سلام آبادہائیکورٹ نے شادی کی عمر سے متعلق اہم فیصلہ سناتے ہوئے 18 سال سے کم عمر شادی کو غیر قانونی معاہدہ قرار دے دیا ہے۔

PLD 2022 ISLAMABAD 228

جسٹس بابر ستار نے جاری کردہ فیصلے میں لکھا کہ 18 سال سے کم عمر لڑکی آزادانہ شادی نہیں کرسکتی، حیاتیاتی طور پر بلوغت کی عمر 18 سال کا ہونا ہی ہے۔
عدالتی فیصلے میں کہا گیا کہ محض جسمانی تبدیلیوں پر 18 سال سے پہلے قانونی طور پر بلوغت نہیں ہوتی، بلوغت کی قانونی عمر 18 برس ہے، اس سے کم عمر لڑکی کی شادی غیر قانونی ہوگی۔
فیصلے میں کہا گیا کہ 18سال سے کم عمر لڑکی کے ورثا بھی جسمانی تعلق والا معاہدہ نہیں کراسکتے۔
عدالت نے بیٹی کی بازیابی کے لیے دائر ممتاز بی بی کی درخواست پر فیصلہ سنادیا اور 16سالہ سویرا فلک شیر کو واپس والدہ کے سپرد کرنے کا حکم دے دیا۔
عدالت نے ایس ایچ او گولڑہ کو دارالامان سے لڑکی واپس والدہ کے سپر کرنے کا حکم بھی دیا۔
عدالت نے مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈیننس میں وضاحت نہ ہونے کا معاملہ کابینہ ڈویژن اور پارلیمنٹ کے سامنے رکھنے کی ہدایت کردی۔
ممتاز بی بی نے مئی 2021 سے بیٹی کے اغوا کا مقدمہ درج کرایا تھا، لڑکی نے ہائی کورٹ میں مرضی سے شادی کرنے کا بیان دیا تھا۔
1. Can a Minor execute a valid contract of marriage and can a marriage between an adult and a child, even if with the consent of the child, be deemed to be a valid marriage?
2. What is the age of majority in Pakistan, and does a Minor have the legal competence to enter into a contract of marriage before attaining the age of majority?
3. Can the consideration and purpose of contract of marriage be regarded as lawful in view of section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, read together with sections 375 and 377A of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
4. Can a contract of marriage, involving an object and purpose that is proscribed, be treated as a valid contract while simultaneously creating criminal liability for the male for carrying out acts conceived by such contract?
......................................
A. A child is defined as a person who has not attained the age of 18 years. A child is required to be placed in somebody’s care whether it is a parent or guardian or other caregiver appointed on behalf of the state. Complete agency to grant informed consent for purposes of entering into contract, including, inter alia, a marriage contract cannot be attributed to such child.
B. A female child below the age of 18 cannot be deemed competent to freely grant her consent to enter into a marriage contract merely because she manifests the physical symptoms of having attained puberty. In view of provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018 and PPC, when read together, while being guided by principles of Islamic jurisprudence and Principles of Policy enshrined in the Constitution, (including state’s obligation to protect the woman, the child and the family), the test for legal agency and competence of a female child is her biological age and not her state of physical and biological growth.
C. The provisions of sections 375 and 377A of PPC are mandatory provisions and any contract entered with the object of breaching such provisions or that has the effect of breaching such provisions cannot be treated as a valid contract. A marriage contract in which one of the parties is a child under the age of 18 is therefore a contract executed for an unlawful purpose and is void ab initio. Such marriage contract can neither be registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, nor can be given effect by a court, as that would tantamount to defeating provisions of law that have been promulgated to uphold rights of children guaranteed by Article 9 of the Constitution read together with the provisions of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
D. A child under the age of 18 years is a dependent of an adult whether such adult is a parent or guardian or other caregiver appointed by the State. The State is under an obligation to uphold and guarantee the rights of such child, who cannot be deemed to have the competence or capacity to parent a child of his/her own and act as guardian endowed with the primary responsibility to provide for his/her child while being a child himself/herself.
E. Sections 375 and 377A of PPC read together with Article 9 of the Constitution, Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018, and provisions of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child unequivocally provide that no one can engage in sexual conduct in any form with a child and neither can any person invite or entice a child to engage in sexual conduct in any form, and any invitation or enticement provided to a child to engage in sexual conduct, even under the cloak of marriage, would fall within the definition of sexual abuse in terms of section 377A.
F. Neither a child under the age of 18 can consent to engage in sexual conduct in any form, nor can a parent or guardian of a child, contract a child out to engage in sexual conduct. A child is not a chattel that can be contracted out by a trustee or guardian to engage in conduct that the child himself/herself cannot grant consent for. No consent can be granted on behalf of a child by a parent or guardian involving discharge of personal service by the child or engagement in conduct that is unlawful and prohibited, such as that required to be performed under a marriage contract. While a parent or guardian can deal with a child’s property in his/her best interest, the parent or guardian is not at liberty to contract out the child to engage in a contract of personal service or conduct otherwise prohibited by law.
G. Sections 375 and 377A of PPC do not provide for any exceptions or exclusions to conduct that otherwise qualifies as rape or sexual abuse as defined therein, and the said sections would be attracted even where the offence is made out against a person who seeks to defend himself on the basis that such conduct was pursuant to a marriage contract executed by a child under the age of 18 years or his/her parent or guardian on his/her behest.
Once this Court has come to the conclusion that a marriage contract involving a child under the age of 18 years is a contract prohibited by law, which, even if executed by a child, is void ab initio, the question of treating the purported nikah-nama between respondent No.1 and the Minor as a basis to release her in the custody of respondent No.1 does not arise. This Court has not however determined the age of the Minor definitively, nor has it made any observations as regard the liability of respondent No.1 under provisions of PPC. Doing so in writ jurisdiction could fetter the rights of the parties involved to due process and fair trial as guaranteed by Article 10A of the Constitution. The determination of such questions is left to the court of competent jurisdiction before which such questions are raised.
For reasons stated above, the instant petition is allowed and respondent No.5 is directed to ensure that the Minor is released from Dar-ul-Aman into the custody of the petitioner, who is her mother, and the petitioner along with her husband (i.e. the father of the minor) are responsible to provide for the safety and wellbeing of the Minor in accordance with the provisions of Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018. Respondent No.1 shall pay the petitioner cost of litigation in the amount of Rs.20,000/- under section 35 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 within a period of thirty days and the learned counsel for the respondent will file a certificate with the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court confirming that the order as to costs has been complied with.
The office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Cabinet Division, and Secretary, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, to bring to the attention of the Cabinet and the Parliament, respectively, (i) the absence of a clear statutory provision in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, stating the permissible age for marriage in Pakistan, (ii) section 21 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, which is in conflict with provisions of Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018, read together with provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child, and capable of creating the false impression that children in Pakistan under the age of 18 are still deemed capable of being guardians in select circumstances,and (iii) provisions of statutory instruments dating back to colonial times, including the Majority Act, 1975, Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, provisions of which, if read on a stand-alone basis, could be vulnerable to interpretations in conflict with provisions of Sections 375 and 377A of PPC read together with Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018, and provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child. The office is also directed to send a copy of this judgment to Chief Commissioner, ICT, for information and compliance for purposes of registration of marriages under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, within Islamabad Capital Territory.

