The purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of section 14(2) of the Family Court Act, 1964 (Act) is that for the enhancement of maintenance allowance by the minor, the right of appeal will be available to the minor.

2021 LHC 4880 

The purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of section 14(2) of the Family Court Act, 1964 (Act) is that for the enhancement of maintenance allowance by the minor, the right of appeal will be available to the minor. Any other interpretation of section 14(2) of the Act would not only defeat the very purpose and object of the Act but will also frustrate the beneficial nature of section 14(2) of the Act.

The right of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act shall not be available to the judgment debtor (father/husband) but decree holder (minor or wife) can file appeal for enhancement of decretal amount. The purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of section 14(2) of the Act made by august Supreme Court in above judgments, is also squarely applicable to the matter for the enhancement of maintenance allowance by the minor. Any other interpretation of section 14(2) of the Act would not only defeat the very purpose and object of the Act but will also frustrate the beneficial nature of Section 14(2) of the Act.
Every principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has force of binding precedent under the provisions of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution). Both as a matter of its constitutional duty as well as the prudence and rationale of such precedents, it is incumbent that Courts enforce principle of law if clearly laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, the judgment cannot be construed as “law declared” under Article 189 of the Constitution if no “ratio decidendi” is discoverable from the judgment. The expression “ratio decidendi” is the ground or reason of decision and the point in a case which determines the judgment. It is the “ratio decidendi” which is applicable to subsequent cases presenting the same problem.

WP 46766/21
Muhammad Faizan Raza Vs Judge Family Court Lahore etc
Mr. Justice Abid Aziz Sheikh
23-09-2021
2021 LHC 4880











Who is real mother of the disabled lady was appointed as guardian. She has mentioned the reason for obtaining/withdrawing the amount from the bank.

 The Court was under obligation to see the intent of the legislation. The petitioner who is real mother of the disabled lady was appointed as guardian. She has mentioned the reason for obtaining/withdrawing the amount from the bank. The Court is also the guardian of the minors and disabled persons. The Court is not only to see and supervise but to take care of the rights of the minors and the disabled persons. Although the lady submitted the statement of expenditure too late and did not deposit/submit the inventory about the movable and immovable property related to the disabled person as required under Section 37 of the Ordinance, yet this was for the Court to take into account the reason/need mentioned by the petitioner for withdrawal of amount. The Court was under obligation to consider and entertain the statement of accounts/expenditures tendered by the lady. The other factor is that there was no complaint against lady/petitioner/guardian that she is not taking care of the disabled lady (her person and property). In that case, the Court was under obligation to consider the need of the lady and to entertain the documents/statement of accounts/expenditures tendered by the petitioner and may also enquire about the correctness of the same, but the Court cannot refuse to entertain the same because the intent of the legislation is the welfare of the minor/disabled person.

W.P. No.7155 of 2021
Safia Begum Versus Additional District Judge etc.











--𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅, 𝒏𝒐𝒏 𝒎𝒆𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚. 𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒎𝒆𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚, 𝒊𝒇 𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒇𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔---

 𝑷 𝑳 𝑫 2014 𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒉 120

𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒍𝒂𝒘---
----𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅, 𝒏𝒐𝒏 𝒎𝒆𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚. 𝒉𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒎𝒆𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚, 𝒊𝒇 𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝒇𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔---𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔---𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓-𝒊𝒏-𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆---𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑳𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅---𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒍𝒂𝒘---𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇---𝑵𝒐 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝑳𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕---𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑳𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕---𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.
𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒁𝒂𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 1994 𝑴𝑳𝑫 2208; 𝑨𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒗. 𝑨𝒓𝒋𝒖𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒎 𝑲. 𝑻𝒂𝒍𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒂 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 2008 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 255=2008 𝑷𝑳𝑪 (𝑪.𝑺.) 376. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒐𝒅𝒉𝒂 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒚𝒂 𝑨𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒃 2009 𝑴𝑳𝑫 1252, 𝒁𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒖𝒃 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑴𝒂𝒋𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 1988 𝑴𝑳𝑫 837; 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑯𝒂𝒎𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒌𝒉 𝒗. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏, 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1998 𝑲𝒂𝒓. 59 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒗. 𝑴𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑵𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 2008 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 713 𝒓𝒆𝒇.
𝑩𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑰𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑫𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1988 𝑺𝑪 8; 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒛𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒗. 𝒁𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 4 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 1992 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1191; 𝑵𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒃 𝒂𝒏𝒅 3 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑸𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒃𝒃𝒂𝒔 2006 𝒀𝑳𝑹 721; 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑰𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒒𝒖𝒆 2006 𝑪𝑳𝑪 1850 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑵𝑳𝑹 2010 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 2005(𝒔𝒊𝒄) 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒅.
𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒛𝒊𝒛 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕.
𝑴𝒔. 𝑵𝒂𝒛𝒊𝒂 𝑯𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒇 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.4.
𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 26𝒕𝒉 𝑺𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓, 2013.

 𝑷 𝑳 𝑫 2014 𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒉 120
𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒒 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉, 𝑱
𝑱𝑨𝑴𝑺𝑯𝑬𝑫---𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕
𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔
𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑬𝑴𝑼𝑫𝑫𝑰𝑵 𝒂𝒏𝒅 4 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔---𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.85 𝒐𝒇 2013, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 4𝒕𝒉 𝑶𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒓, 2012.


