, schooling and healthcare. The right to receive maintenance is a legal right granted by law and enforceable through the Court. It is not merely a personal right based on love and affection of a person towards his wife and children. Maintenance must be received by those held entitled to receive the same with dignity in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution. Even the non-discrimination clause embodied in Article 25 of the Constitution proclaiming equal protection of law for all citizens, creates a conscious and conspicuous exception by proclaiming that the State is not prevented from making any special provision for the protection of women and children. The directive Principles of Policy contained in Articles 34, 35 and 37 of the Constitution particularly call upon the State to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life; protect marriage, the family, the mother and the child; promote special care, educational and economic interests of backward classes; and ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice.
13. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that Section 17-A(3) of the Act is a beneficial, remedial or curative provision which calls for liberal interpretation. It is triggered when the Court omits to prescribe annual increase in maintenance or does not expressly specify if annual increase so prescribed will take effect on compound or non-compound basis while passing a decree under Section 17-A(2) read with Section 12(2) of the Act. If the legislature has not specifically provided for compound calculation in Section 17-A(3) of the Act, it is equally true that the legislature has also not provided otherwise. The expression "the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten percent each year" ordinarily imply that quantum of maintenance fixed under a decree does not remain static or constant but is a variable figure which is meant to increase after each year. After increase of 10% at the end of first year, a new quantum of maintenance comes in field and the amount gets merged or amalgamated in the quantum of maintenance fixed by Court. The process is repeated after each year till the legal entitlement of wife or children under the decree. Therefore, annual increase of each year is required to be calculated on the merged amount of last preceding year for the reason that 10% increase is intrinsically linked with the principal amount and is an inseparable part of the decree. If the rent is traditionally increased with reference to the last prevailing rent, there is no reason why maintenance should not be increased based on the same principle. The compound calculation of maintenance not only caters for inflation and rising cost of living but also allows to account for growing needs and requirements of wife and children, thus, reducing the occasions to resort to Court seeking enhancement in maintenance allowance. Hence, it is concluded that when a decree of maintenance does not prescribe an annual increase or is silent qua calculation of prescribed annual enhancement on principal or aggregate amount of maintenance, Section 17-A(3) of the Act will come into operation and the Executing Court shall calculate the due decreed amount on compound basis.
14. Before parting, we note that in the case of Kashif Mahmood (supra), it has been aptly held that Section 17-A(3) of the Act shall apply to all pending proceedings from the date of its promulgation and the finding contained therein to this extent is fully endorsed.
15. In view of the above, this Petition is allowed; the impugned Order and Judgment dated 13.09.2023 and 31.10.2023 are set aside; and consequently, the Objection Petition of the Respondent stand dismissed. The Executing Court is directed to enforce the Decree under execution in accordance with law. However, it is clarified that this Judgment will only apply to pending proceedings and shall not affect the past and closed proceedings which have attained finality.
16. The Registrar of this Court is directed to transmit a copy of this Judgment to all District Judges of the Province of Punjab for its circulation to all Family Courts within the jurisdiction of respective Districts for information. A copy of this Judgment shall also be sent to Secretary Law, Government of the Punjab for consideration of initiation of appropriate amendment in the Act to bring clarity in Section 17-A of the Act in the manner deemed appropriate by the Legislature.

تیس سال سے زیادہ پرانے دستاویز میں صداقت کا مفروضہ ہونے کا دعوی کیا گیا ہے لیکن اس مفروضے کی سچائی پر سوال اٹھانے والی فریق ہمیشہ تردید کرتی ہے ۔ درحقیقت کسی.........

