--Ss.5 & 9---Nikahnama, contents of--Column No. 20 of Nikahnama---Entry of Rs.25,000/- as monthly maintenance allowance--

 2022 C L C 24
[Lahore]
Before Safdar Saleem Shahid, J
MUJAHID KAMRAN----Petitioner
Versus
Mst. SAIRA AZIZ and 2 others----Respondents
Writ Petition No.32191 of 2021, heard on 30th June, 2021.

(a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---
----Ss.5 & 9---Nikahnama, contents of---Suit for recovery of maintenance/dower amount---Column No. 20 of Nikahnama---Entry of Rs.25,000/- as monthly maintenance allowance---Allegation of cruelty by husband---Petitioner/defendant claimed for restitution of conjugal rights and also filed a suit for cancellation of conditions/entries of Columns Nos. 14, 16, 17, 19 and 20 of Nikahnama on the ground that the same were illegal and incorporated without his consent in deceitful manner---Family Court partially decreed the respondent's suit to the extent of entitlement of the recovery of maintenance at rate of Rs.25,000/- per month with 10% annual increase from date of marriage till the date of judgment---Petitioner's suit was dismissed---Appeals filed by both parties were also dismissed---Validity---Wife could be justified in living separately if the husband treated her with cruelty or did not pay prompt dower---No disagreement or point of cruelty was quoted/proved by respondent other than the demand of dower---No particular point cited/proved by petitioner as to alleged disobedience except the allegation that respondent remained only one day in his house---Petitioner did not prove his version that columns of Nikahnama were afterwards filled in and were the result of forgery---All witnesses of Nikahnama admitted their signatures over the same---Petitioner had not proved that the copy of Nikahnama was not given to him at that time---Petitioner was bound to pay maintenance allowance according to column No.20---Case of respondent was based on column No.20, which could not be dealt with under the conditions of S.17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964---Neither the Court had to see the financial status of husband nor to fix the maintenance on the conditions mentioned in S.17A---Order as to 10% annual increase was not according to the spirit of Column No. 20 of Nikahnama---Date and Majlis of Nikah and signatures on Nikahnama by respective person were admitted---Execution of Nikahnama was proved by the respondent---Nikahkhwan, appearing as witness, had certified that all the columns were filled at that time with consent of parties---Presumption would be that the Nikah Pert (paper) was handed over to the petitioner on that very day which was requirement of law after the registration of the same in Union Council---Petitioner did not prove that the entries in the columns were not in his knowledge---Entries of column No. 19 limiting the absolute right of Talaq of the petitioner were against the spirit of the instructions of Almighty Allah, hence, declared void ab initio and not binding to the parties---High Court declared entries of Column No.19 as null and void---Constitutional petition was partly allowed.
(b) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---
----S.5---Nikahnama, contents of---Scope---Nikahnama is a very important document and it's all columns are legally binding on both the parties---Any right given through Nikahnama to woman is her right strictly protected by law---Woman may sue her husband regarding the past maintenance allowance on the basis of agreement in Nikahnama---All she has to do is to prove the execution of document/Nikahnama where such condition has been agreed between the parties.
Mohammedan Law by D.F. Mulla (S. 278) ref.
(c) West Pakistan Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---
----R.8(1)---Nikah---Proof---Witness, requirement of---Wakeel as witness---Apart from the spouses and their wakeel, if any, at least two witnesses are required to certify the proceedings of "Ijab o Qabool" and that should be conducted in one Majlis---Person who has been appointed as wakeel for the bride, cannot be the witness of Nikah---Wakeel has his specific identity as to accept the proposal on behalf of the bride---Nikahkhawan can also be the witness of the Nikah if he has also heard the "Ijab o Qabool" by himself.
(d) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---
----S. 5---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 79---Nikahnama, proof of---Execution of document---Anything which has been brought in writing, if it is witnessed by two persons and signed over the same, under S.79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, that document is proved one and in case of denial from that, the person denying the same has to produce the cogent reasons and solid grounds.
(e) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---
----S.5---Nikahnama, contents of---Proof---Entries in columns---If Nikahnama was written at the time and it was signed in the same Majlis, then it will be presumed that the same was stated to the lady and the proposal and acceptance were there regarding dower which has been mentioned in the Columns Nos. 13 & 14 of Nikahnama.
(f) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---
----S.7---Talaq, absolute right of---Islamic Law---Husband has an absolute right to divorce his wife---No condition is described in Shariah as well as in the codified law.
Muhammad Bashir Ali Siddiqui v. Muhammad Sarwar Jahan Begum 2008 SCMR 186 ref.
(g) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---
----S.5---Nikahnama, contents of---Injunctions of Islam---Anything contained in Nikahnama which is against the spirit of Islam or the orders of Allah and Prophet (peace be upon him) cannot bind the parties even if has been made with the consent of the parties.
Iftikhar Ahmad Mian for Petitioner.
Ghulam Rasool Sial for Respondent No.1.
Date of hearing: 30th June, 2021.