𝑱𝑼𝑫𝑮𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻

𝑺𝒀𝑬𝑫 𝑴𝑼𝑯𝑨𝑴𝑴𝑨𝑫 𝑭𝑨𝑹𝑶𝑶𝑸 𝑺𝑯𝑨𝑯, 𝑱.---𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒕-𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒉 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒐 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏.
2. 𝑰𝒏 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 371 𝒐𝒇 2011, 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝑽𝒕𝒉 𝑺𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 (𝑬𝒂𝒔𝒕), 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇'𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 '𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏' 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒃𝒅𝒖𝒍 𝑮𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒊' 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒐𝒇 '𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏' 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔. 𝑰𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑪𝑵𝑰𝑪 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒅. 𝑶𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇'𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 '𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏' 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒐𝒇 '𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏'. 𝑰𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 31-1-2012 𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓, 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒏𝒐 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔. 𝑩𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒈𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑵𝒐.61 𝒐𝒇 2012. 𝑩𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 19-2-2013, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒓𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 (𝑬𝒂𝒔𝒕) 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍.
3. 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒃𝒊𝒓𝒕𝒉 𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝑱𝒂𝒎𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒔 𝑷𝒂𝒑𝒐𝒐 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒆𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏; 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒏 23-2-2002; 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕/ 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒎𝒂 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒉𝒛𝒂𝒅𝒊, 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏, 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊, 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆. 𝑶𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 `𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏' (𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕) 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 '𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏'. 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 20 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 2006, 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇'𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 '𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏'. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 4. 𝑹𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔. 1 𝒕𝒐 3 𝒂𝒏𝒅 5 (𝑵𝑨𝑫𝑹𝑨) 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒅𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔. 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 3 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕.
4. 𝑨𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.4 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆.
5. 𝑴𝒓. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒛𝒊𝒛 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕, 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 '𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏' 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑰𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 1973, 𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒄 𝒇𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒂𝒘 (𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏). 𝑨𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆, 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒋𝒐𝒓, 𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕, 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒚𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒖𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆, 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔:--
"𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒁𝒂𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 1994 𝑴𝑳𝑫 2208, 𝑨𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒗. 𝑨𝒓𝒋𝒖𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒎 𝑲. 𝑻𝒂𝒍𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒂 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 2008 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 255 = 2008 𝑷𝑳𝑪 (𝑪.𝑺.) 376, 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝑺𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒐𝒅𝒉𝒂 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒚𝒂 𝑨𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒃 2009 𝑴𝑳𝑫 1252, 𝒁𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒖𝒃 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑴𝒂𝒋𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 (1988 𝑴𝑳𝑫 837), 𝑩𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑰𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝑫𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1988 𝑺𝑪 8, 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒛𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒗. 𝒁𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 4 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 1992 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1191 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑵𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒃 𝒂𝒏𝒅 3 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑸𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒃𝒃𝒂𝒔 (2006 𝒀𝑳𝑹 721).
6. 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒚, 𝑴𝒔. 𝑵𝒂𝒛𝒊𝒂 𝑯𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒇, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.4 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏 (𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓) 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 42 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝑨𝒄𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒎𝒊𝒔-𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒂𝒘. 𝑰𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑯𝒂𝒎𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒌𝒉 𝒗. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏, 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 (𝑷𝑳𝑫 1998 𝑲𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊 59), 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑰𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒒𝒖𝒆 (2006 𝑪𝑳𝑪 1850), 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒗. 𝑴𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑵𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 (2008 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 713).
7. 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅, 𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒑𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒊𝒔 '𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏' 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑪𝑵𝑰𝑪 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎 𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 '𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏'. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 '𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏' 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 '𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏'. 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒎𝒂 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 '𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏' 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 '𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏'.
8. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 '𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏' 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒏𝒆'𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒏/𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕 1956 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒐𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝑳𝒂𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚, 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒕 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒑𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒏𝒆'𝒔 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒄 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅, 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒉𝒂𝒏, 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒅. 𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒂 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 "𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆" 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔. 𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑩𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍, 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚. 𝑻𝒉𝒖𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒔𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒃𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 (𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅), 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝑨𝒓𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒄 𝒂𝒔 '𝑲𝒂𝒇𝒂𝒍𝒂'. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 𝒂 `𝒎𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒂𝒎' 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚, 𝒊𝒇 𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒕-𝒇𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔. 𝑰𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒔𝒎𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒐 𝒂𝒔𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 `𝑾𝒊𝒌𝒊𝒑𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂 𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂' 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒕 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 (𝑺𝑨𝑾𝑾) 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑯𝒂𝒛𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 (𝑺𝑨𝑾𝑾) 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒆. 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 `𝑯𝒂𝒛𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝒁𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒃𝒏 𝑯𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒉'𝒔' 𝒆𝒙-𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑯𝒂𝒛𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 (𝑺𝑨𝑾𝑾). 𝑨 𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 (𝑯𝒂𝒛𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝑨𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒂' 𝒂𝒏𝒅 '𝑯𝒂𝒛𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒃𝒖-𝑯𝒖𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒚𝒇𝒂𝒉 𝒊𝒃𝒏 𝑼𝒕𝒃𝒂𝒉'𝒔' 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒏 '𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒎𝒂𝒘𝒍𝒂 𝑨𝒃𝒖 𝑯𝒖𝒅𝒂𝒊𝒇𝒂' 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔:--
"𝑨𝒃𝒖 𝑯𝒖𝒅𝒉𝒂𝒊𝒇𝒂, 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑩𝒂𝒅𝒓, 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉'𝒔 𝑨𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒄𝒆 𝑯𝒊𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒊𝒏 𝑨𝒍-𝑾𝒂𝒉𝒍 𝒃𝒊𝒏 '𝑼𝒕𝒃𝒂 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒎' 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒘𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒏. 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉'𝒔 𝑨𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒁𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒏. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆-𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕, 𝒊𝒇 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒔𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒐𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅-𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒎 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍, 𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒅: "𝑪𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎 (𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒐𝒏) 𝒃𝒚 (𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇) 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔". (33.5)
9. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒔 𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒉𝒖𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒔, 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒐𝒏. 𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒊𝒏𝒋𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑺𝒐 𝒇𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 4 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔. 𝑰𝒏 𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 (2006 𝑪𝑳𝑪 1850) 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒊𝒓𝒕𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒊𝒓𝒕𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆. 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒚, 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒉, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒊𝒓𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑴𝒓. 𝑻𝒂𝒍𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒂, 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒊𝒓𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅. 𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝑳𝑹 2010 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 2005(𝒔𝒊𝒄) 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑩𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1988 𝑺𝑪 8, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒄𝒚 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒐𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝑳𝒂𝒘 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒍𝒆𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝑴𝒐𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒏𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒍𝒆𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒖𝒏𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒔, 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒍𝒆𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒏𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒛𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒗. 𝒁𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 4 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 1992 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1191, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒐𝒏'𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒈𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒆𝒙 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒍𝒂𝒘, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒃𝒂𝒓 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂 𝒘𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆, 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 '𝑻𝒂𝒖𝒃𝒂' 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒂 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉'𝒔 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 2006 𝒀𝑳𝑹 721 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 (𝑵𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒃 𝒂𝒏𝒅 3 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑸𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍), 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒄𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅.
10. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑪𝑵𝑰𝑪, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰 𝒅𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒌 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒔-𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔. 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒂𝒔 '𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏'. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒊𝒔 '𝑰𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒏', 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇.
11. 𝑪𝒓𝒖𝒙 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑰 𝒅𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚, 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 31-1-2012 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑺𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒏𝒐 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 4 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 "𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘, 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒏𝒐 𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒕", 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈/𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒂𝒘. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒌𝒆𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 31-1-2012 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒅. 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏 19-2-2012 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 1-3-2013 𝒊𝒏 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑵𝒐. 61 𝒐𝒇 2012 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆.
12. 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒏𝒐 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔.
𝑴𝑯/𝑱-13/𝑲 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅.

DIVORCE (طلاق) CASE LAWS

Zubaida Khatoon V/S Administrator Union Council Uch Gillani (Lah.)
1996 MLD 1689.
S.7. Talaq pronounced by husband to wife thrice …. Right of revocation by husband……. Legality …. Withdrawal of notice of talaq by husband from Administrator, Union Council…. Validity …. Talaq pronounced by husband to wife thrice would become “Bain” and husband would have no right of its revocation as per injunctions laid down in Holy Quran and Sunnah, relating to divorce and its revocation and to that extent provisions of S.7 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, would give its way to those injunctions as enshrined in the constitution.
1998 MLD 486. Mst. Rehmat Ara V/S Mehmoodul Hassan & another (Lah.)
S.7. Husband asserted that period of “Iddat” of 90 days must be counted from date of issuance of notice to Arbitration Council and not from the date of pronouncement of Talaq. Commencement of period “Iddat”… Talaq was validly given by husband on 9-6-1996 when the same was pronounced and period of “Iddat” of three months had expired on 9-9-1996 and talaq became final on said date. Withdrawal of talaq by husband on 21-10-1996 (after it had become final) was inconsequential and ineffective.
1998 MLD 85. Farah Khan V/S Tahir Hamid Khan & another (Lah.)
Marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized in accordance with provisions of Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 in Pakistan. Respondent divorced petitioner which was endorsed by Arbitration Council. Validity. Originally both petitioner and respondent were Pakistani citizens and after three years of marriage only respondent had acquired citizenship of USA. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, would extend to whole of Pakistan and applied to all muslim citizens of Pakistan wherever they might be in terms of S.(2) of the Ordinance. Provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, could be invoked where one of the party to marriage was Muslim citizen of Pakistan. Even if it was presumed that Arbitration council had no jurisdiction to entertain notice of talaq given by respondent under provisions of S.7 Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, right of talaq vested in husband under Sharia had not been taken away from any Muslim, irrespective of the country to which he belonged. Despite restrictions contained in Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, husband’s right of talaq would prevail as given to him under Quranic injunctions. Divorce pronounced by respondent had, thus, taken effect under Islamic injunctions even if notice to Arbitration council intimating such talaq or subsequent proceedings taken in that regard and certificate issued by Arbitration council endorsing effectiveness of talaq, were ignored. Constitutional petition also suffered from laches which would not warrant interference by High court at such belated stage when talaq under Sharia had already become effective.
1998 MLD 1216. Abdullah V/S Mst. Shaheen & 2 Others (Pesh.DB)
S.2(v). Proviso
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. Dissolution of marriage on ground of impotency of husband. Decree for dissolution of marriage was granted to wife by Family Court on ground of impotency of husband on only evidence furnished by Lady Doctor to the effect that hymen of the wife being intact, she was a virgin. According to settled medical and scientific phenomenon, factum of hymen being intact, was not a conclusive proof of virginity because hymen in certain cases is so flexible that it is not repertured by incideence of first delivery. Evidence on record indicated that husband and wife had tried to produce their own medical certificates by consulting Doctors themselves, but court had not referred same for examination which had shown touch of personal involvement of court. Better approach would have been to get the parties medically examined through court. Application filed by husband under proviso
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of S.2(v) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, was also not considered by Family Court before passing decree for dissolution of marriage on ground of impotency of husband. Family Court had acted without jursidiction and also had exercised jurisdiction not vested in it as Family Court could not pass decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of impotency of husband, unless on application of husband, he was required to satisfy the court within one year from the date of such order that he had ceased to be impotent. If husband so satisfies the court within such period qua the same woman involved, no decree for dissolution of marriage would be passed on ground of impotency. Judgement of Family Court was set aside and case was remanded to be decided afresh after complying with provisions of proviso
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of S.2(v) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
NLR 2002 SD 161. Mst. Ambreen Shah V/S Chairman Union Council etc. (Lahore)
Pronouncement of triple talaq by husband. According to verse 230 of Surah Baqra of the Holy Quran, talaq becomes irrevocable. Husband cannot subsequently revoke such talaq.
PLD 2002 Lahore 518. Hamid Hameed Waris V/S Mrs. Tehseen
Divorce. If a husband announces divorce thrice to his wife, same becomes operative according to Hanafi Sect. (2) S.2(ix). Suit for dissolution of marriage. Oral pronouncement of divorce by husband to his wife. Husband not reducing such divorce in writing. Remedy of wife to get confirmed such oral divorce. Wife in such circumstances had no other option, but to approach the Court.

