Ss. 380/452--Family suit--Pre-arrest bail--Grant of--Complainant is husband of the sister of the petitioner and she had filed a suit for recovery of dowry articles which was decreed ex-parte-

 PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 219
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
Present: Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ.
ADEEL MANZOOR--Petitioner
versus
STATE and others--Respondents
Crl. P. No. 119-L of 2022, decided on 21.2.2023.
(On appeal against the judgment dated 19.02.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Criminal Miscellaneous
No. 32166-B of 2022)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----S. 498--Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Ss. 380/452--Family suit--Pre-arrest bail--Grant of--Complainant is husband of the sister of the petitioner and she had filed a suit for recovery of dowry articles which was decreed ex-parte--The bailiff was appointed to recover the said articles--On the date of occurrence of this case, bailiff visited the house of the complainant but failed to recover the same--Even the arrival of the bailiff has also been suppressed--All these circumstances clearly indicate the malafide and ulterior motive on the part of the complainant--Petition is converted into an appeal and the same is allowed.                     [P. 220] A & B

Sardar M. Latif Khan Khosa, Senior ASC (via video link
from Lahore) for Petitioner along with Petitioner in person (at Islamabad).

Mr. Muhammad JaffarAdditional P.G. Punjab, Amir Malik, DSP, Ghulam Mustafa, IO and M. Razzaq, SI for State (through video link from Lahore).

Mr. Muhammad Yaseen HatifASC for Complainant (via video link from Lahore).

Date of hearing: 21.2.2023.

Order

Sardar Tariq Masood, J.--The petitioner Adeel Manzoor through this petition has impugned the order dated 19.09.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore whereby, pre-arrest bail was declined to him in case FIR No. 647 dated 07.04.2022, registered at Police Station Sundar District Lahore, under Sections 380 and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

2. The allegation against the petitioner, his co-accused TouqeerManzoor Ahmed and seven other un-known persons is that they stole away house hold articles of the complainant.

3. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner and learned APG and counsel for the complainant, we observed that complainant Khudadad Bhandara is husband of the sister of the petitioner and she had filed a suit for recovery of dowry articles which was decreed ex-parte and in the execution proceedings, the bailiff was appointed to recover the said articles. On 24.03.2022, which is the date of occurrence of this case, the bailiff visited the house of the complainant but failed to recover the same. According to the bailiff, the complainant was not present in the house and he kept on waiting for two hours and thus proceedings remained un-successful. While lodging the FIR, the complainant had totally suppressed the relationship of the petitioner with the complainant and also suppressed the fact of ex-parte decree dated 25.2.2022. Even the arrival of the bailiff has also been suppressed. All these circumstances clearly indicate the mala fide and ulterior motive on the part of the complainant. The co-accused Manzoor Ahmed who was the father-in-law of the complainant was also nominated as one of the accused but during the investigation it was opined by the Investigating Officer that he was not present there and his bail was confirmed through the impugned order which was not challenged. The case of the petitioner is at par with his co-accused Manzoor Ahmed because the role against both these persons is the same, mentioned in the FIR. The petitioner has also joined the investigation. It will be the trial Court who, after recording of the evidence, will determine the guilt of the petitioner when his sister already has a decree in her favour.

4. Due to the above mentioned reasons, when petitioner remained successful in proving the mala fide on the part of the complainant, this petition is converted into an appeal and the same is allowed. The pre-arrest bail already granted to the petitioner is hereby confirmed, subject to his furnishing fresh bail bonds of Rs. 100,000/- (Rupees one hundred thousand only) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

(K.Q.B.)          Bail confirmed

- Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance , 1961 , has been enacted to remove the difficulties and sufferings of grandchildren but it cannot be interpreted so as to decrease the shares of the other descendants of the propositus -

 PLD 2023 Peshawar 6

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance ( VIII of 1961 ) ---
---- S . 4 --- Muslim Personal Law ( Shariat ) Application Act ( V of 1962 ) , S. 2 --- Principle of " per stripes " --- Scope --- Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance , 1961 , has been enacted to remove the difficulties and sufferings of grandchildren but it cannot be interpreted so as to decrease the shares of the other descendants of the propositus --- Section 4 in spite of being non - obstante clause , has to be interpreted in the light of S. 2 of the Muslim Personal Law ( Shariat ) Application Act , 1962 and both the statutes çan stand together .

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance ( VIII of 1961 ) ----
---- S . 4 --- Succession --- Scope --- Son / daughter of a predeceased son can get their share in the property of their grandfather , but it would be subject to the shares as provided in the Holy Quran and if the distribution of share under the provisions of S. 4 is overlapping or inconsistent then Shariat would prevail .

-Prohibition of--Establishment of child care centre within residential premises--Fundamental right--Facility for working parents--Domain of municipal corporation--

 PLJ 2023 Islamabad 256
PresentMohsin Akhtar Kayani, J.
ABDUL JABBAR KHAN BANGASH--Petitioner
versus
FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Cabinet Division
and another--Respondents
W.P. No. 3178-2016, decided on 7.3.2023.

Islamabad Capital Territory Local Government Act, 2015 (X of 2015)--

----Ss. 3(3)(4), 71 & 73--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Arts. 37(e), 104, 199--Prohibition of--Establishment of child care centre within residential premises--Fundamental right--Facility for working parents--Domain of municipal corporation--Function of union council--Functions of Union Council have been defined in Sections 71 of Act also explained in 2nd Schedule, but surprisingly there is no specific provision or subject, which gives an extensive powers to Union Councils or MCI or as case may be to allow childcare set up as an occupation to be registered within residential area--It is mandatory to establish childcare centers in every vicinity as well as in every establishment to provide safeguard and to ensure protection of family, mother and child including protection of marriage, which is State responsibility--State has to provide all facilities to working mothers or parents, who are not able to properly maintains their minor children due to non-availability of daycare facility for establishment of childcare center in different areas, establishment or institution due to fact that plots have not been specified for childcare in Islamabad Land Disposal Regulation, 2005--Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, acknowledges concept of promotion of social justice in terms of Article 37 (e), where state is under obligation to make provisions for securing just and humane conditions of work, ensuring that children and women are not employed in vocations unsuited to their age or sex, and for maternity benefits for women in employment--Federal Government shall take all necessary steps for establishment of childcare facility in public and private institution within ICT--Disposed of.         [Pp. 259, 265, 266 & 267] A, B, C, D & E

Mr. Mohkam Bajwa and Mr. Haider Omer Hayat, Advocates for Petitioner.

Mr. Usman Rasool Ghuman, AAG for Respondents.

Ch. Kamil Hayat, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.

Date of hearing: 14.2.2023.

