Presumption of the delivery of Dowry articles attached to rukhsati---In an arranged marriage and in line with customs which are deeply rooted and entrenched in the society, ..................

 2023 MLD 51

Presumption of the delivery of Dowry articles attached to rukhsati---In an arranged marriage and in line with customs which are deeply rooted and entrenched in the society, parents whether rich or poor always give Dowry to their daughters at the time of marriage, so delivery of Dowry articles can be presumed if Rukhsati takes place

Presumptions as to large family and a Pathan family are gratuitous/legally unwarranted and hence anathema--- No constitutional/statutory dispensation in force recognizes such presumptions to defeat the return of Dowry articles---In presence of the fact that Rukhsati took place, the delivery of Dowry articles ought to have been presumed as per law

S. 5, Sched.--- Dowry --- Suit for recovery of past/future maintenance, delivery expenses and return of Dowry articles---Petitioner/wife alleged that due to the cruelty of respondent/husband she was compelled to leave his place and live with her parents where minor daughter was born---Petitioners' suit was partially decreed entitling wife to receive maintenance for her Iddat period only and delivery expenses, and minor was awarded past and future maintenance allowance since her birth---Petitioner's claim for past maintenance and return of Dowry articles was concurrently dismissed in totality---Held, that for proving herself entitled to the recovery of past maintenance, petitioner could not prove the fact that she had been compelled to leave the house of respondent on account of cruelty---While rejecting the petitioner's claim as to return of Dowry articles Trial Court observed that since petitioner was twelve siblings, Dowry articles could not have been given to her by her parents---Such observation of the Trial Court was questionable/unwarranted and having no basis in law---If Rukhsati took place (and which did take place) then giving of Dowry articles was presumed which was also trite and acknowledged---Petitioner had specifically taken the plea about Dowry articles and had relied on a list filed along with her plaint pertaining to Dowry articles valuing Rs.4,23,526/- to be recovered---Petitioner also appeared as witness and her testimony could not be shattered as such during cross-examination---Appellate court committed the cardinal mistake of basing its decision on a questionable/bald presumption that 'Pathan' families would not give Dowry articles to their daughters'---No legal benchmark/yardstick existed which explained that Pathans would not give Dowry articles to their daughters---Such was an absolutely irrelevant consideration---Trial Court did not attach any importance to the deposition of petitioner and her father as to purchasing of Dowry articles and brushed aside without much ado---High Court partially allowed the Constitutional petition and deemed the question of return of Dowry articles pending before Family Court and directed that the same to be decided in view of evidence on record and not on the basis of said presumptions

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Maintenance allowance--Concurrent findings--Jurisdiction--Challenge to--Grounds raised by counsel for petitioner are neither legal nor touching jurisdiction--Petitioner has already exhausted appellate forum-

 PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 15

Present: Shahid Jamil Khan, J.

SALEEM--Petitioners

versus

ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ZAFARWAL etc.--Respondents

W.P. No. 3422 of 2015, decided on 11.4.2022.

Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----S. 9--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Maintenance allowance--Concurrent findings--Jurisdiction--Challenge to--Grounds raised by counsel for petitioner are neither legal nor touching jurisdiction--Petitioner has already exhausted appellate forum--Petition dismissed.                                [Para 3] A

Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad Dhoon, Advocate for Petitioner.

Date of hearing: 11.4.2022.

Order

Petitioner has assailed judgment and decree passed by Judge Family Court, Zafarwal regarding maintenance to wife (Respondent No. 3) for three years of desertion period at the rate of Rs. 3500/-per month with 10% annual increase. The decree to this extent was upheld by the Appellate Court.

2. Petitioner has approached this Court against concurrent finding of fact and read Paragraph No. 12 from the judgment by Trial Court wherein it is found, on facts, that petitioner did not make any serious effort to rehabilitate the deserted wife for last three years. Though petitioner recorded in his evidence that he is willing to rehabilitate her but in absence of any suit for restitution of conjugal rights or an effort before the elders of the village or family.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that findings of fact by both the Courts below are not as per record. He has referred to Paragraph No. 4 of the written statement to submit that from day one petitioner is ready to rehabilitate the wife but this aspect has been ignored by both the Courts below. Also submits that desertion period was two months before filing of suit, therefore, determination of maintenance for three years is against the record.