-Barred by time--Consolidated judgment and decree one appeal of petitioner to extent of increase of alternative price of dowry articles was within time and same has been duly entertained by appellate Court, whereas other appeal against same consolidated judgment has been dismissed being barred by time-

  PLJ 2022 Lahore 359

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----Ss. 9 & 10--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Suits for recovery of maintenance allowance and recovery of dowry articles--Consolidated judgment--Appeal for enhancement of maintenance allowance was dismissed--Barred by time--Challenge to--Consolidated judgment and decree one appeal of petitioner to extent of increase of alternative price of dowry articles was within time and same has been duly entertained by appellate Court, whereas other appeal against same consolidated judgment has been dismissed being barred by time--It is settled law that if against same consolidated judgment one appeal is within time then delay in filing of other appeal against same judgment is condonable--Appellate Court has erred in law and fact while dismissing appeal of petitioner being barred by time--Petition allowed.                                                        [P. 360] A & B

2019 SCMR 524 and PLD 2008 SC 591 ref.

Mr. Shafique Ahmad Bhutta, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Azam Jan Muhammad, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

Date of hearing: 18.3.2021.


  PLJ 2022 Lahore 359
Present: Abid Aziz Sheikh, J.
Mst. RUKHSANA KAUSAR--Petitioner
versus
MUHAMMAD NADEEM and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 10342 of 2021, decided on 18.3.2021.


Order

Through this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 30.1.2021 whereby petitioner’s appeal was dismissed being barred by time.

2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner filed two separate family suits i.e. one for recovery of maintenance allowance and the other for recovery of dowry articles. Both these suits were decided by learned family Court through consolidated judgment dated 21.12.2020. The petitioner being aggrieved filed two separate appeals, however, one appeal (for enhancement of the maintenance allowance) was dismissed being barred by time through impugned order dated 30.1.2021, hence this Constitutional petition.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after consolidated judgment dated 21.12.2020, the petitioner applied for the certified copy of the judgment and decree on 26.12.2020 which was received on 15.1.2021 and a single appeal was filed against the consolidated judgment. However, the concerned office did not entertain the appeal and directed the petitioner to file two separate appeals as two separate suits were filed by the petitioner. Submits that petitioner again applied for another certified copy on 15.1.2021; which was received on the same day. However, as father of the counsel for the petitioner was hospitalized, therefore, the appeal was filed on 28.1.2021. Submits that appeal to the extent of maintenance allowance was dismissed being barred by time though the delay was duly explained in the application for condonation of delay.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that each and every day of delay was not explained hence appeal was lawfully dismissed.