 تیس سال سے زیادہ پرانے دستاویز میں صداقت کا مفروضہ ہونے کا دعوی کیا گیا ہے لیکن اس مفروضے کی سچائی پر سوال اٹھانے والی فریق ہمیشہ تردید کرتی ہے ۔ درحقیقت کسی دستاویز کی غیر مشکوک نوعیت ، اس کی مناسب تحویل اور دیگر حالات اس پر عمل درآمد کے مفروضے کو بڑھانے کی بنیاد ہیں ، تاہم ، اگر پہلی نظر میں ، اس پر عمل درآمد اور مناسب تحویل کا تنازعہ اٹھایا جاتا ہے تو یہ عدالت کا فرض بن جاتا ہے کہ وہ اس کی صداقت کے سوال کا تعین کرے ۔ اس طرح یہ مفروضہ صوابدیدی ہے اور اللہ دتا بمقابلہ ایمنا بی بی (2011 ایس سی ایم آر 1483) کے معاملے کے لحاظ سے لازمی نہیں ہے ۔ مذکورہ بالا کے تابع ، تیس سال پرانی دستاویز کے سلسلے میں حکم قانون 1984 کے تحت دستیاب دستاویز کی درستگی کا مفروضہ صرف ایک خاص شخص کی تحریر میں دستخط اور اس کے ہر دوسرے حصے کے حوالے سے ہے ۔ باقی مواد جو تحریر میں نہیں ہیں پھر ثبوت کا موضوع بن جائیں گے ۔ اس معاملے کا دوسرا پہلو جو قانون کے تقاضے کو پورا کرتا ہے وہ یہ ہے کہ اس موضوع کی دستاویز کو قانون شہادت آرڈر ، 1984 کے آرٹیکل 100 کے مطابق مناسب تحویل میں رکھنے والے شخص کے ذریعہ پیش کیا جانا چاہئے ۔ "مناسب تحویل" سے تیس سال پرانی یا ثابت شدہ دستاویز پیش کرنا شرط کی مثال تھی ؛ جب تک کہ اس طرح کی شرط پوری نہ ہو جائے ، دستخط ، مواد یا اس طرح کے دستاویز کے کسی حصے کے بارے میں کوئی مفروضہ پیدا نہیں ہوگا جس پر باضابطہ طور پر عمل درآمد/تصدیق کی جائے ۔ درحقیقت موضوعاتی دستاویز اسکرائبر نے پیش کی تھی جس کے پاس موجودہ تنازعہ کے مقاصد کے لیے مناسب تحویل نہیں ہے ۔

The dower deed which is more than thirty years old claimed to have presumption of genuineness but that presumption is always rebuttable by the party questioning genuineness thereof. Indeed the unsuspicious character of a document, its proper custody and other circumstances are the foundation to raise presumption of its execution, however, if prima-facie, the dispute to its execution and proper custody is raised then it becomes the duty of the court to determine the question of its genuineness. The presumption is thus discretionary and not mandatory in terms of the case of Allah Ditta v. Aimna Bibi (2011 SCMR 1483). The presumption of correctness of a document available under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 in respect of thirty years old document, subject to above, is only in respect of a signature and every other part thereof in handwriting of a particular person. Rest of the contents which are not in the handwriting would then become the subject matter of proof. The other aspect of the matter which germane to the requirement of law is that the subject document should be produced by person having proper custody in terms of Article 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Production of document purported or proved to be thirty years old from “proper custody” was the condition precedent; until and unless such condition is met, no presumption as to the signature, contents or any part of such document to be duly executed/attested, would arise. Indeed the subject document was produced by scriber who, for the purposes of the present controversy does not have a proper custody.

C.A.156-P/2013
Muhammad Israr v. Jehanzeb & others
Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui
24-02-2025
03-03-2025






دیکھ بھال ، موخر کرایہ ، اور جہیز کے سامان کی وصولی کے لیے سوٹ - - شادی کے فورا بعد بیوی کو نکال دیا گیا-- سابقہ شادیوں کو چھپانا --- اس کے بعد غیر قانونی ............