3. The grounds raised by learned counsel for the petitioner are neither legal nor touching the jurisdiction. The petitioner has already exhausted appellate forum. The concurrent findings of fact by both the Courts below cannot be displaced in constitutional jurisdiction.

No case for interference is made out, therefore, the petition is dismissed.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

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Whether the suit for recovery of dowry articles filed by sister of the deceased lady was maintainable and did she had the locus standi to file such a suit.?

 2023 MLD 92

A careful reading of the preamble would show that the Act has primarily been promulgated for “expeditious” “settlement” and “disposal of disputes” mentioned in the Schedule reproduced supra which primarily cater for the disputes arising out of “marriage”, which is between the “spouses” and the “family affairs” which are outcome of marriage.

When an “issue/dispute/matter” as contemplated in the above Schedule arise to a spouse, for “disposal” of the same either of them under section 6 of the Act being an aggrieved spouse will approach the family court against a party as defined in section 2(d) of the Act, whose presence is necessary for proper decision of the case or which has been impleaded by the family court. Upon such institution, defendant shall be intimated under section 8 who upon intimation will file a written statement under section 9 whereafter under section 10 process of “settlement” will be initiated by the family court by making an effort for reconciliation between the spouses. If the reconciliation fails, issues will be framed and thereupon under section 11 parties will be put to evidence and once the evidence is concluded, under section 12 another effort for “settlement” between the spouses shall be made by the family court and in case it fails, a final decree will be passed.

Unlike the procedure provided for proceeding in a regular civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure 1898 (CPC), for “expeditious” disposal of the family suits, under section 7 an aggrieved spouse is allowed to enjoin multifarious causes of action (as mentioned in the Schedule) in one suit and for disposal of the same section 12-A provides for a time line. To further simplify the process/procedure and for express disposal of cases, under section 17 application of Qanun-eShahdat Order 1984 and CPC has also been ousted.

Placing the afore-referred dissection of the Act in juxtaposition with the facts of the present case, it has surfaced that the jurisdiction of a family court is circumscribed and is restricted to the “matters” mentioned in the Schedule reproduced supra. A bare perusal of the Schedule would show that it does not empower a family court to adjudicate upon a claim of a party qua his/her right of inheritance or tarka.

In the above background, since the claim of the petitioner is that of her inheritance as she is asking for ½ of her share in the dowry articles being the estate/tarka of the deceased for which she has approached the family court by way of filing a suit for recovery of dowry article and since determination of share in the estate/tarka of a deceased or its distribution do not fall within the jurisdiction of the family court, hence the suit filed by her was not maintainable as she had no locus standi to approach the family court, thus, the courts below have rightly decided against the petitioner.

As discussed above since the Act revolves around the settlement and resolution of disputes arising out of marriage and family, (which is the outcome of the marriage), it is only the spouses (either of them) who under the Act can approach the family court, being an aggrieved person and file a case against the other spouse or any person whose presence is necessary for proper adjudication [see section 2(d) of the Act]. An exception to the question of locus standi is created in the cases of guardianship as in such cases the paramount consideration is the welfare of the minor [as contemplated in the Guardian and Wars Act 1890]. Similarly the Superior Court have also recognized the rights of the parents of a deceased daughter to approach the family court seeking recovery of dowry articles [since they had given the dowry articles to the deceased and their capacity to sue is recognized in section 2(d) of the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act 1976].

