فیملی کورٹ براہ راست کاروائی اجرا دوسرے ضلع میں نہ بھجوا سکتی ھے۔ دفعہ 25A فیملی کورٹ 1964 کے مطابق اجرا کو صرف ہایئکورٹ کے ذریعہ ہی دوسرے ضلع میں بھجوایا جاسکتا ھے
-Nikah was solemnized---Consent for nikah by coercion--Suit was dismissed to extent of jactitation but marriage was dissolved on basis of khulla-
PLJ 2022 AJ&K 47
Jactitation of Marriage--
----Forcibly abduction--Nikah was solemnized--Consent for nikah by coercion--Registration of FIR--Suit was dismissed to extent of jactiation but marriage was disolved on basis of khulla--Challenge to--It is evident from record that soon after alleged Nikkah ceremony Haleema Bibi plaintiff straightaway went to police station and lodged a complaint against her father and alleged bridegroom Respondent No. 1, which strengthen argument of counsel for plaintiff--Consent obtained by coercion, or undue influence would not validate marriage--Alleged Nikkah is apparently performed I against consent of plaintiff-appellant herein, which is basic essential of valid Nikkah--Appeal was allowed. [Pp. 49 & 50] A, B & C
Malik Shahnawaz Khan, Advocate for Appellant.
Raja Masood Ahmed Khan, Advocate for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 29.4.2019.
PLJ 2022 AJ&K 47
Shariat Appellate Bench]
Present: Chaudhary Khalid Yousaf, J.
HALEEMA BIBI--Appellant
versus
AZEEM and 2 others--Respondents
Family Appeal No. 41 of 2019, decided on 29.4.2020.
Order
The captioned appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree of Additional District Judge/Judge Family Court Kotli dated 30.3.2019, whereby, suit filed by plaintiff-appellant, for jactitation of marriage was dismissed and marriage was dissolved on the ground of Khulla.
The necessary facts forming the background of instant appeal are that Mst. Haleema Bibi, appellant herein, filed a suit for jactitation of marriage against defendant-Respondent No. 1 herein, to restrain him from pretending himself as her husband, before the Judge Family Court Kotli on 08.09.2016, stating therein, that her right arm was injured, her father, Muhammad Anwar Respondent No. 2 brought her in DHQ Kotli for treatment, thereafter Respondents No. 2 and 3 forcibly abducted her to an unknown place and forced her to enter into a Nikkah with Respondent No. 1, Muhammad Azeem. It has been further alleged that on her refusal they forcibly take her signature and thumb impressions on Nikkahnama without her consent. On the same day i.e. 17.08.2016, the plaintiff lodged a written complaint against the defendants-respondents herein therefore; an F.L.R was registered against the respondents on 25.08.2016. On the other hand Respondent No. 1, Muhammad Azeem, also filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights before the same Court alleging therein that she is his lawfully wedded wife and on inducement of her relatives she filed the suit for jactitation of marriage.
On filing of the suits parties were summoned who, resisted the suits by filing written statements pro and contra. The learned Judge Family Court Kotli consolidated both the suits and proceeded in the suit for jactitation of marriage. The parties were directed to lead evidence. The learned Family Judge while concluding the suits dismissed the suit filed by Muhammad Azeem for restitution of conjugal rights whereas suit filed by the Mst. Haleema Bibi appellant herein, was dismissed to the extent of jactitation however marriage was dissolved on the basis of Khulla in consideration of 4 tola gold ornaments vide its judgment and decree dated 30.03.2019; hence, this appeal.