 2026 YLR 1338

دیکھ بھال ، موخر کرایہ ، اور جہیز کے سامان کی وصولی کے لیے سوٹ - - شادی کے فورا بعد بیوی کو نکال دیا گیا-- سابقہ شادیوں کو چھپانا --- اس کے بعد غیر قانونی کثرت ازدواج --- جائز موجودہ شادی---علیحدگی کا اثر ؛ اگر کوئی ہو-- - درخواست گزار (بیوی) نے دیکھ بھال ، موخر کرایہ اور جہیز کے سامان کی وصولی کے لیے مقدمہ دائر کیا ، جس کا جزوی حکم فیملی کورٹ نے دیا تھا لیکن اپیلٹ کورٹ نے دیکھ بھال اور کرایہ سے انکار اور جہیز کی قیمت کو کم کرکے اس میں ترمیم کی تھی ۔ --تنازعہ سابقہ شادیوں کو چھپانے ، غیر قانونی کثرت ازدواج ، اور شادی کے فورا بعد درخواست گزار کو ملک بدر کرنے کے الزامات سے پیدا ہوا ۔ --ہائی کورٹ کے سامنے تعین کے لیے بنیادی مسئلہ یہ تھا کہ کیا درخواست گزار ، ثابت شدہ طلاق کی عدم موجودگی میں لیکن غیر قانونی کثرت ازدواج اور جبری علیحدگی کی موجودگی میں ، دیکھ بھال ، موخر کرایہ کی فوری ادائیگی ، اور جہیز کی اشیاء کی مکمل وصولی کا حقدار تھا ؟ --- ہولڈ: مدعا علیہ کی طرف سے دوسری شادی کا انکشاف نہ کرنے اور اس کے بعد چوتھی شادی کرنے کی حقیقت ریکارڈ پر قائم کی گئی تھی --- اس نے درخواست گزار کو مدعا علیہ کے ساتھ چھپانے اور دھوکہ دہی کا معاملہ اٹھانے کا ایک قانونی بہانہ فراہم کیا ۔ --ان حالات میں ، مدعا علیہ کی طرف سے اس کے اخراج کو مدعا علیہ کی طرف سے پیش کردہ کسی ٹھوس ثبوت کی عدم موجودگی میں اس سے منسوب نہیں کیا جا سکتا تھا تاکہ یہ ثابت ہو سکے کہ درخواست گزار نے بغیر کسی جائز وجہ کے گھر چھوڑ دیا ہے---لہذا ، بطور شوہر مدعا علیہ کی اپنی بیوی کو برقرار رکھنے کی قانونی اور اخلاقی ذمہ داری تھی ۔ اس قائم شدہ حقیقت کی روشنی میں کہ درخواست گزار شادی کے ایک ماہ کے اندر مدعا علیہ سے الگ ہو گیا تھا اور اس کے بعد سے الگ رہ رہا تھا اور اس بات کا کوئی قابل اعتماد ثبوت نہیں تھا کہ اس طرح کی علیحدگی اس کی اپنی بدانتظامی یا نافرمانی کی وجہ سے تھی ، وہ قانونی طور پر دیکھ بھال الاؤنس حاصل کرنے کی حقدار تھی ۔ --- اس طرح ، وہ ایک لاکھ روپے میں دیکھ بھال الاؤنس حاصل کرنے کی حقدار تھی ۔ 15, 000/- ہر ماہ w.e.f. 27.12.2021 i.e. شادی کی تاریخ کے ایک ماہ بعد اس کی قانونی استحقاق تک 10% سالانہ اضافے کے ساتھ چونکہ مدعا علیہ نے لازمی قانونی تقاضے کو پورا کیے بغیر شادی کا معاہدہ کیا تھا ، اس لیے فریقین کے درمیان شادی کے وجود سے قطع نظر ، پورے موخر ڈیوور کی ادائیگی کی ذمہ داری واجب الادا ہو گئی تھی ۔ جہیز کی اشیا کو مکمل طور پر ، خاندانی عدالت نے عدالتی احتیاط کا استعمال کیا اور صرف ان جہیز کی اشیا کو ایوارڈ دیا جو تسلی بخش طور پر قائم کی گئی تھیں ، یا متبادل طور پر ، ان کی تخمینی قیمت 2 لاکھ روپے تھی ۔ 1, 000,500/----درخواست گزار کو بحالی الاؤنس کی وصولی کا حقدار قرار دیا گیا تھا ۔ 15, 000/- ہر ماہ 27.12.2021 سے 10% سالانہ اضافے کے ساتھ جب تک کہ اس کی قانونی استحقاق اور موخر ڈوور Rs. 1, 000,000/- ؛ اسے خاندانی عدالت کے حکم کے مطابق جہیز کے سامان کی وصولی کا بھی حق حاصل تھا