JUDGMENT

SAFDAR SALEEM SHAHID, J.----The instant petition is directed against the consolidated judgments and decrees dated 14.12.2020 and 31.03.2021, passed by the learned Judge Family Court and the learned Additional District Judge, Ahmadpur Sial, District Jhang.
2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the instant petition are that the petitioner was married with respondent No.1 on 17.12.2017. Respondent No.1 on 23.02.2019, filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dower amount of Rs.15,00,000/- along with gold ornaments weighing 4-tolas, alleging that at the time of Nikah, Rs.15,05,000/- along with 4-tolas gold ornaments was fixed as dower, out of which only an amount of Rs.5000/-, being prompt, was paid at the time of Rukhsati. Further alleged that as per columns No.20 of the Nikah Nama the petitioner was also bound down to pay Rs.25,000/- per month to respondent No.1 as maintenance allowance. According to respondent No.1, the petitioner being owner of landed property, cattle etc. earns approximately 80/90 thousand rupees and could easily pay the maintenance allowance as claimed in the plaint. Respondent No.1 also alleged that behavior of the petitioner was cruel from the very first day and lastly he ousted her from his house after 14-days of marriage.
3. The petitioner resisted the suit by filing written statement on 20.04.2019, wherein he raised certain preliminary objections, denied the conditions having been fixed in the Nikah Nama and claimed that dower amount was fixed only Rs.5000/-, which was paid at the time of marriage, which fact could be clearly seen in the video recorded at the time of Nikah. The petitioner claimed that respondent No.1 left his house on the very next day of marriage and did not come back in spite of his best efforts, therefore, she is not entitled to any maintenance allowance. In addition to the prayer for dismissal of the suit of respondent No.1, the petitioner also prayed that his written statement be also considered as a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. Thereafter, on 09.11.2019, petitioner also filed a suit for cancellation of conditions mentioned in columns Nos.14, 16, 17, 19 and 20 of the Nikah Nama, on the ground that the same were illegally incorporated without his consent and in deceitful manner. Respondent No.1 resisted the suit filed by the petitioner on the grounds taken in her own suit.
4. After the pretrial reconciliation having failed, the learned Judge Family Court framed the following issues:-
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover maintenance allowance, if so, at what rate and for which period? OPP
2. Whether plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs.15,00,000/- and gold ornaments weighing 04-tolas in lieu of dower from the defendant as prayed for? OPP
3. Whether the defendant is entitled to obtain a decree for restitution of conjugal rights as per prayer made by him in his written statement? OPD
3-A.Whether defendant Mujahid Kamran obtains a decree for cancellation of conditions mentioned in column No.14, 16, 17, 19 and 20 of Nikahnama dated 17.12.2017 over foil (پرت ) No.1 to 4 between the parties as prayed for? OPD
4. Relief.
The learned Judge Family Court recorded evidence of the parties and having gone through the same, vide consolidated judgment and decree dated 14.12.2020, partially decreed the suit of respondent No.1 in the terms that she was held entitled to recover maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per month with 10% annual increase from the date of marriage till her legal entitlement, whereas her claim for recovery of dower amount of Rs.15,00,000/- along with gold ornaments weighing 4-tolas was dismissed. The claim of the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights was, however, decreed but subject to payment of monthly maintenance allowance decreed in favour of respondent No.1, whereas suit of the petitioner for cancellation of conditions mentioned in the Nikah Nama was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved both the parties assailed the said judgment and decree, but the learned Additional District Judge through a consolidated judgment and decree dated 31.03.2021 dismissed both the appeals. The petitioner has assailed both the consolidated judgments and decrees through the instant petition.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that both the Courts below have erred in law, as on the one hand both of them decreed the suit of the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights, but on the other hand, decreed the claim of respondent No.1 for recovery of maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per month with 10% annual increase, as under the law a wife who refuses to perform her marital obligations, is not entitled to receive any maintenance. In this regard referred to Section 277 of the Mohammedan Law. Further submitted that the maintenance allowance has not been fixed by the Courts below on the basis of means of the petitioner, but the amount has been taken from the columns of Nikah Nama and that too with 10% annual increase, which is not justified. Even otherwise, the petitioner challenged the entries of the Nikah Nama, but the Courts below failed to appreciate this aspect.
6. The learned counsel for respondent No.1, on the other hand, resisted the arguments and submitted that the Courts below have passed the impugned judgments and decrees on the basis of the columns of the Nikah Nama, which was duly signed by the petitioner as well as the witnesses, after all the conditions mentioned in its columns were settled between the parties. According to the learned counsel, even from the very first day behavior of the petitioner towards respondent No.1 was cruel and after few days of marriage he himself ousted her from his house; and that, even if a husband and wife are residing separately, the husband is bound to provide maintenance to his wife.
7. Arguments heard. Record perused.
8. Section 17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 explains:-
(1) In a suit for maintenance, the Family Court shall, on the date of the first appearance of the defendant, fix interim monthly maintenance for wife or a child and if the defendant fails to pay the maintenance by fourteen day of each month, the defence of the defendant shall stand struck off and the Family Court shall decree the suit for maintenance on the basis of averments in the plaint and other supporting documents on record of the case.
(2) In a decree for maintenance, the Family Court may:
(a) fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint due to afflux of time or any other relevant circumstances; and
(b) prescribe the annual increase in the maintenance.
(3) If the Family Court does not prescribe the annual increase in the maintenance, the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten per cent each year.
(4) For purposes of fixing the maintenance, the Family Court may summon the relevant documentary evidence from any organization, body or authority to determine the estate and resources of the defendant.
Section 277 of the Mohammedan Law defines that "the husband is bound to maintain his wife (unless she is too young for matrimonial intercourse), so long as she is faithful to him and obeys his reasonable orders. But he is not bound to maintain his wife who refuses herself to him or is otherwise disobedient, unless the refusal and disobedience is justified by non-payment of prompt dower or she leaves the husband's house on account of his cruelty."
9. In order to understand the proposition in hand Section 278 of the Mohammedan Law is also very relevant which says that "if the husband neglects or refuses to maintain his wife without any lawful cause wife may sue him for maintenance allowance but she is not entitled to a decree for past maintenance, unless the claim is based on a specific agreement."
10. The moot point in the proposition is whether the lady is entitled for maintenance allowance in view of the definition of Section 278 of the Mohammedan Law. Section 277 defines the rights and obligations of the husband and wife and binds the husband to maintain the wife. Some conditions also have been imposed and some grounds also have been mentioned on the basis of which husband may refuse to maintain the wife. Section 277 also explains that there is a justification for the lady to live separately if the husband treats her with cruelty or does not pay prompt dower. The suit for maintenance by the wife and children is filed under Section 17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964, where the Court determines the financial status of the husband and in view of the evidence of the parties fixes the maintenance allowance but if the maintenance allowance is agreed between the parties through an agreement then it will be payable in view of the said agreement. Nikah Nama is very important document, as its all columns are legally binding on both the parties. Any right given through Nikah Nama to lady is her right strictly protected by law. The wisdom of Section 278 of the Mohammedan Law, already mentioned in the earlier paragraph is that the lady may sue the husband regarding the past maintenance allowance on the basis of agreement. The lady has to prove the execution of the said document or if it is mentioned in the conditions of Nikah Nama, then certainly she has to prove the Nikah Nama where such entry has been agreed in between the parties. In the present proposition all the above mentioned points are questioned by the petitioner. The petitioner has challenged the contents of Nikah Nama, its columns Nos.14, 16, 17, 19 and 20, with specific allegation of fraud and forgery. It was asserted by the petitioner that the above mentioned columns of Nikah Nama were filled in after the completion of Nikah and without knowledge and consent of the petitioner. The