-Protection against women harassment--Challenge--Prompt--Haq Mahar--Talaq-e-Tafweez--Pendency of suits between parties in Family Court—Question of Whether when property is not indentified, Federal Ombudsman can exercise its jurisdiction on complaint filed by respondent No. 2 in terms of women’s property right Act, 2020-

 PLJ 2023 Islamabad (Note) 115
PresentMohsin Akhtar Kayani, J.
MOHSIN ALI KHAN--Petitioner
versus
FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN SECRETARIAT FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT OF WOMEN AT WORKPLACE, ISLAMABAD and another--Respondents
W.P. No. 4032 of 2021, decided on 20.5.2022.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Enforcement of Women’s Property Right Act, 2019--

----S. 4--Family Courts Act, 1964, S. 5--Order to filing of amended complaint before ombudsman Territorial jurisdiction--Protection against women harassment--Challenge--Prompt--Haq Mahar--Talaq-e-Tafweez--Pendency of suits between parties in Family Court—Question of Whether when property is not indentified, Federal Ombudsman can exercise its jurisdiction on complaint filed by respondent No. 2 in terms of women’s property  right Act, 2020--No property description was available--Arbitration took place between parties--No certificate for effectiveness of divorced issued--Family Courts Act, 1964 explicitly provided the jurisdiction in terms of Section 5 to the Family Court to adjudicate upon the matters specified in Part 1 of the Schedule including personal property and belongings of a wife at S. No. 9--Primarily Act of 2020 has been enacted for protection of’ property rights of a woman so that she may not be harassed, coerced, forced or fraud may not be played with her but this Act is silent qua actionable claim--If everything is admitted and conclusively available on record Ombudsman may pass an order but in this case when property description is not available, there is no tangible property available in ICT, Deputy Commissioner or Federal Ombudsman, as case may be, are not in position to compel petitioner to handover any property of 10 marla within ICT-- comprehensive law is Family Courts Act, 1964, which not only provides the complete mechanism rather bars the jurisdiction of all other Courts by providing exclusive jurisdiction on ten (10) subjects referred in Part 1 of the Schedule of the Act--Petition allowed.                                             

                                                                [Para 9, 14 & 20] A, B, C & E

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 5--Jurisdiction of Family Court--Comprehensive law is Family Courts Act, 1964, which not only provides complete mechanism rather bars jurisdiction of all Other Courts by providing exclusive jurisdiction on ten (10) subjects referred in Part 1 of Schedule of Act if read with Family Court Rules 1965. [Para 19] D

2003 CLC 1339 & PLD 2007 Lahore 425 ref.

Ms. Mehak Ali, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Shehryar Gondal, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.

Date of hearing: 25.4.2022.

Judgment

Through this writ petition, the petitioner has called in question order of the Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace, Islamabad, dated 10.11.2021, whereby Respondent No. 2 has been allowed to file amended complaint to make things more elaborate with respect to her claim regarding ownership and possession of both immovable and moveable property based on her Nikahnama, dated 24.11.2019.

2. Learned counsel for petitioner contends that Mohsin Ali Khan (petitioner) and Syeda Sidra Shah (Respondent No. 2) got married on 24.11.2019, but sooner differences arose between the spouses, which compelled Respondent No. 2 to file a complaint under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Enforcement of Women’s Property Right Act, 2019, as such, the said complaint was transferred to Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace, Islamabad (Respondent No. 1) for further proceedings, as a result whereof notices were issued to both the parties, whereby the petitioner appeared before Respondent No. 1 and disputed its territorial jurisdiction as well as the subject matter, but to no avail, rather Respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order giving undue favour to Respondent No. 2.

3. Conversely, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 stressed that Respondent No. 2 tried her best to build a happy home, but the petitioner remained adamant in subjecting Respondent No. 2 to mental torture, physical abuse and demeaning treatment, as a result whereof, Respondent No. 2 decided to enforce her lawfully delegated right concerning Talaq-e-Tafweez under Clause No. 18 of Nikahnama and announced divorce upon the petitioner via a written deed, dated 16.02.2021; that Clause No. 14 of Nikahnama clarifies that Respondent No. 2 would be immediately put in possession of the dower as mentioned in Clauses 15 and 16, regarding which Respondent No. 2 made endless efforts to secure her rights, but to no avail, compelling Respondent No. 2 to file a complaint under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Enforcement of Women’s Property Right Act, 2019, which was finally adjudicated upon by Respondent No. 1 vide the impugned order.

4. Arguments heard, record perused.

5. Perusal of record reveals that petitioner has assailed the jurisdiction of Respondent No. 1 i.e. Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for protection against harassment of women at workplace for entertaining complaint filed by Respondent No. 2/Syeda Sidra Shah, which was initially filed before the Ombudsperson, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar in terms of Section 4 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Enforcement of Women’s Property Right Act, 2019, which has been transmitted to Islamabad on the question of jurisdiction, where-after Respondent No. 1/Federal Ombudsman has proceeded in terms of Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020. The background of this case reveals that both petitioner and Respondent No. 2 were married to each other on 30.11.2019 at Peshawar against dower/Haq Mahar of Rs. 500,000/- which is prompt referred in Column No. 13 with 32 tola gold ornaments referred in Column No. 15 and property measuring 10 marla house which will be constructed by petitioner in Islamabad or in alternate constructed house will be provided as referred in Column No. 16.

6. In addition to above, delegated right of divorce (talaq-e-tafweez) referred in Column No. 18 was also given to Respondent
No. 2, who later on exercised the said right due to acute disparity among the parties wide written deed dated 16.02.2021 in presence of witnesses and served the notice of talaq to the petitioner at District Peshawar, even application before the Arbitration Council has been filed within the said jurisdiction at neighborhood council Marvi where arbitration took place between the parties on different dates but no certificate for effectiveness of divorce was issued by the respective council within prescribed period of ninety (90) days, which persuaded Respondent No. 2 to file suit titled Syeda Sidra Shah vs. Mohsin Ali Khan and others before Family Court at Peshawar for seeking declaration, decree of divorce by exercising delegated right of divorce with further direction to the Arbitration Council for issuance of certificate on 28.07.2021.

7. On the other hand, petitioner has also filed suit titled Mohsin Ali Khan vs. Syeda Sidra Shah and others for cancellation of clauses of nikahnama, especially clause 18 of nikahnama pertaining to talaq-e-tafweez before the Civil Court at Peshawar on 31.01.2022. As such both suits are pending before Courts at Peshawar. However, Respondent No. 2 filed complaint before Ombudsperson, Peshawar which was returned due to lack of jurisdiction vide order dated 14.07.2021, where-after matter has been taken up by Respondent
No. 1/Federal Ombudsman at Islamabad in terms of Section 4 of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 which has been assailed in the instant writ petition.