Suit for recovery of maintenance, deferred dower, and dowry articles--- Wife expelled shortly after marriage --- Concealment of prior marriages --- Subsequent unlawful polygamy --- Valid subsisting marriage --- Effect of separation; if any --- Petitioner (wife) filed a suit for recovery of maintenance, deferred dower and dowry articles, which was partially decreed by the Family Court but modified by the Appellate Court by denying maintenance and dower and reducing dowry value --- The dispute arose from allegations of concealment of prior marriages, unlawful polygamy, and expulsion of the petitioner shortly after marriage --- The core issue for determination before the High Court was whether the petitioner, in absence of proven divorce but in presence of unlawful polygamy and forced separation, was entitled to maintenance, immediate payment of deferred dower, and full recovery of dowry articles?---Held: The fact of non-disclosure of second marriage and subsequently contracting fourth marriage by the respondent was established on the record --- This provided a lawful excuse to the petitioner to raise the issue of concealment and cheating with the respondent --- Under these circumstances, her expulsion by the respondent could not be attributed to her in absence of any cogent evidence produced by the respondent to establish that the petitioner left the house without lawful cause --- Hence, the respondent as husband had the legal and moral obligation to maintain his wife --- In light of the established fact that the petitioner was separated from the respondent within one month of the marriage and had since been residing apart and there being no convincing proof that such separation was due to her own misconduct or disobedience, she was legally entitled to receive maintenance allowance --- As such, she was entitled to receive maintenance allowance @ Rs. 15,000/- per month w.e.f. 27.12.2021 i.e. one month after the date of marriage till her legal entitlement with 10% annual increase --- Since the respondent contracted marriage without fulfilling the mandatory legal requirement, the liability to pay the entire deferred dower had become due, irrespective of the subsistence of the marriage between the parties --- Instead of allowing the claim viz. dowry articles in its entirety, the Family Court rightly exercised judicial caution and awarded only those dowry articles which were satisfactorily established, or in the alternative, their assessed depreciated value amounting to Rs. 1,000,500/- --- Petitioner was held entitled to recover maintenance allowance @ Rs. 15,000/- per month since 27.12.2021 with 10% annual increase till her legal entitlement and deferred dower Rs. 1,000,000/-; she was also held entitled to recover her dowry articles as decreed by the Family Court

تیس سال سے زیادہ پرانے دستاویز میں صداقت کا مفروضہ ہونے کا دعوی کیا گیا ہے لیکن اس مفروضے کی سچائی پر سوال اٹھانے والی فریق ہمیشہ تردید کرتی ہے ۔ درحقیقت کسی دستاویز کی........

 2025 SCMR 841

تیس سال سے زیادہ پرانے دستاویز میں صداقت کا مفروضہ ہونے کا دعوی کیا گیا ہے لیکن اس مفروضے کی سچائی پر سوال اٹھانے والی فریق ہمیشہ تردید کرتی ہے ۔ درحقیقت کسی دستاویز کی غیر مشکوک نوعیت ، اس کی مناسب تحویل اور دیگر حالات اس پر عمل درآمد کے مفروضے کو بڑھانے کی بنیاد ہیں ، تاہم ، اگر پہلی نظر میں ، اس پر عمل درآمد اور مناسب تحویل کا تنازعہ اٹھایا جاتا ہے تو یہ عدالت کا فرض بن جاتا ہے کہ وہ اس کی صداقت کے سوال کا تعین کرے ۔ اس طرح یہ مفروضہ صوابدیدی ہے اور اللہ دتا بمقابلہ ایمنا بی بی (2011 ایس سی ایم آر 1483) کے معاملے کے لحاظ سے لازمی نہیں ہے ۔ مذکورہ بالا کے تابع ، تیس سال پرانی دستاویز کے سلسلے میں حکم قانون 1984 کے تحت دستیاب دستاویز کی درستگی کا مفروضہ صرف ایک خاص شخص کی تحریر میں دستخط اور اس کے ہر دوسرے حصے کے حوالے سے ہے ۔ باقی مواد جو تحریر میں نہیں ہیں پھر ثبوت کا موضوع بن جائیں گے ۔ اس معاملے کا دوسرا پہلو جو قانون کے تقاضے کو پورا کرتا ہے وہ یہ ہے کہ اس موضوع کی دستاویز کو قانون شہادت آرڈر ، 1984 کے آرٹیکل 100 کے مطابق مناسب تحویل میں رکھنے والے شخص کے ذریعہ پیش کیا جانا چاہئے ۔ "مناسب تحویل" سے تیس سال پرانی یا ثابت شدہ دستاویز پیش کرنا شرط کی مثال تھی ؛ جب تک کہ اس طرح کی شرط پوری نہ ہو جائے ، دستخط ، مواد یا اس طرح کے دستاویز کے کسی حصے کے بارے میں کوئی مفروضہ پیدا نہیں ہوگا جس پر باضابطہ طور پر عمل درآمد/تصدیق کی جائے ۔ درحقیقت موضوعاتی دستاویز اسکرائبر نے پیش کی تھی جس کے پاس موجودہ تنازعہ کے مقاصد کے لیے مناسب تحویل نہیں ہے ۔
The dower deed which is more than thirty years old claimed to have presumption of genuineness but that presumption is always rebuttable by the party questioning genuineness thereof. Indeed the unsuspicious character of a document, its proper custody and other circumstances are the foundation to raise presumption of its execution, however, if prima-facie, the dispute to its execution and proper custody is raised then it becomes the duty of the court to determine the question of its genuineness. The presumption is thus discretionary and not mandatory in terms of the case of Allah Ditta v. Aimna Bibi (2011 SCMR 1483). The presumption of correctness of a document available under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 in respect of thirty years old document, subject to above, is only in respect of a signature and every other part thereof in handwriting of a particular person. Rest of the contents which are not in the handwriting would then become the subject matter of proof. The other aspect of the matter which germane to the requirement of law is that the subject document should be produced by person having proper custody in terms of Article 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Production of document purported or proved to be thirty years old from “proper custody” was the condition precedent; until and unless such condition is met, no presumption as to the signature, contents or any part of such document to be duly executed/attested, would arise. Indeed the subject document was produced by scriber who, for the purposes of the present controversy does not have a proper custody.
C.A.156-P/2013
Muhammad Israr v. Jehanzeb & others