version of the respondent was that the Nikah Nama was validly executed in between the parties; all the witnesses were present at the time of Nikah; all the entries were read over to all the persons present in the Majlis and thereafter Nikah Nama Exh.P.1 was signed by all the relevant witnesses. The allegation of the respondent was that she was expelled from his house by the petitioner. The point of cruelty was also raised by the respondent through the suit whereas the version of the petitioner was that the lady was disobedient and she herself left the house of the petitioner without any reason, rather with a planning only after one day of the Rukhsati on the ground of marriage of one of her relatives in the company of her relatives and while leaving the house of the petitioner she also took away 4-tolas gold ornaments. The learned Judge Family Court has not fixed any liability of separation in between the spouses on anybody. Actually no evidence was led on this particular point. It has been noted that there could be no such circumstances which could be quoted by any of the parties because period of settlement of the spouses is one day or maximum fourteen days. During this period no particular stance was referred by any of the parties either on the point of cruelty by the petitioner towards the respondent or matter of disobedience on the part of the respondent towards the petitioner. The respondent has produced PW.4 and PW.5, her maternal uncle and paternal uncle, but their evidence is hearsay and is not based on any logic. The lady in her statement has defined the torture as, when she demanded her dower, she was put under torture. She also has admitted in the evidence that she did not pass on this torture to any of her relatives. The cruelty is defined in Section 281(2) of the Mohammedan Law as, when it is of such a character as to render it unsafe for the wife to return to her husband's dominion, is a valid defence to such a suit. It may be, too, that gross failure by the husband of the performance of the obligation, which the marriage contract imposes on him. So, the point of cruelty to this extent that the lady demanded the dower and it was not paid can be considered. Otherwise, no other disagreement was quoted as proof of the behavior of the husband or cruelty towards the respondent. On the other hand, allegation of disobedience as alleged by the petitioner is not proved. No event or particular point is cited to prove that the respondent was disobedient. Specially keeping in view the version of the petitioner that the lady remained only one day in his house, it cannot be presumed that there was any disobedience on part of the respondent, unless proved and established by the petitioner. From the evidence the petitioner was, however, unable to prove the allegation regarding disobedience of the respondent. Furthermore, there is no other corroboration to the statement of the petitioner in this regard. So, in this case the lady becomes entitled to claim maintenance allowance in view of Section 278 of the Mohammedan Law, as it was the obligation of the husband to pay maintenance allowance as agreed in column No.20 of Exh.P.1, which says:-
So, the version of the petitioner that this column was afterwards filled in and is the result of forgery, was not proved by the petitioner. The lady was under obligation to prove the execution of the document Exh.P.1. The execution of Exh.P.1 has been proved, as all the witnesses admitted that they signed over the Nikah Pert and none of them stated that they had not signed the Nikah Pert. Another important factor is that the petitioner has not proved that the copy of Nikah Nama was not given to him at that time. Neither it is the claim of the petitioner nor has he stated regarding this factor at any stage. He did not assail the entries of Nikah Nama for a long time and when the lady filed suit for maintenance allowance and dower, then the petitioner challenged the entries of Exh.P.1. Hence, it is proved to the extent that the petitioner is bound to pay maintenance allowance of Rs.25,000/- in view of column No.20. So far as 10% annual increase is concerned, it is not according to the spirit of column No.20 of Exh.P.1 because the case of respondent for maintenance allowance will not be dealt with under the conditions of Section 17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964, but in fact it would be seen in view of column No.20 of Exh.P.1, where the parties agreed for payment of Rs.25,000/- per month as maintenance allowance. Neither the Court had to see the financial status of the husband under the situation nor the maintenance allowance has to be fixed on the conditions maintained in Section 17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964. Therefore, 10% annual increase as ordered by the learned Family Judge is not according to the spirit of column No.20 of Exh.P.1 and that is not justified. Hence, the order to the extent of 10% annual increase in the maintenance allowance is set aside and findings on issue No.1 is modified to the extent that the lady is entitled for maintenance allowance of Rs.25,000/- per month as agreed between the parties through Exh.P.1, from the date of marriage till her entitlement.
11. The other moot point is the Majlis of Nikah, ingredients of Nikah and valid conditions of Nikah. The petitioner's grievance was that the conditions mentioned in columns Nos.14, 16, 17, 19 and 20 of Nikah Nama were not read over to him at the time of proposal and acceptance by the Nikah Khawan with a further objection that nobody in the Majlis heard the same. So, in view of the principles of Sharia, these conditions are not part of Nikah and as such are not binding upon the petitioner, but no relevant evidence was produced by the petitioner. All the witnesses including Nikah Khawan stated that Nikah Pert Exh.P.1 was signed at the time of Nikah.
12. Another legal aspect of the proposition is that the petitioner filed an independent suit on 09.11.2019 after the filing of the suit by the respondent on 23.02.2019 with the subject for cancellation of the entries in Nikah Nama Exh.P.1 dated 17.12.2017 regarding the columns 14, 16, 17, 19 and 20. It was the stance of the petitioner that those columns were filled in afterwards and without consent of the petitioner. At the time of the arguments before this court, counsel for the petitioner also brought attention of this court towards the entries of Column No.19 that the entry mentioned against column No.19 is not only fabricated, fictitious and has been filled in without consent and knowledge of the petitioner but also it is against the original text of the Holy Quran/the orders of Allah and the spirit of the instructions of the Almighty Allah and Sunnah. Exh.P.1 is an admitted document where no witness has resiled from his signatures. The date of Nikah is admitted one. The Majlis of Nikah is admitted one. The signatures on the Nikah Nama Exh.P.1 by the respective persons is admitted one. Now the question about the columns mentioned by the petitioner with the allegation that those were filled afterwards, is a very serious allegation and the same were to be proved by the petitioner. Regarding the column No.19 of Exh.P.1, the reservation of the petitioner was that it was not only forged, but also against the principles of Islam. This Court is of the view that Nikah Nama Exh.P.1 and its execution has been proved by the respondent side. All the persons who were present in the Majlis have admitted that this Nikah Nama was executed and was signed by all the persons mentioned in Nikah Nama. Their signatures reflect that all persons were educated and they know the meaning and importance of the paper they were signing and certainly they had gone through the contents of the same. It is noted that all the irrelevant columns were crossed by drawing a line by the Nikah Khawan. The Nikah Khawan PW.2 himself has appeared in the witness box and has certified that all the columns were filled at that time with the consent of the parties.
13. The ingredient for the valid Nikah is that it should be solemnized in one Majlis. There is no definition of Majlis that how many people are required to constitute a Majlis. "Fiqah", says that apart from the spouses, at least two witnesses are required to certify the proceedings of Aijabu Qabool () and that should be conducted in one Majlis. Therefore, this is the requirement that the person, who had been appointed as Wakeel for the lady, cannot be the witness of Nikah. He has his specific identity as to accept the proposal on behalf of the lady. Therefore, he cannot be the witness to the Nikah if some person is appointed as Wakeel of the lady, then there must be two independent witnesses of the Nikah apart from said Wakeel of the lady. The Nikah Khawan, however, can also be the witness of the Nikah if he also hears the Aijabo Qabool by himself, of spouses. The objection of the petitioner was that the condition mentioned in column No.14 was not read by the Nikah Khawan at the time of announcing the Nikah. This column was afterwards filled, also the condition mentioned in column No.19 Ex.PA is against the spirit of Islam. Whereas the Nikah Khawan has clearly stated in his statement before the trial court that he read over all the columns and the parties were agreed to that and thereafter signed over it. In the Holy Quran it has been directed by the Almighty Allah that whenever you enter in some contract or you do some deal (معاملہ ), write it down and the scribe should write what he has been advised to write, correctly, and thereafter two male among you be made witness to that writing or one male and two females may be the witnesses to the such writing. The witnesses must be from the same "Majlis", and they also had heard and understood the spirit of contract, or deal which has been agreed between the parties and has been written in their presence, then