There is no cavil to the proposition that in the cases of Mst. Nasim Sharif and Mst. Musarrat Andleeb supra, this Court has held that while determining the jurisdiction of a family court, the subject-matter has to be given precedence instead of the parties who have approached the court, however, the said judgments are distinguishable and not applicable to the case in hand for the reason that in those cases there was no claim of inheritance/distribution of assets of the deceased spouse. Moreover, in the former judgment, a suit was filed by the parents of the deceased daughter qua recovery of dowry articles, whereas in the latter, the same was filed by the wife against the successor of her deceased husband, alleging that they have usurped the dowry articles.

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--Ss. 9 & 10--Suit for maintenance and recovery of dower--Partially decreed--Claim of dower land was satisfied--

 PLJ 2022 Lahore (Note) 9

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----Ss. 9 & 10--Suit for maintenance and recovery of dower--Partially decreed--Claim of dower land was satisfied--No specification in nikahnama regarding plot as part of dower--Challenge to--Perusal of Nikahnama (Exh.P-3) reveals that against its column No. 15, both, petitioner and his father Respondent No. 4 were made bound to deliver land measuring 02-Beghas to Respondent No. 3--Respondent No. 4 not only participated in marriage ceremony of his son, but also put his signature on Exh.P-3, which amounts to suggest that all terms and conditions were settled in his presence--Exh.P-4 do reveal that present petitioner got transferred land measuring 08-Kanals in favour of his wife three days prior to Rukhsati--Judge Family Court has rightly held that claim of plaintiff regarding dower land was satisfied,  she cannot claim land--Measurement of which plot is mentioned as 3½-Marlas, whereas claimed plot by plaintiff was having measurement of 7½-Marlas--No specification in column No. 16 of Exh.P-3 is made to effect that same is to be treated as a part of dower--Courts below have rightly appreciated evidence available on record in its true perspective--Petition dismissed.     [Para 4, 5 & 6] A, B, C & D

2011 CLC 726 ref.

Mr. Muhammad Irfan Aarbi, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Muhammad Asif Ali Khan, Advocate for Respondent
No. 3.

Date of hearing: 23.4.2018.

 PLJ 2022 Lahore (Note) 9
[Multan Bench, Multan]
Present: Ibad-ur-Rehman Lodhi, J.
MOHSIN AMIN--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE ALIPUR DISTT. MUZAFFARGARH and others--Respondents
W.P. No. 14049 of 2015, decided on 23.4.2018.

Order

The suit filed by Mst. Zakia Bibi-Respondent No. 3 for recovery of dower and maintenance was decreed by the learned Judge Family Court on 07.05.2014 and she was held entitled to receive maintenance at the rate of Rs. 5000/-per month from the present petitioner since institution of suit till payment of dower or subsistence of her marriage. Similarly, her claim to the extent of gold ornaments weighing 05 Tolas and possession of dower land as dower was also decreed, whereas her suit to the extent of remaining claim of dower was dismissed.

Feeling aggrieved, the present petitioner preferred an appeal, which was dismissed by the learned first appellate Court and the findings arrived at by the learned Judge Family Court were affirmed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 15.06.2015.

2. The stance of plaintiff/Respondent No. 3 is that her marriage with present petitioner took place against dower of Rs. 2000/-gold ornaments weighing 05-Tolas, land measuring 02-Beghas and plot measuring 7½-Marlas, which was not paid. She also sought possession of land measuring 08-Kanals, which was transferred in her name by the present petitioner by way of gift.

On the other hand, the stance of present petitioner/Defendant No. 1 in the suit is that he delivered gold ornaments and also got transferred the land as detailed in Nikahnama in favour of plaintiff before Rukhsati, whereas he categorically denied the condition regarding transfer of plot in her favour. Muhammad Ameen real father of present Petitioner-Defendant No. 2 in the suit has termed the transfer of land in favour of plaintiff by the present petitioner as a result of fraud.

3. Admittedly, marriage between present petitioner and Respondent No. 3 was not arranged one, rather it was a love marriage. It is also an admitted fact that Nikah of both the parties was performed on 28.02.2010, whereas Rukhsati of plaintiff was effected on 28.11.2010 i.e. after nine months of Nikah. It is also an admitted position that marriage in between the parties still subsists.