Judgment

Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following relief:-

i.        childcare centers be declared as an activity that offer essential home based public service;

ii.       the Respondents be directed to classify childcare centers as public service, within regulation 3 of the Land Disposal Regulations, and allot plots for childcare centers, within ICT, under the head of Community and Facilities Plots, and dispose them off accordingly;

iii.      the Respondents be directed to authorize and permit childcare to be located in residential premises within the aforementioned zoning regulations;

iv.      Home Occupation be declared to include the establishment, running and management of childcare centers;

          Any other and better relief that the honorable Court deems appropriate may also be granted.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that petitioner is aggrieved with the prohibition on the establishment of daycare center within the residential premises on the ground that it is a fundamental right to establish such kind of business in the residential area, therefore, he prayed for issuance of writ to grant permission for establishment of childcare center to provide home based services and public service within Islamabad Capital Territory. He further contends that the childcare center is required within closest residential community and provision of Building Control Regulation, 2005, Islamabad Land Disposal Regulation, 2005, CDA Ordinance, 1960 as well as provisions of Sections 3(3) 3(4), 71 and 73 of the Islamabad Capital Territory Local Government Act, 2015 are to be declared ultra vires to the constitutional guarantees.

3. Conversely, respondents have not filed any comments in this case, despite elapse of seven (07) years, such conduct demonstrates that they are not interested to argue this case, even on the date fixed, they were not interested to argue the case, whereby they were directed to file para-wise their comments within two (02) days, but no such comments have been filed on record, therefore, this Court has left with no other option, but to proceed under the law.

4. Notices were also issued to learned Attorney General of Pakistan under Section XXVII-A CPC, whereby learned AAG in attendance has raised the question of maintainability on the ground that the prayer made in the instant writ petition falls within the policy domain of Municipal Corporation Islamabad under ICT Local Government Act, 2015.

5. Arguments heard and record perused.

6. Perusal of record reveals that petitioner is managing a childcare center under the name and style of Nigran Carea Company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, which offers daytime childcare facilities to the residents of Islamabad Capital Territory and it has been claimed by the petitioner that it is neither operated by or connected to any school system or any Montessori, nor does it have any connection with other any business establishment or professional office. The Nigran Care solely functions as a daytime childcare center, and offers working parents and employees with a safe, secure and hassle-free facility to meet their core childcare issues, but they have not been given permission to run the business.

7. The petitioner has also challenged the vires of Sections 3(3), 3(4), 71 and 73 of the Islamabad Capital Territory Local Government Act, 2015 to be declared illegal and unconstitutional for being against the spirit of Article 140A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 as well as against the spirit of ICT Local Government Act, 2015 reflected in the preamble.

8. In order to resolve the issue, it is necessary to go through the Sections 3(3), 3(4), 71 and 73 of the Islamabad Capital Territory Local Government Act, 2015, which are as under:-

(3) The development, planning and overall maintenance of the Master plan within the specified area of Islamabad Capital Territory will continue to vest with Capital Development Authority and thus the overall Master Plan shall apply and no action by any authority, body or corporation shall be initiated in violation of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 and the Zoning regulations duly approved by the Government. All powers to be exercised and rules to be enforced shall be subject to the planning framework already set in the aforementioned laws, rules and regulations.

(4) This legal framework shall without derogation to the existing laws and regulations of the Islamabad Capital Territory and Capital Development Authority and segments not covered by the prevalent law shall be covered by the respective local Government, as determined by the Government. Wherever there is a clash between the existing law and provisions of this Act, the existing law shall prevail unless clearly specified or repealed.

71. Functions of the Union Council.--(1) A Union Council shall, subject to the provisions of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, perform functions specified in the Second Schedule.

73. Functions of Metropolitan Corporation.--(1) The Metropolitan Corporation shall, subject to the provisions of Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 and Islamabad Capital Territory Zoning Regulations, 1992 perform functions mentioned in Third Schedule

9. While going through the said provisions of law, it appears that ICT Local Government Act, 2015 extracted major functions of Capital Development Authority and curtailed the powers of the CDA, which are now confined to the extent of Sections 11 and 12 of the CDA Ordinance, 1960, where Master Regulator CDA can only plan and prepare a scheme within the specified area of ICT. Similarly regulations framed under the CDA Ordinance have also been covered in terms of Section 3(4) of the ICT Local Government Act, 2015, where all prevalent laws were given complete protection unless there is clash between the existing law and provision of this Act, in such eventuality, the existing law shall prevail unless clearly specified or repealed.

10. No doubt the petitioner’s case falls within the domain of Municipal Corporation, Islamabad in terms of ICT Local Government Act, 2015, in which MCI can perform its functions and powers provided in 3rd Schedule of the Act. Similarly, functions of the Union Council have been defined in Sections 71 of the Act also explained in 2nd Schedule, but surprisingly there is no specific provision or subject, which gives an extensive powers to the Union Councils or MCI or as the case may be to allow the childcare set up as an occupation to be registered within the residential area as Sections 71 and 73 of the Act are subject to the provisions of CDA Ordinance, 1960 as well as ICT Zoning Regulation, 1992, such aspect minimize and curtail the Authority of MCI, rather placed a limit upon the representative institution of public i.e. MCI not to perform those functions, which are within the domain of CDA.

11. This Court is mindful of the fact that legislative intent has to be considered on the plain reading of Sections 71 and 73 of the ICT Local Government Act, 2015, which was incorporated by the Legislature intentionally to supervise the MCI under the umbrella of CDA in terms of CDA Ordinance, 1960, though transitory provision in terms of Chapter-XV of the Act provided the mechanism, where powers have been transmitted to Municipal Corporation including the financial powers in terms of Sections 127, 128, 129 within a specified timeline. Section 130 deals with the succession, where timeline of 180 days has been fixed to divide the rights, assets and liability of the Local Government and even the Government has been empowered to bring all bylaws, rules, regulations, notifications or any other legal instrument, issued under any law in force on the date of commencement of this Act, in conformity with this Act within a period of two years from the date of commencement of this Act. In terms of Sub-Section (3) of Section 130, all existing bye-laws, rules, regulations, notification or any other legal instrument shall, subject to this Act, continue in force, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations until altered, repealed or amended by the Government”. The Federal Government has also been extended with powers to amend the schedule in terms of Section 134 of the Act, such aspect reveals that ICT Building Zoning Regulation, 1992 and CDA Ordinance, 1960 are alive legal instruments, restrict the functionality of MCI, which is indeed against the spirit of Article 140A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 that is a constitutional mandate to establish Local Government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representative of the Local Government however, if such autonomy has not been extended in the literal sense, it will defeat the very purpose of the Local Government and it has to be established to devolve these three major components i.e. political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the Local Government; to promote good governance, effective delivery of services and transparent decision making through institutionalized participation of the people at local level in this regard I have been guided by the principles set-out in PLD 2021 Islamabad 144 (MCI vs Chairman, CDA).

12. While considering the arguments of the petitioner’s side the principle of interpretation expresses the application of literal rule, where the words and phrases used in the statute should be read keeping in view their plain meaning as held in PLD 2012 SC 923 (Baz Muhammad Kakar vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and Justice). It is also settled proposition of law that literal rule of interpretation of the Constitution and statutes was that the words and phrases used therein should be read keeping in view their plain meaning as held in PLD 2012 SC 501 (Ghulam Haider vs Murad through Legal Representatives), therefore, the plain and unambiguous words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense as provided in Sections 71 and 73 as well as Sections 3(3), 3(4) of the Local Government Act, 2015 as held 1998 SCMR 841 (Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi vs Wafaqi Mohtasib). No doubt Courts can interpret the provision of law, but cannot change or substitute said provision and also cannot go beyond the wisdom of law, therefore, while interpreting a statue, Courts are bound to follow intention of legislature and are prohibited to interpret law in a manner, contrary to the legislature as held in PLD 2007 SC 447 (Muhammad Akhtar alias Hussain vs The State).