they had signed it, as witness. Now the spirit is that anything which has been brought in writing if it is witnessed by two persons and that is proved that witnesses have signed over the same; then under Section 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, that document is proved one and in case of denial from that, the person denying the same has to produce the cogent reasons and solid grounds. In this proposition nobody had resiled from his signatures. The witnesses who had appeared in the witness box including the petitioner had certified the signatures. It was the liability on the part of the petitioner to prove that the Nikah Khawan got Exh.P.1 late registered in the Union Council office and the copy of the Nikah Nama Exh.P.1 was never handed over to him. In the written statement by the petitioner, no such ground has been taken by the petitioner. It cannot be assessed from the written statement that when the petitioner came to know about the entries. Even in the suit filed although this is mentioned by the petitioner that all the Perts (pages) were with the Nikah Khawan but he did not mention and did not produce any evidence regarding the fact that on the day of Nikah the Pert (page) was not handed over to him. The Nikah Khawan appeared as PW.2. No such specific question was put to the witness PW.2, therefore, it will be presumed that the Pert Nikah was handed over to the petitioner on that very day which is requirement of law after the registration of the same in the Union Council. This is also not mentioned through the evidence of the petitioner that when he demanded the Nikah Pert (page) from the Nikah Khawan or he applied to the Union Council for obtaining the Pert of Nikah. Therefore, the version of the petitioner is not proved that the entries in the column were not in the knowledge of the petitioner. The witnesses of Exh.P.1 signed over the same in the same Majlis. So, Exh.P.1 is not a disputed document. Therefore, to the extent of the entries, the petitioner is not succeeded to establish his case.
14. Another point raised by counsel for the petitioner was about the validity of the Nikah that anything not mentioned as Haq Mehr at the time of Nikah, it cannot be added afterwards. It was the contention of the petitioner that at the time of Nikah, no such Haq Mehr was fixed Rs.15,00,000/- (rupees 1.5 million) as has been mentioned in column No.14. Neither this was proposed by the petitioner nor it was put to the lady for having the acceptance of the proposal of Nikah. The entry in Column No.14 was made afterwards. Therefore, the entry of Column No.14 cannot be determined as Haq-ul-Mehr and the same is not binding to the petitioner to pay the same in lieu of Haq Mehr. The lady also cannot claim as Haq Mehr that amount mentioned in Column No.14.
15. This court has given thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by counsel for the petitioner. The ingredients of Nikah are proposal and acceptance in one Majlis in presence of the witnesses and with the fixation of Haq-ul-Mehr. مثل Misle Dower may be fixed that is based on custom that in some families the dower is fixed according to the customs of the families and even if it is not fixed in specific words at that time, then at the time of Nikah the word used is that and the proposal and acceptance are made with the same words. Now it was for the petitioner to prove that the proposal of المہر حق mentioned in Column No.14 was neither offered by the petitioner nor it was proposed before the lady for the acceptance of the Nikah. Therefore, this entry was not valid and it cannot be termed as dower. This is custom rather mandatory that dower is always fixed between the parties prior to the solemnization of Nikah and it is to be proposed and accepted in presence of the witnesses in the same Majlis. Oral Nikah is also valid with all these conditions. If the Nikah Nama was written at that time and it was signed in the same Majlis, then it will be presumed that the same was stated to the lady and the proposal and acceptance were there regarding dower, which has been mentioned in Columns Nos.13 and 14 of the نکاح پرت . Since all the witnesses of the Nikah have singed over Exh.P.1 within the same Majlis at the same time immediately after the Nikah and they did not object at any of the entry at that time and even afterwards till the petitioner filed the suit on 9.11.2019 for cancellation of the entries of Exh.P.1, it will be presumed that the said columns were duly filled in at that time in the same Majlis at the time of Nikah and it was a valid المہر حق. The petitioner was unable to prove the allegation that it was neither mentioned at the time of pronouncement of Nikah nor it was written at that time in the same Majlis. No reliable evidence was produced by the petitioner. To this extent, issue No.3-A has been rightly decided by the learned trial court and was rightly upheld by the learned Addl. District Judge, the first Appellate Court.
16. Now, come to column No.19 and its content of Exh.P.1. The right of divorce is given by the Almighty Allah. However, Allah Almighty does not like the act of divorce. I would like to quote the references from the Holy Quran and from some very eminent case laws. In the Holy Quran in Surah Al-Baqra and Surah Talaq the delegation of right of divorce has been described in detail. Similarly, section 7(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1964 deals with the matter of Talaq. The provision of section 105 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws also certain this thing that a husband has an absolute right to divorce his wife. In this regard no condition is described in Sharia as well as in the codified law. The same proposition has been discussed in case of "Muhammad Bashir Ali Siddiqui v. Muhammad Sarwar Jahan Begum" (2008 SCMR 186). No condition can be imposed on the husband if he desires to divorce his wife. Because the right of divorce has been given by the Almighty Allah to the husband and this proposition has been discussed in detail. I place reliance on "Mst. Zeenat Bibi v. Muhammad Hayat and 2 others" (2012 CLC 837). Therefore, to this extent, there is no other view that no condition can be imposed on the right of the husband if he desires to divorce his wife. To this extent, the entries of Column No.19 are against the spirit of the instructions of the Almighty Allah. The petitioner has taken a specific plea that the entry against column No.19 is also added afterward without consent of the petitioner; rather it was not in knowledge of the petitioner; furthermore, it is against the injunctions of Islam, hence void, ab initio and liable to be cancelled. The court has decided the issue against the petitioner while observing that regarding those claim for cancellation of entries, no evidence was produced by the petitioner. But to this extent the answer regarding entry No.19 is not correct because to decide the entry of Column No.19, no evidence is required. It pertains to the instructions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah and anything contained in the document which is against the spirit of Islam or the orders of Allah and Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) cannot bind the parties even if had been made with the consent of the parties. So to that extent, the judgment on issue No.3-A is modified, there was no need of any evidence but from the bare reading of Column No.19, that is found against the injunctions of Islam, hence, declared void ab initio and not binding to the parties. But since the court had not passed any order regarding the same which could have effect adversely to the petitioner, therefore, this part of the judgment will have no effect on the other parts of the judgment. However, the entries of Column No.19 are declared void ab initio as these are against the injunctions of Islam. So to that extent, the prayer of the petitioner is allowed. Therefore, under the Constitutional Jurisdiction, this court holds that the entries of Column No.19 for imposing any condition on the husband to divorce his wife are null and void.
17. The lady is still the legally wedded wife of the petitioner and she had not been divorced. The lady is entitled for the monthly expenditure of Rs.25,000/- from the date of Rukhsati till the satisfaction of the decision of the Family Court dated 14.12.2020 where the decree of restitution of conjugal rights has been awarded by the court with the condition to pay the monthly maintenance allowance. Since the lady has not filed any appeal against that judgment, therefore, the decree to the extent of restitution of conjugal rights has attained finality and the respondent will not be entitled for any monthly expenditure/pocket money after the satisfying of the decree dated 14.12.2020, if the respondent does not settle down with the petitioner in lieu of the order of the Court for restitution of conjugal rights dated 14.12.2020. The condition of 10 percent per annum increase in the monthly expenditure is against the spirit of the document, which is declared null and void. Therefore, the finding on issue No.1 is modified to the extent that the lady is entitled to receive monthly expenditure @ Rs.25,000/- from the date of her marriage till the satisfaction of the decree passed by the learned Family Court dated 14.12.2020 and there will be no 10 percent increase per annum in the maintenance allowance.
18. The upshot of the above discussion is that the Writ Petition is partly allowed. The findings on issue No.1 are modified to the extent that 10 percent increase is not justified in the order. The lady is entitled for the monthly expenditure till the date of the decision and satisfaction of the judgment and decree, and the entries of Column No.19 are declared against the injunctions of Islam, hence, declared null and void. There is no order as to costs.
ZH/M-172/L Order accordingly.