Mohsin Ameen-present petitioner, while appearing as DW-1, has admitted in his examination-in-chief that at the time of Nikah,
Rs. 2000/-, land measuring 02-Beghas and gold ornaments weighing 05-Tolas were fixed as dower of Respondent No. 3. He further admitted that against such conditions, his marriage with Respondent No. 3 was settled.

PW-1/plaintiff during cross-examination has candidly deposed that she was not paid gold ornaments as dower at the time of Rukhsati. While denying suggestion of getting divorce from the present petitioner, she categorically deposed that if the petitioner would pay maintenance and entire dower to her, she is ready to reside with him. It is an admitted fact that the present petitioner has miserably failed to produce any evidence showing delivery of gold ornaments to Respondent No. 3 before Rukhsati. In his written statement, he averred that he will produce photograph of Respondent No. 3 wearing such ornaments, but, even such photograph was not produced by him during process of recording evidence. He also failed to produce receipt of purchase of gold ornaments.

4. Perusal of Nikahnama (Exh.P-3) reveals that against its column No. 15, both, present petitioner and his father Muhammad Ameen-Respondent No. 4 were made bound to deliver land measuring 02-Beghas to Respondent No. 3. Admittedly, Respondent No. 4/father of present petitioner not only participated in marriage ceremony of his son, but also put his signature on Exh.P-3, which amounts to suggest that all terms and conditions were settled in his presence.

As discussed above, the present petitioner contracted love marriage with Respondent No. 3 and for fulfilling conditions of Nikahnama, Rukhsati of Respondent No. 3 with the present petitioner was effected after nine months of Nikah. Even otherwise, Exh.P-4 do reveal that the present petitioner got transferred land measuring 08-Kanals in favour of his wife three days prior to Rukhsati. The learned Judge Family Court has rightly held that the claim of plaintiff regarding dower land was satisfied vide Mutation No. 13015, therefore, she cannot claim land measuring 02-Beghas in Mouza Ghalwan.

In view of above facts and particularly in absence of any evidence, the stance taken by Respondent No. 4/father of present petitioner in his written statement regarding alleged fraud on the part of present petitioner in getting such property from him and subsequent transfer of such property in favour of his wife, is not tenable.

5. So far as the claim of plaintiff/Respondent No. 3 regarding transfer of plot No. 95 measuring 7½-Marlas situated in Gulshan Qadir Scheme, Multan in her favour is concerned, suffice to say that there is marked difference in such claim as is noted in Nikahnama (Exh.P-3), the measurement of which plot is mentioned as 3½-Marlas, whereas the claimed plot by the plaintiff was having the measurement of 7 ½-Marlas. Even otherwise, no specification in column No. 16 of Exh.P-3 is made to the effect that the same is to be treated as a part of dower. The learned Judge Family Court, while relying upon case titled “Syed Nadeem Raza through Attorney General versus Mst. Amna-Tuz-Zahra and 2 others” (2011 CLC 726) has rightly declined such request of the Plaintiff/Respondent No. 3.

6. The learned Courts below have rightly appreciated evidence available on record in its true perspective. No illegality or irregularity has been found in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below calling for interference by this Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction.

7. Resultantly, the present Constitutional petition having no force, is dismissed.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

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Production of minor---Removal of child---Petitioner lived in UAE for good while his wife suffered from mental trauma and in this backdrop, girl long stayed with her aunt seemingly under a consensual arrangement-

 PLJ 2022 Lahore (Note) 7

Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--

----Art. 199--Production of minor--Extraordinary jurisdiction--Removal of child--Consensual arrangement--Challenge to--Petitioner lived in UAE for good while his wife suffered from mental trauma and in this backdrop, girl long stayed with her aunt seemingly under a consensual arrangement--The minor was sent for when she vehemently resisted her returned in parental fold and, thus, having found request inexpedient declined same--ADSJ in peculiar facts and circumstances of case was well within remit of law as well as wisdom to suggest recourse to Guardian Court for settlement of controversy--Extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is not to be exercised in every run of mill case of custody while pre-empting jurisdiction of a tribunal statutorily designated to settle claims of custody through a procedure conducive for child to adapt him/herself to find a comfortable place in an uncongenial contest--Petition dismissed.                                                      [Para 1 & 3] A, B & C

2015 SCMR 731 ref.

Sardar Muhammad Hafeez Khan, Advocate for Petitioner.