8. Learned Federal Ombudsman at Islamabad has exercised its jurisdiction while considering Column No. 16 of nikahnama in which it has specifically been written that after nikah petitioner will provide 10 marla house or manage constructed house, otherwise this aspect has been placed in juxtaposition with the concept of property defined in Section 2(e) of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 and notices have been issued to the petitioner.

9. The above background persuaded this Court to decide the question of legal and territorial jurisdiction at the first instance. No doubt Family Courts Act, 1964 explicitly provided the jurisdiction in terms of Section 5 to the Family Court to adjudicate upon the matters specified in Part 1 of the Schedule including personal property and belongings of a wife at S. No. 9.

10. The above referred special subject has to be considered within the exclusive domain of Family Courts Act, 1964, which was promulgated with the object to achieve expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes with regard to marriage and family affairs as held in 2003 CLC 1339 Lahore (Ahmad Din vs. Shama Bibi). The Family Courts Act is silent qua any special procedure and even to exclude the applicability of CPC 1908 and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 to avoid the lengthy cumbersome procedural intricacy normally provided in civil trial and as such Family Courts Act empowers the Judge Family Court to adopt the procedure as of his choice, in order to meet the situation not visualized in the act applicable as held in PLD 2007 Lahore 425 (Muhammad Din vs. Mst. Aliya V” Bibi). Even there is no cavil to the proposition that every procedure is permissible unless clear prohibition is found in the law.

11. The legislature has also considerate of the fact that Almighty Allah in Surah An-Nisa (Ayat No. 35) in Holy Quran prescribed the efforts to be made by induction of one Hakam from the family of husband and one from the family of wife for ultimate reconciliation or compromise, so the family ties between the husband and wife remains intact and this spirit has properly been given effect in terms of Section 10 (pre-trial proceedings) and Section 12 conclusion of trial where compromise or consultation if not possible, the Family Court shall announce its judgment and decree but at the same time Family Court Act has amended through Amending Ordinance LV of 2002, where-after Section 12-A has been incorporated whereby Family Court shall dispose of a case, including a suit for dissolution of marriage, within a period of six months from the date of institution, this aspect put a heavy responsibility upon the Family Courts to settle the family and matrimonial disputes within shortest possible time but despite that majority of cases relating to women have not been addressed within the prescribed time especially the matter relating to property rights of women which persuaded the legislature in the provinces as well as in Islamabad to enact new law “to provide for the protection of the rights of ownership and possession of properties owned by women, ensuring that such rights are not violated by means of harassment, coercion, force or fraud” by way of Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020, this new law is the subject matter of instant writ petition, whereby complaint has been filed by Respondent No. 2 before Federal Ombudsman/Respondent No. 1 seeking dower mentioned in Clauses 15 & 16 of nikahnama. The said terms of nikahnama only provides actionable claim in shape of property rights which has not yet been conclusively identifiable in shape of plot number, street number, sector, area, town, society, etc. rather vague description has been provided in notional way where husband i.e. petitioner undertook to provide such property within marriage contract or after the marriage contract if divorce took place, as such there is no denial that parties have already been locked in litigation at Peshawar on the same subject matter.

12. Now question arises as to whether when property is not identifiable, Federal Ombudsman at Islamabad can exercise its jurisdiction on complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 in terms of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020. In order to understand the proposition, provision of Section 4 is reproduced as under:-

4.       Complaint to the Ombudsman in case no proceedings in a Court of law are pending. (1) Any woman deprived of ownership or possession of her property, by any means, may file a complaint to the Ombudsman if no proceedings in a Court of law are pending regarding the property:

          Provided that the Ombudsman, on its own motion or on a complaint filed by any person including a non-governmental organization, may also initiate action under sub-section (1) in relation to the ownership or possession of a woman’s property, if no proceedings are pending in a Court in respect of that property.

(2) The Ombudsman shall make a preliminary assessment of the complaint filed under sub-section (1) whereafter he may, if the matter requires further probe or investigation, refer the matter to the concerned Deputy Commissioner, who, after calling the record, if necessary, and issuing notices to the complainant or her adversaries, conduct a summary enquiry and submit a report within fifteen days to the Ombudsman.

(3) If the matter does not require any detailed probe, investigation or recording of evidence, the Ombudsman may, after calling any record, if deemed necessary, pass orders under Section 5.

(4) The Ombudsman upon receiving the report under sub-section (2), may further conduct such summary enquiry and call for such record as he may deem fit.

(5) The Ombudsman after confronting the report of the concerned Deputy Commissioner and the conclusion and findings of his own enquiry, shall call upon the complainant and her adversaries to submit, objections, whereafter he may conduct a hearing and pass orders under Section 5, preferably within sixty days of receipt of the complaint under sub-section (1).

13. From the plain reading of above referred provision, it appears that firstly a woman who is deprived of the ownership or possession of her property, this aspect highlights the unconditional, clear right to property but such aspect is not available in Column
No. 16 of nikahnama rather it is unconditional right to seek a property, therefore, there is a mark difference between these two. When the property is not identifiable then party i.e. in this case Respondent No. 2, who has filed suit before Family Court on the basis of nikahnama to exercise her right on the basis of dower which has duly been protected though the terms of nikahnama are already subject matter before Civil Court, therefore, this Court is not in position to further highlight or interfere in that part of nikahnama, which has yet to be adjudicated by the Court of competent jurisdiction.

14. Primarily the Act of 2020 has been enacted for the protection of property rights of a woman so that she may not be harassed, coerced, forced or fraud may not be played with her but this Act is silent qua the actionable claim. In such scenario, the procedure provided in Section 4 of the Act reveals that Federal Ombudsman shall make a preliminary assessment of the complaint and if Ombudsman come to conclusion to further probe or investigation is required, the matter be referred to Deputy Commissioner concerned after calling the record including the adversaries to conduct summary enquiry. However, if everything is admitted and conclusively available on record the Ombudsman may pass an order but in this case when property description is not available, there is no tangible property available in ICT, the Deputy Commissioner or Federal Ombudsman, as the case may be, are not in position to compel the petitioner to handover any property of 10 marla within ICT.