فیملی کورٹ براہ راست کاروائی اجرا دوسرے ضلع میں نہ بھجوا سکتی ھے۔ دفعہ 25A فیملی کورٹ 1964 کے مطابق اجرا کو صرف ہایئکورٹ کے ذریعہ ہی دوسرے ضلع میں بھجوایا جاسکتا ھے

فیملی کورٹ براہ راست کاروائی اجرا دوسرے ضلع میں نہ بھجوا سکتی ھے۔ دفعہ 25A فیملی کورٹ 1964 کے مطابق اجرا کو صرف ہایئکورٹ کے ذریعہ ہی دوسرے ضلع میں بھجوایا جاسکتا ھے
ڈسٹرکٹ جج اپنے ضلع میں میں ایک فیملی کورٹ سے دوسری فیملی کورٹ اجرا منتقل کر سکتا ھے۔
جبکہ سپریم کورٹ ایک صوبہ سے دوسرے صوبہ اجرا منتقل کرنے کی مجاز ھے
2022 MLD 1289
In future, execution proceedings / execution petition, arising out of decree passed by learned Judge Family Court, would be transferred keeping in view the spirit of Section 25-A of the Act of 1964 as well as observations recorded hereinabove. Copy of this judgment be sent to all District & Sessions Judges in the Punjab for its further circulation amongst all Judicial O fficers.

-Nikah was solemnized---Consent for nikah by coercion--Suit was dismissed to extent of jactitation but marriage was dissolved on basis of khulla-

 PLJ 2022 AJ&K 47

Jactitation of Marriage--

----Forcibly abduction--Nikah was solemnized--Consent for nikah by coercion--Registration of FIR--Suit was dismissed to extent of jactiation but marriage was disolved on basis of khulla--Challenge to--It is evident from record that soon after alleged Nikkah ceremony Haleema Bibi plaintiff straightaway went to police station and lodged a complaint against her father and alleged bridegroom Respondent No. 1, which strengthen argument of counsel for plaintiff--Consent obtained by coercion, or undue influence would not validate marriage--Alleged Nikkah is apparently performed I against consent of plaintiff-appellant herein, which is basic essential of valid Nikkah--Appeal was allowed.                                                                     [Pp. 49 & 50] A, B & C

Malik Shahnawaz Khan, Advocate for Appellant.

Raja Masood Ahmed Khan, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 29.4.2019.


 PLJ 2022 AJ&K 47

Shariat Appellate Bench]

PresentChaudhary Khalid Yousaf, J.

HALEEMA BIBI--Appellant

versus

AZEEM and 2 others--Respondents

Family Appeal No. 41 of 2019, decided on 29.4.2020.


Order

The captioned appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree of Additional District Judge/Judge Family Court Kotli dated 30.3.2019, whereby, suit filed by plaintiff-appellant, for jactitation of marriage was dismissed and marriage was dissolved on the ground of Khulla.

The necessary facts forming the background of instant appeal are that Mst. Haleema Bibi, appellant herein, filed a suit for jactitation of marriage against defendant-Respondent No. 1 herein, to restrain him from pretending himself as her husband, before the Judge Family Court Kotli on 08.09.2016, stating therein, that her right arm was injured, her father, Muhammad Anwar Respondent No. 2 brought her in DHQ Kotli for treatment, thereafter Respondents No. 2 and 3 forcibly abducted her to an unknown place and forced her to enter into a Nikkah with Respondent No. 1, Muhammad Azeem. It has been further alleged that on her refusal they forcibly take her signature and thumb impressions on Nikkahnama without her consent. On the same day i.e. 17.08.2016, the plaintiff lodged a written complaint against the defendants-respondents herein therefore; an F.L.R was registered against the respondents on 25.08.2016. On the other hand Respondent No. 1, Muhammad Azeem, also filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights before the same Court alleging therein that she is his lawfully wedded wife and on inducement of her relatives she filed the suit for jactitation of marriage.

On filing of the suits parties were summoned who, resisted the suits by filing written statements pro and contra. The learned Judge Family Court Kotli consolidated both the suits and proceeded in the suit for jactitation of marriage. The parties were directed to lead evidence. The learned Family Judge while concluding the suits dismissed the suit filed by Muhammad Azeem for restitution of conjugal rights whereas suit filed by the Mst. Haleema Bibi appellant herein, was dismissed to the extent of jactitation however marriage was dissolved on the basis of Khulla in consideration of 4 tola gold ornaments vide its judgment and decree dated 30.03.2019; hence, this appeal.

Malik Shahnawaz Khan, Advocate, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, Haleema Bibi; submitted that the Judge Family Court committed an illegality while dismissing the suit for jactitation of marriage. Learned counsel further contended that respondents forcibly got signatures of plaintiff-appellant on Nikkahnama without her free will which has no legal effect. Learned counsel further contended that defendant-respondent herein failed to prove that dower was given to her but learned judge Family Court wrongly passed a decree of Khullah in consideration of 4 tola gold ornaments which is not sustainable. The learned counsel further contended that the appellant proved her case through cogent and convincing evidence but the Court below passed the impugned judgment in capricious manner. Lastly, he prayed that impugned judgment and decree may be set-aside and decree for jactitation of marriage may also be passed against the defendant-Respondent No. 1.