NLR 2004 SD 190. Shoukat Ali & another V/S The State (FSC).
S.10 Zina Ord. S.7(I) Muslim F.L.Ord.1961, Talaq pronounced by husband in accordance with requirements of Shariah without following the procedure laid down in S.7 would be valid pronouncement of Talaq. Failure to follow procedure laid down in S.7 may entail punishment but would not invalidate Talaq which is conscious and willful pronouncement of Talaq with intention to release wife from marriage bond. CONVICTION SET-ASIDE.
PLD 2004 Lahore 77.Mst. Nazir Fatima Nazim Union Council
S.5 & Schedule Family Courts Act 1964. One of the conditions of the marriage between parties was that husband had delegated the right do divorce wife and try to that effect was made in column No.18 of Nikahnama. Wife in exercise of said right pronounced divorce upon herslef for her husband and a notice was sent to Nazim Union Council concerned. Nazim had intimated wife that husband being not ready to pronounce divorce, wife could approach the court as he could not grant Khula and Nazim sent the case to the Family Court. Nazim was oblivious of legal position as right of divorce could be lawfully delegated by husband to wife and that had happened in the present case and notice was sent by wife in compliance with the terms of S. 7 & 8 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Ninety days prescribed period having expired after receipt of notice issued by wife and reconciliation being not possible between the parties, law as prescribed in S.7(3) & 8 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 would have in course. Nazim would issue requisite document regarding receipt of notice and failure of reconciliation within prescribed time.
PLD 2004 Lahore 316. Mian Arif Mehmood V/S Mst. Tanvir Fatima & another
S.7(3) & (5) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. Divorce pronounced by the husband upon the wife having not been revoked, had become effective after the expiry of ninety days from the date of receipt of notice by the Nazim/Chairman Arbitration Council in view of S.7(3). PETITION PARTLY ALLOWED.
PLD 2004 Lahore 588.Nasrullah V/S District Judge Mianwali
S.5 West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 & Schedule. Suit for recovery of value of dowry articles and compensation for divorce. Suit for recovery of compensation for divorce filed by wife was resisted by husband on ground that Family Court had no jurisdiction to grant that relief. Husband had claimed that he had divorced the lady because of her bad character. Evidence on record had shown that husband had made false accusation against the lady as he had no evidence to offer for the same. No particulars were given as to how he had accused the lady to be of a bad character. Divorce, in circumstances was pronounced by husband wtihout giving any reason against the lady. Schedule appended to West Pakistan Family Courts Act was amended and item No.9 was added to the effect "Personal property and belonging of a wife" which by all means vested the lady with a right to bring an action against the husband to claim compensation for divorce pronounced upon her without any justification. Husband became indebted to the lady in the said amount and moment said condition became operative. Even if such debt was conditional or contingent, would fall within the meaning of actionable claim. Claim of the lady to said amount accruing to her upon an unjustified divorce, by all means was a property and fell within item 9 of Schedule read with S.5 of West Pakistan Family Act, 1964. Appellate court, in circumstances had not acted without lawful authority while decreeing said claim of respondent. PETITION DISMISSED.
PLD 2006 SC 457.Mst. Farah Naz V/S Judge Family Court Sahiwal
S.5 Family Courts Act, 1964. Plea of oral divorce. Validity. Husband was required to send notice of divorce to Arbitration Council under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and also to send copy of such notice to wife by registered post. No such proceedings having been ever conducted, oral allegation of Talaq would neither be effective nor valid and binding on wife, who was legally entitled to past maintenance.
PLJ 2008 Sh.C.(AJK) 55. Bilal Hamza Abbasi V/S Wazir Muhammad & another
Specific mode for dissolution of marriage --- Divorce pronounced on telephonic call. Islam does not prescribe any specific mode for dissolution of marriage. It is an overt act on the part of husband which could indicate a clear intention to annul the marriage to operate as a divorce. No particular form of words is prescribed for affecting a talaq. If the words of Talaq are clear express and very well understood as implying divorce, no proof of intention is required. It is also not necessary that divorce should be pronounced in the presence of wife or even addressed to her. Witness for the respondent told him that appellant tried to hand over the divorce deed to him but he refused to receive the same. Held: Appellant had pronounced talaq through telephonic call by producing cogent, sufficient and reliable evidence. No any non-reading or misreading of the evidence on the part of Family Court. APPEAL DISMISSED.
2009 MLD 1478. Ambreen Afshan V/S Mrs. Idrees Qazu (Lahore)
S.7 Muslim Family Laws Ord. 1961. Divorce--Effectiveness---Husband administered the divorce and notified the same to Chairman of Arbitration/Union Council whereupon certain proceedings were taken and ultimately a certificate for the effectiveness of divorce was issued through the impugned order. Wife was well aware of the fact that husband had pronounced divorce to her for which consequential proceedings before the Arbitration/Union Council had also been taken. Father of the wife had been pursuing the matter before Arbitration Council. Case of the wife who had challenged effectiveness of the divorce was that the submission of divorce deed with a notice before the Arbitration Council could not ipso facto, operate and result into the dissolution of marriage. In the present case it could not be disputed that the period much beyond 90 days had expired from the date of notice of the divorce when impugned certificate of its effectiveness was issued, in the circumstances, especially keeping in view all the relevant facts of service of notice on the Chairman Union Council, the initiation of the proceedings by the Arbitration Council, the repeated appearance of father of the wife who was holding a power of attorney on her behalf in those proceedings and actual knowledge of the wife about the pendency and fact of those proceedings, divorce and its pronouncement had become effective. Failure to send a notice to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council would not render the divorce in-effective in Shariah. Effect of pronouncement of divorce in Shariah would not justify interference with impugned order nor would warrant exercise of discretion in favor of the petitioner/wife under Art.199 of the Constitution.