Malik Shahnawaz Khan, Advocate, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, Haleema Bibi; submitted that the Judge Family Court committed an illegality while dismissing the suit for jactitation of marriage. Learned counsel further contended that respondents forcibly got signatures of plaintiff-appellant on Nikkahnama without her free will which has no legal effect. Learned counsel further contended that defendant-respondent herein failed to prove that dower was given to her but learned judge Family Court wrongly passed a decree of Khullah in consideration of 4 tola gold ornaments which is not sustainable. The learned counsel further contended that the appellant proved her case through cogent and convincing evidence but the Court below passed the impugned judgment in capricious manner. Lastly, he prayed that impugned judgment and decree may be set-aside and decree for jactitation of marriage may also be passed against the defendant-Respondent No. 1.
Conversely, Raja Masood Khan, Advocate, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. 1 argued that the learned Judge Family Court has correctly appreciated the evidence of the parties and rightly dissolved the marriage on the ground of Khula in consideration of 4 tola gold ornaments. He further contended that plaintiff-appellant is sui-juris and married of her own choice, and free will in the presence of witnesses, valid Nikkahnama is on record. He further submitted that she filed the present suit on inducement of her relatives. He finally prayed for dismissal of appeal.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case with utmost care.
At very outset it may be observed that marriage is a civil contract based on mutual consent on the part of a man and woman. The solemnization of marriage requires Ijab-o-Kabul that there should be a proposal made by or on behalf of one of the parties and an acceptance of the proposal by or on behalf of the other, in the presence of two male or one male and two female witnesses, as the case may be, who must be sane and adult. However, this Ijab-o-Kabul, should be without any fear or undue influence or fraud. Marriage without a free consent of both the parties, would not be legally valid. Any consent obtained by coercion or undue influence from any of the parties would make the marriage invalid.
So far as, the contention of learned counsel for Respondent
No. 1 that a valid Nikkah was solemnized on 17.08.2016 in the presence of witnesses and Wali (father) of the plaintiff is concerned. It is pertinent to mention here that guardians are enjoined by Islam to marry their daughters after getting their consent, consent of a woman is necessary; she cannot be compelled to enter into a marriage contract without her free will and consent. If a girl is married to a person who is not of her choice and girl signed the Nikkahnama unwillingly by the force or fear of her father, the same cannot be termed as valid marriage, because father’s consent is no substitute for the girl’s consent. In the instant case it is evident from record that soon after the alleged Nikkah ceremony Haleema Bibi plaintiff straightaway went to the police station and lodged a complaint against her father and alleged bridegroom Respondent No. 1, which strengthen the argument of the learned counsel for plaintiff-appellant herein that the signature and thumb impression of the plaintiff are taken with undue influence of her father, which is not permissible under law. Consent obtained by coercion, or undue influence would not validate the marriage. Furthermore, perusal of alleged Nikkahnama reveals that four persons namely, Muhammad Kabir, Muhammad Tariq, Muhammad Ashiq and Nisar Hussain Shah are enlisted in it as witnesses of alleged Nikkah ceremony and their names are also included in the list of witnesses placed on record by the Respondent No. 1 herein but none of them was appeared before the Court in support of alleged Nikkah ceremony.
So far as the contention of the learned counsel for respondents that the plaintiff filed the present suit on inducement of her relatives is concerned. Perusal of the record reveals that Nikkah was alleged to be held on 17.08.2016, on the same day the alleged bride plaintiff-appellant herein, went to the police station and lodged a complaint against her father Respondent No. 2 alongwith the Respondent No. 1 and the same was indorsed in “Roznamcha”, ultimately an F.I.R No. 216/16, under section 11/ZHA, 34, 502(2), APC was registered against the respondents herein, hence, this contention of the learned counsel for respondent is hereby repelled.
In the light of above discussion I am of the view that the alleged Nikkah is apparently performed against the consent of the plaintiff-appellant herein, which is basic essential of the valid Nikkah, therefore; I accept the instant appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.03.2019 and declared the Nikkah null and void. Consequently, the suit for jactitation of marriage filed by the Haleema Bibi appellant herein, is hereby decreed.