13. While considering the above discussion, it is apparently clear that Local Government system established under ICT Local Government Act, 2015 is subservient to CDA Ordinance, 1960 and as such majority of the functions of CDA still holds the field and in order to resolve certain issues of powers matrix, the CDA versus Local Government system, it is necessary to transmit all the administrative, financial and political authorities to the representatives of the Local Government system, the transitory provisions as well as amendment in schedule, has to be considered by the Government, who is empowered to amend any rules, regulations in terms of Section 134 of the ICT Local Government Act, 2015. This Court comes to an irresistible conclusion that the arguments rendered by the petitioner side where question of vires has been raised to the extent of ICT, Local Government Act, 2015, is not made out as all those provisos referred in the prayer clause of this petition are not contrary to the constitutional framework, even abstract constitutional review of some provisions are not permissible, especially, when no constitutional defect or fundamental rights have been violated in those provisions, therefore, the challenge thrown by the petitioner to the extent of Sections 3 (3), 3(4), 71 and 73 of the ICT, Local Government Act, 2015 is not made out, rather only a proposed amendment in the schedule of ICT, Local Government Act, 2015, is required to acknowledge the daycare facility being a state obligation.

14. In order to deal with the issue of daycare centers, the Government of Pakistan has introduced Labour Policy, 2010, where Women Workers will benefit from the application of ILO Convention on Equal Remuneration, 1951 (No. 100), ratified by Pakistan in 2001. Minimum and above-minimum wages will be ensured on the basis of equal pay for equal work, and equal pay for work of equal value, as between men and women, in accordance with Pakistan’s obligations under ILO Conventions 100 and 111 concerned with equality and non-discrimination respectively. Women will also benefit from better information concerning their working conditions and arrangements in the informal economy, from improved maternity arrangements, codes of conduct relating to sexual harassment and, where possible, day care arrangements for their children. Similarly, the Government is also committed with providing women with equal opportunities for employment and will re-examine existing legislation to ensure that women are not denied access to suitable jobs that are arising due to Pakistan’s changing labour markets.

15. While considering the above policy this Court is also obliged to appreciate the international standards provided in different conventions. The details of same are as under:

01. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC):

Adopted on 20th November, 1989.

Pakistan has ratified CRC on 12th November, 1990.

Article 18:

1.       States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.

2.       For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present Convention, States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children.

3.       States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of working parents have the right to benefit from child-care services and facilities for which they are eligible.

02. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR):

proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (General Assembly resolution 217 A).

Article 25:

1.       Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

2.       Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

3.       International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights (ICCPR):

          Adopted on 16th December, 1966, by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI)

          Pakistan has ratified ICCPR on June 23, 2010.

        Article 10:

          The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:

1.       The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.

2.       Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.

3.       Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.

4.       Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW):

          Adopted on 18th of December, 1979, by United Nationals General Assembly.

          Pakistan has ratified CEDAW on 3rd December, 1996.

        Article 11

1.       States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:

(a)      The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;

(b)      The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment;

(c)      The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training;

(d)      The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;

(e)      The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;

(f)       The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction.

2.       In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures:

(a)      To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;

(b)      To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances;

(c)      To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities;

(d)      To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.

3.       Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended as necessary.

16. Now adverting towards need of the hour qua the establishment of child daycare center, which are essential for the working parents, who leave their children at the mercy of other family members or servants, who are not professionally trained to provide a care and to supervise the child. It is very difficult for the working mothers and even for fathers being a single parent to achieve his personal life goals for his betterment as well as for his family members while leaving the child at the mercy of others. In such scenario, the global practices allow recognition of childcare centers provided by the State as well as in a joint venture with private entities through an institutionalized manner, where high quality childcare service contributes the peace of mind to the employees/parents. In present times, it is mandatory to establish the childcare centers in every vicinity as well as in every establishment to provide safeguard and to ensure the protection of family, mother and the child including the protection of marriage, which is the State responsibility, similarly State has to take such steps for full participation of women in all spheres of life, so that they may not be excluded or marginalized from all opportunities at national and regional level on the basis that they are working mothers.

17. It is also noted with great concern that state has to provide all facilities to working mothers or parents, who are not able to properly maintains their minor children due to non-availability of daycare facility for establishment of childcare center in different areas, establishment or institution due to the fact that plots have not been specified for childcare in Islamabad Land Disposal Regulation, 2005, despite the fact that those regulations have been made by the CDA in terms of the powers conferred under Section 51 read with Section 49 of the CDA ordinance, 1960 unless a land has been classified in Chapter II of classification of plots provided in the Islamabad Land Disposal Regulation, 2005. The status of daycare facility on any residential building as well as its related business activity could not be considered legally justified to run such facility by any individual, though on plain reading of Regulation 3(3) of the Islamabad Land Disposal Regulation, 2005, the daycare facility falls within the concept of community buildings like Educational Institution, Hospitals, Dispensaries, Maternity Homes etc., therefore, CDA being the custodian of any scheme under Sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance is empowered to include the daycare facility/center in the Islamabad Land Disposal Regulation, 2005 in accordance with their Board decisions by settling the criteria of such plot, if such plot has been provided by the CDA, thereafter, the next step should have been taken by the MCI in terms of powers conferred under Section 73, which deals with the functions of Metropolitan Corporation to recognize daycare service / facility / profession under ICT, Local Government Act, 2015, accordingly.

18. The above referred discussion lead to irresistible conclusion that Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, acknowledges the concept of promotion of social justice in terms of Article 37 (e), where the state is under obligation to make provisions for securing just and humane conditions of work, ensuring that children and women are not employed in vocations unsuited to their age or sex, and for maternity benefits for women in employment, therefore, while looking from different angle the state is under obligation to consider the Conventions on the Rights of Child (CRC), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICCPR), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), whereby, all these conventions have been ratified by the state of Pakistan and in this context Article 37(e) of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, has to give effect in shape of separate legislation or in shape of policy as discussed in above paras, where Labour Policy, 2010, acknowledges the application of ILO conventions in which international labor standards provides a daycare center / childcare facility in every residential area, establishment, office, organization,


company as well as in the judicial hierarchy including District Courts, High Courts, etc. where such facility has to be provided accordingly so that all working parents, especially, the rights of mother and the child be given protection.

19. In view of above, instant writ petition is DISPOSED OF with the observation that Federal Government shall take all necessary steps for establishment of the childcare facility in public and private institution within ICT.

20. The Capital Development Authority shall initiate a study on the growing needs for establishment of Daycare Center in ICT and thereafter shall submit their proposals before the CDA Board for inclusion of childcare in the classification of plots under Islamabad Land Disposal Regulation, 2005 and may also formulate the necessary regulations to deal with the facility in a proper manner.