Conversely, Raja Masood Khan, Advocate, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. 1 argued that the learned Judge Family Court has correctly appreciated the evidence of the parties and rightly dissolved the marriage on the ground of Khula in consideration of 4 tola gold ornaments. He further contended that plaintiff-appellant is sui-juris and married of her own choice, and free will in the presence of witnesses, valid Nikkahnama is on record. He further submitted that she filed the present suit on inducement of her relatives. He finally prayed for dismissal of appeal.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case with utmost care.

At very outset it may be observed that marriage is a civil contract based on mutual consent on the part of a man and woman. The solemnization of marriage requires Ijab-o-Kabul that there should be a proposal made by or on behalf of one of the parties and an acceptance of the proposal by or on behalf of the other, in the presence of two male or one male and two female witnesses, as the case may be, who must be sane and adult. However, this Ijab-o-Kabul, should be without any fear or undue influence or fraud. Marriage without a free consent of both the parties, would not be legally valid. Any consent obtained by coercion or undue influence from any of the parties would make the marriage invalid.

Description: BDescription: ASo far as, the contention of learned counsel for Respondent
No. 1 that a valid Nikkah was solemnized on 17.08.2016 in the presence of witnesses and Wali (father) of the plaintiff is concerned. It is pertinent to mention here that guardians are enjoined by Islam to marry their daughters after getting their consent, consent of a woman is necessary; she cannot be compelled to enter into a marriage contract without her free will and consent. If a girl is married to a person who is not of her choice and girl signed the Nikkahnama unwillingly by the force or fear of her father, the same cannot be termed as valid marriage, because father’s consent is no substitute for the girl’s consent. In the instant case it is evident from record that soon after the alleged Nikkah ceremony Haleema Bibi plaintiff straightaway went to the police station and lodged a complaint against her father and alleged bridegroom Respondent No. 1, which strengthen the argument of the learned counsel for plaintiff-appellant herein that the signature and thumb impression of the plaintiff are taken with undue influence of her father, which is not permissible under law. Consent obtained by coercion, or undue influence would not validate the marriage. Furthermore, perusal of alleged Nikkahnama reveals that four persons namely, Muhammad Kabir, Muhammad Tariq, Muhammad Ashiq and Nisar Hussain Shah are enlisted in it as witnesses of alleged Nikkah ceremony and their names are also included in the list of witnesses placed on record by the Respondent No. 1 herein but none of them was appeared before the Court in support of alleged Nikkah ceremony.

So far as the contention of the learned counsel for respondents that the plaintiff filed the present suit on inducement of her relatives is concerned. Perusal of the record reveals that Nikkah was alleged to be held on 17.08.2016, on the same day the alleged bride plaintiff-appellant herein, went to the police station and lodged a complaint against her father Respondent No. 2 alongwith the Respondent No. 1 and the same was indorsed in “Roznamcha”, ultimately an F.I.R No. 216/16, under section 11/ZHA, 34, 502(2), APC was registered against the respondents herein, hence, this contention of the learned counsel for respondent is hereby repelled.

Description: CIn the light of above discussion I am of the view that the alleged Nikkah is apparently performed against the consent of the plaintiff-appellant herein, which is basic essential of the valid Nikkah, therefore; I accept the instant appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.03.2019 and declared the Nikkah null and void. Consequently, the suit for jactitation of marriage filed by the Haleema Bibi appellant herein, is hereby decreed.

(Y.A.)  Appeal allowed

Compliant (استغاثہ) Case Laws


جس شخص کے خلاف استغاثہ دائر کیا جاتا ہے تو عدالت اسے ضابطہ فوجداری کئی دفعہ 204 کے تحت طلب کرتی ہے اور حاضری کے بعد ضمانتی مچلکے بھی جمع کرانے کا حکم دے سکتی ہے۔
2019 PCr.LJ 665
اگر کوئی شخص جھوٹا استغاثہ دائر کرے گا تو عدالت ضابطہ فوجداری کی دفعہ 250 کے تحت سزا دینے اور معقول جرمانہ ادا کرنے کا حکم صادر کر سکتی ہے ۔
2017 MLD 920
پرائیویٹ استغاثہ میں اس کے حقائق پر آزادانہ کاروائی کی جاتی ہے لہذا ملزمان کو بھی اپنے دفاع کے لیے مکمل موقع فراہم کیا جاتا ہے اور ان کو وکیل تک رسائی دے دی جاتی ہے۔
2017 YLR 1036
اگرچہ استغاثہ دائر کرنے کی کوئی معیاد قانون میں مقرر نہیں ہے۔ مگر استغاثہ جتنی دیر سے دائر کیا جاتا ہے تو اس کی سچائی کے امکانات اتنے ہی کم ہوجاتے ہیں۔
PLD 2018 Lhr. 118

--S. 9-The expression "ratio decidendi" is ground or reason of decision and point in a case which determines judgment. It is "ratio decidendi" which is applicable to subsequent cases presenting same problem-

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 630

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----S. 9--Suit for maintenance allowance was decreed--Availability of remedy of appeal--Ratio decidendi--Maintainability--There is no cavil that under Section 14(1) of Act, right of appeal is available against decision or decree passed by Family Court--The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Saif-ur-Rehman (supra) while interpreting Section 14(2) of Act, held that only possible purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of Section 14(2) of Act, is that right of appeal of a husband against whom a decree has been passed is curtailed, if amount awarded is less than amount, mentioned in said provision but not for decree holder, otherwise it will defeat very purpose and object of Act and frustrate its beneficial nature--It is incumbent that Courts enforce principle of law if clearly laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, judgment cannot be construed as "law declared" under Article 189 of Constitution if no "ratio decidendi" is discoverable from judgment. The expression "ratio decidendi" is ground or reason of decision and point in a case which determines judgment. It is "ratio decidendi" which is applicable to subsequent cases presenting same problem--Being adequate alternative remedy of appeal available under statute, this Constitutional petition is not maintainable.

                                                                  [Pp. 631 & 633] A, B, C & D

Mr. Mahmood Tahir Ch. Advocate for Petitioner.

Barrister Zargham Lukhesar, Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab for State.

Date of hearing: 23.9.2021.


 PLJ 2022 Lahore 630
PresentAbid Aziz Sheikh, J.
MUHAMMAD FAIZAN RAZA--Petitioner
versus
JUDGE, FAMILY COURT and others--Respondents
W.P. No. 46766 of 2021, decided on 23.9.2021.


Order

In this writ petition, the petitioner is seeking enhancement of maintenance allowance of Rs. 5000/- per month for minor fixed in the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.4.2021 passed by learned Judge Family Court.