(Y.A.) Appeal allowed
Compliant (استغاثہ) Case Laws
--S. 9-The expression "ratio decidendi" is ground or reason of decision and point in a case which determines judgment. It is "ratio decidendi" which is applicable to subsequent cases presenting same problem-
PLJ 2022 Lahore 630
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--
----S. 9--Suit for maintenance allowance was decreed--Availability of remedy of appeal--Ratio decidendi--Maintainability--There is no cavil that under Section 14(1) of Act, right of appeal is available against decision or decree passed by Family Court--The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Saif-ur-Rehman (supra) while interpreting Section 14(2) of Act, held that only possible purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of Section 14(2) of Act, is that right of appeal of a husband against whom a decree has been passed is curtailed, if amount awarded is less than amount, mentioned in said provision but not for decree holder, otherwise it will defeat very purpose and object of Act and frustrate its beneficial nature--It is incumbent that Courts enforce principle of law if clearly laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, judgment cannot be construed as "law declared" under Article 189 of Constitution if no "ratio decidendi" is discoverable from judgment. The expression "ratio decidendi" is ground or reason of decision and point in a case which determines judgment. It is "ratio decidendi" which is applicable to subsequent cases presenting same problem--Being adequate alternative remedy of appeal available under statute, this Constitutional petition is not maintainable.
[Pp. 631 & 633] A, B, C & D
Mr. Mahmood Tahir Ch. Advocate for Petitioner.
Barrister Zargham Lukhesar, Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab for State.
Date of hearing: 23.9.2021.
PLJ 2022 Lahore 630
Present: Abid Aziz Sheikh, J.
MUHAMMAD FAIZAN RAZA--Petitioner
versus
JUDGE, FAMILY COURT and others--Respondents
W.P. No. 46766 of 2021, decided on 23.9.2021.
Order
In this writ petition, the petitioner is seeking enhancement of maintenance allowance of Rs. 5000/- per month for minor fixed in the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.4.2021 passed by learned Judge Family Court.
2. Relevant facts are that petitioner minor filed suit through his mother for recovery of maintenance allowance, in which, interim maintenance allowance of Rs. 4000/- per month was fixed on 04.5.2019. For failure to pay the interim maintenance allowance, the suit was finally decreed under Section 17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (Act) for maintenance allowance of Rs. 5000/- with 10% annual increase. The petitioner being aggrieved has filed this constitutional petition for enhancement of maintenance allowance.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner at the very outset confronted that when right of appeal is available under Section 14 of the Act for enhancement of maintenance allowance in view of law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saif-ur-Rehman v. Additional District Judge and others (2018 SCMR 1885), then how this constitutional petition is maintainable. Learned counsel in response submits that said judgment only provide right of appeal for enhancement of amount against dower and dowry articles and not against maintenance allowance for the minor, therefore, being no right of appeal available, this writ petition is maintainable.
4. Arguments heard. The threshold legal question requires determination in this case is that whether under Section 14(2) of the Act, the right of appeal against decree for maintenance allowance of Rs. 5000/- or less is denied only to the judgment debtor or also to the minor, if he wants to file appeal for enhancement of the maintenance allowance. There is no cavil that under Section 14(1) of the Act, the right of appeal is available against the decision or decree passed by Family Court, however, by virtue of seb-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, this right of appeal is curtailed in three eventualities including where decree for maintenance allowance is of Rs. 5000/- or less.