15. No doubt the law in this case has been promulgated with intent to protect the rights of a woman, however, Section 6 provides reference to Court concerned if the Ombudsman comes to the conclusion that the matter requires in-depth enquiry, investigation or detailed recording of evidence or intricate adjudication, a reference be filed. Similarly, Section 7 deals with the cases which are pending before competent Court of law in relation to ownership or possession of any property claimed to be owned by a woman, this aspect highlights the concurrent and simultaneous proceedings of the Family Court alongwith Ombudsman. As such there is no restriction or bar available to proceed further under this Act though Section 11 of the Act further extends the jurisdiction to the Ombudsman by restricting the jurisdiction of Court or other authority to question the validity of any action taken, or intended to be taken, or order made, or anything or purporting to have been taken, made or done under this Act. The cumulative interpretation of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 if read in conjunction with Family Courts Act, 1964, it appears that both are special legislation having overlapping jurisdiction on the subject of property belonging to a woman. In such scenario, the rule of interpretation of statute lays down the principles to deal with such delicate issues on the basis of principle of harmonization.

16. It is the rule that incorporated law in existence viz. a viz. the new law on the subject has to be given harmonious and consistent meaning though primary rule is that statute which is complete in nature is to be construed according to its own terms and not with reference to another statute to whittle down beneficial provision of the former. Similarly, the statute later in time ordinarily prevails as held in PLD 2021 ICT 378 (Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. vs. Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority).

17. This Court is mindful of the fact that it is duty of this Court while interpreting these two special laws, have to see other factors including object, purpose and policy of both statutes as well as intention of legislature in order to determine which of the two special laws prevail and is applicable as held in PLD 2018 ICT 372 (Shifa International Hospital Ltd. vs. Mst. Hajira Bibi), 2017 CLD 1198 (Syed Mushahid Shah vs. Federal Investment Agency).

18. There is another principle that in case of conflict between two laws, generally the statute later in time would prevail over the statute prior in time, said presumption, however, was not automatic, instead a host of other factors including the object, purpose and policy of both statutes and the legislature’s intention, as expressed by the language employed therein, needed to be considered in order to determine which of the two special laws was to prevail as held in Syed Mushahid Shah case supra. Similarly, non-obstante clause was also not to be given overriding effect in a mechanical fashion as underlying object of interpretative project undertaken by Court was to discover meaning of words used by Legislature and a non-obstante clause was usually employed to suggest that a provision referred to in such clause was to prevail over other provisions of a statute, but repugnancy between non-obstante clause and other clause was not to be presumed and overriding effect was to be accorded only in case of irreconcilable conflict as held in 2021 PTD 1203 (Messer Federal Bank for Cooperatives, Islamabad vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad).

19. This Court while comparing the two special laws, meant to protect the women, comes to conclusion that Section 5 of the Family Court Act, 1964 has conferred the exclusive jurisdiction upon family Court to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon the matters specified in Part 1, Schedule of the Act if read with the Family Court Rules 1965. The question of territorial jurisdiction has also been settled under
Rule 6 on the basis of cause of action wholly or in part has arisen or where the parties reside or last resided together. Provided that in suits for dissolution of marriage or dower the Courts within the local limits of which the wife ordinarily resides shall also have jurisdiction. This aspect extend complete protection to the woman even if she shifts from one place to other the jurisdiction must flow with her rather it is a choice based concept. The proviso by very nature of its language is an enabling provision and is for benefit of wife. Similarly the term ordinarily resides in the above mentioned rules has also been explained in PLD 1976 Karachi 978 (Mahbub Ahmad vs. First Additional District Judge) and even the word ordinarily means more Khan mere temporary residence, hence, the suit for maintenance, personal property, belongings of wife, custody of children can also be instituted in Family Court where wife resides as held in PLD 2005 SC 22 (Muhammad Iqbal vs. Parveen Iqbal). And the Apex Court has conferred the exclusive territorial jurisdiction to the Family Court where wife resides in all such matters under the Family Court Act as settled in PLD 2016 SC 613 (Mst Yasmeen Bibi vs. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan), PLD 2012 SC 66 (Major Muhammad Khalid Karim vs. Mst. Saadia Yaqub). This complete code known as Family Court Act, 1964 read with its rules and the interpretation given by the Apex Court covers each and every aspect to protect the rights of a woman therefore, the new law i.e, the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 in ICT could not be equalized and applied to the property situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of ICT, nor it is applicable to those women/complainants who are residing outside the ICT and claiming their property rights beyond ICT. However, as of today the rules have not been prescribed in terms of Section 2(b) of the Act, therefore, the gray areas have not yet been settled by the Federal Government having exclusive authority to make the rules to carry out the purpose of this Act in terms of Section 12 of the Act but primarily this special law of Act of 2020 is not in derogation with the Family Court Act, 1964 rather considered to be in addition to as the very purpose is to ensure and to protect the rights of ownership and possession of properties owned by women through a different mechanism.

20. By applying the above referred principles, this Court comes to the conclusion that the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020, though has no overriding clause, except that jurisdiction of other Courts and authorities are barred to the extent of questioning the validity of action taken, or intended to be taken or to grant an injunction or stay or to make any interim order in relation to any proceedings before, or anything done or intended to be done, or under the orders or at the instance of the Ombudsman. In such scenario, the comprehensive law is Family Courts Act, 1964, which not only provides the complete mechanism rather bars the jurisdiction of all other Courts by providing exclusive jurisdiction on ten (10) subjects referred in Part 1 of the Schedule of the Act, therefore, this Court comes to the following view for the purpose of elucidating the issue:

(a)      When any matter specified in Part 1 of the Schedule of Family Court Act, 1964 is pending with competent Family Court among spouses or ex-spouses on a property issue, which is claimed by either party on the basis of terms referred in nikahnama or otherwise, territorial jurisdiction has to be settled under the Family Court Act, 1964, however, if any complaint has been filed by a woman for protection of her rights of ownership and possession of property (moveable or immovable) within ICT under the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020, she must demonstrate that she owns or possess any property within the territorial jurisdiction of ICT, otherwise complaint is not entertainable.

(b)      No complaint is entertain-able if the parties are married to each other in some other district, living outside the territorial jurisdiction of ICT and litigation is also pending in other district, the complaint should have been filed within that district only under the provincial laws, if enacted.

(c)      The Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 only covers those properties which are agreed to be given with clear terms within ICT, however, mere mentioning of a property within nikahnama without its clear description in terms of clause 16 will not extend the jurisdiction to Federal Ombudsman at ICT to exercise its jurisdiction as well as when the subject lis is pending with the Court in any other district unless the Family Court in that district grants permission to proceed with the complaint through a speaking order.