2. Relevant facts are that petitioner minor filed suit through his mother for recovery of maintenance allowance, in which, interim maintenance allowance of Rs. 4000/- per month was fixed on 04.5.2019. For failure to pay the interim maintenance allowance, the suit was finally decreed under Section 17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (Act) for maintenance allowance of Rs. 5000/- with 10% annual increase. The petitioner being aggrieved has filed this constitutional petition for enhancement of maintenance allowance.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner at the very outset confronted that when right of appeal is available under Section 14 of the Act for enhancement of maintenance allowance in view of law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saif-ur-Rehman v. Additional District Judge and others (2018 SCMR 1885), then how this constitutional petition is maintainable. Learned counsel in response submits that said judgment only provide right of appeal for enhancement of amount against dower and dowry articles and not against maintenance allowance for the minor, therefore, being no right of appeal available, this writ petition is maintainable.

Description: A4. Arguments heard. The threshold legal question requires determination in this case is that whether under Section 14(2) of the Act, the right of appeal against decree for maintenance allowance of Rs. 5000/- or less is denied only to the judgment debtor or also to the minor, if he wants to file appeal for enhancement of the maintenance allowance. There is no cavil that under Section 14(1) of the Act, the right of appeal is available against the decision or decree passed by Family Court, however, by virtue of seb-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, this right of appeal is curtailed in three eventualities including where decree for maintenance allowance is of Rs. 5000/- or less.

Description: B5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Saif-ur-Rehman (supra) while interpreting Section 14(2) of the Act, held that the only possible purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act, is that the right of appeal of a husband against whom a decree has been passed is curtailed, if the amount awarded is less than the amount, mentioned in the said provision but not for the decree holder, otherwise it will defeat the very purpose and object of the Act and frustrate its beneficial nature. Relevant observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment in para 13 and 16 are reproduced hereunder:

"13. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 1964, confers a right of appeal. However, by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act of 1964, this right of appeal has been curtailed. The obvious purpose of curtailing the right of appeal is to avoid the benefits of any decree which may have been passed being tied up in an appeal before a higher forum. It has also been noticed that in only three eventualities that even the right of first appeal has been curtailed. In all three eventualities, the decree would be for the benefit of the wife for dissolution of marriage under Clause (a), for dower or dowry under Clause (b) and for maintenance under Clause (c). The last may also be for the benefit of a minor. Thus, the only logical and reasonable interpretation, which is in accordance with the purposive of the Act and in line with the beneficial nature thereof would be that a judgment-debtor of a decree envisages in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of seb-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act of 1964, would not have a right of appeal so that the disputes mentioned therein are resolved expeditiously and the benefits conferred through such decree reach the decree-holder without being frustrated. However, the said provision cannot be interpreted so as to exclude a right of appeal to a wife whose claim of dower or dowry has been partially or entirely declined. For such an interpretation, would defeat the purpose and object of the Act of 1964 and frustrate its beneficial nature.

16. Thus, the only possible purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act of 1964, is that the right of appeal of a husband against whom a decree has been passed is curtailed, if the amount awarded is less than the amount, which is mentioned in the said provision. However, in no event the right of the wife to file an appeal is extinguished if she is dissatisfied with any decree in a Suit for dower or dowry".

6. The Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Tayyaba Yunus v. Muhammad Ehsan and others (2010 SCMR 1403) while interpreting Section 14(2) of the Act held that where suit for dower has been dismissed, the wife has right of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act. In the case of Abid Hussain v. Additional District Judge, Alipur, District Muzaffargarh and another (2006 SCMR 100), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that object behind non-provision of appeal in case of dissolution of marriage is to protect women, an under privileged and generally oppressed section of our society from prolonged and costly litigation and it aims to put a clog on the right of husband.

7. Every principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has force of binding precedent under the provisions of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution). Both as a matter of its constitutional duty as well as the prudence and rationale of such precedents, it is incumbent that Courts enforce principle of law if clearly laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, the judgment cannot be construed as "law declared" under Article 189 of the Constitution if no "ratio decidendi" is discoverable from the judgment. The expression "ratio decidendi" is the ground or reason of decision and the point in a case which determines the judgment. It is the "ratio decidendi" which is applicable to subsequent cases presenting the same problem. In this regard, reliance is placed on the cases of Muhammad Zahid, Proprietor Plus Enterprises v. Federal Board of Revenue through Chairperson, Islamabad and 5 others (2021 PTD 80), S. Nasim Ahmad Shah and 115 others versus State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another (2017 PTD 2029), Pakistan Lawyers' Forum through General Secretary v. Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Justice Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights, Islamabad and another (PLD 2011 Lahore 382) and Zafar Ahmed Khan versus Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Islamabad and 2 others (2009 PLC (C.S.) 415).

Description: C8. No doubt, the above judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court are in respect of enhancement of alternative price of dowry articles, dower or dissolution of marriage, however, the ratio decidendi settled in these judgments are that non-provision of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act is to protect under privileged and generally oppressed section of our society from prolonged and costly litigation. The minor indeed fall within that category, hence as per law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court, denial of appeal is for the protection of the minor and not vice versa.

9. The right of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act shall not be available to the judgment debtor (father/husband) but decree holder (minor or wife) can file appeal for enhancement of decretal amount. The purposive beneficial and rational interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act made by august Supreme Court in above judgments, is also squarely applicable to the matter for the enhancement of maintenance allowance by the minor. Any other interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act would not only defeat the very purpose and object of the Act but will also frustrate the beneficial nature of Section 14(2) of the Act.

Description: D10. In view of above discussion, this Court has no manner of doubt that remedy of appeal under Section 14(2) of the Act shall be available to the petitioner/minor for the enhancement of maintenance allowance in the impugned judgment and decree. Therefore, being adequate alternative remedy of appeal available under the statute, this Constitutional petition is not maintainable, which is accordingly dismissed.

                        Petition dismissed

Provisions of C.P.C. and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order are not applicable to proceedings of Family Court-

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 580

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----Ss. 14 & 17--Jurisdiction of--Filing of objection application--Execution proceedings--Right of appeal--No provision of appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order--Provisions of C.P.C. and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order are not applicable to proceedings of Family Court--Only one right of appeal has been provided by Act against final order of Family Court, whereas no provision of appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order of Family Court--High Court has reason to believe that while assuming jurisdiction to entertain said appeal and passing impugned order, erred in law by setting aside interim orders passed by Executing Court.

                                                                                  [P. 583] A, B & C

2002 SCMR 1950 ref.

M/s. Adnan Qureshi & Tanveer Hayat, Advocates for Petitioner.

M/s. Agha Abdul Hassan Arif & Nosheen Amber Bukhari, Advocates for Respondent No. 1.

Date of hearing: 8.3.2022.


 PLJ 2022 Lahore 580
PresentSafdar Saleem Shahid, J.
SADIA IQBAL--Petitioner
versus
UMAR NASIM AHMED etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 14646 of 2016, decided on 8.3.2022.