Description: ADescription: B5. Arguments heard. It is admitted position on record that against the consolidated judgment and decree dated 21.12.2020 one appeal of the petitioner to the extent of increase of alternative price of dowry articles was within time and same has been duly entertained by the learned appellate Court, whereas the other appeal against the same consolidated judgment has been dismissed being barred by time. It is settled law that if against the same consolidated judgment one appeal is within time then the delay in filing of the other appeal against the same judgment is condonable. In this regard reliance is placed on “Sheikh Akhtar Aziz vs. MstShabnam Begum and others (2019 SCMR 524), “Subedar Sardar Khan through Legal Heirs and others vs. Muhammad Idrees through General Attorney and another (PLD 2008 S.C. 591). Further in the application of condonation of delay the petitioner has explained that delay was caused as father of the learned counsel for the petitioner was hospitalized. In the circumstances the learned appellate Court has erred in law and fact while dismissing the appeal of the petitioner being barred by time.

6. In view of above discussion, the petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 30.1.2021 is set aside. Consequently the delay in filing of the appeal is condoned and matter is remitted back to the learned appellate Court to decide the appeal on merits.

(Y.A.)  Petition allowed

Great grandchildren are not within the meaning of “children” for the purposes of s. 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (“Ordinance”)?

 2022 SCMR 1131

S.4 has been declared to be contrary to the Injunctions of Islam by the Federal Shariat Court (“FSC”) by its judgment reported as Allah Rakha and others v Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2000 FSC 1. However, this judgment is under appeal before the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court (C.Sh.A 1/2000 and connected cases (Tanveer Jehan v Federation of Pakistan and others, etc.)). Article 203G of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no court including this Court itself shall, save as provided in Article 203F (which provides for appeals to the Shariat Appellate Bench), “entertain any proceeding or exercise any power or jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the power or jurisdiction of the [Federal Shariat] Court”. The proviso to clause (2) of Article 203D provides, inter alia, that if an appeal has been preferred to the Shariat Appellate Bench then the decision of the FSC shall be deemed stayed pending disposal of the appeal. The position that emerges therefore is that for purposes of deciding this matter s. 4 of the Ordinance is to be regarded as being in the field but the provision must be interpreted and applied on its own footing, purely as a matter of statutory interpretation.
Now, it is a fundamental principle of the law of Muslim inheritance that the legal heirs of a person are only determined at the moment of death and not before. This rule is clearly reflected in s. 4 by use of the words “opening of succession”. The point is then reinforced by the immediately succeeding words, “the children of [the predeceased] son or daughter, if any, living at the time the succession opens” (emphasis supplied). The words emphasized impose a clear limitation: s. 4 applied only to those grandchildren as are alive at the time of death of the propositus. Had these words been absent then, perhaps, a case could be made out for the interpretation put forward by learned counsel for the leave petitioners. However, the words do exist and therefore must be given due effect. To accept the case sought to be made out would, in effect, erase them from the statute. That would be contrary to well established rules of interpretation. It is of course well known that under the rules of Muslim inheritance the legal heirs of a predeceased son or daughter do not inherit from the parent of the predeceased. Section 4 carves out a carefully constructed exception from this rule. It is not without significance that the section does not refer to the legal heirs of the predeceased son or daughter: the words used are “the children of such son or daughter” and not ‘legal heirs’. Quite obviously for the predeceased son or daughter to have children they would have to have had a spouse, who could also be alive when the parent passes away. Yet, any spouse is excluded from the applicability of s. 4. It is also to be kept in mind that some of the rules of Muslim inheritance can apply across generations, which is encapsulated in the phrases “how high so ever” and “how low so ever” used in the standard treatises. Any possibility of s. 4 having such an effect (which, in essence, is the case pleaded by the leave petitioners) is carefully excluded by use of the words emphasized above, i.e., “living at the time the succession opens”. Read as a whole, the purpose and intent behind s. 4 is clear. The exception created by it is limited and circumscribed. It applies only to those grandchildren as are living at the time of the death of the propositus. An extended meaning cannot be given to the section in terms as urged by learned counsel for the leave petitioners. They, being the great grandchildren, did not have any share in the property left behind by the propositus on the basis of s. 4.

-Shariat petition--Article 35 states that "the State shall protect the marriage, the family, the mother and the child.

