The Christian Marriage Act 1872 and the Divorce Act 1869 are the principal family laws for Christians in our country. Every church has its precepts but these statutes prevail where there is a conflict.

 This statute consolidated and amended the law relating to solemnizing the marriages of people professing Christianity. It consists of 88 sections. The first three sections are grouped under the heading “Preliminary,” while the remaining sections are divided into eight Parts. Section 3 is the interpretation clause and defines “minor” as a person who has not completed the age of twentyone years and is not a widower or a widow. Parts III, V and VI contain provisions for marriages where one or both parties are minors. In Part III, which bears the heading “Marriages solemnized by Ministers of Religion licensed under this Act”, section 19 enjoins that the father, if alive, or his guardian, if he is dead, and the mother of the minor, if there is no guardian, may give consent to the minor’s marriage. However, such consent is not required if the person authorized to give it does not reside in Pakistan. Sections 20, 21, and 22 describe how the person whose consent to the marriage is required under section 19 can prohibit the issuance of the certificate by the minister and how the latter should proceed when a notice prohibiting the marriage is issued. Part V contains provisions pertaining to marriages performed by or in the presence of a Marriage Registrar. Section 44 stipulates that the provisions of section 19 apply to any marriage under Part V in which either party is a minor. Anyone whose consent is required for such a marriage can enter a protest in the prescribed manner. When such a protest is filed, no certificate will be issued until the Marriage Registrar has examined the case and determined that it should be given. Part VI relates to the marriage of Native Christians, an expression, which as per section 3, includes the Christian descendants of the natives of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent converted to Christianity as well as such converts. Part VII prescribes penalties for various violations and offences under the CMA.

In view of the above, the minimum age for a Native Christian man to enter into a marriage is 16 years and for a woman 13 years in terms of section 60 of the CMA. The consent requirement under section 19 is within the age bracket of 16 to 18 and 13 to 18 years respectively. The marriage can be solemnized in the presence of a person licensed under section 9 in the presence of at least two credible witnesses without the preliminary notice required under Part III. I agree with Mr. Saad Rasool that the CMA does not expressly prohibit the marriage of a minor if it is compliant with section 5 (Persons by whom marriage is solemnized) and does not violate section 88 (Non-validation of marriages within prohibited degrees).
Section 2 of the Majority Act expressly excludes marriage and divorce from its application. A combined reading of this provision and section 11 of the Contract Act would show that they have no bearing on the capacity of a person to act in some matters, including marriage, which are left to be governed by the individual’s personal law – unless the Parliament has enacted a special law in that regard. As a result, the CMA and the Divorce Act of 1869 govern Christian marriage and divorce in Pakistan. The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, does not override them. It is a separate law that punishes those who are responsible for an under-age marriage but does not nulify the marriage.
“Consanguinity” is a relationship by blood while “affinity” is a relationship by marriage. The attitudes of different major world religions towards consanguineous and affinity marriages are diverse. Even in the same religion the practices and beliefs of one community and sect may differ from those of the others. Section 88 of the CMA recognizes that Christians have similar divisions and prohibits validation of any marriage “which the personal law applicable to either of the parties forbids him or her to enter into,” which includes a marriage within the prohibited degree of consanguinity and affinity.

Writ Petition No. 63301/2021 Nasreen Bibi Vs. Station House Officer etc.
Date of hearing : 30.06.2022

















Polygamy and Punishment on second marriage.

 ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﺍﺟﺎﺯﺕ ﺩﻭﺳﺮﯼ ﺷﺎﺩﯼ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯﻗﻮﺍﻧﯿﻦ ﺍﻭﺭ‎ ‎ﺳﺰﺍﺋﯿﮟ:

ﺩﻓﻌﮧ 6 ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻓﯿﻤﻠﯽ ﻻﺯ ﺁﺭﮈﯾﻨﻨﺲ 1961 ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ‎ ‎ﺍﮔﺮ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺷﺨﺺ ﺩﻭﺳﺮﯼ ﺷﺎﺩﯼ ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭼﺎﮨﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻭﮦ
ﺍﺱ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﯾﻮﻧﯿﻦ ﮐﻮﻧﺴﻞ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺩﺭﺧﻮﺍﺳﺖ ﺩﯾﮕﺎ ﺍﻭﺭ
ﺍﺟﺎﺯﺕ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﯾﮕﺎ ۔ﺍﮔﺮ ﻭﮦ ﺍﺟﺎﺯﺕ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﺩﻭﺳﺮﯼ
ﺷﺎﺩﯼ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﺍﯾﮏ ﺳﺎﻝ ﺳﺰﺍ ﺍﻭﺭ 5 ﻻﮐﮫ ﺟﺮﻣﺎﻧﮧ
ﮨﻮﮔﺎ
ﻟﮩﺬﺍ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻧﯽ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﯾﮧ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺳﺰﺍ ﺟﺮﻡ
ﮨﮯ ۔ﺟﺒﮑﮧ ﻓﯿﮉﺭﻝ ﺷﺮﯾﺖ ﮐﻮﺭﭦ ﺳﺎﻝ 2000 ﻣﯿﮟ ﺍﺱ
ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﮐﻮ ﺷﺮﯾﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﮮ ﭼﮑﯽ ﮨﮯ
PLD 2000 FSC page 1
ﺍﺳﯽ ﻃﺮﺡ ﺣﺎﻝ ﮨﯽ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺳﭙﺮﯾﻢ ﮐﻮﺭﭦ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﻧﮯ
ﻣﺬﮐﻮﺭﮦ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﮐﻮ ﺷﺮﯾﺖ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﯾﺘﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ
ﺷﻮﮨﺮ ﮐﯽ ﺳﺰﺍ ﺑﺮﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺭﮐﮭﯽ
PLD 2017 SC page 187
ﺟﺒﮑﮧ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺩﺍﺩ ﺭﺳﯽ ﺧﺎﺹ ﮐﯽ ﺩﻓﻊ 55 ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ
ﻣﺪ ﻋﯽ ﮐﺎ ﺍﯾﺴﺎ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﯽ ﺣﻖ ﺟﺲ ﮐﺎ ﻣﺪ ﻋﺎ ﻋﻠﯿﮧ ﺍﻧﮑﺎﺭ
ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﻮ ﺗﻮ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﺍﺱ ﮐﻮ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﯽ ﮐﺎﻡ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ
ﺭﻭﮎ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ
ﺟﺒﮑﮧ ﺍﯾﮏ ﺷﻮﮨﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺑﯿﻮﯼ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻼﻑ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﮧ ﻣﯿﮟ
ﻓﯿﻤﻠﯽ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﻧﮯ ﺑﯿﻮﯼ ﮐﻮ ﺩﻭﺳﺮﯼ ﺷﺎﺩﯼ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﺳﮯ
ﺭﻭﮎ ﺩﯾﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﺍﻭﺭ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﯾﺎ ﺗﮭﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻓﯿﻤﻠﯽ ﮐﻮﺭﭦ
ﺩﻭﺳﺮﯼ ﺷﺎﺩﯼ ﺭﻭﮐﻨﮯ ﮐﺎ ﺣﮑﻢ ﺍﻣﺘﻨﺎﻋﯽ ﺟﺎﺭﯼ
ﮐﺮﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ
1983 CLC page 279
ﺟﺒﮑﮧ ﺍﻋﻠﯽ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺘﯽ ﻧﻈﺎ ﺋﺮ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﺩﯾﺎ ﮔﯿﺎ ﮨﮯ ﮐﮧ
ﻓﯿﻤﻠﯽ ﮐﻮﺭﭦ ﺍﻧﺼﺎﻑ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﮐﻮﺋﯽ ﺑﮭﯽ ﺣﮑﻢ ﺻﺎﺩﺭ
ﮐﺮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ ۔ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﻧﮑﺎﺡ ﻧﺎﻣﮧ ﮐﮯ ﺧﺎﻧﮧ ﻣﯿﮟ ﺗﺤﺮﯾﺮ
ﮨﻮﺗﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐﮯ ﮐﯿﺎ ﺩﻭﻟﮩﺎ ﭘﮩﻠﮯ ﺳﮯ ﺷﺎﺩﯼ ﺷﺪﮦ ﮨﮯ ؟
ﺍﮔﺮ ﺍﺟﺎﺯﺕ ﮐﺎ ﺳﺮﭨﯿﻔﮑﯿﭧ ﻧﺎ ﺩﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻧﮑﺎﺡ ﺭﺟﺴﭩﺮﺍﺭ
ﻧﮑﺎﺡ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﭘﮍﮬﺎ ﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﺍﻭﺭ ﻧﺎ ﮨﯽ ﺍﯾﺴﺎ ﻧﮑﺎﺡ ﺭﺟﺴﭩﺮﮈ
ﮨﻮﺳﮑﺘﺎ ﮨﮯ ۔ ﻟﮩﺬﺍ ﺑﯿﻮﯼ ﻧﺎ ﺻﺮﻑ ﺷﻮﮨﺮ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻼﻑ ﮐﯿﺲ
ﮐﺮﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺑﻠﮑﮯ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘﮧ ﯾﻮﻧﯿﻦ ﮐﻮﻧﺴﻞ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻼﻑ
ﺑﮭﯽ ﮐﯿﺲ ﮐﺮﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ ﮐﮧ ﻭﻭ ﺩﻭﺳﺮﺍ ﻧﮑﺎﺡ ﺭﺟﺴﭩﺮﮈ
ﻧﮧ ﮐﺮﯾﮟ
ﺍﯾﮏ ﺑﺎﺕ ﯾﺎﺩﺭﮐﮭﯿﮯ ﮐﮧ ﺍﺟﺎﺯﺕ ﮐﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﺩﻭﺳﺮﯼ ﺷﺎﺩﯼ
ﮐﺮﻧﺎ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻧﯽ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﮐﮯ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺷﺮﻋﯽ ﮨﮯ ﺍﻭﺭ ﻏﯿﺮ
ﺷﺮﻋﯽ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ , ﺍﮔﺮ ﺷﻮﮨﺮ ﺍﯾﺴﺎ ﮐﺮﺗﺎ ﮨﮯ ﺗﻮ ﻋﺪﺍﻟﺖ ﺷﻮﮨﺮ
ﮐﺎ ﺩﻭﺳﺮﺍ ﻧﮑﺎﺡ ﮐﺎﻟﻌﺪﻡ ﻧﮩﯿﮟ ﮐﺮﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﺻﺮﻑ ﺷﻮﮨﺮ
ﮐﻮ ﺍﺟﺎﺯﺕ ﻧﮧ ﻟﯿﻨﮯ ﮐﯽ ﺳﺰﺍ ﺩﮮ ﺳﮑﺘﯽ ﮨﮯ