Date of hearing: 4.2.2019.

 PLJ 2022 Lahore (Note) 7
[Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi]
Present: Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed, J.
MUHAMMAD SHAKIR KHAN--Petitioner
versus
Mst. SANAM SIDDIQUE, etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 418 of 2019, decided on 4.2.2019.

Order

In the wake of failure before a learned Addl. Sessions Judge at Rawalpindi, Muhammad Shakir Khan, petitioner herein, seeks issuance of a direction for production of his daughter Areeja Fatima, aged about 13, presently residing with his maternal aunt Sana Siddiqui respondent. It was alleged downstairs that the girl was forcibly taken away on 25-1-2019 while she was attending her school, however, when issue came up before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, it transpired that the petitioner lived in United Arab Emirates for good while his wife suffered from mental trauma and in this backdrop, the girl long stayed with her aunt seemingly under a consensual arrangement. The minor was sent for when she vehemently resisted her returned in the parental fold and, thus, the learned Judge having found the request inexpedient declined the same.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner being real father is natural guardian of the child and, thus, entitled to her custody in preference to the respondent, therefore, Intervention by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction would be most called for.

2. Heard.

3. No doubt under the personal law, the petitioner being real father is pre-eminently placed to claim custody of her daughter, however, his entitlement is subordinate to the paramount consideration of welfare of the minor; personal law prevails in case the claimants are otherwise identically placed and, thus, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case was well within the remit of law as well as wisdom to suggest recourse to the Guardian Court for settlement of controversy. The child appears to be emotionally attached with the respondent and, thus, an incremental approach for her transition into the family fold would be a wiser course than to abruptly snatch her to rejoin her father; this cannot be done without inflicting an emotional trauma and setback to the girl, presently studying in one of the best seats of learning in the town. Even otherwise, extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is not to be exercised in every run of the mill case of custody while pre-empting jurisdiction of a tribunal statutorily designated to settle claims of custody through a procedure conducive for the child to adapt him/herself to find a comfortable place in an uncongenial contest. It has been held in the case of Shoukat Masih vs. Mst. Farhat Parkash & others (2015 SCMR 731), as under:

“Be that as it may we find that through the impugned order passed by the High Court a minor girl has been given in the custody of her real mother and even if there are some questions regarding proper exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in the matter still we would not like the little girl to be made a ball of ping pong and shuttle her custody during the legal battles being fought by those interested in her custody.”

View taken by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge is not open to any legitimate exception, calling for interference by this Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, given the age of the minor and position taken by her before the Court below, it would be more expedient for the Guardian Judge to settle the issue. The petitioner may approach the learned Guardian Judge, if so advised and in case such a course is adopted, his plea for custody along with all collateral matters/reliefs shall be attended without being influenced by any observation made hereinabove. W.P. No. 418 of 2019 fails. Dismissed in limine.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

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فیملی کورٹ میں اگر حلف کی پیشکش دوسرا فریق قبول کرلے تو پھر اسکی پابندی لازم ہے اور اس سے منحرف نہ ہوا جاسکتا ہے

2023 SCMR 153 

Section 14 and Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 and Sections 8 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873.

Binding effect of an offer of special oath, if accepted by the other party.