21. The Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad shall also devise a mechanism and study for childcare center facility in terms of Section 73 of the ICT Local Government Act, 2015 and may include such facility in the third schedule accordingly. The MCI shall also notify the required rules to regulate such facility within every residential area, establishment in ICT including but not limited to Government Offices, Private Companies, Courts, Chief Commissioner Offices, Schools, Factories etc.

(J.K.)   Disposed of

OVERSEAS DIVORCE

*𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐞𝐝𝐮𝐫𝐞,𝐢𝐟 𝐚 𝐡𝐮𝐬𝐛𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐰𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐬 𝐭𝐨 𝐠𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐰𝐢𝐟𝐞 𝐛𝐮𝐭 𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐥𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐚𝐛𝐫𝐨𝐚𝐝?

This procedure has been prescribed in a recent Judgement by *Honorable Mr. Justice Shahid Bilal Hassan,Lahore Highcourt Lahore in judgement PLD 2020 Lahore 679
1.Husband will send a power of attorney to his lawyer.
2. Power of attorney should be attested from the Pakistani embassy or consulate of the country where he is residing.
3. Where a lawyer receives the power of attorney, he will proceed according to law.
4. Proceedings of overseas divorce in Pakistan are conducted in Arbitration council.
5. Minimum 90 days proceedings will be
conducted by lawyer in arbitration council.
6. After the proceedings of overseas divorce in
Pakistan, a divorce certificate will be issued by
NADRA through arbitration council and this certificate is considered as sole and only proof of divorce.

اگر والد زرکفالت نہیں دیتا، تو بیت المال یا مقامی حکومت خرچہ کا بندوبست کرے ۔۔۔ فریق مقدمہ بنانے کی اجازت

Father being unable to pay maintenance allowance: If father was not able to pay maintenance allowance to his minor sons then relevant organ or authority of the State including Bait-ul-Maal and local government would be liable to pay maintenance to the minors.

Petition for impleadment of Director and District Officer Bait-ul-Maal as parties [iz] allowed.

Umer Daraz Vs Family Judge -
{2018-CLC-1786 (Sindh)} -
1994-CLC-444, 1998-MLD-1972, 2004-YLR-616, 2005-SCMR-1293, PLD 1976-Lahore-930, PLD 1976 Lahore 930, PLD 1989 Kar. 404, PLD 1989 Karachi 404, PLD 1991-SC-543, PLD 2012-Lahore-445, PLD 2012 Lahore 445

- S . 4 --- Succession --- Widow of predeceased son --- Entitlement --- Scope --- Petitioner filed a suit for declaration to the effect that she being the widow of predeceased son of propositus was entitled in the legacy of her father - in - law --

 PLD 2023 Peshawar 6

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance ( VIII of 1961 ) ---
---- S . 4 --- Succession --- Widow of predeceased son --- Entitlement --- Scope --- Petitioner filed a suit for declaration to the effect that she being the widow of predeceased son of propositus was entitled in the legacy of her father - in - law --- Validity --- Section 4 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance , 1961 clearly reflected the intention of legislature that in order to cater the suffering of sons or daughters of predeceased son , they could get their share as if the predeceased son or daughter was alive at the time of death of his / her propositus --- Question as to whether other legal heirs of predeceased son or daughter could also be benefited from the provisions of S. 4 , remained controversial , however , S. 4 I could not be interpreted other than as it was and for whose benefit it was promulgated --- In fact , the benefit was provided to the sons and daughters of a predeceased in the legacy of their propositus whereas the other legal heirs of a predeceased son / daughter might not be the legal heirs of grandfather or grandmother either in accordance with the text of the Holy Quran or tables provided by Islamic Law , especially the widow of predeceased son with relation to the legacy of her father - in law or mother - in - law , had got no concerned , whatsoever --- Neither she was sharer nor residuary --- Legacy of her father - in - law or mother - in law , in the event of the death of her husband in the lifetime of his father / mother , being predeceased son is not entitled

Transaction whereby property is sold or transferred by judgment debtor to his close relatives in order to avoid payment of maintenance allowance ..........

  2023 CLC 1750

Transaction whereby property is sold or transferred by judgment debtor to his close relatives in order to avoid payment of maintenance allowance against decree passed in favour of his wife and children, is a sham transaction and the said transaction and any superstructure built on the same cannot be sustained. No prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by not impleading him as party as he would not have any better title than the person from whom title was transferred in is favour and any defence taken by the petitioner would not cure the defect in the title of his predecessor in interest. The grounds raised by the petitioner are not sufficient for setting aside the impugned orders through application under Section 12(2) of C.P.C. because for that purpose the applicant in addition to above mentioned grounds including ground of not being impleaded as a party was also required to establish that he was not impleaded fraudulently, by misrepresentation or Court lacked jurisdiction in the matter as provided under Section 12(2) C.P.C., which has not been done. Through application under Section 12(2) C.P.C. decree could be set aside only on the grounds stated in the said Section and where no case of fraud or misrepresentation or lack of jurisdiction was made out, the application under the said Section was not maintainable and merited to be dismissed

تنسیخ نکاح کی وہ صورتیں جس میں عورت کو مکمل حق مہر ملے گا

پاکستانی قانون میں عورت کو یہ حق حاصل ہے اگر وہ اپنے شوہر کے ساتھ نہیں رہنا چاہتی اور اس کا شوہر اس کو طلاق دے کر آزاد نہیں کررہا تو اس صورت میں پاکستانی قانون کے مطابق عورت عدالت میں خلع کا کیس کرسکتی ہے اور عدالت کے ذریعے سے تنسیخ نکاح کروا سکتی ہے.