Case Laws -> S.5, Sched.---suit for maintenance--

 2021 CLC 374 P. 17-A.Wife entitled to maintenance

2021 CLC 348 p. Unregistered nikah name or deed is genuine.
2021 YLR 108. Not cross examined on special matter is admi
2021 MLD 337. 17-A
2020 old lay 160. Christian divorce on basis of cruelty
2021 MLD peshawar 109
Family Court Act.1964.Sec.5.
Sched..
Suit for maintenance allowance,etc.
Wife with held best evidence which was available with her and made her claims doubtful by virtue of this she lost some claims,
Therefore High court modified judgments of the lower court
2020 PLD 269 SUPREME-COURTBookmark this Case
FAWAD ISHAQ VS Mst. MEHREEN MANSOOR
S. 5, Sched.---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 41---dower (mehr), recovery of---Property mentioned in Cl.16 of Nikahnama as dower for wife---suit for recovery of said property was filed by respondent-lady against her motherin-law and father-in-law without impleading her husband---Subject property was owned by the mother-in-law---Held, that mother-in-law was not a signatory to the Nikahnama nor had executed any other document agreeing to transfer the subject property---Mother-in-law had not permitted her husband, expressly or impliedly, to transfer the property in terms of S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882---Respondent made no attempt to ascertain that the father-in-law had the power to transfer the property---suit filed by respondent was dismissed with the observation that she could still claim from her husband any part of her dower which remained unpaid.
Citation Name: 2020 CLC 380 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTANBookmark this Case
AZIZ-UR-REHMAN VS Mst. BIBI JAMEELA
S.5, Sched.---suit for recovery of dowry articles and dower---Family Court decreed the suit and appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court---Validity---Not possible for wife to keep the record of purchased articles and prepare list of dowry articles and obtain signatures of husband and witnesses---Whosoever alleged existence of a particular fact was to prove the same---Solitary statement of wife was enough to prove dowry articles---When marriage had not been consumated then wife would be entitled to half of the fixed dower only and remaining half should be returned/restored to husband unless he waived such right voluntarily---Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below to the extent of dowry articles were modified and amount of dowry articles was reduced---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.
Citation Name: 2020 YLR 2350 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
JEHANGIR KHAN VS Mst. SAEEDA BEGUM
S. 5, Sched.---Nikahnama, Column Nos. 17 & 20---suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and residential house--Column No. 17 of Nikahnama was silent whether residential house was given to the plaintiff-wife either in lieu of dower or as a gift---suit house had been given to the plaintiff as a part of dower or gift in consideration of marriage in circumstances---Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter---Plaintiff according to Column No. 20 of Nikahnama was entitled for maintenance @ Rs. 5,000/- per month---Plaintiff-wife had left the house of defendant due to non-payment of maintenance allowance---Courts below had rightly held that wife had not self deserted---Trial Court had rightly held that wife was entitled for maintenance @ Rs. 5,000/- per month for last three years and further maintenance allowance at the same rate till subsistence of marriage and had declined to grant maintenance beyond period of three years---Judgment and decree of Appellate Court to the extent of recovery of maintenance beyond three years with 15% increase was illegal and same were set aside and those of Family Court were restored---Constitutional petition was partially allowed.
PLD 2012 L 418. S.9 SUB 1 B favor husband conjugal right only khula can be claim . KFC has no other jurisdiction
Citation Name: 2020 YLR 1850 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
Mst. SANA GUL VS USMAN KHAN
S. 5, Sched.---suits for recovery of dower, maintenance allowance for wife and minors---Desertion of wife---Effect--Defendant-husband had not paid the dower claimed by the plaintiff-wife---Plaintiff-wife was entitled for recovery of entire dower in the shape of seven tolas gold ornaments---Plaintiff-wife could refuse to perform matrimonial obligation if entire dower had not been paid to her---Desertion of wife could not be considered as her disobedience, in circumstances---Defendant-husband was bound to maintain his wife until and unless he had paid the dower---Plaintiffwife had not been paid maintenance during the period of desertion and she was entitled for maintenance @ Rs. 5,000/per month from the date of institution of suit till payment of dower and provision of separate accommodation to her--If plaintiff-wife after receiving dower and provision of separate accommodation refused to honour the decree of restitution of conjugal rights then she would not be entitled to maintenance allowance---Maintenance allowance for the minors fixed by the Courts below was insufficient to meet their requirements which was enhanced to Rs. 5,000/per month for each child with further increase @ Rs. 10% per annum---Constitutional petition was disposed of, accordingly.
Citation Name: 2020 YLR 188 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
PERVEZ ALI VS Mst. RAZIA BEGUM
S.5, Sched.---dower and maintenance allowance, recovery of---Wife filed suit for recovery of dower and maintenance allowance---Wife, filed application to the effect that she had received an amount of Rs. five lac through cheque as her maintenance allowance and rest of the claim would be settled privately---Joint statement of both the parties was recorded and suit was disposed of on 27.9.2014---Wife on 15.5.2015, filed suit for recovery of dower as husband never turned up for settlement---Said suit was partially decreed---Validity---Record revealed that the wife had sought recovery of possession of agricultural property along with a constructed house, which, as per her contention, were given to her in lieu of her dower---Husband-defendant in his written statement had admitted that he had given his share from his ancestral property to the wife along with constructed house---Factum of deed dated 16.3.1985, on the basis of which dower had been paid, was denied---Petitioner/husband had also asserted that the house was jointly owned by him with brothers and the amount to the extent of her share in the house was paid to her---Petitioner in his written statement, though, had admitted the fixation of dower, but had taken the stance that the respondent-wife to whom the property was transferred, in lieu of dower, had alienated it to another person---Respondent/wife while appearing as witness had reiterated the factum of fixation of dower and non-payment thereof, which portion of the statement remained un-rebutted, which would be considered to have been admitted---Similarly, the respondent-wife had received the amount of share in the house---Evidently, no property was ever mutated in the name of the respondent-wife, as such, she could never transfer it to other person---Petitioner/husband could not produce any evidence regarding payment of share in the house to the respondent-wife---Petitioner/ husband had failed to prove that any property either constructed or otherwise was given to the respondent-wife---Constitutional petition being without any merit was dismissed in limine.
Citation Name: 2020 MLD 1091 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
ABDUL ALI VS Mst. SANI
S. 5, Sched.---suit for recovery of dower and maintenance allowance---Principles---Payment of dower on behalf of grandfather---Scope---Dower deed---Proof of---Grandfather of defendant-husband promised to transfer landed property as a dower in favour of wife of his grandson through dower deed---Contention of defendant-husband was that he had not executed dower deed in favour of plaintiff-wife---suit was decreed concurrently---Validity---Scribe and marginal witnesses of dower deed had expired but plaintiff-wife had substantiated the execution of the dower deed by producing sons of said deceased witnesses---Entire dower as per dower deed was outstanding against the defendanthusband---Grandfather of defendant being his elder agreed to transfer landed property to the wife of his grandson through dower deed which had his signature and he stood surety for the same---Property which had been mentioned in the dower deed as dower for plaintiff even if it did not belong to the defendant should be transferred to the wife--Father or grandfather could transfer movable as well as immovable property as dower on the eve of marriage of his son/grandson---If anyone had stood surety or had guaranteed the payment of dower then he was as much party and liable to pay the same as bridegroom himself---Presence of wife at the time of execution of dower deed/agreement was not necessary as same was not a commercial transaction---Marriage in the present case was arranged one and its terms and conditions had been settled amongst elders of the families---Dower deed had been proved on behalf of plaintiffwife---Grandfather of defendant had expired and inheritance mutation to the extent of share of plaintiff was illegal and void---Wife had right to refuse conjugal rights of her husband in case of non-payment of dower---Desertion of plaintiff in her parents' house could not be considered as her disobedience when her dower was outstanding against the husband---Defendant was bound to maintain his children and disclose his financial status before the Family Court--Defendant had not disclosed his earning which showed that maintenance allowance fixed by the Courts below was within his means---Family Court had discretion to grant annual increase in the maintenance allowance---No misreading or non-reading of evidence had been pointed out in the impugned judgments passed by the Courts below--Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2020 MLD 554 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