 PLJ 2022 Cr.C. (Note) 64

Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--

----Art. 35--Protection of family system--In Islamic society, the protection of family unit or family system has core-importance, which is rightly reflected in Article 35 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 stating one of the principles of policies in the Constitution. Article 35 states that "the State shall protect the marriage, the family, the mother and the child.                                                                          [Para 2] A

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 10(3)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 203D--Shariat petition--Challenged to--S. 10(3) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 is repugnant to injunctions of Islam--Reconciliation and compromise in family matters--In light of Quran and Sunnah, divorce is legally permissible but it is considered as most abhorrent and unpleasant act; therefore, Quran and Sunnah stress upon reconciliation and compromise to be made between spouses in, case of any unpleasant rift occurs between them to avoid divorce--Quran puts a moral and religious duty upon elders and family members of parties to put efforts for making a compromise between spouses in case any unpleasant rift occurs between them--Referred Ayat of Sura-Al-Nisa explains manner in which such reconciliation efforts may be made between parties within family--Ayat 35 of Sura Al-Nisa is directed for family members and elders of conflicting spouses for making compromise or doing efforts for reconciliation between them--Authority given to Family Court for reconciliation or compromise at pre-trial proceedings u/S. 10 of Family Courts Act, 1964 or after conclusion of trial under Section 12 of said Act, is adopted on basis of Verse 35 of Sura Al-Nisa of Holy Quran--The reference made by petitioners to Holy Quran and Sunnah while challenging Section 10(3) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act (Act XXXV of 1964) and Section 10(3) of Family Courts Act, 1964 (As amended for Punjab) is completely/ misconceived.

                                                                           [Para 2 & 3] B, C & D

Mr. Muhammad Irfan Khan, Advocate for Petitioners.

Date of hearing: 2.6.2021.


 PLJ 2022 Cr.C. (Note) 64
[Federal Shariat Court]
PresentMuhammad Noor Meskanzai, C.J., Dr. Syed Muhammad Anwer and Khadim Hussain M. Shaikh, JJ.
HAMMAD HUSSAIN and another--Petitioners
versus
FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Law & Justice, Islamabad and another--Respondents
Shariat P. No. 02/I of 2021, decided on 25.10.2021


Order

Dr. Syed Muhammad Anwer, J.--The petitioners have filed this Shariat petition under Article 203-D of the Constitution through which they have challenged Section 10(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act (Act XXXV of 1964), which according to them is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. In addition to that, they also challenged Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (As amended for Punjab). The West Pakistan Family Courts (Act XXXV of 1964) states as follow:

"10. Pre-trial proceedings.--(1) When the written statement is filed, the Court shall fix an early date for a pre-trial hearing of the case.

(2) -

(3) At the pre-trial, the Court shall ascertain the points at issue between the parties and attempt to effect a compromise or reconciliation between the parties, if this be possible."

Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (As amended for Punjab) states as follow:

"10. Pre-trial proceedings.--(1) When the written statement is filed, the Court shall fix an early date for a pre-trial hearing of the case.

(2) ---

(3) The Family Court may, at the pre-trial stage, ascertain the precise points of controversy between the parties and attempt to effect compromise between the parties."

The petitioners state that the said provision of the stated laws are in conflict with Ayat 35 of Surah Nisa. They also relied upon two Ahadis, from Sunan Abu Dawood, which stress upon the importance of making compromise (sulah) between any conflicting parties in general. The petitioners made arguments in favour of their petition. The petitioners also stressed upon the importance of family system in Islam. While relying upon Ayat 35 of Surah Nisa, the petitioners claimed that the process of reconciliation referred to in the impugned section of the law must be made mandatory upon the Family Courts.

2. We have heard the arguments and reached at the following conclusions:--

i)        it is correct understanding of the petitioners that in Islamic society, the protection of family unit or family system has core-importance, which is rightly reflected in Article 35 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 stating one of the principles of policies in the Constitution. Article 35 states that "the State shall protect the marriage, the family, the mother and the child";

ii)       in the light of Quran and Sunnah, divorce is legally permissible but it is considered as the most abhorrent and unpleasant act; therefore, Quran and Sunnah stress upon reconciliation and compromise to be made between the spouses in case of any unpleasant rift occurs between them to avoid divorce. The Quran puts a moral and religious duty upon the elders and family members of the parties to put efforts for making a compromise between the spouses in case any unpleasant rift occurs between them. The referred Ayat of Sura-Al-Nisa explains the manner in which such reconciliation efforts may be made between the parties within the family. The Ayat 35 of Sura Al-Nisa is directed for the family members and elders of the conflicting spouses for making compromise or doing efforts for reconciliation between them. For ready-reference, the Ayat 35 of Surah Nisa is reproduced below:

وَإِنْ خِفْتُمْ شِقَاقَ بَيْنِهِمَا فَٱبْعَثُوا۟ حَكَمًۭا مِّنْ أَهْلِهِۦ وَحَكَمًۭا مِّنْ أَهْلِهَآ إِن يُرِيدَآ إِصْلَـٰحًۭا يُوَفِّقِ ٱللَّهُ بَيْنَهُمَآ ۗ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ كَانَ عَلِيمًا خَبِيرًۭا

اور اگر تم کو معلوم ہو کہ میاں بیوی میں ان بن ہے تو ایک منصف مرد کے خاندان میں سے اور ایک منصف عورت کے خاندان میں سے مقرر کرو وہ اگر صلح کرا دینی چاہیں گے تو خدا ان میں موافقت پیدا کر دے گا کچھ شک نہیں کہ خدا سب کچھ جانتا اور سب باتوں سے خبر دار ہے۔ (35)