لیکن اگر عورت عدالت سے خلع لیتی ہے تو The family court Act 1964 کے سیکشن 10 کے تحت عورت کو وہ مہر جو اس کو نہیں ملا یعنی Deferred dower جس کو اردو میں مہر موجل یا غیر معجل بھی کہتے ہیں اس کا 50 فیصد شوہر کو معاف کرے گی اس کو 50 فیصد حق مہر ملے گا اور اگر حق مہر معجل یعنی prompt dower ہے تو 25 فیصد واپس کرے گی اگر وصول کرلیا ہے. اگر حق مہر میں گھر سونا زیور لکھا تھا اس پر بھی یہی اصول لاگو ہوگا خلع کی صورت میں.
کن صورتوں میں بیوی حق مہر واپس نہیں کرے گی؟
تو The dissolution of marriage Act 1939 میں وہ Grounds بیان ہوئے ہیں کہ اگر عورت ان گراونڈز کی بنیاد پر عدالت سے اپنے نکاح کی تنسیخ کرواتی ہے تو اسے حق مہر گھر زیور واپس نہیں کرنا ہوگا۔
1) اگر کسی عورت کا شوہر 4 سال سے لاپتہ ہو تو اس صورت میں عورت عدالت سے نکاح ختم کرواسکتی ہے۔ عدالت 6 ماہ تک انتظار کرے گی اگر شوہر آگیا تو تنسیخ نہ ہوگی اگر شوہر نہ آیا تو تنسیخ نکاح کی ڈگری effective ہو جائے گی۔
2) اگر شوہر 2 سال سے خرچہ نہیں دے رہا
3) اگر شوہر 3 سال سے ازواجی حقوق بغیر کسی وجہ کے ادا نہیں کر رہا.
4) اگر شوہر پاگل ہوگیا ہے یا کوئی وبائی مرض کا شکار ہوگیا عرصہ 2 سال سے
5) اگر شوہر کو 7 سال یا اس سے زائد قید کی سزا ہوگئی ہو
6) اگر شوہر شادی کے وقت سے ہی نامرد تھا اور آگے بھی نامرد ہے تو اس صورت میں بھی عدالت تنسیخ نکاح کا حکم دے دے گی لیکن تنسیخ نکاح سے پہلے عدالت مرد کو علاج کروانے کا ٹائم دے گی 1 سال کا اگر 1 سال میں علاج نہیں ہوتا تو عدالت تنسیخ نکاح کر دے گی
7) اگر عورت کی شادی 16 سال کم عمر میں اسے کے والدین یا سرپرست نے کر دی اب وہ لڑکی 16 سال کی ہوگئی ہے اب اس پر ہے اگر وہ اپنی شادی ختم کرنا چاہے تو کرسکتی ہے اس کو حق اخیارغ البلوغ کہتے ہیں
😎
اگر شوہر مارپیٹ کرتا ہے نشہ کرتا ہے، غیر عورتوں سے تعلقات رکھتا ہے، عورت کا سامان بلا اجازت بیچتا ہے یا عورت کو استعمال نہیں کرنے دیتا، اگر شوہر عورت کو غیر اخلاقی زندگی گزارنے پر مجبور کرتا ہے یا اس کو اسے مذہبی معاملات کے مطابق زندگی گزارنے نہیں دیتا یا اس کی زیادہ بیویاں ہیں وہ ان بیویوں کی موجودگی میں اس عورت سے انصاف نہیں کرتا تو ان اوپر بیان کی گئی وجوہات کی بنا پر اگر بیوی شوہر سے عدالت کے ذریعے علیحدگی، تنسیخ نکاح کرتی ہے تو اس صورت میں بیوی کو حق مہر گھر زیور واپس نہ کرنا ہوگا. خلع میں اگر بیوی صرف اتنا کہہ دے کے مجھے نفرت ہوگئی ہے اپنے شوہر سے میں نہیں رہنا چاہتی تو عدالت خلع دے دیتی ہے لیکن ان اوپر بیان کی گئی وجوہات کو عدالت میں عورت کو ثابت کرنا ہوگا جیسا کے وہ خرچہ نہیں دیتا مار پیٹ کرتا ہے. اگر عورت ثابت کر دیتی ہے عدالت میں تو اسے حق مہر واپس نہ کرنا ہوگا.

اگر دولہا کے والد نے بوقت نکاح دولہا کے وکیل کے طور پر نکاح نامہ پر دستخط کیے ہوں

 PLD 2023 Lahore 446

اگر دولہا کے والد نے بوقت نکاح دولہا کے وکیل کے طور پر نکاح نامہ پر دستخط کیے ہوں یا انگوٹھا ثبت کیا ھو تو اس صورت میں وہ نکاح نامہ میں درج حق مہر اپنی بہو کو ادا کرنے کا پابند ہے

Perusal of section 7(3) of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance) manifests that talaq by husband can be revoked expressly or otherwise before expiry of 90 days.......

 2023 CLC 1673

Perusal of section 7(3) of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance) manifests that talaq by husband can be revoked expressly or otherwise before expiry of 90 days, however, section 21(3) of the Family Court Act, 1964 (Act) is a nonabstante clause and under clause (b) of subsection (3) of section 21 of the Act, there is no room of revocation available for the decree of khula and only way decree will become ineffective if reconciliation has been effected between the parties in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance. The presence of word "revoke" in section 7(3) of the Ordinance and its conspicuous absence in section 21(3)(b) of the Act, leave no manner of doubt that decree of khula will only become ineffective if within 90 days, a reconciliation has been affected between the spouses on the basis of mutual or bilateral arrangement.

Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance--No annual increa was fixed in final order of both Courts--Introducing of amendment in Family Court (Amendment) Act--Automatic mandatory annual increase in maintenance allowance-

 PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 116
PresentAli Baqar Najafi, J.
GHULAM FARID--Petitioner
versus
KHALIDA BIBI etc.--Respondents
R.P. No. 51524 of 2022 in W.P. No. 51618 of 2019,
decided on 14.9.2022.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----S. 144 & O.XLVII R.1--Punjab Family Court (Amendment) Act, (XI of 2015), S. 17-A--Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance--No annual increa was fixed in final order of both Courts--Introducing of amendment in Family Court (Amendment) Act--Automatic mandatory annual increase in maintenance allowance--Suit was decreed on 7.7.2009--Amendment required to be applied from date of amendment--Consolidated order--In paragraph No. 2 of judgment contention regarding 10% annual increase notwithstanding amendment made on 18.03.2015 was raised--However, this plea was not specifically dealt in paragraph but-was deemed to be rejected with dismissal of writ petitions filed by respective parties--Both Courts did not-fix any annual increase--Meanwhile, amendment was introduced on 18.03.2015 in section 17-A through Punjab Family Court (Amendment) Act XI of 2015 whereby automatic increase @ 10% was mandatory--An amendment imposing a monitory liability has to be strictly construed, therefore, required to be applied from date of amendment i.e. 18.03.2015--The 10% annual increase will be available from said date and not date of filing of family suit--Review petition dismissed. [Para 3 & 4] A & B

PLD 1954 Privy Council 22 & PLD 1970 SC 80 ref.

Mr. Abdul Rauf, Advocate for Applicant.

Date of hearing: 14.9.2022.

order

Through this petition under, Section 144 read with Order XLVII Rule-1 CPC, the consolidated order dated 23.06.2022 passed in W.P. No. 51618-2019 is sought to be reviewed on the ground that the points raised in the writ petition were not discussed in the order.

2. After hearing, the learned counsel for the applicant and perusing the file, it is straightaway observed that in the writ petition the prayer was made to the extent of grant of 10% annual increase in the maintenance from the date of institution of the suit. Although this was not discussed in the order but the writ petition was dismissed in the background of other connected writ petitions. Obviously, after the amendment of 2015 the annual increase in the maintenance allowance is mandated by the statute but on the exceptional grounds, depending on case to case basis, it can be increased to more than 10%. Prior to the amendment in the statute it was granted at any rate by the family Court.

3. In the Paragraph No. 2 of the judgment dated 23.06.2022, the contention regarding the 10% annual increase notwithstanding the amendment made on 18.03.2015 was raised. However, this plea was not specifically dealt in the paragraph but-was deemed to be rejected with the dismissal of the writ petitions filed by the respective parties.