Under the Islamic law a wife’s right to be maintained by her husband is absolute so long as she remains faithful to him and discharges, or is willing to discharge,

 PLD 2022 SC 686

Under the Islamic law a wife’s right to be maintained by her husband is absolute so long as she remains faithful to him and discharges, or is willing to discharge, her own matrimonial obligations. A Muslim husband is bound to maintain his wife even if no term in this regard is agreed to between them at the time of marriage or she can maintain herself out of her own resources. The Holy Quran enunciates that men are the protectors and maintainers of women because the God Almighty has given the one more strength than the other and because they support them from their money. And the Holy Prophet of Islam (pbuh) has instructed Muslim men to provide their wives with maintenance in a fitting manner.and declared it to be the right of the women

-Ss. 9 & 10--Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, delivery charges and dowry articles----S. 5--Jurisdiction--Under provision of section 5 of Family Courts Act, Family Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon matter specified in schedule

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 815

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----Ss. 9 & 10--Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, delivery charges and dowry articles--Suit was partially decreed--Concurrent findings--Financial status of respondent--Challenge to--In cross-examination Petitioner No. 1 had admitted that Ali Hassan minor was born in a hospital through a normal delivery, suit to extent of recovery of delivery expenses was rightly dismissed by Courts below--Petitioner No. 1 admitted in her cross-examination that there was no proof with her regarding financial income of Respondent No. 1--In circumstances, Courts below decreed suit--Courts below have concurrently fixed maintenance allowance after giving due consideration to requirements of minor and by taking into account financial status of Respondent No. 1--Concurrent findings of facts recorded by Courts below do not suffer from any illegality, infirmity or perversity, which could convince to interfere in same while exercising constitutional jurisdiction of this Court--In case petitioners think rate of maintenance at lower side, they can move application before trial Court which is empowered to increase same after having considered financial status of Respondent No. 1--If maintenance allowance is fixed without considering financial status of person, who has been burdened with such future financial liability can file application for re-fixation of maintenance allowance in view of financial status of person is also entertainable under same analogy--Petition dismissed.

                                                              [Pp. 817 & 818] A, B, C, E & F

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 5--Jurisdiction--Under provision of section 5 of Family Courts Act, Family Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon matter specified in schedule. [P. 818] D

M/s. S.M. Zeeshan Mirza, Rana Muhammad Majid, Zaheer Abbas, Tahir Mahmood Mughal and Naveed Khalid Rana, Advocates for petitioners.

Nemo for Respondent No. 1.

Date of hearing: 10.1.2022.


 PLJ 2022 Lahore 815
PresentSafdar Saleem Shahid, J.
SAMIA ANWAR etc.--Petitioners
versus
NASIR HUSSAIN etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 32224 of 2015, decided on 10.1.2022.


Order

This petition is directed against concurrent judgments and decrees dated 23.01.2015 and 04.05.2015 passed by the learned Judge Family Court and learned Additional District Judge, Gujrat.

2. Brief facts necessary for decision of the instant petition are that the petitioners filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, delivery charges and dowry articles, alleging that Petitioner No. 1 was married with Respondent No. 1 on 23.07.2009 but behavior of Respondent No. 1 remained cruel and ultimately he ousted Petitioner No. 1 from his house in November, 2009, whereafter a son (Petitioner No. 2) was born out of the wedlock. It was claimed that Respondent No. 1 works in Dubai and also owns landed property and can easily pay maintenance allowance of Rs. 30,000/-per head per month. According to the petitioners Respondent No. 1 has pronounced divorce, but has refused to return the dowry articles given to Petitioner No. 1 by her parents at the time of marriage and has also refused to pay maintenance allowance and the delivery charges Rs. 40,000/-incurred by Petitioner No. 1. The suit was contested by Respondent No. 1 by filing written statement, wherein he alleged that Petitioner No. 1 left his house on 30.04.2013 and refused to rehabilitate as such on her demand he pronounced divorce on 20.05.2013 and that he is ready to return the dowry articles as per list attached with the written statement, which are lying with him.