 P L D 2025 Supreme Court 853

شادی کے دوران پیدائش قانونی حیثیت کا فیصلہ کن ثبوت - نابالغ بیٹی کا ڈی این اے ٹیسٹ - - درخواست گزار نابالغ بیٹی کی پدرانہ حیثیت قائم کرنے کے لیے ڈی این اے ٹیسٹ کروانے سے انکار پر ناراض تھا - - جواز-- نابالغ بیٹی کی پدرانہ حیثیت سے متعلق مادی سوال کا تعین درج ذیل تین عدالتوں نے مقدمے کے پہلے دور میں ریکارڈ پر دستیاب شواہد کی بنیاد پر پہلے ہی کر دیا تھا ۔ - ایک طرفہ فیصلہ اور حکم نامہ جس پر درخواست گزار نے انحصار کیا تھا وہ خاندانی مقدمے کے فیصلے کے بعد تھا اور مجاز دائرہ اختیار کی عدالت کے ذریعے منظور کیے گئے پہلے فیصلے کو کالعدم نہیں کر سکتا تھا ، جس سے نابالغ کی قانونی حیثیت قائم ہوتی ہے ۔ سپریم کورٹ نے ہائی کورٹ کے اس نتیجے میں مداخلت کرنے سے انکار کر دیا جو نابالغ بیٹی کی قانونی حیثیت کے حق میں تھا ۔ قانونی حیثیت سے منسلک شرائط مسلم قانون کے تحت دوسرے نظاموں کے مقابلے میں زیادہ سخت ہیں لیکن مسلم قانون دان اور عدالتیں بھی عام طور پر کسی بچے کو ناجائز قرار دینے میں بہت ہچکچاتے رہے ہیں ۔ - جہاں تک ممکن ہو ہر مفروضہ قانونی حیثیت کے حق میں کیا جاتا ہے - - عدالتیں بچوں کو کمینے قرار دینے سے گریزاں ہیں اور عام طور پر جب آس پاس کے حالات سے قانونی حیثیت کا اندازہ لگایا جا سکتا ہے تو انہوں نے ناجائز حیثیت کو تسلیم کرنے سے انکار کر دیا ہے-- -

Birth during marriage conclusive proof of legitimacy---DNA test of minor daughter---Petitioner was aggrieved of denial of conducting DNA test to establish paternity of minor daughter---Validity---Material question relating to paternity of the minor daughter had already been determined by three courts below in earlier round of litigation, on the basis of evidence available on the record---Ex-parte judgment and decree relied upon by petitioner was subsequent to the judgment in family suit and could not nullify earlier judgment, passed by Court of competent jurisdiction, establishing legitimacy of the minor---Supreme Court declined to interfere with the conclusion reached at by High Court which was in favour of legitimacy of minor daughter---Conditions attached to legitimacy are more strict under Muslim Law than under other systems but Muslim jurists and also the Courts have generally been very reluctant to stigmatize a child as illegitimate---As far as possible every presumption is made in favour of legitimacy---Courts are reluctant to declare a child bastard and have generally refused to admit illegitimacy when legitimacy can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances---