3. This matter was very clearly decided by this Hon'ble Court in Para-8 of its earlier judgment dated 04.07.2013, wrhereby Sh. Petition No. 20-I of 1999 titled "Muhammad Zoonnoon Khan vs. Federal Government of Pakistan & another" and Sh. Petition No. 06-I of 2010 titled "Muhammad Shah, etc. vs. The State" in which it was pointed out that the authority given to Family Court for reconciliation or compromise at pre-trial proceedings under Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 or after conclusion of trial under Section 12 of the said Act, is adopted on the basis of Verse 35 of Sura Al-Nisa of Holy Quran.

The reference made by the petitioners to the Holy Quran and Sunnah while challenging Section 10(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act (Act XXXV of 1964) and Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (As amended for Punjab) is completely misconceived Hence, the Shariat petition is dismissed accordingly and the Shariat Miscellaneous Application No. 4-1 of 2021 being infructuous is disposed of.

(A.A.K.)          Application disposed of

Maintenance fixed at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per month with 15% annual increase-

 2021 Y L R 1458

(a) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)---
----S. 25--- Custody of minor---Compromise decree--- Fixation of maintenance allowance--- Scope---Petitioner assailed decree passed by Judge Family Court on the basis of compromise between the parties to the extent of maintenance fixed at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per month with 15% annual increase---Contention of petitioner was that compromise was not signed by him and that the amount of maintenance was exorbitant---Validity---Compromise once arrived at with due deliberation and consultation was not legally challengable--- Challenging the compromise partially to the extent of maintenance allowance after its submission before the court of law had no moral and legal justification---Petitioner had signed vakalatnama in favour of his counsel and on the basis of said vakalatnama his counsel had appeared as a representative/ attorney of the petitioner---Consent decree was not appealable---Appeal filed by the petitioner agitating consent decree was validly dismissed by the Appellate Court---Petitioner, in view of his admission in the guardian petition, could easily afford maintenance of Rs.50,000/- per month to support his minor daughter---Constitutional petition was dismissed.
(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---
----O. III, R. 4---Appointment of pleader--- Scope--- Vakalatnama is a document which legally authorizes the lawyer/counsel to act on behalf of his/her client---Once the advocate is engaged through duly signed vakalatnama by the client for a case then all acts of the counsel in connection with such case are considered to be authorizedly taken on behalf of his client till such time the vakalatnama is revoked or withdrawn by the client in terms of the procedure prescribed under the law.
Hassan Akhtar and others v. Azhar Hameed and others PLD 2010 SC 657 rel.
Syeda Azra Bibi for Petitioner.
Respondent No.3 in person.
Date of hearing: 3rd December, 2020.

 2021 Y L R 1458
[Islamabad]
Before Lubna Saleem Pervez, J
MUHAMMAD KHAWER HASAN---Petitioner
Versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ISLAMABAD (WEST) and others---Respondent
Writ Petition No. 3180 of 2019, decided on 13th January, 2021.