3. Out of divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed issues, recorded evidence of the parties and after having gone through the same partially decreed the suit holding Petitioner No. 1 entitled to recover Rs. 7000/-per month as maintenance allowance from 30.04.2013 till the period of Iddat, whereas Petitioner No. 2 was held entitled to recover Rs. 7000/-per month as maintenance allowance from 30.04.2013 till his legal entitlement with the direction that the interim maintenance allowance already given shall be adjusted in his maintenance. The suit to the extent of recovery of delivery expenses was, however, dismissed, whereas to the extent of recovery of dowry articles the same was dismissed as withdrawn. Both the parties assailed the judgment by filing their respective appeals, but both the appeals were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge.

4. Despite repeated calls no one appeared on behalf of Respondent No. 1, hence he is proceeded against ex parte. The case has been taken up for hearing with the assistance of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

5. The petitioners have filed the instant petition with the prayer that by setting aside the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below, their suit be decreed as prayed for. Matter regarding recovery of dowry articles was settled during the pendency of the suit, whereas since in her cross-examination Petitioner No. 1 had admitted that Ali Hassan minor was born in a hospital through a normal delivery, the suit to the extent of recovery of delivery expenses was rightly dismissed by the Courts below. As regards prayer for grant of maintenance allowance, Petitioner No. 1 admitted in her cross-examination that there was no proof with her regarding financial income of Respondent No. 1. In the circumstances, learned Courts below decreed the suit holding the petitioners entitled to recover the maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 7000/-per month each for the periods mentioned against each of them. Courts below have concurrently fixed the maintenance allowance after giving due consideration to the needs/requirements of the minor and by taking into account the financial status of Respondent No. 1. Besides, the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Courts below do not suffer from any illegality, infirmity or perversity, which could convince to interfere in the same while exercising constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. In this regard reliance can be placed upon the case of Syed Hussain Naqvi and others vs. Mst. Begum Zakara Chatha through L.Rs. and others (2015 SCMR 1081), wherein it has been held as under:

"15. There are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below against the appellants. This Court in Muhammad Shafi and others v. Sultan (2007 SCMR 1602) while relying on case-law from Indian jurisdiction as well as from the Pakistani jurisdiction has candidly held that this Court could not go behind concurrent findings of fact "unless it can be shown that the finding is on the face of it against the evidence or so patently improbable, or perverse that to accept it could amount to perpetuating a grave miscarriage of justice, or if there has been any misapplication of principle relating to appreciation of evidence or finally, if the finding could be demonstrated to be physically impossible." No such thing could be brought on record to warrant interference by this Court."

6. Furthermore, legislature has established the Family Courts for expeditious settlement and disposal of the disputes relating to marriage, family affairs and the matters connected therewith. Under the provision of section 5 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Court is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the matter specified in the schedule. The matter of maintenance is at serial No. 3 in the schedule. Thus, the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction relating to maintenance allowance and the matters connected therewith. Once a decree by the Family Court in a suit for maintenance is granted thereafter, if the granted rate for per month allowance is insufficient and inadequate, in that case, according to scheme of law, institution of fresh suit is not necessary rather the Family Court may entertain any such application and if necessary make alteration in the rate of maintenance allowance.

7. In the circumstances, in case the petitioners think the rate of maintenance at lower side, they can move application before the learned trial Court which is empowered to increase the same after having considered financial status of Respondent No. 1. It is statutory provision, that for enhancement of maintenance allowance on behalf of the minors, the application can be filed by the person, having custody of the minors; similarly if the maintenance allowance is fixed without considering the financial status of the person, who has been burdened with such future financial liability can file application for re-fixation of maintenance allowance in view of financial status of the person is also entertainable under the same analogy.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has been unable to point out any exercise of excess of jurisdiction by the learned Courts


below or indeed that their decisions are perverse. The learned counsel for the petitioner has similarly been unable to point out any illegality or material irregularity having been committed by the learned Courts below. Under the circumstances this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

سلام آبادہائیکورٹ نے شادی کی عمر سے متعلق اہم فیصلہ سناتے ہوئے 18 سال سے کم عمر شادی کو غیر قانونی معاہدہ قرار دے دیا ہے۔