ISLAM GUL VS Mst. NALEEM
S. 5, Sched. & S. 7(2)---suit for dissolution of marriage and recovery of dowry articles, dower and maintenance allowance---Khula, announcement of---Procedure---Additional evidence, production of---Scope---Family Court decreed the suit against which appeal was filed wherein appellant moved an application for additional evidence but same was dismissed---Validity---Wife at her own could not announce or award khula---Family Court could dissolve marriage on the basis of khula on the request of wife---Family Court could not allow additional evidence or add names of witnesses in the schedule of witnesses---Parties with the permission of Court could call any witness at any later stage if Court considered such evidence expedient in the interest of justice---Family Court or Appellate Court could not re-open schedule of witnesses submitted by the parties---Defendant (husband) remained silent during the trial of case despite ample opportunity to produce any witness in his defence---Defendant had neglected his wife and had entered into second marriage---Father of plaintiff was businessman and delivery of dowry articles as per list annexed with the plaint could not be denied---Nothing was on record that plaintiff had taken back the dowry articles---Courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence produced by the parties and arrived at proper conclusions while passing the impugned judgments and decrees---No jurisdictional error had been pointed out in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2020 PLD 173 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
Mst. YASMEEN GUL VS MUHAMMAD ZUBAIR
S. 5, Sched. & S. 10(4)---suit for dissolution of marriage and recovery of dowry articles---Khula---Scope---Family Court dissolved marriage on the basis of Khula---Validity---Plaintiff (wife) had produced sufficient evidence in support of her claim for dowry articles---Defendant (husband) had submitted that he himself had purchased articles but he had failed to substantiate the same---Evidence of plaintiff with regard to dowry articles was cogent and convincing as compared to the evidence produced by the defendant---Khula could be granted by the Family Court if wife had failed to establish any allegation leveled in the plaint---Family Court, in the present case, had granted Khula as reconciliation between the parties had failed---Such findings of Family Court were not based on evidence and same could not be challenged through constitutional petition---Right for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula was absolute and contingent upon restoration of dower to the husband---Muslim woman had been given right to get herself released from the bond of marriage, if she could not live with her husband within the limits prescribed by Allah Almighty---Wife in such event had to seek Khula by foregoing dower received by her from her husband in consideration of marriage---If husband had left his wife giving divorce then he would not be entitled to receive anything back giving by him to his spouse---If wife herself deserted her husband then she had to give something in lieu of her release---Courts below were competent to draw inference while delivering the judgments---High Court in constitutional jurisdiction could not interfere into such findings unless and until miscarriage of justice had been established---Constitutional petition was not maintainable when evidence in the case had properly been appreciated--Appellate Court had passed the decree after properly evaluating the evidence available on record---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2020 CLC 1874 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
Mst. FARHAT IMAM VS SAJID NAZEEF
S.5, Sched.---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S.2---suit for dissolution of marriage---Grounds for decree for dissolution of marriage---Plea of khula---Scope---Wife would lose her dower only if she seeks dissolution of marriage on the sole ground of khula and not when she urges other grounds in support of her case, unless the other grounds are not proved---Entitlement to receive dower or its retention would remain unaffected and intact, if wife proved other grounds like cruelty of the husband.
Citation Name: 2020 CLC 910 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
USMAN KHAN VS Mst. SHEHLA GUL
S. 5, Sched---suit for recovery of dower---Scope---Husband assailed the findings of courts below whereby wife's claim of 5-1/2 tolas gold as outstanding dower was decreed---Validity---Husband himself had admitted outstanding dower as 5-1/2 tolas against him while cross-examining the Nikah Registrar---Appellate Court had rightly held that the wife was entitled to the outstanding dower of 5-1/2 tolas of gold---Constitutional petition was dismissed.
Citation Name: 2020 CLC 910 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
USMAN KHAN VS Mst. SHEHLA GUL
S. 5, Sched---suit for recovery of dower---Failure to cross-examine on specific issue---Effect---Husband assailed the findings of courts below whereby wife's claim of four marla plot as dower was decreed---Husband had admitted the nikahnama in his examination-in-chief--- Wife, through her attorney, had categorically stated that it was agreed between the parties that four marla plot would be given to her as dower---Husband, during cross-examination, had not specifically questioned about the plot nor had he put any suggestion to her, as such the unchallenged/uncrossed portion of the statement had to be considered as admission of the husband---Constitutional petition, being devoid of merit, was dismissed.
Citation Name: 2020 CLC 803 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
SAKHAWAT HUSSAIN VS Mst. RUBINA SHAHEEN
S.5, Sched.---suit for maintenance---Second marriage by husband without consent of first wife---Effect---Plaintiff, being wife, claimed maintenance, dower and return of dowry articles---Validity---Defendant husband, was responsible to provide maintenance to his wife so that she could live a respectable life but he had failed to maintain her---Plaintiff wife was entitled to maintenance allowance, irrespective of the fact as to whether she left the house of her own choice or was compelled to do so; she was held to be entitled to the award of decree---Constitutional petition filed against the decree passed by the courts below was dismissed.
Citation Name: 2020 CLC 803 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
SAKHAWAT HUSSAIN VS Mst. RUBINA SHAHEEN
S. 5, Sched.---suit for recovery of dower---Entries made in nikahnama---Presumption of truth---Scope---Husband contracted second marriage without first wife's consent---Claim of first wife for maintenance, dower and return of dowry articles---Wife produced nikahnama and kabin-nama which showed that the husband, at the time of nikah, had committed and agreed to transfer certain share of the suit house and give gold ornaments to the wife in lieu of dower amount---Plaintiff wife had established her case through examination of marginal witnesses of nikahnama as well as kabin-nama---Held, when the husband gave immovable property as dower and it was incorporated in the nikahnama, such property became property of the wife---Entries incorporated in the nikahnama were equated to a registered deed---Strong presumption of truth was attached to entries made in the nikahnama---Wife was entitled to the award of decree, in circumstances---Constitutional petition filed against the decree passed by the courts below was dismissed.
Citation Name: 2020 CLC 803 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
SAKHAWAT HUSSAIN VS Mst. RUBINA SHAHEEN
S.5, Sched.---suit for recovery of dowry articles---Scope---Husband contracted second marriage without consent of first wife---Wife claimed maintenance, dower and return of dowry articles---Evidence led by wife in order to substantiate her claim of dowry articles was sufficient as she had appeared before the Trial Court and had also produced other witnesses who were subjected to lengthy cross-examination but they had remained consistent on material points---List of dowry articles was attached and duly exhibited in evidence, which consisted of routine articles and under no circumstances could be termed as unreasonable---Wife was held to be entitled to the award of decree---Constitutional petition was dismissed.
Citation Name: 2020 PLD 343 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
SAIF ULLAH BAJWA VS Mst. SAJIDA MANZOOR
S. 5, Sched, & S.18.---Maintenance for minor and wife---Appearance through agent before Family Court---Effect--Concealment of source of income by husband---Effect---suit for recovery of dower articles and maintenance of wife and minor was decreed concurrently---Contention of petitioner / husband, inter alia, was that impugned orders did not take into account that the husband/petitioner no longer had any source of income and furthermore that wife had not personally appeared before Family Court to substantiate her contentions---Validity---Evidence showed that husband/petitioner had concealed his sources of income and there existed contradictions on behalf of petitioner and his father, who was a witness, regarding his sources of income---Husband, if he fails to disclose his salary, or financial earnings, then adverse inference was to be drawn against him---No bar existed in wife being represented before Family Court by her authorized agent, therefore contention that wife did not appear before Family Court to substantiate her contentions was not tenable since her appearance was made through her authorized agent, who was her father---No illegality existed in impugned order---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2020 MLD 1008 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
Dr. NOOR MUHAMMAD SALEEMI SAGGU VS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE
S. 10---dower---Deferred dower---Scope---Wife sought recovery of deferred dower during subsistence of marriage--Validity---Prompt dower was payable on demand during subsistence of the marriage tie whereas the deferred dower was payable on the time stipulated between the parties, but where no time was stipulated, it was payable on dissolution of marriage either by death or divorce---Deferred dower did not become "prompt" merely because the wife had demanded it---High Court observed that the wife was not entitled to recover her dower at this stage and her suit was premature---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2020 CLCN 10 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
KHUBAIB KHAN VS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, MIAN CHANNU
S. 5, Sched.---suit for recovery of dower and dowry articles---Consent decree---Appeal---Scope---Petitioner assailed judgment and decree passed by the appellate court---Validity---Petitioner along with his brother and counsel was present before the appellate court when the parties settled to resolve the claim of dowry articles and dower on the basis of statement of maternal uncle of the petitioner on oath---Appellate court had passed the impugned order and decree on the basis of statement of petitioner's uncle---Status of impugned order and decree was that of consent decree, which was not appealable---No illegality as jurisdictional error was pointed out in the impugned order warranting interference by the High Court in exercise of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was dismissed.
Citation Name: 2020 CLC 952 HIGH-COURT-AZAD-KASHMIRBookmark this Case
NIAZ AHMED VS Mst. MUSHARAF SHAHEEN
O. VII, R. 10---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act (XI of 1993), S.5, Sched.---suit for declaration and permanent injunction with regard to land given as dower--Maintainability---Plaint, return of---Plaintiff-wife filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction regarding land given to her as dower---Trial Court returned the plaint for presentation before Family Court---Validity---Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate all the matters which fell within the Schedule of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993---If dispute was between the spouses then Family Court was the right forum but if it was between the spouses and third party with regard to property given in lieu of dower then Civil Court had jurisdiction to resolve the said controversy---Dispute, in the present case, was between the widow and the third party i.e. brothers and sisters of her deceased husband---Civil Court was the appropriate forum to decide the present matter--Impugned orders passed by the Courts below were set aside and suit was transferred to the Court of Senior Civil Judge for its decision on merits---Revision was allowed, in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2019 MLD 576 SUPREME-COURT-AZAD-KASHMIRBookmark this Case
Syed IQBAL SHAH VS Syeda TAHIRA BIBI
S. 42---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act (XI of 1993), S.5---suit for declaration regarding land given as dower---Maintainability---Plaintiff-wife filed suit for declaration with regard to the land given to her as dower and also challenged therein the gift deed relating to the said land executed in favour of a third party---suit was decreed concurrently---Validity---Entries of Nikahnama had presumption of truth vis-à-vis oral evidence---suit land given as dower had not been abandoned by the wife---In case of controversy regarding payment of dower in respect of any property between the spouse and third party the civil court was an appropriate forum for determination of the matter--No misreading or non-reading of evidence had been pointed out in the impugned judgments passed by the courts below---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2019 YLR 1945 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
NISAR VS Mst. FAUZIA
Ss. 5, Sched. & 10(4)---suit for recovery of dower, maintenance and dissolution of marriage---Divorce pronounced by husband prior to consummation of marriage---Effect---Dower, payment of---Scope---Family Court dissolved marriage on the basis of khula and found that defendant-husband was entitled for recovery of seven tolas gold as dower from the plaintiff-wife---Appellate Court modified the said judgment and held that wife was entitled for the half of the dower fixed at the time of Nikah---Validity---Marriage, in the present case, had not been consummated and dissolved prior to valid retirement---If Talaq was pronounced by the husband prior to consummation then wife was entitled for half of the dower fixed at the time of Nikah---Where Talaq was pronounced on the demand of wife then she was not entitled to half of dower---Marriage was dissolved by defendant-husband on phone, therefore, he was bound to pay half of the fixed dower to the wife---Wife, in the present case, was bound to return half of the dowered ornaments to the husband---Judgment of Family Court was rightly modified by the Appellate Court---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.
Citation Name: 2019 YLR 734 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
ANWAR ALI VS Mst. NAHEED
S. 5, Sched--- suit for recovery of dower, dowry articles maintenance allowance and custody of minors by the exwife/mother---Payment of gold ornaments in lieu of dower at the time of marriage---Scope---Non-production of receipts of purchase of dowry articles---Effect---Welfare of minors---Scope---Trial Court had held that payment for claimed dower/gold ornaments had already been paid to the ex-wife/petitioner to which she was entitled to retain--Petitioner/ex-wife contended that Trial Court had wrongly held so as she was minor at the time of her marriage and sister of the respondent (husband) had skillfully taken the said gold ornament on the next day of the marriage; Trial Court had not rightly discarded few items like furniture from list of her dowry articles while passing decree in her favour---Respondent (husband) contended that at the time of leaving his house, petitioner (wife) had taken away the dower/gold ornaments---Validity---No proof was provided by the respondent that petitioner had taken gold ornaments along with her while leaving his house---Female who had been given in Nikah to the respondent being minor at that time, it was more plausible to believe that on the next day of marriage, the sister of the respondent had taken the gold ornaments from her as the same had been temporarily arranged at the time of marriage by the sister of respondent who demanded its return just after the marriage was solemnized---Where there was a list of dowry articles which included household articles such list was to be believed---Normally it was not possible for bride to keep the record of purchase of dowry articles and obtain signature on the list of articles from the bridegroom side, all the dowry articles as per list were either returnable or payment of one third of its value in the alternate---Record revealed that during subsistence of trial, Session Court, on application under S. 491, Cr.P.C, gave children to the custody of mother--Mother/petitioner being natural guardian could best take care of the children; father having had contracted second marriage---Constitutional petition of ex-wife/mother was allowed accordingly.
Citation Name: 2019 YLR 605 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
FAWAD ISHAQ VS Mrs. MAHREEN MANSOOR
Ss. 2(d) & 5, Sched.---dower, recovery of---suit against mother-in-law---Concurrent findings of two courts below--suit was filed by plaintiff against her ex-husband and ex-mother-in-law for recovery of dower in shape of constructed house which was in name of her mother-in-law---Family Court and Lower Appellate Court concurrently decreed suit and appeal in favour of plaintiff---Validity---Nikahnama was signed by father-in-law of plaintiff as guarantor and consented that house in question would be given to plaintiff in lieu of dower---House in question was in ownership of ex-mother-in-law of plaintiff---dower in shape of cash amount and gold ornaments was already paid to plaintiff by her husband---Remaining part of her dower concerned the defendant (mother-in-law)---Plaintiff had rightly filed suit against her mother-in-law for recovery of dower---Family Court had jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon such suit filed by plaintiff---Judgments of two courts below were well-reasoned and were based on proper appreciation of evidence and law on the subject---Defendants failed to point out any jurisdictional defect or violation of any law in judgments passed by two courts below---High Court, in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction maintained judgments and decrees passed by two courts below---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2019 MLD 401 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
IQBAL RABBANI VS NOOR UL AIN
Ss. 5, Sched, 7, 9, 17-A & 18---Family Courts Rules, 1965, R. 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 132 & O. VI,