JUDGMENT

LUBNA SALEEM PERVEZ, J.---Through present petition, the petitioner Muhammad Khawer Hassan, has assailed judgment and decree dated 11.07.2019, passed by learned Additional District Judge, West-Islamabad (hereinafter referred to as the ADJ), whereby the judgment and decree dated 21.05.2019, passed by learned Judge Family Court/Guardian, West-Islamabad, was upheld.
2. Brief facts of the case are that petitioner is the ex-husband of respondent No.3/Mst. Ruqaiya Saireen Malik. During subsistence of marriage daughter namely Khadija-tul-Kubra (the minor) was born on 09.01.2015, who at the time of filing of suit was about four years of age. The petitioner filed guardian petition under section 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1925 on 28.01.2019, for custody of the minor daughter. The petition was disposed of on the basis of compromise between the parties before the learned Judge Family Court, who made the compromise as part of the impugned order and decree dated 21.05.2019. The petitioner assailed the said order and decree to the extent of maintenance fixed @ Rs. 50,000/- per month with 15% annual increase and pleads it to be unreasonable and beyond the reach of petitioner. The learned ADJ dismissed the appeal, vide judgment and decree dated 11.07.2019 and held that the impugned judgment was passed in the presence and with the concurrence of the parties. He further held that the petitioner is an employee of well reputed international organization in Dubai, is earning a handsome amount of salary thus, can easily afford maintenance of Rs.50,000/- per month for his daughter.
3. After being unsuccessful in appeal, he preferred present writ petition against the judgment and decree dated 21.05.2019, of learned Guardian Judge as well as judgment and decree dated 11.07.2019, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, respectively.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the order/ judgment impugned herein, submitted that no consent was given by the petitioner as has been recorded by the learned Judge Family Court, while passing order dated 21.05.2019, as the petitioner at that time was abroad, which can be proved from the fact that the compromise is not signed by the petitioner; that the amount of maintenance fixed for the minor at Rs.50,000/- per month is exorbitant and unreasonable as the estimated monthly expenditure of the minor is about 21,000/-; that the learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the arguments and documents submitted during the course of proceedings. She submitted that the judgment passed by both the learned courts below are not sustainable and liable to be set-aside.
5. Respondent No. 3 attended in' person and supported the judgments of the learned Courts.
6. Arguments heard. Record perused.
7. The impugned order and decree dated 21.05.2019 has been perused which basically is the reproduction of the compromise between the parties to the suit. The order not only reflects the attendance of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, but amicable and harmonious assent is also evident, as the learned Family Judge before writing down the terms and conditions of the compromise has also recorded the categorical consent of the parties that are ready to settle their dispute amicably. Thus the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that he was not present in person at the time of compromise and has not signed the same is not tenable, being baseless and unfounded. Furthermore the, perusal of the contents of the compromise clearly shows that it is a detailed and comprehensive document whereby, every aspect regarding maintenance, custody, visitation and meeting with the minor through social media application e.g. Skype or whatsapp has been appropriately taken care of. It is also worth mentioning that learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court has only assailed the consent judgment and decree to the extent of maintenance of the minor @ Rs. 50,000/- per month as well as the observation that the maintenance allowance should be deposited before 14th of each month failing which the respondent shall stop the meeting of the minor with the petitioner. He has no objection to the rest of the settlement. I am of the considered view that compromised once arrived at with due deliberation and consultation is not legally challengeable. Thus, challenging the compromise partially, after its submission before the court of law by the petitioner, has no moral and legal justification.
8. With regard to appearance of learned counsel for the petitioner before learned Judge Family Court, I am of the view that the petitioner has signed the Vakalatnama in favor of his learned counsel and on the basis of said Vakalatnama the learned counsel has appeared as a representative/attorney of the petitioner. Vakalatnama is a document which legally authorizes the lawyer / counsel to act on behalf of his/her client. Thus, once the advocate is engaged through duly singed Vakalatnama by the client for a case then all acts of the counsel in connection with such case are considered to be authorizedly taken on behalf of his client till such time the Vakalatnama is revoked or withdrawn by the client, as in terms of procedure prescribed under the law. The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, vide Order III Rules 4(1) & (2) provides for the appointment of pleader to represent the client before Court, which for reference is also reproduced as under:-
"4. Appointment of pleader.---(1) No pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by or under a power of attorney to make such appointment.
(2) Every such appointment shall be filed in Court and shall be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client.
3 ...
4 …
5 …"
The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported as Hassan Akhtar and others v. Azhar Hameed and others (PLD 2010 SC 657) is also referred wherein the authority of an advocate, when engaged through duly signed vakalatnama, wherein it has held that:-
"13. It is by now well-settled that an Advocate has authority to make statement on behalf of his client, which is binding upon the client, unless there is anything contrary in the Vakalatnama putting restriction on the authority of the Advocate to compromise or abandon claim on behalf of the client. The Advocate's power in the conduct of a suit allows him to abandon the issue, which in his discretion, advisable in the general interest of his client".
9. The petitioner, therefore, after signing the Vakalatnama in favour of the learned counsel, submitted in the court for conducting the proceedings on his behalf, cannot be allowed to allege before the court that his duly engaged counsel has had acted against his will and authorization, and that too without any concrete material to prove the allegations. As noted above it is quantum of maintenance of Rs. 50,000/- per month as settled through compromise is the cause of his grievance, whereas, the rest of the settlement is acceptable to him, thus it is also admission on the part of petitioner that the dispute was settled amicably between the parties through a compromise in the light whereof the learned Judge Family Court dismissed the Guardian Petition filed by the petitioner and rightly observed that the judgment and decree has been passed with the consent and concurrence of both the parties. Compromise once agreed upon / arrived at between the parties before the trial court and consent judgment/decree passed by a competent court thereon, cannot be allowed to be retracted/challenged partly on the ground that some of its terms are acceptable and some are not acceptable. Even otherwise it is a settled law that the consent decree is not appealable. Hence, appeal filed by petitioner agitating consent decree has been validly dismissed by the learned Appellate Court.
10. I have also perused the petition filed by the petitioner under section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, for the custody of his minor daughter wherein one of the grounds for claiming the custody of the minor was:--
"That the petitioner is a foreign qualified individual, is in a much better position to look after the financial and educational needs of the minor as he has a steady source of income from his current employment with a reputed accounting firm in UAE…….."
11. The above admission of the petitioner is enough to confirm his strong financial status, therefore, I am in agreement with the findings of learned ADJ that the petitioner can easily afford maintenance of Rs. 50,000/- per month to support his minor daughter.
12. In view of the above, no reason to interfere with the judgments and decrees dated 11.07.2019 and 21.05,2019, passed by the learned Courts below has been found, therefore, present petition, being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed.
SA/16/Isl. Petition dismissed.