It is a self-confessed position that the petitioner filed an application for special oath which was accepted by the respondent No.1 and the special oath was taken in the mode and manner proposed by the petitioner. Nevertheless, under Section 17 of the 1964 Act, the application of the QSO 1984 and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (“CPC”), except Sections 10 and 11 have been excluded and made inapplicable to the proceedings before the Family Court in respect of Part-I of the Schedule, but concomitantly under Sub-section (2) of Section 17, it is enumerated in tandem that Sections 8 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 (“Oaths Act”) shall apply to all proceedings before the Family Court. The power of the Court to tender certain oaths is provided in Section 8 of the Oaths Act which envisages that if any party to, or witness in, any judicial proceeding offers to give evidence on oath or solemn affirmation in any form common amongst, or held binding by, persons of the race or persuasion to which he belongs, and not repugnant to justice or decency, and not purporting to affect any third person, the Court may, if it thinks fit, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, tender such oath or affirmation to him. Whereas under Section 9 of the Oaths Act, if any party to any judicial proceeding offers to be bound by any such oath or solemn affirmation as is mentioned in Section 8 if such oath or affirmation is made by the other party to, or by any witness in, such proceeding, the Court may, if it thinks fit, ask such party or witness, or cause him to be asked, whether or not he will make the oath or affirmation provided that no party or witness shall be compelled to attend personally in Court solely for the purpose of answering such question. So far as the conclusiveness and unwaveringness of evidence as against the person offering to be bound is concerned, Section 11 elucidates lucidly and unambiguously that the evidence so given shall, as against the person who offered to be bound as aforesaid, be conclusive proof of the matter stated. The phraseology “conclusive proof” brings into play inconspicuously the general principle of estoppel and sets forth that a party, who offers to be bound by the evidence given by the opposite party or a witness on special oath, shall not have the right to challenge the evidence which shall be conclusive and definitive proof of the matter.

The letter of the law makes it unequivocally clear that under the provisions of the Oaths Act, a party in litigation can offer the opposite party to accept or reject the claim on special oath, but they cannot compel each other to take the special oath, however if the offer is accepted by the other party then a binding agreement comes into existence and the party making the offer has no right and authority in law to resile from it. When the Court communicates the offer to the other party and gets hold of his assent or refusal, as the case may be, it in fact plays a role as an intermediary between the parties and when the offer is accepted by the other party, the acceptance is transmitted to the party inviting the other to take special oath, thereafter the agreement is completed between the parties unless the offer is withdrawn before its acceptance by the other side. The stipulations of the Oaths Act cannot be construed to give an unfair or inequitable advantage to one party over the other, so in the event of an offer or proposal to be bound by the oath of the opposite party, then obviously, due to the mutuality of the promise between them, the party making an offer has no right to resile from it after the offer is accepted and the special oath is taken. In the absence of any such satisfactory or sufficient cause the Court is obligated to implement the agreement and to record the statement of the party concerned to make a decision in the case accordingly. The petitioner cannot wriggle out or withdraw his offer which was given by him voluntarily before the Family Court and the same acted upon according to his will.

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-Suit for recovery of personal belongings--Question of whether a suit filed by lady regarding personal belongings or personal property which have been allegedly purchased by her after marriage while residing with her husband comes within jurisdiction of Family Court--Family Court Act, 1964, clearly empowers Family Court to hear such suits but those are also subject to prove--

 PLJ 2023 Lahore 76

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 7(2)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Suit for recovery of personal belongings--Dismissal of suit and appeal--Jurisdiction-- Maintainability--Question of whether a suit filed by lady regarding personal belongings or personal property which have been allegedly purchased by her after marriage while residing with her husband comes within jurisdiction of Family Court--Family Court Act, 1964, clearly empowers Family Court to hear such suits but those are also subject to prove--On this legal point, both Courts below have erred in law and committed illegality--Petitioner cannot be ousted on point of jurisdiction by Family Court (concerned)--Both Courts below have not rightly passed impugned order and judgment--Petition accepted.             [P. 79] A

M/s. Khalil Ahmad Maan, Rana Naveed Khalil and Ch. Saif Ullah Khata Advocates for Petitioner.

Proceeded against ex-parte for Respondent No. 1 vide order dated 31.5.2018.

Date of hearing: 18.1.2022.