PLD 2022 ISLAMABAD 228

جسٹس بابر ستار نے جاری کردہ فیصلے میں لکھا کہ 18 سال سے کم عمر لڑکی آزادانہ شادی نہیں کرسکتی، حیاتیاتی طور پر بلوغت کی عمر 18 سال کا ہونا ہی ہے۔
عدالتی فیصلے میں کہا گیا کہ محض جسمانی تبدیلیوں پر 18 سال سے پہلے قانونی طور پر بلوغت نہیں ہوتی، بلوغت کی قانونی عمر 18 برس ہے، اس سے کم عمر لڑکی کی شادی غیر قانونی ہوگی۔
فیصلے میں کہا گیا کہ 18سال سے کم عمر لڑکی کے ورثا بھی جسمانی تعلق والا معاہدہ نہیں کراسکتے۔
عدالت نے بیٹی کی بازیابی کے لیے دائر ممتاز بی بی کی درخواست پر فیصلہ سنادیا اور 16سالہ سویرا فلک شیر کو واپس والدہ کے سپرد کرنے کا حکم دے دیا۔
عدالت نے ایس ایچ او گولڑہ کو دارالامان سے لڑکی واپس والدہ کے سپر کرنے کا حکم بھی دیا۔
عدالت نے مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈیننس میں وضاحت نہ ہونے کا معاملہ کابینہ ڈویژن اور پارلیمنٹ کے سامنے رکھنے کی ہدایت کردی۔
ممتاز بی بی نے مئی 2021 سے بیٹی کے اغوا کا مقدمہ درج کرایا تھا، لڑکی نے ہائی کورٹ میں مرضی سے شادی کرنے کا بیان دیا تھا۔
1. Can a Minor execute a valid contract of marriage and can a marriage between an adult and a child, even if with the consent of the child, be deemed to be a valid marriage?
2. What is the age of majority in Pakistan, and does a Minor have the legal competence to enter into a contract of marriage before attaining the age of majority?
3. Can the consideration and purpose of contract of marriage be regarded as lawful in view of section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, read together with sections 375 and 377A of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
4. Can a contract of marriage, involving an object and purpose that is proscribed, be treated as a valid contract while simultaneously creating criminal liability for the male for carrying out acts conceived by such contract?
......................................
A. A child is defined as a person who has not attained the age of 18 years. A child is required to be placed in somebody’s care whether it is a parent or guardian or other caregiver appointed on behalf of the state. Complete agency to grant informed consent for purposes of entering into contract, including, inter alia, a marriage contract cannot be attributed to such child.
B. A female child below the age of 18 cannot be deemed competent to freely grant her consent to enter into a marriage contract merely because she manifests the physical symptoms of having attained puberty. In view of provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018 and PPC, when read together, while being guided by principles of Islamic jurisprudence and Principles of Policy enshrined in the Constitution, (including state’s obligation to protect the woman, the child and the family), the test for legal agency and competence of a female child is her biological age and not her state of physical and biological growth.
C. The provisions of sections 375 and 377A of PPC are mandatory provisions and any contract entered with the object of breaching such provisions or that has the effect of breaching such provisions cannot be treated as a valid contract. A marriage contract in which one of the parties is a child under the age of 18 is therefore a contract executed for an unlawful purpose and is void ab initio. Such marriage contract can neither be registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, nor can be given effect by a court, as that would tantamount to defeating provisions of law that have been promulgated to uphold rights of children guaranteed by Article 9 of the Constitution read together with the provisions of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
D. A child under the age of 18 years is a dependent of an adult whether such adult is a parent or guardian or other caregiver appointed by the State. The State is under an obligation to uphold and guarantee the rights of such child, who cannot be deemed to have the competence or capacity to parent a child of his/her own and act as guardian endowed with the primary responsibility to provide for his/her child while being a child himself/herself.
E. Sections 375 and 377A of PPC read together with Article 9 of the Constitution, Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018, and provisions of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child unequivocally provide that no one can engage in sexual conduct in any form with a child and neither can any person invite or entice a child to engage in sexual conduct in any form, and any invitation or enticement provided to a child to engage in sexual conduct, even under the cloak of marriage, would fall within the definition of sexual abuse in terms of section 377A.
F. Neither a child under the age of 18 can consent to engage in sexual conduct in any form, nor can a parent or guardian of a child, contract a child out to engage in sexual conduct. A child is not a chattel that can be contracted out by a trustee or guardian to engage in conduct that the child himself/herself cannot grant consent for. No consent can be granted on behalf of a child by a parent or guardian involving discharge of personal service by the child or engagement in conduct that is unlawful and prohibited, such as that required to be performed under a marriage contract. While a parent or guardian can deal with a child’s property in his/her best interest, the parent or guardian is not at liberty to contract out the child to engage in a contract of personal service or conduct otherwise prohibited by law.
G. Sections 375 and 377A of PPC do not provide for any exceptions or exclusions to conduct that otherwise qualifies as rape or sexual abuse as defined therein, and the said sections would be attracted even where the offence is made out against a person who seeks to defend himself on the basis that such conduct was pursuant to a marriage contract executed by a child under the age of 18 years or his/her parent or guardian on his/her behest.
Once this Court has come to the conclusion that a marriage contract involving a child under the age of 18 years is a contract prohibited by law, which, even if executed by a child, is void ab initio, the question of treating the purported nikah-nama between respondent No.1 and the Minor as a basis to release her in the custody of respondent No.1 does not arise. This Court has not however determined the age of the Minor definitively, nor has it made any observations as regard the liability of respondent No.1 under provisions of PPC. Doing so in writ jurisdiction could fetter the rights of the parties involved to due process and fair trial as guaranteed by Article 10A of the Constitution. The determination of such questions is left to the court of competent jurisdiction before which such questions are raised.
For reasons stated above, the instant petition is allowed and respondent No.5 is directed to ensure that the Minor is released from Dar-ul-Aman into the custody of the petitioner, who is her mother, and the petitioner along with her husband (i.e. the father of the minor) are responsible to provide for the safety and wellbeing of the Minor in accordance with the provisions of Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018. Respondent No.1 shall pay the petitioner cost of litigation in the amount of Rs.20,000/- under section 35 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 within a period of thirty days and the learned counsel for the respondent will file a certificate with the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court confirming that the order as to costs has been complied with.
The office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Cabinet Division, and Secretary, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, to bring to the attention of the Cabinet and the Parliament, respectively, (i) the absence of a clear statutory provision in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, stating the permissible age for marriage in Pakistan, (ii) section 21 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, which is in conflict with provisions of Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018, read together with provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child, and capable of creating the false impression that children in Pakistan under the age of 18 are still deemed capable of being guardians in select circumstances,and (iii) provisions of statutory instruments dating back to colonial times, including the Majority Act, 1975, Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, provisions of which, if read on a stand-alone basis, could be vulnerable to interpretations in conflict with provisions of Sections 375 and 377A of PPC read together with Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018, and provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child. The office is also directed to send a copy of this judgment to Chief Commissioner, ICT, for information and compliance for purposes of registration of marriages under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, within Islamabad Capital Territory.