(d)      Any woman can file a complaint under Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 who owns any property in Islamabad Capital Territory by way of registered sale-deed, mutation, allotment letter, provisional allotment letter or through any other legal instrument, through which a property rights are conveyed to her with specific details and description, which has been taken over by force or by way of fraud or through any other mode and mean against the legal rights of a woman, the Ombudsman shall have the jurisdiction to restore the rights of such a complainant/woman by exercising her authority in joint collaboration with Deputy Commissioner of Islamabad Capital Territory and other state agencies by treating the same as a complaint.

31. For what has been discussed above, the instant writ petition is ALLOWED as the Federal Ombudsman at Islamabad has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of Respondent No. 2 Syed Sidra Shah qua the property referred in her Nikahnama, which is yet to be conferred through the judgment of the Family Court at Peshawar. Consequently, the complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 before the Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace/Islamabad is not maintainable.

(J.K.)   Petition allowed

فیملی کیسز میں اپیل کے بعد رٹ کو ناقابل سماعت قرار دے دیا گیا۔ جسٹس عائشہ ملک کا 6 صفحات کا تفصیلی فیصلہ جاری کر دیا۔۔

 اگر مقننہ نے دوسری اپیل کا حق نہیں دیا تواس کا مقصد مقدمہ بازی کو مختصر کرنا ہے لہذا رٹ کے ذریعے مقننہ کی منشا کو چیلنج نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔ جسٹس عائشہ ملک۔

آئینی عدالت آئینی درخواست میں فیملی کیسز کے حقائق کا از سر نو جائزہ لینے کا اختیار نہیں رکھتی۔ عائشہ ملک

CP No 1418/23
Hammad Hasan Vs Isma Bukhari
Dated 17.07.23


Judgment PFD Click to see compete judgment

Suit for recovery of dower can validly be filed against father-in-law

PLD 2023 Lahore 446
Suit for recovery of dower can validly be filed against father-in-law

Suit for recovery of dower --- Wakeel of Nikahnama , liability of - Scope - Plaintiff claimed deferred dower by filing a suit against her father - in - law ( defendant ) as he had acted as a wakeel of her late husband --- Validity- .. Defendant was a party to the Nikahnama and his name was clearly mentioned in column No. 9 as the ' wakeel of the bridegroom Nikahnama also bore his thumb impression --- Undeniably , it was primarily duty and obligation of the husband to pay dower to his wife --- However , there was no bar or prohibition on another person binding himself as a surety by putting his signature on the Nikahnama , ensuring the payment --- Such a surety cannot wriggle out from this legal obligation when a suit for the recovery of dower is brought against him by the wife

Suit for recovery of dower --- Wakeel in Nikahnama , liability of --- Scope --- Family Court under Section 5 of the Family Court Act , 1964 had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain . hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in Part I of the Schedule to the said Act and there was no barring provision that while claiming dower from the husband , only bridegroom / husband can be impleaded in the suit for recovery of dower and none else --- If another person has stood surety or has guaranteed the payment of dower , he / she can lawfully be impleaded in the suit --- Surety and guarantor to the dower are as much party and liable to pay dower as the bridegroom himself . 

Suit for recovery of dower --- Wakeel ( Father in - law ) in Nikahnama , liability of --- Scope --- Word ' wakeel ' is synonymous to English word agent ---- Agency may be created expressly i.e. in writing or through implication ; it can even be inferred from the circumstances of the case , from things spoken or written or on the basis of ordinarily course of dealings --- By creating agency , the principal confers certain authorities to agent and agent owes certain liabilities in exchange towards principal --- Agency remains intact unless rescinded or some act of agent renders him incapable of continuing his authority --- Normally agent is not held responsible for enforcement of contract entered by him on behalf of the principal --- However , under Islamic law a departure to the general rule in case pertaining to the marriage has been made , particularly , where father had acted as a wakeel of his son / bridegroom --- In absence of tangibly expressed repudiation of such authority the agent / wakeel cannot get rid of the liabilities imposed upon him being wakeel / father of bridegroom .

Nikahnama...Columns. 13, 14, 15 & 16---

 Dower amount---Object, purpose and scope---Marriage is a civil contract, which has for its object, the procreation and legalizing of children---Dower or "Mehr" is the sum of money or other property which wife is entitled from husband in consideration of marriage---It is an obligation imposed upon a husband as a mark of respect to wife and where a claim is made under a contract of Dower , Court should, unless it is provided by any legislative enactment, award entire sum provided in the contract---Dower may be prompt or deferred---Prompt Dower is payable immediately on demand---Where part of Dower is described as Mu'wajjal i.e. deferred but no time limit is fixed for its payment, time of such payment is either death or divorce---Dower may be in any form of property, tangible or intangible---Parties to marriage contract i.e. bride and the bridegroom have freedom of contract to negotiate and settle terms of marriage including Dower ---Dower is the only corollary for a valid marriage.

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.5---Muslim Family Laws Rules, 1961, R.8, Form II, Cls. 13, 14, 15 & 16---Dower , recovery of---Dispute was with regard to payment of Dower and transfer of house as stated in entries in columns Nos. 13 to 16 of Naikahnama registered under S. 5 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Validity---Entry in column No.13 was rider to entries in columns Nos.14, 15 and 16, of Nikahnama---Respondent / wife in the first instance could lay her claim with regard to Rs.500,000/- as Dower mentioned in column No.13 of Nikahnama and if due to any reason, Dower was not paid to her then she would become entitled to the property mentioned in column No.16 of Nikahnama in lieu thereof--- House in question was owned by father of petitioner / bridegroom who was neither signatory to the Nikahnama nor he had given any consent for the transfer of house in favour of his daughter-in-law, i.e. respondent / wife, who was precluded to claim said house---High Court declined to interfere in judgment by Lower Appellate Court as there was no legal infirmity in it---High Court directed that in order to avoid such problems in future, Nikah Registrars must ensure compliance of Rr. 7 to 13 of Muslim Family Laws Rules, 1961, while recording entries in Nikahnama---High Court further directed Nikah Registrars to avoid from incorporating any entry other than allowed in Nikahnama and to take special care while making entries in columns Nos.13 to 16 of Nikahnama---Further that Nikah Registrars should only record entry of Dower in column No.13 of Nikahnama whatever was fixed by the parties as Dower ---High Court directed Federal Government as well as Provincial Government to prescribe minimum educational qualification for the grant of licence to Nikah Registrar in pursuance of R.5(2) of Muslim Family Laws Rules, 1961 and make arrangement for their proper training---High Court also directed the authorities that till such time Nikahnama Form prescribed under R.8 of Muslim Family Laws Rules, 1961---Parties desirous to fix some other beneficial condition in addition to Dower , they should execute an independent instrument to that effect instead of intermingling the same with the Dower