4. However, admittedly, the family suit of the recovery of maintenance allowance was filed on 07.07.2009 and was decided on 29.04.2014 which order was assailed before the appellate Court, in continuation of the proceedings, but the appeal was dismissed on 29.07.2015. Both the Courts did not-fix any annual increase. Meanwhile, the amendment was introduced on 18.03.2015 in Section 17-A through Punjab Family Court (Amendment) Act XI of 2015 whereby the automatic increase @ 10% was mandatory. Of course, an amendment imposing a monitory liability has to be strictly construed, therefore, required to be applied from the date of amendment i.e. 18.03.2015. The 10% annual increase will be available from the said date and not the date of filing of the family suit. Reliance can be placed upon case titled Gondicalo Hypolito Constancio Noronha vs. Damji Devji and others” reported as PLD 1954 Privy Council 22 and case titled “The Income Tax Officer (Investigation) Circle I, Dacca and another vs. Sulaiman Bhai Jiwa reported as PLD 1970 SC 80.

5. With this observation, this review petition is hereby dismissed in limine.

(Y.A.)  Review petition dismissed

--Comprehensive law is Family Courts Act, 1964, which not only provides complete mechanism rather bars jurisdiction of all Other Courts by providing exclusive jurisdiction on ten (10) subjects referred in Part 1 of Schedule of Act if read with Family Court Rules 1965.

 PLJ 2023 Islamabad (Note) 115
PresentMohsin Akhtar Kayani, J.
MOHSIN ALI KHAN--Petitioner
versus
FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN SECRETARIAT FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT OF WOMEN AT WORKPLACE, ISLAMABAD and another--Respondents
W.P. No. 4032 of 2021, decided on 20.5.2022.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Enforcement of Women’s Property Right Act, 2019--

----S. 4--Family Courts Act, 1964, S. 5--Order to filing of amended complaint before ombudsman Territorial jurisdiction--Protection against women harassment--Challenge--Prompt--Haq Mahar--Talaq-e-Tafweez--Pendency of suits between parties in Family Court—Question of Whether when property is not indentified, Federal Ombudsman can exercise its jurisdiction on complaint filed by respondent No. 2 in terms of women’s property  right Act, 2020--No property description was available--Arbitration took place between parties--No certificate for effectiveness of divorced issued--Family Courts Act, 1964 explicitly provided the jurisdiction in terms of Section 5 to the Family Court to adjudicate upon the matters specified in Part 1 of the Schedule including personal property and belongings of a wife at S. No. 9--Primarily Act of 2020 has been enacted for protection of’ property rights of a woman so that she may not be harassed, coerced, forced or fraud may not be played with her but this Act is silent qua actionable claim--If everything is admitted and conclusively available on record Ombudsman may pass an order but in this case when property description is not available, there is no tangible property available in ICT, Deputy Commissioner or Federal Ombudsman, as case may be, are not in position to compel petitioner to handover any property of 10 marla within ICT-- comprehensive law is Family Courts Act, 1964, which not only provides the complete mechanism rather bars the jurisdiction of all other Courts by providing exclusive jurisdiction on ten (10) subjects referred in Part 1 of the Schedule of the Act--Petition allowed.                                             

                                                                [Para 9, 14 & 20] A, B, C & E

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 5--Jurisdiction of Family Court--Comprehensive law is Family Courts Act, 1964, which not only provides complete mechanism rather bars jurisdiction of all Other Courts by providing exclusive jurisdiction on ten (10) subjects referred in Part 1 of Schedule of Act if read with Family Court Rules 1965. [Para 19] D

2003 CLC 1339 & PLD 2007 Lahore 425 ref.

Ms. Mehak Ali, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Shehryar Gondal, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.

Date of hearing: 25.4.2022.

Judgment

Through this writ petition, the petitioner has called in question order of the Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace, Islamabad, dated 10.11.2021, whereby Respondent No. 2 has been allowed to file amended complaint to make things more elaborate with respect to her claim regarding ownership and possession of both immovable and moveable property based on her Nikahnama, dated 24.11.2019.

2. Learned counsel for petitioner contends that Mohsin Ali Khan (petitioner) and Syeda Sidra Shah (Respondent No. 2) got married on 24.11.2019, but sooner differences arose between the spouses, which compelled Respondent No. 2 to file a complaint under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Enforcement of Women’s Property Right Act, 2019, as such, the said complaint was transferred to Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace, Islamabad (Respondent No. 1) for further proceedings, as a result whereof notices were issued to both the parties, whereby the petitioner appeared before Respondent No. 1 and disputed its territorial jurisdiction as well as the subject matter, but to no avail, rather Respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order giving undue favour to Respondent No. 2.

3. Conversely, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 stressed that Respondent No. 2 tried her best to build a happy home, but the petitioner remained adamant in subjecting Respondent No. 2 to mental torture, physical abuse and demeaning treatment, as a result whereof, Respondent No. 2 decided to enforce her lawfully delegated right concerning Talaq-e-Tafweez under Clause No. 18 of Nikahnama and announced divorce upon the petitioner via a written deed, dated 16.02.2021; that Clause No. 14 of Nikahnama clarifies that Respondent No. 2 would be immediately put in possession of the dower as mentioned in Clauses 15 and 16, regarding which Respondent No. 2 made endless efforts to secure her rights, but to no avail, compelling Respondent No. 2 to file a complaint under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Enforcement of Women’s Property Right Act, 2019, which was finally adjudicated upon by Respondent No. 1 vide the impugned order.

4. Arguments heard, record perused.

5. Perusal of record reveals that petitioner has assailed the jurisdiction of Respondent No. 1 i.e. Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for protection against harassment of women at workplace for entertaining complaint filed by Respondent No. 2/Syeda Sidra Shah, which was initially filed before the Ombudsperson, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar in terms of Section 4 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Enforcement of Women’s Property Right Act, 2019, which has been transmitted to Islamabad on the question of jurisdiction, where-after Respondent No. 1/Federal Ombudsman has proceeded in terms of Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020. The background of this case reveals that both petitioner and Respondent No. 2 were married to each other on 30.11.2019 at Peshawar against dower/Haq Mahar of Rs. 500,000/- which is prompt referred in Column No. 13 with 32 tola gold ornaments referred in Column No. 15 and property measuring 10 marla house which will be constructed by petitioner in Islamabad or in alternate constructed house will be provided as referred in Column No. 16.

6. In addition to above, delegated right of divorce (talaq-e-tafweez) referred in Column No. 18 was also given to Respondent
No. 2, who later on exercised the said right due to acute disparity among the parties wide written deed dated 16.02.2021 in presence of witnesses and served the notice of talaq to the petitioner at District Peshawar, even application before the Arbitration Council has been filed within the said jurisdiction at neighborhood council Marvi where arbitration took place between the parties on different dates but no certificate for effectiveness of divorce was issued by the respective council within prescribed period of ninety (90) days, which persuaded Respondent No. 2 to file suit titled Syeda Sidra Shah vs. Mohsin Ali Khan and others before Family Court at Peshawar for seeking declaration, decree of divorce by exercising delegated right of divorce with further direction to the Arbitration Council for issuance of certificate on 28.07.2021.