فیملی اجرا میں مدیون کو حاضری یا مقدمہ فوجداری میں ملزم کو گرفتاری دینے پر مجبور کرنے کیلئے اسکا قومی شناختی کارڈ بلاک نہ کیا جا سکتا ھے

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 803

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 17--Execution of decree of dower--Blocking of national identity card--S. 10/11/12//18(2)/19 of National data base registration authority Ordinance, 2000--Art. 175 of Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--The National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000, (NADRA) provides for registration of all persons--Section 10 entitles every citizen to have National Identity Card who has attained age of 18 years and is registered under section 9--The Ordinance also makes provision for issuance of Pakistan Origin Cards (section 11), Overseas Identity Cards (section 12) and Alien Registration Cards (section 13), Section 19(4) stipulates that--In this backdrop it can be legitimately argued that CNIC is essential for enjoyment of a number of fundamental rights guaranteed by Constitution--A person cannot be deprived of it without due process--Section 18(1) of Ordinance stipulates--Executing Court has passed impugned order without taking section 18 of Ordinance into consideration--The said section does not allow blocking/digital impounding of CNIC of a person to compel him to appear before court--This cannot be permitted because it does not have sanction of law--Such orders are contrary to Article 175(2) of Constitution and concept of rule of law.                                               [Pp. 808, 809 & 810] A, C, & E

National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000--

----S. 19(4)--Issuance of card--Cards issued under Ordinance, including National Identity Card, shall be proof of identity as could be established from contents of such card.               [P. 808] B

National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000--

----S. 18(1)—Property of Federal Government--All cards issued by NADRA, including CNIC, shall be property of Federal Government and it may cancel, impound or confiscate it by an order after giving a show cause notice to holder.    [P. 809] D

PLD 2020 SC 1; PLD 2017 Lahore 1; AIR 1978 SC 597; PLD 1994 SC 693; 2013 SCMR 1383; 2015 SCMR 1257; PLD 2010 Lahore 230;
PLD 2019 Lahore 515; PLD 2017 Sindh 585 ref.

 

Mr. Allah Nawaz Nasir, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Muhammad Akhtar Rana, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.

Syed Muhammad Haider Kazmi, Assistant Attorney General, with Imran Muhammad Naeem, Law Officer NADRA for Respondent No. 3.

Date of hearing: 10.5.2022.


 PLJ 2022 Lahore 803
PresentTariq Saleem Sheikh, J.
Hafiz AWAIS ZAFAR--Petitioner.
versus
JUDGE FAMILY COURT etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 21987 of 2022, decided on 10.5.2022.


Judgment

Respondent No. 2 instituted a suit for recovery of dower against the Petitioner in the Family Court at Lahore which was decided in her favour vide judgment and decree dated 13.08.2020. The Petitioner did not satisfy that decree so she filed execution petition for its enforcement. The Executing Court issued him notice but he did not appear and subsequently even avoided coercive process. Eventually, on the application of Respondent No. 2, the Court directed the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) to block his Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) vide order dated 04.06.2021. Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the “Constitution”), the Petitioner lays challenge to that order (the “Impugned Order”).