 PLJ 2023 Lahore 76
Present: Safdar Saleem Shahid, J.
SURIYA NAFEES--Petitioner
versus
MUHAMMAD RAMZAN SHAHID etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 9545 of 2016, heard on 18.1.2022.

Judgment

Through instant petition, petitioner has called in question the legality of order dated 09.01.2014 passed by learned Judge Family Court and judgment dated 18.02.20216 passed by learned Additional District Judge, whereby claim of the petitioner for recovery of personal belongings valuing Rs. 21,19,000/- was dismissed.

2. Brief facts necessary for decision of instant writ petition are that Suriya Nafees petitioner was married with Respondent No. 1 in consideration of 10-tolas gold as dower but no issue was born out of this wedlock. Petitioner was serving as Nurse and she after her marriage purchased one kanal land and constructed Maternity Home over it along with necessary equipment/articles valuing Rs. 21,19,000/-. Thereafter, the petitioner was ousted from her aforesaid property and the same is in possession of Respondent No. 2. The petitioner filed a suit for recovery of her personal belongings before Judge Family Court (concerned) which was contested by Respondent No. 1 by filing written statement and raising many factual objections. After hearing the parties, learned Judge Family Court dismissed the aforesaid suit vide order dated 09.01.2014 by holding that the suit is not family suit in nature and same is not maintainable in its present form. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner preferred an appeal before learned Addl: District Judge which was also dismissed by the said Court vide judgment dated 18.02.2016. Hence, this writ petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that impugned order and judgment have been passed by both the Courts below while ignoring the relevant law and facts of the case, therefore, same are not sustainable in the eyes of law; claim of the petitioner needs to be proved after recording of evidence of the parties but suit of the petitioner has illegally been dismissed by the learned Judge Family Court being not maintainable; as per amended Schedule of Family Courts Act, 1964, suit for recovery of personal property and belongings of a wife falls within the category of family suit which is maintainable before Judge Family Court (concerned).

4. Notice was issued to Respondent No. 1 but no one has turned up on his behalf despite service effected upon him, therefore, he was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 31.05.2018.

5. Arguments heard. Record perused.

6. It has been noticed that claim of the petitioner is that she was serving as Nurse and after her marriage she purchased one kanal land and constructed Maternity Home over it along with necessary equipment/articles valuing Rs. 21,19,000/- which was in possession of Respondent No. 1. The question before this Court is that whether Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit where contention of the lady is that these articles/belongings were purchased by the lady herself after the marriage which were in possession of the husband at the time of separation between the parties. Section 5 of the Family Court Act, 1964, says that the following matters fall within the jurisdiction of Family Court:-

1.       Dissolution of marriage [including Khula].

2.       Dower.

3.       Maintenance.

4.       Restitution of conjugal rights.

5.       Custody of children [and the visitation rights of parents to meet them]

6.       Guardianship.

7.       Jactitation of marriage.

8.       Dowry.

9.       Personal property and belongings of a wife.

Rule 6 of the Act ibid deals with the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit under the Act. Learned Judge Family Court straight away refused to entertain the suit with the observation that the subject matter of the instant suit is not mentioned in the Family Court Act, 1964, as the property alleged to have been purchased or made after the marriage and most of the articles mentioned in the list are relating to the health center. The order passed by learned Judge Family Court when assailed before learned Addl: District Judge, he maintained the same by mentioning some different reasons that in the earlier suits filed by the petitioner and her mother mostly the same articles were mentioned in the list and said suits have already been decided by the competent Courts. This was particularly not the question before the 1st appellate Court because in-fact said learned Court was bound to decide the matter regarding jurisdiction of the Family Court (concerned) to the effect that whether a suit filed by the lady regarding personal belongings or personal property which have been allegedly purchased by her after marriage while residing with her husband comes

within the jurisdiction of the Family Court or not. As per Schedule mentioned above, the Family Court Act, 1964, clearly empowers the Family Court to hear such suits but those are also subject to prove. On this legal point, both the Courts below have erred in law and committed illegality. Primarily petitioner cannot be ousted on
the point of jurisdiction by the Family Court (concerned). Both the Courts below have not rightly passed the impugned order and judgment.