R. 15---suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, dower and dowry articles---Appearance of parties in person---Scope---Representation through counsel/attorney---Scope---Defendant-husband living abroad submitted wakalatnama and written statement without his signatures---Striking of defence---Scope---Personal appearance of a party before Family Court---Pardanasheen lady---Appearance through agent---Exemption from personal appearance--Appointment of a counsel---Authority of agent---Irregularity in the wakalatnama---Effect---Wife filed suit against her husband who lived abroad and his father---Wakalatnama and written statement signed by the father of husband were filed but without signatures of defendant-husband---Family Court struck-off defence of defendant-husband---Validity--suit with regard to family matters could be filed before Family Court by presentation of a plaint---Court on presentation of plaint was to fix a date for appearance of defendant issue summons for appearance on the date fixed therein---If defendant received summon then he should appear before the Family Court and file written statement with list of witnesses---Pardanasheen lady/party to a family suit might be permitted to be represented by a duly authorized agent---Defendant was not bound to appear in person before Family Court---Right to be represented through counsel was a statutory right---Any person who was of the age of majority and was of sound mind might employ an agent through an express or implied authority---Said agent could perform every lawful action which was necessary in order to do such act---When a party was not required to personally appear then he could be represented through attorney or counsel---Appearance of the parties before the Court would include appearance through duly constituted attorney--Court had to confirm genuineness of pleadings/presentations and consent of parties to be represented having not been obtained by way of force, fraud or undue influence---Counsel appointed by a party to the proceedings could represent his/her client before the Court---Execution of wakalatnama was the written instrument and proof of such appointment--If from the record it was clear that party to the proceedings had appointed a counsel, mere omission of certain particulars in the wakalatnama was irregularity which would not vitiate the relations between the counsel and client--Family Court could strike-off defence if order for interim maintenance had not been complied with and decree the suit---If conduct of defendant was contumacious and he had willfully disobeyed the lawful order of Family Court then Court had jurisdiction to strike off the defence---Written statement was signed by one of the defendants and counsel in the present case---Submission of power of attorney at belated stage was not fatal---Order for striking-off defence in presence of valid written statement and that too without notice was unwarranted and not sustainable in the eyes of law---Non-signing of pleadings as well as wakalatnama were mere irregularity and said defect could be cured at any stage by allowing the party to put his/her signatures on the same---If any of the defendants had signed written statement then it would be deemed as valid written statement before the Court---If there was any defect in the power of attorney then same could be cured by filing power of attorney duly attested by the Consulate of Pakistan abroad--Defendant had been restrained from defending his case through impugned order which was against law; said order being illegal and final in nature was amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Defendant could be represented through duly authorized agent---Wakalatnama should be returned to the counsel for the defendant for resubmitting the same before the Trial Court---Defendant-husband was allowed to place on file the power of attorney executed in his favour---Impugned order passed by the Family Court was set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2019 PLD 218 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
AJMAL KHAN VS Mst. FALAK NEGAR BIBI
S. 5, Sched---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S.2---suit for dissolution of marriage and recoveryof dower---Rukhsati having not been effected---Effect---Family Court conditionally dissolved the marriage and passed decree for half dower in favour of wife---Validity---Wife would be entitled to whole dower upon consummation of marriage or death of the husband and valid retirement---Wife could not ask for her dower before rukhsati---When husband had divorced his wife before consummation, he had to pay half of the dower but said principle was not applicable when before consummation wife was asking for dower---Wife before consummation was not entitled to ask for dissolution of marriage on the grounds provided in S.2 of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939---Wife was not entitled for dower before rukhsati and valid retirement---No ground existed for the wife to ask for dissolution of marriage in circumstances---Impugned judgments passed by the Courts below were against law---When parties were not ready to settle and live their lives in accordance with Islam, their marriage was dissolved on the basis of khula--Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below were set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2019 PLD 218 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURTBookmark this Case
AJMAL KHAN VS Mst. FALEK NEGAR BIBI
S. 5, Sched---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S.2---suit for dissolution of marriage and recovery of dower---Rukhsati having not been effected---Effect---Family Court conditionally dissolved the marriage and passed decree for half dower in favour of wife---Validity---Wife would be entitled to whole dower upon consummation of marriage or death of the husband and valid retirement---Wife could not ask for her dower before rukhsati---When husband had divorced his wife before consummation, he had to pay half of the dower but said principle was not applicable when before consummation wife was asking for dower---Wife before consummation was not entitled to ask for dissolution of marriage on the grounds provided in S.2 of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939---Wife was not entitled for dower before rukhsati and valid retirement---No ground existed for the wife to ask for dissolution of marriage in circumstances---Impugned judgments passed by the Courts below were against law---When parties were not ready to settle and live their lives in accordance with Islam, their marriage was dissolved on the basis of khula--Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below were set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.
Citation Name: 2019 YLR 640 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
SAIMA ASHRAF VS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE
S. 5 & Sched.---suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dower---Maintenance allowance proportionate to financial status of husband/father---Scope---Dower---Scope---Petitioner (wife) contended that she was entitled for maintenance allowance proportionate to the financial status of her husband and the dower amount as per entry in Nikahnama--- Validity--- Record revealed that respondent was a retired person getting monthly pension of Rs. 7000; he also owned some agricultural as well as urban land in addition to some cattle---Appellate Court, while dilating upon the issue of maintenance allowance, had taken into account the assets of husband and that he had three wives, including the petitioner---Husband had to maintain all three of them---Maintenance allowance to wife /children by a husband/father was governed by Injunctions of Islam---Appellate Court had determined the issue of maintenance allowance of the petitioner quite reasonably---Column No. 17 of Nikahnama showed that dower amount was only to be given to the petitioner in case of divorce by the husband, whereas marriage between the parties was still intact---No illegality or infirmity having been found in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the two Courts below constitutional petition was dismissed.
Citation Name: 2019 YLR 84 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
Mst. RUKHSANA MAJEED VS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE
S. 5 & Sched.---suit for recovery of dower---Gold ornaments and a constructed house was incorporated in the
Nikahnama as "dower" at the time of marriage---Execution of exhibited agreement admitted by the party---Effect--Petitioner/ ex-wife contended that Appellate Court had wrongly set aside the decree passed by the Family Court as written agreement exhibited by the respondent/ex-husband was disbelieved by the Family Court---Respondent contended that petitioner had waived off the right incorporated in Nikahnama in light of agreement between the parties duly written on stamp paper---Validity---Record revealed that petitioner/plaintiff (ex-wife) had admitted the fact that she purchased the stamp paper, mentioning certain serial number and date, which contained her signature as well as thumb impression; she also admitted that she signed the stamp paper after the same was written---Record revealed that document exhibited by the respondent bore the serial number and date as referred to by the petitioner--Respondent produced not only attesting witnesses and the scribe of said exhibited document , but also one witness to prove the purchase of exhibited stamp paper---Witnesses proved the fact that the petitioner had waived her dower in favour of the respondent while she admitted the execution of the document exhibited by the respondent---Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence on record---High Court upheld the impugned decree and judgment passed by the Appellate Court----Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.
Citation Name: 2019 CLC 1799 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
JAM MEERAN VS ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
Ss.13 & 5, Sched.---suit for recovery of dower---Execution proceedings---Petitioner assailed orders of executing court and appellate court whereby both the courts below in proceedings for execution of decree refused to accept some other property as dower instead of the property which was decreed---Validity---Substituting the property would amount to the executing court amending the decree, which was not permissible in law---Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine.
Citation Name: 2019 CLC 1475 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
SHAZIA PARVEEN VS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE
S. 5, Sched.---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XII, R. 6---suit for recovery of dower---Judgment on admission--