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Saif-ur-Rehman (supra) while interpreting Section 14(2) of the Act, held that the only possible purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act, is that the right of appeal of a husband against whom a decree has been passed is curtailed, if the amount awarded is less than the amount, mentioned in the said provision but not for the decree holder, otherwise it will defeat the very purpose and object of the Act and frustrate its beneficial nature. Relevant observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment in para 13 and 16 are reproduced hereunder:
"13. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 1964, confers a right of appeal. However, by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act of 1964, this right of appeal has been curtailed. The obvious purpose of curtailing the right of appeal is to avoid the benefits of any decree which may have been passed being tied up in an appeal before a higher forum. It has also been noticed that in only three eventualities that even the right of first appeal has been curtailed. In all three eventualities, the decree would be for the benefit of the wife for dissolution of marriage under Clause (a), for dower or dowry under Clause (b) and for maintenance under Clause (c). The last may also be for the benefit of a minor. Thus, the only logical and reasonable interpretation, which is in accordance with the purposive of the Act and in line with the beneficial nature thereof would be that a judgment-debtor of a decree envisages in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of seb-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act of 1964, would not have a right of appeal so that the disputes mentioned therein are resolved expeditiously and the benefits conferred through such decree reach the decree-holder without being frustrated. However, the said provision cannot be interpreted so as to exclude a right of appeal to a wife whose claim of dower or dowry has been partially or entirely declined. For such an interpretation, would defeat the purpose and object of the Act of 1964 and frustrate its beneficial nature.
16. Thus, the only possible purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act of 1964, is that the right of appeal of a husband against whom a decree has been passed is curtailed, if the amount awarded is less than the amount, which is mentioned in the said provision. However, in no event the right of the wife to file an appeal is extinguished if she is dissatisfied with any decree in a Suit for dower or dowry".
6. The Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Tayyaba Yunus v. Muhammad Ehsan and others (2010 SCMR 1403) while interpreting Section 14(2) of the Act held that where suit for dower has been dismissed, the wife has right of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act. In the case of Abid Hussain v. Additional District Judge, Alipur, District Muzaffargarh and another (2006 SCMR 100), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that object behind non-provision of appeal in case of dissolution of marriage is to protect women, an under privileged and generally oppressed section of our society from prolonged and costly litigation and it aims to put a clog on the right of husband.
7. Every principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has force of binding precedent under the provisions of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution). Both as a matter of its constitutional duty as well as the prudence and rationale of such precedents, it is incumbent that Courts enforce principle of law if clearly laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, the judgment cannot be construed as "law declared" under Article 189 of the Constitution if no "ratio decidendi" is discoverable from the judgment. The expression "ratio decidendi" is the ground or reason of decision and the point in a case which determines the judgment. It is the "ratio decidendi" which is applicable to subsequent cases presenting the same problem. In this regard, reliance is placed on the cases of Muhammad Zahid, Proprietor Plus Enterprises v. Federal Board of Revenue through Chairperson, Islamabad and 5 others (2021 PTD 80), S. Nasim Ahmad Shah and 115 others versus State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another (2017 PTD 2029), Pakistan Lawyers' Forum through General Secretary v. Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Justice Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights, Islamabad and another (PLD 2011 Lahore 382) and Zafar Ahmed Khan versus Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Islamabad and 2 others (2009 PLC (C.S.) 415).
8. No doubt, the above judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court are in respect of enhancement of alternative price of dowry articles, dower or dissolution of marriage, however, the ratio decidendi settled in these judgments are that non-provision of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act is to protect under privileged and generally oppressed section of our society from prolonged and costly litigation. The minor indeed fall within that category, hence as per law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court, denial of appeal is for the protection of the minor and not vice versa.
9. The right of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act shall not be available to the judgment debtor (father/husband) but decree holder (minor or wife) can file appeal for enhancement of decretal amount. The purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act made by august Supreme Court in above judgments, is also squarely applicable to the matter for the enhancement of maintenance allowance by the minor. Any other interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act would not only defeat the very purpose and object of the Act but will also frustrate the beneficial nature of Section 14(2) of the Act.
10. In view of above discussion, this Court has no manner of doubt that remedy of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act shall be available to the petitioner/minor for the enhancement of maintenance allowance in the impugned judgment and decree. Therefore, being adequate alternative remedy of appeal available under the statute, this Constitutional petition is not maintainable, which is accordingly dismissed.