Jurisdiction of Family Courts --- Custody of minor --- Scope --- As evident from its Preamble , the Family Courts Act , 1964 , has been enacted for the establishment of Family Courts for expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith --

PLD 2023 Lahore 433

Jurisdiction of Family Courts --- Custody of minor --- Scope --- As evident from its Preamble , the Family Courts Act , 1964 , has been enacted for the establishment of Family Courts for expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith --- Subject to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance . 1961 and the Conciliation Courts Ordinance , 1961 . exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Family Courts to entertain , hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in Part I of the Sched , to the Family Courts Act , 1964 --- Said subject matters include custody of children and the visitation rights of the parents to meet them as specified in Entry No.5 of Part 1 of the Sched , whereas the matters of Guardianship are also stipulated in Entry No.6 thereof --- Section 25 of the Family Courts Act , 1964 , deems the Family Court to be a District Court for the purposes of Guardians and Wards Act , 1890 Barring a few exceptions specified in subsections ( 4 ) & ( 5 ) of S. 1 of the Family Courts Act , 1964 , jurisdiction of the Family Court over matters of custody is exclusive and no otherCourt including the Guardian Judge has any jurisdiction to deal with such matters . 

Jurisdiction of Family Court Judicial proceedings for appointment of guardian of mentally disordered person --- Custody of minors --- Scope --- No doubt Ss . 32 & 33 of the Mental Health Ordinance , 2001 , vest authority in the Court of Protection for the appointment of guardian of a mentally disordered person who is incapable of taking care of himself or the manager of his property when he is incapable of managing his property , however , judicial proceedings in that regard are governed by the provisions of Ss . 29 to 31 --- Requirements of possession of property by the person alleged to be mentally disordered and consent in writing of the Advocate General Punjab prescribed in S. 29 are for proceedings qua mandatory prerequisites appointment of guardian and / or manager under the Mental Health Ordinance , 2001 , whereas none of that is required for the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction by the Family Court under the Family Courts Act , 1964 , since no minor can be left without a guardian and custodian


کیا اجرا ڈگری میں فیملی کورٹ براہ راست کاروائی اجرا دوسرے ضلع میں بھجوا سکتی ھے؟

 2023 CLC 1300

کیا اجرا ڈگری میں فیملی
کورٹ براہ راست کاروائی اجرا دوسرے ضلع میں بھجوا سکتی ھے؟
لاہور ہائیکورٹ کے اس قانونی نکتہ پر متضاد فیصلہ جات موجود تھے۔
2022 MLD 1280
میں سنگل بنچ اور Objection Case (Civil)
16605
عشرت بانو بنام فتح محمد فیصلہ شدہ مورخہ 09-02-2023 میں دو ججز پر مشتمل بنچ نے قرار دیا کہ براہ راست کاروائی اجرا دوسرے ضلع میں نہ بھجوائی جا سکتی ھے۔ جبکہ ایک دوسرے فیصلہ PLD 2022 Lahore 600 میں سنگل بنچ نے یہ قرار دیا کہ فیملی کورٹ براہ راست کاروائی اجرا دوسرے ضلع میں بھجوا سکتی ھے۔
اس نکتہ قانونی کے حتمی تعین کیلئے تین ججز پر مشتمل فل بنچ تشکیل دیا جس نے یہ قرار دے دیا ھے کہ فیملی کورٹ براہ راست کاروائی اجرا دوسرے ضلع میں بھجوا سکتی ھے۔
Decision of learned Larger Bench in order to clear a serious disparity and conflict between views of two learned Single Benches of this Court regarding transfer of execution petitions in family matters.
It is held in this judgment that the learned Judge Family Court has the same powers as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) to transfer the execution proceedings and execute the decree in question"
Once a decree is passed by the Family Court that becomes executable in terms of Section 13 and in case of any hindrance to the same, the learned executing court can adopt any of the mode provided for the execution of the decree in the “C.P.C.”

Column No.18 of the nikah-nama clearly mentions that...............

 2020 (M) CLR 385

Column No.18 of the nikah-nama clearly mentions that in case of divorce, the dowry articles shall be returned to respondent; this condition mentioned in the nikah-nama negates the claim of the petitioner that nothing was given as dowry articles as people may tell a lie but documents cannot. Consequently, to that extent, it is established that dowry articles were given to respondent at the time of her marriage

The term "decree" is nowhere defined in the Family Courts Act, 1964. So for this purpose, recourse can be made to section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908), ....

 2023 CLC 1285

The term "decree" is nowhere defined in the Family Courts Act, 1964. So for this purpose, recourse can be made to section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908), which defines the decree. After having a glimpse of the definition of decree, no doubt left that a decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint the determination of any question within section 144 and an order under rules 60, 98, 99, 101 or 103 of Order XXI but shall not include any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or any order of dismissal for default. Suit for dissolution of marriage was decreed in terms of section 10 (4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The decision was compound, which on the one hand dissolved the marriage interse parties and on the other dissolution was made subject to return of dower. Section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 provides the manner of enforcement of decrees The manner and form of decree is provided in the West Pakistan Family Court Rules, 1965. Rules 16 and 17, for the said purpose, are more relevant The above discussion leads to irresistible conclusion that the order dated 8th December, 2010 resulting into dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula subject to return of dower, for all intent and purposes, was a decree under section 13 of the "Act, 1964" and was executable

Custody of minors --- " Guardian " --- Maintenance , right to --- Scope --- Law maintains a distinction between custody and guardianship and ...........

 PLD 2023 Lahore 433

Custody of minors --- " Guardian " --- Maintenance , right to --- Scope --- Law maintains a distinction between custody and guardianship and respective rights and obligations in that regard under the Guardians and Wards Act , 1890 ( ' Act ' ) --- Definition of " guardian " in S. 4 ( 2 ) seems to include the concept of custody , unless the same has been exclusively awarded by the court to a party who is not the guardian of a minor --- Custody under the Act involves a right to upbringing of a minor --- On the other hand , guardianship entails the concept of taking care of the minor even in situations when the guardian does not have domain over the corpus of the child --- Father is considered to be a natural guardian of a minor , even after separation with the mother , and even when the mother has been granted custody of a minor , he is obligated to provide financial assistance to the minor --- Liability to maintain the minor is not only religious and moral but also legal --- Right of custody of father is subordinate to the fundamental principle i.e. welfare of the minor Maintenance of child is the duty of father and the mother cannot be deprived of custody due to her inability to maintain the child for lack of resources .