The submissions

2. The counsel for the Petitioner contends that the right to identity is a part of right to life and it cannot be syncopated without due sanction of law. A person’s CNIC can be cancelled, impounded or confiscated only by the Federal Government and that too on the grounds enumerated in section 18(2) of the National Database Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (the “Ordinance”), which do not exist in the instant case. Hence, the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to pass the Impugned Order.

3. The Assistant Attorney General submits that the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, does not apply to the Family Court in terms of section 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, so it is competent to regulate its own proceedings. It can adopt any procedure unless it is specifically prohibited by law. In the instant case, the Executing Court took all possible steps – even issued coercive process – to procure the Petitioner’s attendance but failed. The Impugned Order was passed as a last resort.

4. The counsel for Respondent No. 2 has adopted the Law Officer’s arguments. He argues that the Impugned Order was necessary to maintain rule of law and prevent the frustration of decree dated 13.8.2020.

Opinion

5. The personal identity of a person comprises all those aspects of his profile which are significant to him.[1] His personal identity begins from the moment of conception and, going beyond the information such as date of birth, encompasses his personal attributes like biographical data, physical traits and significant social relations, such as ties to family members, culture or religion.[2] In this view of the matter, the right to identity is associated with several other rights, e.g. the rights to a name, nationality, juridical personality, family and culture.[3] Some legal experts consider it a part of the right of life while others posit that it is rooted in human dignity and thus fundamental and non-derogable.

6. The international law focuses more on what may be described as “legal identity”. Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) proclaims that everyone has the right to be recognized as a person before the law. Articles 7 & 8 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly protect the child’s right to identity. These are reproduced below for ready reference:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

Article 8

1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.

2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.

7. The other treaties which seek protection of identity rights inter alia include the Hague Adoption Convention[4] and the anti-human trafficking conventions.

8. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development contemplates that legal identity is catalytic for achieving at least ten Sustainable Development Goals. Therefore, it has established it as a specific target =Target 16.9 (legal identity for all).[5] The concept note of the United Nations Legal Identity Expert Group says:

“For the purpose of the operational United Nations definition, legal identity is defined as the basic characteristics of an individual’s identity. e.g. name, sex, place and date of birth conferred through registration and the issuance of a certificate by an authorized civil registration authority following the occurrence of birth. In the absence of birth registration, legal identity may be conferred by a legally-recognized identification authority; this system should be linked to the civil registration system to ensure a holistic approach to legal identity from birth to death. Legal identity is retired by the issuance of a death certificate by the civil registration authority upon registration of death.”[6]

9. The Constitution of Pakistan (1973) does not expressly guarantee the right to identity but can it still be claimed? In The Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Education v. Collins MacDonald Fisher and Eunice Carmeta Fisher, (1979) 3 All ER 21, Lord Wilberforce held that fundamental rights “call for a generous interpretation avoiding what has been called ‘the austerity of tabulated legalism’, suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to.” The Courts in India and Pakistan are essentially of the same view. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597) the Supreme Court of India held that it is not imperative that every right should be enumerated as a fundamental right in the Constitution. It can be claimed even if it forms an integral part of a named fundamental right or is of the same nature or character or if its recognition is necessary to make the exercise of the named fundamental right meaningful and effective. In Jurist Foundation v. Federal Government through the Secretary Ministry of Defence and others (PLD 2020 SC 1) the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that “fundamental rights in a living Constitution are to be liberally interpreted so that they continue to embolden freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice.” In Hafiz Junaid Mahmood v. Government of Punjab and others (PLD 2017 Lahore 1) this Court held that “fundamental rights are the heart and soul of a living Constitution and must at all times be ready to embrace and protect the sensibilities and sensitivities of the people. They must be progressively and purposively interpreted to advance the frontiers of freedom, individual autonomy and free choice. Such vibrance and vitality is the hallmark of a living constitution in a democracy.”

10. Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973) guarantees the right to life and liberty and enjoins that no person shall be deprived of it save in accordance with law. In Ms. Shehla Zia and others v. WAPDA (PLD 1994 SC 693) the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the term “life” in the said Article means more than mere animal existence. It ruled:

The word “life” is very significant as it covers all facets of human existence. The word “life” has not been defined in the Constitution but it does not mean nor can it be restricted only to the vegetative or animal life or mere existence from conception to death. Life includes all such amenities and facilities which a person born in a free country is entitled to enjoy with dignity legally and constitutionally.”

The Court added:

“The Constitutional Law in America provides an extensive and wide meaning to the word ‘life’ which includes all such rights which are necessary and essential for leading a free, proper, comfortable and clean life. The requirement of acquiring knowledge, to establish home, the freedoms as contemplated by the Constitution, the personal rights and their enjoyment are nothing but part of life. A person is entitled to enjoy his personal rights and to be protected from encroachments on such personal rights, freedoms and liberties. Any action taken which may create hazards of life will be encroaching upon the personal rights of a citizen to enjoy the life according to law.”