Order

Through this constitutional petition, Mst. Sadia Iqbal petitioner has challenged the validity of judgment dated 11.03.2016 whereby learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore set aside the orders dated 23.05.2015 & 15.12.2015 passed by learned Executing Court Lahore, “with the directions to learned Executing Court to determine/ ascertain the actual value of gold ornaments and not pure gold, prevailing at the date of satisfaction/execution of decree, when the judgment debtor had paid decretal amount, which was exact date of execution/satisfaction of decree, as per order of Hon’ble Lahore High Court, Lahore”.

2. Perusal of order dated 06.05.2016 passed by this Court in the instant petition reveals that on the said date, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Respondent No. 1 had filed an application before the learned Executing Court raising objection on the value of gold ornaments on 3rd June, 2015 which was dismissed vide order dated 11th June,2015. Thereafter, the Respondent No. 1 filed EFA No. 1366 of 2015 against the said order, which he withdrew, after arguments, vide order dated 21.10.2015; that instead of availing appropriate remedy, he again moved an application with the same contents, pleadings and prayer seeking revaluation of the gold ornaments on 28.11.2015 which was also dismissed by the learned Executing Court vide order dated 15.12.2015. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal before the learned Lower Appellate Court which was taken up and decided vide impugned judgment dated 11.03.2016, despite the objection of learned counsel for the petitioner that appeal did not lie against the said interim order as per provisions of Section 14(3) and 17 of the West Pakistan Family Court Act 1964.

3. Arguments heard. Record perused.

4. The actual point involved in the instant petition was that whether learned first Appellate Court was having jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the interim orders of learned Executing Court as per provisions of Section 14(3) and 17 of the West Pakistan Family Court Act 1964?. Here I would like to reproduce Section 14(3) & Section 17 (supra) as under:

“Section 14(3) “No appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order passed by a family Court”.

“Section 17 provisions of evidence Act and Code of Civil procedure not to apply.(1) save as otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the (Qanun-e-Shahdat, 1984 (P.O No. 10 of 1984) and the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (except Sections 10 & 11) shall not apply to proceedings before any Family Court ( in respect of part I of Schedule).”

(2) Sections 8 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873, shall apply to all proceedings before the Family Courts.

5. It has been noticed that Mst. Sadia Iqbal petitioner filed writ petition Bearing No. 29500 of 2013 before this Court. Vide order dated 12.06.2014 this Court observed as under:-

        “The respondent is held entitled for recovery of gold ornaments as prayed for or in alternate their market value which would be prevailing at the time of execution/satisfaction of the decree”

        “From the above discussion, it has been established on record that both the learned Courts below erred in law while declining the prayer of respondent for recovery of deferred dower. The petitioner could not prove that he has paid the dower during the existence of marriage, therefore, respondent is held entitled to recover Rs. 1,00,000/- from the petitioner as deferred dower.

Keeping in view the aforesaid observations passed by this Court, the learned Executing Court vide order dated 23.05.2015 had fixed the value of seventy tolas gold ornaments as Rs. 32,90,000/- and dower amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-, total decretal amount was calculated as
Rs. 33,90,000/ and thereafter the learned Executing Court, Lahore directed the respondent/judgment debtor to present seventy tolas gold ornaments or its value ascertained hereinabove or Rs. 33,90,000/- as decretal amount. The respondent/judgment debtor filed an application seeking evaluation of correct price of gold ornaments and depositing of an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- in lieu of decretal amount which was dismissed by learned Executing Court vide order dated 11.06.2015. Being aggrieved by the orders of learned Executing Court, the respondent/judgment approached this Court by filing EFA No. 1366 of 2015 which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 21.10.2015 and that dismissal order was not assailed by the respondent /judgment debtor. It has further been noticed that respondent/judgment debtor also filed an application under Section 151 CPC read with Section 94 of CPC praying the Court to appreciate the actual direction of this Court given in para No. 13 of the judgment dated 12.06.2014 passed in W.P No. 12640 of 2013, which was also dismissed by learned Executing Court vide order dated 15.12.2015. Thereafter on 05.01.2016 against the orders dated 23.05.2015 & 15.12.2015 passed by learned Executing Court, the respondent/judgment debtor filed a family appeal before the learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore who set aside the aforesaid orders passed by learned Executing Court. The other question arises that whether interim order dated 23.05.2015 passed by learned Executing Court, during the execution of decree in question can be assailed through appeal which was allegedly filed by the respondent/judgment debtor on 05.01.2016 with the delay of more than seven months. The West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 provides only one provision of appeal and in view of that whether appeal against other interim order dated 15.12.2015 is competent and maintainable before learned Ist Appellate Court. During the course of arguments learned counsel for respondent/judgment debtor took stance that an illegal order of the Court may be assailed in appeal before the Court of competent jurisdiction and as such the appeal before the learned appellate Court regarding the aforesaid orders passed by learned Executing Court was well maintainable before the said Court. It was further contended by learned counsel for the respondent that learned executing Court was bound to fix the market value of alleged gold ornaments keeping in view the spirit of judgment dated 12.06.2014 passed by this Court in W.P No. 12640 of 2013 which was not certainly followed by the learned Executing Court. In the case reported as “Muhammad Sadiq vs Dr. Sabir Sultana” (2002 SCMR 1950) the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed as under:-

Ss.13 & 17--civil procedure Code (V of 1908),O.XXI,
 R.  54--Order of attachment and auction of property by the Family Court--Compliance of O.XX,R.54, C.P.C.--Necessity--Provisions of O.XXI, R.54, being not mandatory substantial compliance with the said provision is enough--Strict compliance with O.XXI,R.54 CPC may not be insisted upon as S.13 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 provides for the execution of a decree passed by the Family Court and application of O.XXI, R.54 C.P.C has been excluded by S.17 of the said Act.

Description: ADescription: BDescription: CThe West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 is a special law and all the proceedings are conducted under the said act and when only one provision of appeal is provided that means there is philosophy behind the said provision of aforementioned Act and Family Court has been empowered to decide all the matters while observing the principle of law. The provisions of C.P.C and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order are not applicable to the proceedings of Family Court in order to decide the matters within the shortest possible time with permanent solution. This is why that only one right of appeal has been provided by the Act against the final order of the Family Court, whereas no provision of appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order of the Family Court, especially when the petitioner has taken a specific objection regarding the maintainability of appeal before the learned 1st Appellate Court, that matter should have been decided first in view of spirit of law. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court has reason to believe that learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore while assuming the jurisdiction to entertain the said appeal and passing the impugned order, erred in law by setting aside the interim orders passed by learned Executing Court.

6. For what has been discussed above, instant petition is accepted and order dated 11.03.2016 passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore is set aside.

(K.Q.B.)          Petition accepted

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