PLD 2023 Lahore 433
' Minor ' --- ' Guardian ' --- ' Ward ' --- Meaning --- Unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context , S. 4 of the Guardians and Wards Act , 1890 , defines the ' Minor ' as a person who , under the provisions of the Majority Act , 1875 , is to be deemed not to have attained his Majority ; the ' Guardian ' means a person having the care of the person of a minor or his property , or of both his person and property and the ' Ward ' means a minor for whose person or property or both there is a guardian.

PLD 2023 Lahore 433
Custody of minors --- Guardianship --- Visitation rights --- Scope --- Question before High Court was whether the provisions of Mental Health Ordinance , 2001 , contradict and repeal the Family Courts Act , 1964 , to take away jurisdiction of the Family Court qua custody of minors who are suffering from any mental disability and vest the same in the Court of Protection --- Held ; main crux of the Mental Health Ordinance , 2001 .essentially relates to psychiatric facility and management of property of the mentally disabled persons and appointment of guardian under the Mental Health Ordinance , 2001 --- Dispute inter se parents of a minor for his or her custody and / or guardianship is manifestly not a subject matter of the Mental Health Ordinance , 2001 , which falls within the exclusive domain of Family Court even when the minor suffers from any disability --- Provisions of Mental Health Ordinance , 2001 , do not contradict and repeal the provisions of S. 5 read with Entries Nos . 5 and 6 of Part I of the Schedule to the Family Courts Act , 1964 to take away jurisdiction of the Family Court in disputes amongst parents regarding guardianship and / or custody of minors who are suffering from any mental disability ... Overriding effect of the Mental Health Ordinance , 2001 , as provided in S. 60 thereof , is limited to cases of conflict .

PLD 2023 Lahore 433
Custody of minor girl ... Mother , entitlement of - Scope --- Mother of minor girls is entitled to their custody unless there is anything available on record to disentitle her
Repeal by implication --- Scope --- Legislature is normally not [ Wo contradictory to keep presumed to have intended enactments on the statute book with the intention of repealing the one with the other , without expressing an intention to do so --Such an intention cannot be imputed to the legislature without strong reasons and unless that is inevitable --- Before adopting the last - mentioned course , it is necessary for the courts to exhaust all possible and reasonable constructions which offer an escape from repeal by implication . ----
Law maintains a distinction between custody and guardianship and respective rights and obligations in that regard under the Act. The definition of „guardian‟ in section 4(2) seems to include the concept of custody, unless the same has been exclusively awarded by the court to a party who is not the guardian of a minor. Custody under the Act involves a right to upbringing of a minor. On the other hand, guardianship entails the concept of taking care of the minor even in situations when the guardian does not have domain over the corpus of the child. A father is considered to be a natural guardian of a minor, since even after separation with the mother, and even when the mother has been granted custody of a minor, he is obligated to provide financial assistance to the minor. The liability to maintain the minor is not only religious and moral but also is legal. The right of custody of father is subordinate to the fundamental principle i.e. welfare of the minor. Maintenance of child is the duty of father and the mother cannot be deprived of custody due to her inability to maintain the child for lack of resources.
Unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, section 4 of the Act defines the 'Minor' to mean a person who, under the provisions of the Majority Act, 1875, is to be deemed not to have attained his Majority; the 'Guardian‟ to mean a person having the care of the person of a minor or his property, or of both his person and property and the „Ward‟ to mean a minor for whose person or property or both there is guardian. As evident from its preamble, the FCA 1964 has been enacted for the establishment of Family Courts for expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith. Subject to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Family Courts to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in Part I of the Schedule to the FCA 1964. These subject matters include custody of children and the visitation rights of the parents to meet them as specified in Entry No.5 of Part I of the said Schedule whereas the matters of Guardianship are also stipulated in Entry No.6 thereof. Section 25 of the FCA 1964 deems the Family Court to be a District Court for the purposes of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Barring a few exceptions specified in sub sections (4) and (5) of section 1 of the FCA 1964, jurisdiction of the Family Court over matters of custody is exclusive and no other Court including the Guardian Judge has any jurisdiction to deal with such matters.
The main crux of the MHO 2001 essentially relates to psychiatric facility and management of property of the mentally disabled persons and appointment of guardian under the MHO 2001 is in that context. The dispute inter se parents of a minor for his or her custody and/or guardianship is manifestly not a subject matter of the MHO 2001, which falls within the exclusive domain of Family Court even when the minor suffers from any disability. Therefore, the provisions of MHO 2001 do not contradict and repeal the provisions of section 5 read with items No. 5 & 6 of the Schedule to the FCA 1964 to take away jurisdiction of the Family Court in disputes amongst parents regarding guardianship and/or custody of minors who are suffering from any mental disability.
The overriding effect of the MHO 2001, as provided in section 60 thereof, is again limited to cases of conflict, which is not the case here since the dispute in the instant case involves custody of the minor amongst her parents and Wania is not claimed to be in possession of any property.

Application for the custody of minor girl --- Due service --- Fair trial --- Service upon the defendant --- Presumption --- Mother and minor girl ................

 PLD 2023 Lahore 412

Application for the custody of minor girl --- Due service --- Fair trial --- Service upon the defendant --- Presumption --- Mother and minor girl were living at a place / district different from the place / district where the father moved application for custody .... Guardian Court dismissed application of the petitioner / mother for setting aside ex - parte judgment and decree --- Petitioner / mother claimed that neither she was personally served nor she had any knowledge of the case proceedings --- Held , that primary controversy for the Court , in the present case , was that whether the mother was served in accordance with law before decree I was passed against her --- Without framing issues and recording evidence , the Court below had decided the factual controversy qua residential address of the mother / petitioner while relying on the photocopy of her alleged second marriage in district " K " , produced by the respondent / father --- Court also presumed the petitioner's knowledge of proceedings and service of summons on the basis that notice along with registered envelope AD were sent on her district ' K ' address and that notice was also proclaimed in the newspaper having been circulated / published from relevant division --- Neither the process server was ] produced as a witness , in the present case , to establish personal service of summons under S.8 of the Family Courts Act , 1964 , upon the mother / petitioner in accordance with law , nor any reference to his ( process server's ) report to the said effect had been made in the impugned order --- In the absence of any acknowledgement due available on record , service of the notice been presumed by the Court below merely on the basis of al receipt available on record --- Without establishing on not be served rd that the mother / petitioner could rsonally , reliance on publication of the notice could not be considered safe to presume service of the mother / petitioner , particularly when father / respondent himself alleged in his petition for custody that she was an illiterate villager --- High Court set - aside impugned order and allowed the application of mother / petitioner for setting aside ex - parte judgment and decree --- Application of father for the custody of minor girl . would be deemed to be pending , at the place mother and minor were residing , for decision afresh in accordance with law

Custody of minor girl --- Welfare of minor --- Decision upon the custody of minor girl , as far as practicable , must be made on merit on the basis of her welfare being paramount consideration in law .