11. Our Courts have expanded the right to life over time and held that it includes “the right to legal aid; the right to speedy trial; the right to bare necessities of life; protection against adverse effects of electro-magnetic fields; the right to pure and unpolluted water; the right of access to justice;”[7] the right to livelihood,[8] the right to travel,[9] the right to food, water, decent environment, education and medical care.[10] Keeping in view the international human rights jurisprudence discussed in the earlier part of this judgment which considers the right to identity as concomitant to the right to life, I hold that the said right is protected under Article 9 of our Constitution. I would also read it into Article 14 which guarantees dignity of man.

12. Let’s now come to the National Identity Card. The National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000, provides for registration of all persons. Section 10 entitles every citizen to have the National Identity Card who has attained the age of 18 years and is registered under section 9. The Ordinance also makes provision for issuance of Pakistan Origin Cards (section 11), Overseas Identity Cards (section 12) and Alien Registration Cards (section 13). Section 19(4) stipulates that the cards issued under the Ordinance, including the National Identity Card, shall be the proof of his identity as could be established from the contents of such card.

13. Sub-sections (1) & (2) of section 19 of the Ordinance specify a few circumstances when the National Identity Card is compulsorily required. These include grant of passport, permit or other travel document for going out of Pakistan and identification of a voter at various elections. Section 19(3) empowers the Federal Government to specify any other purpose for which the production of any card issued as aforesaid shall be necessary. However, the need for the CNIC has increased manifold during recent years. In Muhammad Umar v. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others (PLD 2017 Sindh 585) the Sindh High Court observed that now almost every government and private organization requires CNIC from a person before they attend him. “It is not possible to get higher education, apply for a job, open a bank account, get a driving licence or arms licence, get utility connections, purchase railway and air tickets, execute any instrument, stay in a hotel or lodge, appear in a Court proceedings and enter in certain building and premises without production of CNIC.” In this backdrop it can be legitimately argued that the CNIC is essential for enjoyment of a number of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, a person cannot be deprived of it without due process.

14. Section 18(1) of the Ordinance stipulates that all the cards issued by NADRA, including the CNIC, shall be the property of the Federal Government and it may cancel, impound or confiscate it by an order after giving a show cause notice to the holder. Section 18(2) enumerates the circumstances in which it may take such an action. It reads:

(2) An order under sub-section (1) cancelling, impounding or confiscating a card may be made only if there is reason to believe that--

(a)      the card has been obtained by a person who is not eligible to hold such card, by posting himself as eligible;

(b)      more than one cards have been obtained by the same person on the same eligibility criteria;

(c)      the particulars shown on the card have been obliterated or tampered with; or

(d)      the card is forged.

15. Inasmuch as cancellation, impounding or confiscation of CNIC impacts the fundamental rights of a person, the provisions of section 18 of the Ordinance must be strictly construed and scrupulously followed. Any order passed or action taken on a consideration other than those stipulated therein cannot sustain.


16. In the present case, the Executing Court has passed the Impugned Order dated 04.06.2021 without taking section 18 of the Ordinance into consideration. The said section does not allow blocking/ digital impounding of the CNIC of a person to compel him to appear before the Court.

17. I am fully aware of the fact that the Courts frequently direct digital impounding of the CNIC because it is an effective means to secure presence of a person. Sometimes it even impels a fugitive from law to surrender. Notwithstanding the benefits, this cannot be permitted because it does not have the sanction of law. Such orders are contrary to Article 175(2) of the Constitution[11] and the concept of rule of law. The Federal Government may, therefore, propose the Parliament to amend the Ordinance.

Disposition

18. In view of what has been discussed above, this petition is accepted. The Impugned Order dated 04.06.2021 is declared to be without legal authority and set aside.

(K.Q.B.)          Petition accepted



[1].      Theodore McCombs etal., Right to Identity (2007).
Available at: http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2007/CP19277.PDF

[2].      ibid.

[3].      ibid.

[4].      The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption (1993).

[5].      United Nations Strategy for Legal Identity for All. Available at: https://unstats.un.org/legal-identity-agenda/documents/UN-Strategy-for-LIA.pdf

[6].      ibid.

[7].      Fazal Karim, Judicial Review of Public Actions, Second Edition, Vol. 2, p. 804 (internal citation omitted).

[8].      Abdul Wahab and others v. HBL and others (2013 SCMR 1383); and Pir Imran Sajid and others v. Managing Director/General Manager (Manager Finance) Telephone Industries of Pakistan and others (2015 SCMR 1257).

[9].      Mian Ayaz Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and 3 others (PLD 2010 Lahore 230).

[10].    Nestle Pakistan v. Director Pessi and others (PLD 2019 Lahore 515).

[11].      11 Article 175(2) of the Constitution mandates:

        “No Court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law”.

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