7. On the other hand, petitioner has also filed suit titled Mohsin Ali Khan vs. Syeda Sidra Shah and others for cancellation of clauses of nikahnama, especially clause 18 of nikahnama pertaining to talaq-e-tafweez before the Civil Court at Peshawar on 31.01.2022. As such both suits are pending before Courts at Peshawar. However, Respondent No. 2 filed complaint before Ombudsperson, Peshawar which was returned due to lack of jurisdiction vide order dated 14.07.2021, where-after matter has been taken up by Respondent
No. 1/Federal Ombudsman at Islamabad in terms of Section 4 of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 which has been assailed in the instant writ petition.

8. Learned Federal Ombudsman at Islamabad has exercised its jurisdiction while considering Column No. 16 of nikahnama in which it has specifically been written that after nikah petitioner will provide 10 marla house or manage constructed house, otherwise this aspect has been placed in juxtaposition with the concept of property defined in Section 2(e) of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 and notices have been issued to the petitioner.

9. The above background persuaded this Court to decide the question of legal and territorial jurisdiction at the first instance. No doubt Family Courts Act, 1964 explicitly provided the jurisdiction in terms of Section 5 to the Family Court to adjudicate upon the matters specified in Part 1 of the Schedule including personal property and belongings of a wife at S. No. 9.

10. The above referred special subject has to be considered within the exclusive domain of Family Courts Act, 1964, which was promulgated with the object to achieve expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes with regard to marriage and family affairs as held in 2003 CLC 1339 Lahore (Ahmad Din vs. Shama Bibi). The Family Courts Act is silent qua any special procedure and even to exclude the applicability of CPC 1908 and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 to avoid the lengthy cumbersome procedural intricacy normally provided in civil trial and as such Family Courts Act empowers the Judge Family Court to adopt the procedure as of his choice, in order to meet the situation not visualized in the act applicable as held in PLD 2007 Lahore 425 (Muhammad Din vs. Mst. Aliya V” Bibi). Even there is no cavil to the proposition that every procedure is permissible unless clear prohibition is found in the law.

11. The legislature has also considerate of the fact that Almighty Allah in Surah An-Nisa (Ayat No. 35) in Holy Quran prescribed the efforts to be made by induction of one Hakam from the family of husband and one from the family of wife for ultimate reconciliation or compromise, so the family ties between the husband and wife remains intact and this spirit has properly been given effect in terms of Section 10 (pre-trial proceedings) and Section 12 conclusion of trial where compromise or consultation if not possible, the Family Court shall announce its judgment and decree but at the same time Family Court Act has amended through Amending Ordinance LV of 2002, where-after Section 12-A has been incorporated whereby Family Court shall dispose of a case, including a suit for dissolution of marriage, within a period of six months from the date of institution, this aspect put a heavy responsibility upon the Family Courts to settle the family and matrimonial disputes within shortest possible time but despite that majority of cases relating to women have not been addressed within the prescribed time especially the matter relating to property rights of women which persuaded the legislature in the provinces as well as in Islamabad to enact new law “to provide for the protection of the rights of ownership and possession of properties owned by women, ensuring that such rights are not violated by means of harassment, coercion, force or fraud” by way of Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020, this new law is the subject matter of instant writ petition, whereby complaint has been filed by Respondent No. 2 before Federal Ombudsman/Respondent No. 1 seeking dower mentioned in Clauses 15 & 16 of nikahnama. The said terms of nikahnama only provides actionable claim in shape of property rights which has not yet been conclusively identifiable in shape of plot number, street number, sector, area, town, society, etc. rather vague description has been provided in notional way where husband i.e. petitioner undertook to provide such property within marriage contract or after the marriage contract if divorce took place, as such there is no denial that parties have already been locked in litigation at Peshawar on the same subject matter.

12. Now question arises as to whether when property is not identifiable, Federal Ombudsman at Islamabad can exercise its jurisdiction on complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 in terms of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020. In order to understand the proposition, provision of Section 4 is reproduced as under:-

4.       Complaint to the Ombudsman in case no proceedings in a Court of law are pending. (1) Any woman deprived of ownership or possession of her property, by any means, may file a complaint to the Ombudsman if no proceedings in a Court of law are pending regarding the property:

          Provided that the Ombudsman, on its own motion or on a complaint filed by any person including a non-governmental organization, may also initiate action under sub-section (1) in relation to the ownership or possession of a woman’s property, if no proceedings are pending in a Court in respect of that property.

(2) The Ombudsman shall make a preliminary assessment of the complaint filed under sub-section (1) whereafter he may, if the matter requires further probe or investigation, refer the matter to the concerned Deputy Commissioner, who, after calling the record, if necessary, and issuing notices to the complainant or her adversaries, conduct a summary enquiry and submit a report within fifteen days to the Ombudsman.

(3) If the matter does not require any detailed probe, investigation or recording of evidence, the Ombudsman may, after calling any record, if deemed necessary, pass orders under Section 5.

(4) The Ombudsman upon receiving the report under sub-section (2), may further conduct such summary enquiry and call for such record as he may deem fit.

(5) The Ombudsman after confronting the report of the concerned Deputy Commissioner and the conclusion and findings of his own enquiry, shall call upon the complainant and her adversaries to submit, objections, whereafter he may conduct a hearing and pass orders under Section 5, preferably within sixty days of receipt of the complaint under sub-section (1).

13. From the plain reading of above referred provision, it appears that firstly a woman who is deprived of the ownership or possession of her property, this aspect highlights the unconditional, clear right to property but such aspect is not available in Column
No. 16 of nikahnama rather it is unconditional right to seek a property, therefore, there is a mark difference between these two. When the property is not identifiable then party i.e. in this case Respondent No. 2, who has filed suit before Family Court on the basis of nikahnama to exercise her right on the basis of dower which has duly been protected though the terms of nikahnama are already subject matter before Civil Court, therefore, this Court is not in position to further highlight or interfere in that part of nikahnama, which has yet to be adjudicated by the Court of competent jurisdiction.

14. Primarily the Act of 2020 has been enacted for the protection of property rights of a woman so that she may not be harassed, coerced, forced or fraud may not be played with her but this Act is silent qua the actionable claim. In such scenario, the procedure provided in Section 4 of the Act reveals that Federal Ombudsman shall make a preliminary assessment of the complaint and if Ombudsman come to conclusion to further probe or investigation is required, the matter be referred to Deputy Commissioner concerned after calling the record including the adversaries to conduct summary enquiry. However, if everything is admitted and conclusively available on record the Ombudsman may pass an order but in this case when property description is not available, there is no tangible property available in ICT, the Deputy Commissioner or Federal Ombudsman, as the case may be, are not in position to compel the petitioner to handover any property of 10 marla within ICT.