Custody of minor girl --- Welfare of minor --- Due service --- Fair trial ---- Guardian Court dismissed application of the petitioner / mother for setting aside ex - parte judgment and decree --- Held , that in the absence of proper service and adequate opportunity of hearing granted to both sides , any determination of welfare of the minor could not be termed as lawful and satisfying the requirement of fundamental right to fair trial as guaranteed under Art . 10 - A of the Constitution of Pakistan

-- Ss . 5 , Sched . & 17 --- Oaths Act ( X of 1873 ) , S. 11 --- Recovery of dower and dowry articles --- Wife taking special oath in regard to dower against husband offering to be bound by oath -

 2023 S C M R 153

Family Courts Act ( XXXV of 1964 ) ---
--- Ss . 5 , Sched . & 17 --- Oaths Act ( X of 1873 ) , S. 11 --- Recovery of dower and dowry articles --- Wife taking special oath in regard to dower against husband offering to be bound by oath --- In the present case the and dowry articles upon offer made by husband --- Evidence conclusive husband - petitioner filed an application for special oath which was accepted by the wife - respondent and the special oath was taken in the mode and manner proposed by the petitioner --- Due to the mutuality of the promise between the parties , the party making an offer has no right to resile from it after the offer is accepted and the special oath is taken --- In the absence of any such satisfactory or sufficient cause the Court is obligated to implement the agreement and to record the statement of the party concerned to make a decision in the case accordingly --- Petitioner could not wriggle out or withdraw his offer which was given by him voluntarily before the Family Court and the same was acted upon according to his will --- Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused .


Entitlement for lump sum for iddat period--Appeal of respondent was partially accepted--Modification in judgment--Financial status-

 PLJ 2023 Lahore 143
[Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi]
Present: Jawad Hassan, J.
ZIA HUSSAIN--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others--Respondents
W.P. No. 2832 of 2018, heard on 25.1.2022.

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----Ss. 8 & 9--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Suit for dissolution of marriage and recovery of maintenance allowance--Decreed--Held: Entitlement for lump sum for iddat period--Appeal of respondent was partially accepted--Modification in judgment--Financial status--Petitioner was not attached any document with written statement regarding his financial status--Petitioner had ample opportunity to prove his financial status even at documentary stage and till decision of suit but not only he, rather his witness, failed to do so--Petitioner has deliberately hidden his source of income from Court just to avoid payment of maintenance allowance to minors--Appellate Court, while considering evidence and needs of minors, enhanced maintenance allowance as no documentary proof was produced by Petitioner before it--Respondent No.3 has failed to bring on record any document to prove income of Petitioner as alleged--Both parties have failed to make out their case in any manner for interference in findings of fact of Courts below which is based on oral as well as documentary evidence produced by parties--Petition dismissed.

                                                      [Pp. 147, 148 & 149] B, C, F, G & H

Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--

----Art. 199--Exercising of lawful jurisdiction--Maintenance--Findings on fact recorded by a competent court in exercise of lawful jurisdiction cannot be agitated by invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of Constitution unless same suffer from any legal infirmity, jurisdictional error or perversity causing serious miscarriage of justice.      [P. 146] A

PLD 2013 SC 557 ref.

Words and Phrases--

----“Maintenance” means and includes food, clothing, and lodging which is responsibility of father to pay to his children and wife.

                                                                                             [P. 147] D

Words and Phrases--

----“Legal obligation”--Minors are entitled to be maintained by father in manner befitting status and financial condition of father and for this reason Family Court is under an obligation while granting maintenance allowance, to keep in mind financial condition and status of father--Courts are under legal obligation to make an inquiry in this regard.          [P. 148] E

Mr. Majid Ali Butt, Advocate for Petitioner.

Ms. Shahida Tanveer, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 25.1.2022.

Judgment

Through this single judgment, this Court intends to decide the titled petition as well as Writ Petition No.2682 of 2018 filed by the Respondents as both the petitions have been filed against the same judgments and decrees.

2. For the sake of clarity, Zia Hussain is to be referred as (the “Petitioner”, whereas, Mst. Asma Saleem and others are to be referred as (the “Respondents”).

3. The Petitioner has called in question judgments and decrees of the Family Court as well as Appellate Court, dated 25.04.2018 and 01.09.2018, respectively, whereby maintenance allowance in favour of the Respondents has been fixed on higher side. Writ Petition No.2832 of 2018 has been filed by the Petitioner for reduction of the maintenance allowance. On the contrary, the Respondents through W.P.No.2682 of 2018 have assailed the judgments and decrees of the Courts below for enhancement of their maintenance allowance.

4. The facts of the case are that the marriage of Petitioner and the Respondent No.3 was solemnized on 27.11.2003 and they were blessed with two children namely Muhammad Moazam Zia and Abdul Rafay (hereinafter to be referred as “minors”). Due to strained relations between the spouses, the Respondents filed a suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khulla, recovery of maintenance allowance and dowry articles. The said suit was contested by the Petitioner by filing written statement, however, the suit was decreed to the tune of Rs.10,000/- per month for each minor from January, 2016 along with 10% annual increase till their age of majority. Mst. Asma Saleem, was held entitled to recover Rs.30,000/- lumpsum only for iddat period while she was also granted dowry articles as per list Ex.P3 except articles mentioned at Sr. Nos. 9, 12 to 14, 17, 18, 23 to 28, 30, 33, 35 and 36 or alternate price Rs.2,00,000/-. Feeling aggrieved thereof, both the parties preferred their respective appeals, however, appeal of the Respondents was partially accepted with modification while that of the Petitioner was dismissed in the following manner:

“In the light of above discussion, appeal of the appellants is accepted partially whereas appeal of the Respondents dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree is modified to the effect that plaintiffs No.2 and 3 shall be entitled to maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs.15,000/- per month from February, 2015 with 10% increase per annum till their legal entitlement whereas impugned judgment and decree to the extent of maintenance allowance of plaintiff No.1 and dowry articles is upheld”.

5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner inter alia contends that impugned judgments and decrees are the result of mis-reading and non-reading of material available on record; that the learned Trial Court wrongly assumed the financial status of the parties and prices of the dowry articles, therefore, confirmation, as well as, enhancement by the learned Appellate Court has been made under a wrong impression; that the maintenance allowance fixed by the Courts below is also exaggerative and has been awarded without looking into financial status of the Petitioner; that no proof of income of the Petitioner was tendered by Respondents and in absence thereof, fixation of maintenance allowance by the learned Courts below is against the norms of justice.