Petition dismissed
Provisions of C.P.C. and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order are not applicable to proceedings of Family Court-
PLJ 2022 Lahore 580
Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----Ss. 14 & 17--Jurisdiction of--Filing of objection application--Execution proceedings--Right of appeal--No provision of appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order--Provisions of C.P.C. and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order are not applicable to proceedings of Family Court--Only one right of appeal has been provided by Act against final order of Family Court, whereas no provision of appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order of Family Court--High Court has reason to believe that while assuming jurisdiction to entertain said appeal and passing impugned order, erred in law by setting aside interim orders passed by Executing Court.
[P. 583] A, B & C
2002 SCMR 1950 ref.
M/s. Adnan Qureshi & Tanveer Hayat, Advocates for Petitioner.
M/s. Agha Abdul Hassan Arif & Nosheen Amber Bukhari, Advocates for Respondent No. 1.
Date of hearing: 8.3.2022.
PLJ 2022 Lahore 580
Present: Safdar Saleem Shahid, J.
SADIA IQBAL--Petitioner
versus
UMAR NASIM AHMED etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 14646 of 2016, decided on 8.3.2022.
Order
Through this constitutional petition, Mst. Sadia Iqbal petitioner has challenged the validity of judgment dated 11.03.2016 whereby learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore set aside the orders dated 23.05.2015 & 15.12.2015 passed by learned Executing Court Lahore, “with the directions to learned Executing Court to determine/ ascertain the actual value of gold ornaments and not pure gold, prevailing at the date of satisfaction/execution of decree, when the judgment debtor had paid decretal amount, which was exact date of execution/satisfaction of decree, as per order of Hon’ble Lahore High Court, Lahore”.
2. Perusal of order dated 06.05.2016 passed by this Court in the instant petition reveals that on the said date, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Respondent No. 1 had filed an application before the learned Executing Court raising objection on the value of gold ornaments on 3rd June, 2015 which was dismissed vide order dated 11th June,2015. Thereafter, the Respondent No. 1 filed EFA No. 1366 of 2015 against the said order, which he withdrew, after arguments, vide order dated 21.10.2015; that instead of availing appropriate remedy, he again moved an application with the same contents, pleadings and prayer seeking revaluation of the gold ornaments on 28.11.2015 which was also dismissed by the learned Executing Court vide order dated 15.12.2015. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal before the learned Lower Appellate Court which was taken up and decided vide impugned judgment dated 11.03.2016, despite the objection of learned counsel for the petitioner that appeal did not lie against the said interim order as per provisions of Section 14(3) and 17 of the West Pakistan Family Court Act 1964.
3. Arguments heard. Record perused.
4. The actual point involved in the instant petition was that whether learned first Appellate Court was having jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the interim orders of learned Executing Court as per provisions of Section 14(3) and 17 of the West Pakistan Family Court Act 1964?. Here I would like to reproduce Section 14(3) & Section 17 (supra) as under:
“Section 14(3) “No appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order passed by a family Court”.
“Section 17 provisions of evidence Act and Code of Civil procedure not to apply.(1) save as otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the (Qanun-e-Shahdat, 1984 (P.O No. 10 of 1984) and the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (except Sections 10 & 11) shall not apply to proceedings before any Family Court ( in respect of part I of Schedule).”
(2) Sections 8 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873, shall apply to all proceedings before the Family Courts.
5. It has been noticed that Mst. Sadia Iqbal petitioner filed writ petition Bearing No. 29500 of 2013 before this Court. Vide order dated 12.06.2014 this Court observed as under:-
“The respondent is held entitled for recovery of gold ornaments as prayed for or in alternate their market value which would be prevailing at the time of execution/satisfaction of the decree”
“From the above discussion, it has been established on record that both the learned Courts below erred in law while declining the prayer of respondent for recovery of deferred dower. The petitioner could not prove that he has paid the dower during the existence of marriage, therefore, respondent is held entitled to recover Rs. 1,00,000/- from the petitioner as deferred dower.