15. No doubt the law in this case has been promulgated with intent to protect the rights of a woman, however, Section 6 provides reference to Court concerned if the Ombudsman comes to the conclusion that the matter requires in-depth enquiry, investigation or detailed recording of evidence or intricate adjudication, a reference be filed. Similarly, Section 7 deals with the cases which are pending before competent Court of law in relation to ownership or possession of any property claimed to be owned by a woman, this aspect highlights the concurrent and simultaneous proceedings of the Family Court alongwith Ombudsman. As such there is no restriction or bar available to proceed further under this Act though Section 11 of the Act further extends the jurisdiction to the Ombudsman by restricting the jurisdiction of Court or other authority to question the validity of any action taken, or intended to be taken, or order made, or anything or purporting to have been taken, made or done under this Act. The cumulative interpretation of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 if read in conjunction with Family Courts Act, 1964, it appears that both are special legislation having overlapping jurisdiction on the subject of property belonging to a woman. In such scenario, the rule of interpretation of statute lays down the principles to deal with such delicate issues on the basis of principle of harmonization.

16. It is the rule that incorporated law in existence viz. a viz. the new law on the subject has to be given harmonious and consistent meaning though primary rule is that statute which is complete in nature is to be construed according to its own terms and not with reference to another statute to whittle down beneficial provision of the former. Similarly, the statute later in time ordinarily prevails as held in PLD 2021 ICT 378 (Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. vs. Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority).

17. This Court is mindful of the fact that it is duty of this Court while interpreting these two special laws, have to see other factors including object, purpose and policy of both statutes as well as intention of legislature in order to determine which of the two special laws prevail and is applicable as held in PLD 2018 ICT 372 (Shifa International Hospital Ltd. vs. Mst. Hajira Bibi), 2017 CLD 1198 (Syed Mushahid Shah vs. Federal Investment Agency).

18. There is another principle that in case of conflict between two laws, generally the statute later in time would prevail over the statute prior in time, said presumption, however, was not automatic, instead a host of other factors including the object, purpose and policy of both statutes and the legislature’s intention, as expressed by the language employed therein, needed to be considered in order to determine which of the two special laws was to prevail as held in Syed Mushahid Shah case supra. Similarly, non-obstante clause was also not to be given overriding effect in a mechanical fashion as underlying object of interpretative project undertaken by Court was to discover meaning of words used by Legislature and a non-obstante clause was usually employed to suggest that a provision referred to in such clause was to prevail over other provisions of a statute, but repugnancy between non-obstante clause and other clause was not to be presumed and overriding effect was to be accorded only in case of irreconcilable conflict as held in 2021 PTD 1203 (Messer Federal Bank for Cooperatives, Islamabad vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad).

19. This Court while comparing the two special laws, meant to protect the women, comes to conclusion that Section 5 of the Family Court Act, 1964 has conferred the exclusive jurisdiction upon family Court to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon the matters specified in Part 1, Schedule of the Act if read with the Family Court Rules 1965. The question of territorial jurisdiction has also been settled under
Rule 6 on the basis of cause of action wholly or in part has arisen or where the parties reside or last resided together. Provided that in suits for dissolution of marriage or dower the Courts within the local limits of which the wife ordinarily resides shall also have jurisdiction. This aspect extend complete protection to the woman even if she shifts from one place to other the jurisdiction must flow with her rather it is a choice based concept. The proviso by very nature of its language is an enabling provision and is for benefit of wife. Similarly the term ordinarily resides in the above mentioned rules has also been explained in PLD 1976 Karachi 978 (Mahbub Ahmad vs. First Additional District Judge) and even the word ordinarily means more Khan mere temporary residence, hence, the suit for maintenance, personal property, belongings of wife, custody of children can also be instituted in Family Court where wife resides as held in PLD 2005 SC 22 (Muhammad Iqbal vs. Parveen Iqbal). And the Apex Court has conferred the exclusive territorial jurisdiction to the Family Court where wife resides in all such matters under the Family Court Act as settled in PLD 2016 SC 613 (Mst Yasmeen Bibi vs. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan), PLD 2012 SC 66 (Major Muhammad Khalid Karim vs. Mst. Saadia Yaqub). This complete code known as Family Court Act, 1964 read with its rules and the interpretation given by the Apex Court covers each and every aspect to protect the rights of a woman therefore, the new law i.e, the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 in ICT could not be equalized and applied to the property situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of ICT, nor it is applicable to those women/complainants who are residing outside the ICT and claiming their property rights beyond ICT. However, as of today the rules have not been prescribed in terms of Section 2(b) of the Act, therefore, the gray areas have not yet been settled by the Federal Government having exclusive authority to make the rules to carry out the purpose of this Act in terms of Section 12 of the Act but primarily this special law of Act of 2020 is not in derogation with the Family Court Act, 1964 rather considered to be in addition to as the very purpose is to ensure and to protect the rights of ownership and possession of properties owned by women through a different mechanism.

20. By applying the above referred principles, this Court comes to the conclusion that the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020, though has no overriding clause, except that jurisdiction of other Courts and authorities are barred to the extent of questioning the validity of action taken, or intended to be taken or to grant an injunction or stay or to make any interim order in relation to any proceedings before, or anything done or intended to be done, or under the orders or at the instance of the Ombudsman. In such scenario, the comprehensive law is Family Courts Act, 1964, which not only provides the complete mechanism rather bars the jurisdiction of all other Courts by providing exclusive jurisdiction on ten (10) subjects referred in Part 1 of the Schedule of the Act, therefore, this Court comes to the following view for the purpose of elucidating the issue:

(a)      When any matter specified in Part 1 of the Schedule of Family Court Act, 1964 is pending with competent Family Court among spouses or ex-spouses on a property issue, which is claimed by either party on the basis of terms referred in nikahnama or otherwise, territorial jurisdiction has to be settled under the Family Court Act, 1964, however, if any complaint has been filed by a woman for protection of her rights of ownership and possession of property (moveable or immovable) within ICT under the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020, she must demonstrate that she owns or possess any property within the territorial jurisdiction of ICT, otherwise complaint is not entertainable.

(b)      No complaint is entertain-able if the parties are married to each other in some other district, living outside the territorial jurisdiction of ICT and litigation is also pending in other district, the complaint should have been filed within that district only under the provincial laws, if enacted.

(c)      The Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 only covers those properties which are agreed to be given with clear terms within ICT, however, mere mentioning of a property within nikahnama without its clear description in terms of clause 16 will not extend the jurisdiction to Federal Ombudsman at ICT to exercise its jurisdiction as well as when the subject lis is pending with the Court in any other district unless the Family Court in that district grants permission to proceed with the complaint through a speaking order.

(d)      Any woman can file a complaint under Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 who owns any property in Islamabad Capital Territory by way of registered sale-deed, mutation, allotment letter, provisional allotment letter or through any other legal instrument, through which a property rights are conveyed to her with specific details and description, which has been taken over by force or by way of fraud or through any other mode and mean against the legal rights of a woman, the Ombudsman shall have the jurisdiction to restore the rights of such a complainant/woman by exercising her authority in joint collaboration with Deputy Commissioner of Islamabad Capital Territory and other state agencies by treating the same as a complaint.

31. For what has been discussed above, the instant writ petition is ALLOWED as the Federal Ombudsman at Islamabad has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of Respondent No. 2 Syed Sidra Shah qua the property referred in her Nikahnama, which is yet to be conferred through the judgment of the Family Court at Peshawar. Consequently, the complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 before the Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace/Islamabad is not maintainable.

(J.K.)   Petition allowed

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