6. Conversely, learned counsel for Respondents contended that though the learned Appellate Court has modified the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and increased the amount of maintenance allowance yet it is not sufficient to cater with daily needs of minors; that the lower Appellate Court has failed to consider the fact that one minor is serious patient of knee joints who needs proper medication and treatment for which monthly expenses at higher rate are required while the other minor is studying in PAF College, he, too, is in dire need of his educational expenses; that the Petitioner belongs to a rich family and he can easily pay more maintenance to his children.

7. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

8. It is an established principle that findings on fact recorded by a competent court in exercise of lawful jurisdiction cannot be agitated by invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 unless the same suffer from any legal infirmity, jurisdictional error or perversity causing serious miscarriage of justice.

9. Plea of the Petitioner is that the Courts below have awarded maintenance allowance at exorbitant rate which he is unable to pay. While the stance of the Respondents is that the Petitioner has strong financial status, who earns handsome income and can easily pay maintenance allowance as prayed for.

10. Admittedly a suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khulla and maintenance allowance was filed by the Respondents on 17.12.2016. The Petitioner entered appearance and filed written statement on 27.01.2017. The Family Court keeping in view the evidence of the parties, decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 25.04.2018 by awarding maintenance allowance to the minors @ Rs.10,000/- per month with 10% increase till their age of majority while the claim of the Respondents with regard to dowry articles to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- as alternate price was allowed. The said Respondent was also held entitled to recover maintenance allowance @ Rs.30,000/- lumpsum for her iddate period only. The aforesaid judgment and decree was challenged by both the parties through separate appeals which was decided through consolidated judgment and decree dated 01.09.2018 whereby quantum of maintenance allowance was enhanced from Rs.10,000/- per month to Rs.15,000/- per month while remaining findings of the Family Court were upheld.

11. So far as the ground of the Petitioner with regard to fixation of maintenance allowance at higher side is concerned, it is an admitted position that the Petitioner is a MBBS doctor by profession and during cross examination he admitted that he has not annexed any document with regard to his income with written statement. It is noted that the Petitioner had ample opportunity to prove his financial status even at documentary stage and till decision of the suit but not only he, rather his witness, failed to do so which is clear violation of Section 9 of the Act. Evidence produced by the Petitioner depicts that he had concealed his sources of income from the stage of filing written statement till decision of lower appellate Court and there existed contradictions in the statements on behalf of Petitioner and his father, who was a witness, regarding source of income. The Petitioner appeared as DW-1 and admitted in his affidavit Ex.D1 that he earns Rs.30,000/- per month, for which he has not brought any salary slip to controvert the stance of the Respondents while on the other hand the father of the Petitioner appeared as DW-2 and deposed that the Petitioner pays maintenance allowance after lending money from his brothers and sisters. These contradictions on behalf of the Petitioner and his father clearly reflect the fact that the Petitioner has deliberately hidden his source of income from the Court just to avoid the payment of maintenance allowance to the minors. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported as "Muhammad Asim versus Mst. Samro Begum and others" (PLD 2018 SC 819) has held that “if the husband/father fails to disclose his salary or financial earnings, adverse inference would be drawn against him”. ‘Maintenance’ means and includes food, clothing, and lodging which is the responsibility of the father to pay to his children and wife. In this regard, it is noted that Section 17(A) of the Act specifically provides in sub-section to fix maintenance. The Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan has considered the aforesaid issue in the case of “Humayun Hassan versus Arslan Humayun and another” (PLD 2013 SC 557) and held as under:

“Again in interpreting the word “maintenance” some reasonable standard must be adopted. Whilst it is not confined merely to food, clothing, and lodging, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be extended to incorporate within its education at higher levels ad infinitum. What is necessary to decide in this connection is to find out as to what amount of education has to be attained by the child concerned, having regard to the status and other circumstances of his family, to enable it to earn a complete livelihood by honest and decent means. Thus it may not be sufficient to say that the child of a tradesman can maintain itself by working as coolly or by thieving. What is required is that the child must be maintained until it is in a position to earn its livelihood, in an honest ad decent manner in keeping with its family status.

12. Under the law, a father is bound to maintain his children until they have attained the age of majority. The intent and purpose of the maintenance allowance to a minor child is to enable her/him to continue living at least in the same state of affairs as the child was used to live prior to separation/divorce amongst the parents and it would be quite unjust and against the norms of proprietary if due to separation amongst the parents the child has to relegate to a lower level of living standard or he/she is declined the level or standard of education which was achieved by him/her prior to such happening i.e. separation of parents which admittedly has already taken place between the parties. At the same time, there is no escape from the fact that financial status of the father is also to be taken into consideration while awarding maintenance. The minors are entitled to be maintained by the father in the manner befitting the status and financial condition of the father and for this reason the Family Court is under an obligation while granting the maintenance allowance, to keep in mind the financial condition and status of the father. The Courts are under legal obligation to make an inquiry in this regard. It cannot act arbitrarily or whimsically. But in this case, the Petitioner has deliberately concealed his financial status regardless of admitted fact that he is MBBS doctor by profession and runs a clinic.

13. The learned lower Appellate Court, while considering the evidence and needs of the minors, enhanced the maintenance allowance as no documentary proof was produced by the Petitioner before it, therefore, keeping in view the evidence and basic needs of minors, monthly maintenance allowance for minors was enhanced to


Rs.15,000/- per month with 10% annual increase. As far as the question of recovery of dowry articles is concerned, after taking into consideration the oral, as well as, documentary evidence of the parties, and while applying the concept of wear and tear, learned Family Court held that the Respondent No.1 is entitled to receive her dowry articles as per list provided as Ex.P3 except articles mentioned at Sr. Nos. 9, 12 to 14, 17, 18, 23 to 28, 30, 33, 35 and 36 and in the alternate, the price of the same was fixed as Rs.2,00,000/- which finding was upheld by the lower Appellate Court.

14. So far as the stance of the Respondents with regard to enhancement of maintenance allowance of minors is concerned, it evinces from the record that the Respondent No.3 has failed to bring on record any document to prove income of the Petitioner as alleged. Resultantly, the Family Court keeping in view the basic necessities of life of minors and in view of the available record, granted maintenance allowance to them @ Rs.10,000/- per month which was further enhanced by the lower Appellate Court @ Rs.15000/- per month with 10% annual increase till their age of majority.

15. In view of above reasons, both the parties have failed to make out their case in any manner for interference in the findings of fact of the Courts below which is based on oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the parties. Resultantly, both the captioned writ petitions having no merits are hereby dismissed.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

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