Keeping in view the aforesaid observations passed by this Court, the learned Executing Court vide order dated 23.05.2015 had fixed the value of seventy tolas gold ornaments as Rs. 32,90,000/- and dower amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-, total decretal amount was calculated as
Rs. 33,90,000/ and thereafter the learned Executing Court, Lahore directed the respondent/judgment debtor to present seventy tolas gold ornaments or its value ascertained hereinabove or Rs. 33,90,000/- as decretal amount. The respondent/judgment debtor filed an application seeking evaluation of correct price of gold ornaments and depositing of an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- in lieu of decretal amount which was dismissed by learned Executing Court vide order dated 11.06.2015. Being aggrieved by the orders of learned Executing Court, the respondent/judgment approached this Court by filing EFA No. 1366 of 2015 which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 21.10.2015 and that dismissal order was not assailed by the respondent /judgment debtor. It has further been noticed that respondent/judgment debtor also filed an application under Section 151 CPC read with Section 94 of CPC praying the Court to appreciate the actual direction of this Court given in para No. 13 of the judgment dated 12.06.2014 passed in W.P No. 12640 of 2013, which was also dismissed by learned Executing Court vide order dated 15.12.2015. Thereafter on 05.01.2016 against the orders dated 23.05.2015 & 15.12.2015 passed by learned Executing Court, the respondent/judgment debtor filed a family appeal before the learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore who set aside the aforesaid orders passed by learned Executing Court. The other question arises that whether interim order dated 23.05.2015 passed by learned Executing Court, during the execution of decree in question can be assailed through appeal which was allegedly filed by the respondent/judgment debtor on 05.01.2016 with the delay of more than seven months. The West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 provides only one provision of appeal and in view of that whether appeal against other interim order dated 15.12.2015 is competent and maintainable before learned Ist Appellate Court. During the course of arguments learned counsel for respondent/judgment debtor took stance that an illegal order of the Court may be assailed in appeal before the Court of competent jurisdiction and as such the appeal before the learned appellate Court regarding the aforesaid orders passed by learned Executing Court was well maintainable before the said Court. It was further contended by learned counsel for the respondent that learned executing Court was bound to fix the market value of alleged gold ornaments keeping in view the spirit of judgment dated 12.06.2014 passed by this Court in W.P No. 12640 of 2013 which was not certainly followed by the learned Executing Court. In the case reported as “Muhammad Sadiq vs Dr. Sabir Sultana” (2002 SCMR 1950) the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed as under:-
Ss.13 & 17--civil procedure Code (V of 1908),O.XXI,
R. 54--Order of attachment and auction of property by the Family Court--Compliance of O.XX,R.54, C.P.C.--Necessity--Provisions of O.XXI, R.54, being not mandatory substantial compliance with the said provision is enough--Strict compliance with O.XXI,R.54 CPC may not be insisted upon as S.13 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 provides for the execution of a decree passed by the Family Court and application of O.XXI, R.54 C.P.C has been excluded by S.17 of the said Act.
The West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 is a special law and all the proceedings are conducted under the said act and when only one provision of appeal is provided that means there is philosophy behind the said provision of aforementioned Act and Family Court has been empowered to decide all the matters while observing the principle of law. The provisions of C.P.C and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order are not applicable to the proceedings of Family Court in order to decide the matters within the shortest possible time with permanent solution. This is why that only one right of appeal has been provided by the Act against the final order of the Family Court, whereas no provision of appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order of the Family Court, especially when the petitioner has taken a specific objection regarding the maintainability of appeal before the learned 1st Appellate Court, that matter should have been decided first in view of spirit of law. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court has reason to believe that learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore while assuming the jurisdiction to entertain the said appeal and passing the impugned order, erred in law by setting aside the interim orders passed by learned Executing Court.
6. For what has been discussed above, instant petition is accepted and order dated 11.03.2016 passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore is set aside.
(K.Q.B.) Petition accepted