-Family Court dismissed the suit for recovery/possession of house in lieu of dower to be paid by husband in terms of Column No. 16 of Nikahnama---Plea of wife was that an agreement was executed by husband in her favour relating to transfer of house as dower--- Husband claimed that the said dower was paid in cash---Trial Court dismissed the suit on the admission of wife that dower had been received by her---Validity---Trial Court had not mentioned in what perspective such admission was made and what was the mode of payment of dower to the wife in terms of her admission---Admission of wife had been considered in piecemeal before using the same for decision---Admission had to be rejected or accepted as a whole which had not been done by the courts below---Constitutional petition was partly allowed and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for decision afresh.
Citation Name: 2019 CLC 1462 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
Syed SAJJAD HUSSAIN VS JUDGE FAMILY COURT
S. 5, Sched.---suits for recovery of dowry articles by wife and for restitution of conjugal rights by the husband--Payment of deferred dower---Burden of proof---Scope---Plea of wife was that she had been divorced and husband claimed that he had not divorced the wife and had paid the deferred dower---Validity---High Court, on the basis of husband's plea that dower had already been paid, observed that the parties through their conduct had modified the condition for payment of dower on wife's demand instead of waiting for the dissolution of marriage through divorce or death---Husband was required to prove through cogent and confidence inspiring evidence that either he had not agreed to pay the deferred dower or after having agreed to pay the same had actually made the said payment---Husband was estopped by his conduct to claim that deferred dower was not payable during subsistence of marriage as he claimed to have paid the dower on wife's demand---Statement of witness, produced by husband, was sketchy and he did not state that he was a witness to said payment---Payment of dower by husband was not established on record---Trial Court was justified to decree the suit filed by wife for recovery of deferred dower---Constitutional petition, being devoid of force, was dismissed.
Citation Name: 2019 MLD 758 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
FAYAZ HUSSAIN VS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE
S. 5---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illus. (e) & Chap. VI, [Arts.102 to 110]---Exclusion of oral evidence by documentary evidence---Nikahnama, contents of---Scope---suit for recovery of house as dower filed by wife was concurrently decreed in her favour by two Courts below---Plea raised by husband was that house mentioned in Nikahnama was of 5 Marlas whereas two Courts below passed decree for house of 10 Marlas---Validity---Nikah Nama was public document and presumption of truth was attached to entries made therein---Where there was gross misreading, non-reading or jurisdictional defect flouting on the surface of record, High Court was justified to interfere with the same under its Constitutional jurisdiction to undo injustice---High Court modified judgments and decrees passed by two courts below and decreed the suit to the extent of house measuring 5 Marlas with necessary amenities or in alternate its market price---Claim of wife contrary to the terms and conditions of Nikah Nama was dismissed--Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
Citation Name: 2019 MLD 112 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
Mst. IRAM SHAHZADI VS MUHAMMAD IMRAN-UL-HAQ
2003 SCMR 1261, 2008 SCMR 186, 2013 CLC 276, 2016 CLC 180, 2016 CLC 765, 2017 MLD 1101, 2017 YLR 1481, PLD 2007 Lahore 515, PLD 2012 Lah. 43, PLD 2012 Lahore 43, PLD 2018 Lah. 429, PLD 2018 Lahore 429, S. 5 & Sched.---Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act (XLIII of 1976), S. 2(a)---suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, dowry articles, dower and gold ornaments---Dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula---Entries against Serial/Column Nos.13 to 16 of the Nikahnama---Effect---Jurisdiction of the Family Court---Scope---Family Court declared the petitioner/plaintiff owner of 22-Tolas gold ornaments as per entry in Column 16 of the Nikahnama, however, Appellate Court set aside the decree to the extent of said gold ornaments---Petitioner/ex-wife contended that bridal gifts were in addition to and not in lieu of Haq Mehr (dower) thus, the same, being not part of the dower, were not liable to be returned to the respondent on the ground of Khulla---Respondent contended that Appellate Court had rightly reversed decree with regard to the said gold ornaments as Family Court had no jurisdiction to entertain claims regarding entries in Nikahnama---Validity---Held, matter in question called for the perusal of entries made at serial Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the exhibited Nikahnama which showed that Haqmahr of Rs. 5000/- fixed in the entry against serial No. 13, payment of which was deferred since the entry against serial No. 14 had been left empty---Entry against serial No. 15 showed that no part of Haqmahr was paid at the time of marriage---Entry of gold ornaments, weighing 22-Tolas, having been given to the bride by family of respondent was shown at serial No. 16 of the Nikahnama which became ownership of the petitioner---Mentioning of Rs. 5000/- as dower in column No. 13 left no doubt that gold ornaments were in addition to the Haqmahr and not in lieu thereof and did not form part of dower--Such gold ornaments were not part and parcel of dower but had to be regarded as bridal gifts in contradistinction to dower---Said gold ornaments, being bridal gifts, could not be withheld by the husband in lieu of Khulla as the same were not part of dower---Even otherwise respondent had shown his consent to return 22-Tolas gold ornaments to the petitioner while deposing before the Family Court---Section 2(a) of Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976 stipulated that the articles of dowry, bridal gifts, presents or all other moveable property were the belongings of the bride---Consideration for marriage was dower amount which had not been paid to the wife---Petitioner had waived her dower amount in consideration of Khulla which was enough---Family Court had the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate any matter arising out of the Nikahnama---High Court set aside impugned order passed by the Appellate Court and restored decree and judgment passed by the Family Court---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
Citation Name: 2019 CLC 1008 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
MUHAMMAD SAEED VS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE
S. 5 & Sched.---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 104---suit for recovery of deferred dower---Limitation--Deferred dower was payable after a specified period of time and when no period was fixed, the same had to be paid on the death of the husband or dissolution of marriage.
Citation Name: 2019 CLC 1008 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
MUHAMMAD SAEED VS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE
S. 5 & Sched.---suits for recovery of dower, maintenance and dowry articles by wife and for restitution of conjugal rights by the husband---Wife desertion by husband---Scope---suit of wife was decreed to the extent of recovery of dowry articles---Appellate Court modified the decree and wife was held entitled to recover deferred dower---Validity--Wife had mentioned in her plaint that she was deserted by her husband, but she did not specifically mention in her examination-in-chief that she was deserted by her husband---Wife had failed to prove her forcible desertion by the husband---Filing of suit for restitution of conjugal rights demonstrated that husband was willing to rehabilitate wife but she did not want reconciliation and had obtained decree of divorce on the basis of khula---Family Court had rightly declared her disentitled to dower amount---Constitutional petition was partly allowed.
Citation Name: 2019 MLD 720 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDHBookmark this Case
ZAHID HUSSAIN VS Mst. FARHANA
Ss. 7 & 8---Family Courts Rules, 1965,R. 6---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5 & Sched.---suit for dissolution of marriage---'Ordinarily resides'---Scope---Jurisdiction of Family Court---Khulla, right of---Scope---Petitioner (exhusband) contended that respondent/ plaintiff did not ordinarily reside at the address shown in her plaint and Family Court had not complied with the provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 in granting decree of khulla to the respondent---Validity---Deliberate use of the phrase 'ordinarily resides' in proviso clause of R. 6 of the Family Courts Rules, 1965 was an exception confined to the 'wife' alone---Ordinarily residence must not require proof as would be for permanent residence, such was keeping in view the agony of woman who, on being ousted by husband, sometimes did not find shelter in the house of her parents---Right to claim 'khula' as well 'dower' were absolute rights of 'wife' which legally could not be resisted if the 'wife' persisted to such claim---Such entitlement, was not subject to a proof of permanent or long residence but a claim of stay of few days even would be enough for the wife to file a suit for dissolution of marriage or dower only---Claim of 'ordinarily resides' would not require proof of the standard which normally was necessary for a disputed fact but a claim on oath shouldered by independent support would be sufficient---Record revealed that claim of wife regarding her ordinary residence was backed by an inquiry (physical verification from neighbors) made by the commissioner appointed by the Family Court on the application of the petitioner, which was rightly taken as sufficient proof to take cognizance into the matter---Temporary, even one day, residence, was sufficient to seek relief of Khulla and said proposition of law had taken status of stare decisis, hence the petitioner's objections over Khulla with regard to jurisdiction was not maintainable--- Compliance of Ss. 7 & 8 of Muslim Family laws Ordinanc e, 1961.2021 CLC 374 P. 17-A.Wife entitled to maintenance
2021 CLC 348 p. Unregistered nikah name or deed is genuine.
2021 YLR 108. Not cross examined on special
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