--Ordinarily residence must not require proof as would be for permanent residence, such was keeping in view the agony of woman who, on being ousted by husband, sometimes did not find shelter in the house of her parents--

 Citation Name: 2019 MLD 720

KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDHBookmark this Case
ZAHID HUSSAIN VS Mst. FARHANA

Ss. 7 & 8---Family Courts Rules, 1965,R. 6---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5 & Sched.---suit for dissolution of marriage---'Ordinarily resides'---Scope---Jurisdiction of Family Court---Khulla, right of---Scope---Petitioner (exhusband) contended that respondent/ plaintiff did not ordinarily reside at the address shown in her plaint and Family Court had not complied with the provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 in granting decree of khulla to the respondent---Validity---Deliberate use of the phrase 'ordinarily resides' in proviso clause of R. 6 of the Family Courts Rules, 1965 was an exception confined to the 'wife' alone---Ordinarily residence must not require proof as would be for permanent residence, such was keeping in view the agony of woman who, on being ousted by husband, sometimes did not find shelter in the house of her parents---Right to claim 'khula' as well 'dower' were absolute rights of 'wife' which legally could not be resisted if the 'wife' persisted to such claim---Such entitlement, was not subject to a proof of permanent or long residence but a claim of stay of few days even would be enough for the wife to file a suit for dissolution of marriage or dower only---Claim of 'ordinarily resides' would not require proof of the standard which normally was necessary for a disputed fact but a claim on oath shouldered by independent support would be sufficient---Record revealed that claim of wife regarding her ordinary residence was backed by an inquiry (physical verification from neighbors) made by the commissioner appointed by the Family Court on the application of the petitioner, which was rightly taken as sufficient proof to take cognizance into the matter---Temporary, even one day, residence, was sufficient to seek relief of Khulla and said proposition of law had taken status of stare decisis, hence the petitioner's objections over Khulla with regard to jurisdiction was not maintainable---Compliance of Ss. 7 & 8 of Muslim Family laws Ordinance, 1961.

dower (mehr), recovery of---Property mentioned in Cl.16 of Nikahnama as dower for wife--

  2020 PLD 269
SUPREME-COURTBookmark this Case
FAWAD ISHAQ VS Mst. MEHREEN MANSOOR

S. 5, Sched.---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 41---dower (mehr), recovery of---Property mentioned in Cl.16 of Nikahnama as dower for wife---suit for recovery of said property was filed by respondent-lady against her motherin-law and father-in-law without impleading her husband---Subject property was owned by the mother-in-law---Held, that mother-in-law was not a signatory to the Nikahnama nor had executed any other document agreeing to transfer the subject property---Mother-in-law had not permitted her husband, expressly or impliedly, to transfer the property in terms of S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882---Respondent made no attempt to ascertain that the father-in-law had the power to transfer the property---suit filed by respondent was dismissed with the observation that she could still claim from her husband any part of her dower which remained unpaid.

--Filing of suit for restitution of conjugal rights demonstrated that husband was willing to rehabilitate wife but she did not want reconciliation and had obtained decree of divorce on the basis of khula--

 Citation Name: 2019 CLC 1008
LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
MUHAMMAD SAEED VS ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE

S. 5 & Sched.---suits for recovery of dower, maintenance and dowry articles by wife and for restitution of conjugal rights by the husband---Wife desertion by husband---Scope---suit of wife was decreed to the extent of recovery of dowry articles---Appellate Court modified the decree and wife was held entitled to recover deferred dower---Validity--Wife had mentioned in her plaint that she was deserted by her husband, but she did not specifically mention in her examination-in-chief that she was deserted by her husband---Wife had failed to prove her forcible desertion by the husband---Filing of suit for restitution of conjugal rights demonstrated that husband was willing to rehabilitate wife but she did not want reconciliation and had obtained decree of divorce on the basis of khula---Family Court had rightly declared her disentitled to dower amount---Constitutional petition was partly allowed.

- Sole ground to challenge Cl . 19 was the decree passed on the basis of Cl . 19 of Nikahnama , wherein parties had mutually agreed that in case of an unreasoned divorce , declared by petitioner to his wife , petitioner would provide gold ornaments / finances as specified therein -

 2022 CLC 963

Suit for recovery of alimony --- Nikahnama , Cl . 19 --- Scope --- Sole ground to challenge Cl . 19 was the decree passed on the basis of Cl . 19 of Nikahnama , wherein parties had mutually agreed that in case of an unreasoned divorce , declared by petitioner to his wife , petitioner would provide gold ornaments / finances as specified therein --- Contention of petitioner was that the condition imposed in the Nikahnama was contrary to the law and Islamic Injunctions --- Validity --- Financial benefits agreed mutually were in the nature of reasonable financial support for setting the wife free --- Nikahnama was a civil contract between the parties , both of which were at liberty to agree to the terms of arrangement --- Clause 19 , as available in Nikahnama , was not in the nature of absolute bar qua right to divorce --- Petitioner had divorced the wife , which manifested that no bar to divorce was imposed ---