ORDER

---This petition for Leave to Appeal filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, has arisen out of the judgment and decree dated 11.06.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur, whereby and whereunder the Intra Court Appeal No.98 of 2022, filed against the order dated 23.06.2022 passed by the Single Judge in Chambers, dismissing the Constitution Petition No.4467 of 2022 of the petitioner, was dismissed in limine.
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner filed a Constitution Petition No.4467 of 2022 before the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur, seeking issuance of directions to the Medical Superintendent, District Head Quarter Hospital, Lodhran to decide his application, pending before him for the constitution of Medical Board to conduct DNA Test of the petitioner, as well as respondents Nos. 4 and 5 to ascertain as to whether the minor is his daughter or not. After providing right of audience to the learned counsel for the parties, the petition was dismissed, vide judgment dated 23.06.2022. Dissatisfied with the same, the petitioner filed Intra Court Appeal No.98 of 2022, which was dismissed in limine, vide judgment dated 11.06.2012. Hence this petition.
3. Heard and record perused.
4. We heard arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and examine the record with his valuable assistance. It appears from the impugned judgment that the Constitution Petition and Intra Court Appeal filed by the petitioner, seeking issuance of direction to the Medical Superintendent, District Head Quarter Hospital, Lodhran, for constitution of Medical Board to conduct DNA test of the petitioner and the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 to ascertain as to whether minor, Nibah Noor is daughter of the petitioner or not; firstly, on the ground that, before filing the Constitution Petition before the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur, the petitioner had moved an application before the Ilaqa Judicial Magistrate for conducting DNA Test of the minor, which was declined, vide order dated 02.05.2008. The said order of the Ilaqa Judicial Magistrate was not impugned before higher forum, thus the same has attained finality; secondly, that along with the reply of the petitioner, the respondent No.4 had appended copy of the consolidated judgment dated 25.09.2007 passed in family suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and maternity expenses titled "Mst. Nadia Khan and another v. Muhammad Akhtar Hussain" and the suit for restitution of conjugal rights instituted by the petitioner the learned Trial Court had framed a specific (issue No.4A) on the legitimacy of minor, Nibah Noor, and after recording findings on the said issue, the Trial Court held that the said Nibah Noor is the daughter of the petitioner in the light of the principles laid down in Islamic Law. The appeal filed against the said judgment of the Trial Court was dismissed, by the Appeal Court on 06.03.2008, thereagainst the petitioner filed Constitution Petition No.1523 of 2008, before the High Court, which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 08.10.2008 with the observation that the petitioner has failed to lead cogent evidence to prove that Nibah Noor was not his daughter and in presence of admitted Nikah between the parties presumption is that she (Nibah Noor) belongs to him.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner while arguing the case mainly relied on ex-parte judgment and decree dated 23.09.2019, passed by the Civil Judge, Kehror Pacca, whereby the suit of the petitioner denying paternity of the minor was decreed in his favour ex-parte, vide judgment and decree dated 23.09.2019 and went on to say that in the light of the said ex-parte judgment and decree the minor is not the legitimate child of the petitioner, therefore, the impugned judgments passed by the courts below are liable to be set aside. This contention of the petitioner seems to be misplaced.
6. We find from the record that the material question relating to the paternity of the minor Nibah Noor has already been determined by three courts below in the earlier round of litigation, on the basis of evidence available on the record. The ex-parte judgment and decree relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner being subsequent to the judgment in family suit referred to above, in our view, cannot nullify the earlier judgment, passed by the court of competent jurisdiction, establishing the legitimacy of the minor.
7. There is no reason made out for interference with the conclusion reached in the Constitution Petition as well as Intra Court Appeal below, which is in favour of legitimacy of the minor, Nibah Noor. In the case reported as "Shah Nawaz and another v. Nawab Khan",1 it has been ruled that:-
"It may be that conditions attached to legitimacy are more strict under Muslim Law than under other systems but the Muslim jurist-consults as also the Courts have generally been very reluctant to stigmatize a child as illegitimate and, therefore, as far as possible every presumption is made in favour of its legitimacy. Courts, therefore, have been reluctant to declare a child bastard and have generally refused to admit illegitimacy when legitimacy can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances."
8. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the instant petition, the same is hereby dismissed and leave declined. No order as to costs
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