Matters arising out of Column No 19 of Nikahnama --- Scope -

 2022 CLC 963

Matters arising out of Column No 19 of Nikahnama --- Scope --- No restriction existed that husband cannot agree to arrange for maintenance or agree to extend fiscal advantage to the wife , even after the divorce --- Such nature of the benefit / advantage , which in any manner is not restricting the right of divorce , is in fact an act of bestowing benefit or gift upon wife to support her , hence , cannot be termed as illegal or contrary to the Spirit of Islam and Teachings of Holy Quran --- Concept of alimony is not alien to the Islam --- Financial support agreed to in Column
19 cannot be construed as encumbrance or clog on the right to divorce but manifests sense of continuing responsibility and affection , which cannot be construed as continuing maintenance allowance beyond the period of iddat

Entries in Nikahnama ,-- Suit for recovery 5 Marla house as dower amount filed by respondent plaintiff was decreed in her favour , as the same was mentioned in Nikahnama -

 2022 CLC 947

Entries in Nikahnama ,--- Proof --- Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below --- Withholding of evidence --- Presumption --- Suit for recovery 5 Marla house as dower amount filed by respondent plaintiff was decreed in her favour , as the same was mentioned in Nikahnama --- Validity --- Nikahnama was to be examined as a simple contract between parties without any presumption of truth attached to it --- Petitioner's copy (پرت ) of Nikahnama was his best evidence and by producing that copy ( پرت) of Nikahnama petitioner could have dispelled statement of Nikah Registrar that he forgot to fill conditions of Nikah only in " fourth copy " (پرت ) prior to submitting the same in Union Council concerned under the law --- In absence of such copy there was no reason in disbelieving unshaken testimony of respondent / plaintiff , her witness as well as scribe of Nikahnama --- Non - production of his own copy of Nikahnama led to an adverse inference against petitioner as the best evidence in such regard was withheld by him --- Case of petitioner fell within the purview of Illustration ( g ) to Art . 129 of Qanun - e - Shahadat , 1984.

--Petitioner assailed orders of executing court and appellate court whereby both the courts below in proceedings for execution of decree refused to accept some other property as dower instead of the property which was decreed--

 Citation Name: 2019 CLC 1799

LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
JAM MEERAN VS ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL

Ss.13 & 5, Sched.---suit for recovery of dower---Execution proceedings---Petitioner assailed orders of executing court and appellate court whereby both the courts below in proceedings for execution of decree refused to accept some other property as dower instead of the property which was decreed---Validity---Substituting the property would amount to the executing court amending the decree, which was not permissible in law---Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine.

-Payment of deferred dower---Payment of dower by husband was not established on record--

 Citation Name: 2019 CLC 1462
LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHOREBookmark this Case
Syed SAJJAD HUSSAIN VS JUDGE FAMILY COURT

S. 5, Sched.---suits for recovery of dowry articles by wife and for restitution of conjugal rights by the husband--Payment of deferred dower---Burden of proof---Scope---Plea of wife was that she had been divorced and husband claimed that he had not divorced the wife and had paid the deferred dower---Validity---High Court, on the basis of husband's plea that dower had already been paid, observed that the parties through their conduct had modified the condition for payment of dower on wife's demand instead of waiting for the dissolution of marriage through divorce or death---Husband was required to prove through cogent and confidence inspiring evidence that either he had not agreed to pay the deferred dower or after having agreed to pay the same had actually made the said payment---Husband was estopped by his conduct to claim that deferred dower was not payable during subsistence of marriage as he claimed to have paid the dower on wife's demand---Statement of witness, produced by husband, was sketchy and he did not state that he was a witness to said payment---Payment of dower by husband was not established on record---Trial Court was justified to decree the suit filed by wife for recovery of deferred dower---Constitutional petition, being devoid of force, was dismissed.

--suit for declaration regarding land given as dower---Maintainability---

 Citation Name: 2019 MLD 576

SUPREME-COURT-AZAD-KASHMIRBookmark this Case
Syed IQBAL SHAH VS Syeda TAHIRA BIBI

S. 42---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act (XI of 1993), S.5---suit for declaration regarding land given as dower---Maintainability---Plaintiff-wife filed suit for declaration with regard to the land given to her as dower and also challenged therein the gift deed relating to the said land executed in favour of a third party---suit was decreed concurrently---Validity---Entries of Nikahnama had presumption of truth vis-à-vis oral evidence---suit land given as dower had not been abandoned by the wife---In case of controversy regarding payment of dower in respect of any property between the spouse and third party the civil court was an appropriate forum for determination of the matter--No misreading or non-reading of evidence had been pointed out in the impugned judgments passed by the courts below---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Powered by Blogger.

Case Law Search