7. In view of what has been discussed above, instant writ petition is accepted, impugned order and judgment passed by both the Courts below are set aside and the case is remanded to the learned District Judge, Faisalabad, for its entrustment to the Court of competent jurisdiction for trial afresh. However, as this writ petition was filed in the year 2016 whereas the matter in hand pertains to the year 2012, therefore, learned Judge Family Court seized with the matter shall decide the same expeditiously.

(Y.A.)  Petition accepted

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--Grounds raised by counsel for petitioner are neither legal nor touching jurisdiction-

 PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 15

Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----S. 9--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Maintenance allowance--Concurrent findings--Jurisdiction--Challenge to--Grounds raised by counsel for petitioner are neither legal nor touching jurisdiction--Petitioner has already exhausted appellate forum--Petition dismissed.                                [Para 3] A

Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad Dhoon, Advocate for Petitioner.

Date of hearing: 11.4.2022.

 PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 15
Present: Shahid Jamil Khan, J.
SALEEM--Petitioners
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ZAFARWAL etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 3422 of 2015, decided on 11.4.2022.

Order

Petitioner has assailed judgment and decree passed by Judge Family Court, Zafarwal regarding maintenance to wife (Respondent No. 3) for three years of desertion period at the rate of Rs. 3500/-per month with 10% annual increase. The decree to this extent was upheld by the Appellate Court.

2. Petitioner has approached this Court against concurrent finding of fact and read Paragraph No. 12 from the judgment by Trial Court wherein it is found, on facts, that petitioner did not make any serious effort to rehabilitate the deserted wife for last three years. Though petitioner recorded in his evidence that he is willing to rehabilitate her but in absence of any suit for restitution of conjugal rights or an effort before the elders of the village or family.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that findings of fact by both the Courts below are not as per record. He has referred to Paragraph No. 4 of the written statement to submit that from day one petitioner is ready to rehabilitate the wife but this aspect has been ignored by both the Courts below. Also submits that desertion period was two months before filing of suit, therefore, determination of maintenance for three years is against the record.

3. The grounds raised by learned counsel for the petitioner are neither legal nor touching the jurisdiction. The petitioner has already exhausted appellate forum. The concurrent findings of fact by both the Courts below cannot be displaced in constitutional jurisdiction.

No case for interference is made out, therefore, the petition is dismissed.

(Y.A.)  Petition dismissed

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-Suit for recovery of personal belongings-

 PLJ 2023 Lahore 76

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 7(2)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Suit for recovery of personal belongings--Dismissal of suit and appeal--Jurisdiction-- Maintainability--Question of whether a suit filed by lady regarding personal belongings or personal property which have been allegedly purchased by her after marriage while residing with her husband comes within jurisdiction of Family Court--Family Court Act, 1964, clearly empowers Family Court to hear such suits but those are also subject to prove--On this legal point, both Courts below have erred in law and committed illegality--Petitioner cannot be ousted on point of jurisdiction by Family Court (concerned)--Both Courts below have not rightly passed impugned order and judgment--Petition accepted.             [P. 79] A

M/s. Khalil Ahmad Maan, Rana Naveed Khalil and Ch. Saif Ullah Khata Advocates for Petitioner.

Proceeded against ex-parte for Respondent No. 1 vide order dated 31.5.2018.

Date of hearing: 18.1.2022.

 PLJ 2023 Lahore 76

Present: Safdar Saleem Shahid, J.

SURIYA NAFEES--Petitioner

versus

MUHAMMAD RAMZAN SHAHID etc.--Respondents

W.P. No. 9545 of 2016, heard on 18.1.2022.

Judgment

Through instant petition, petitioner has called in question the legality of order dated 09.01.2014 passed by learned Judge Family Court and judgment dated 18.02.20216 passed by learned Additional District Judge, whereby claim of the petitioner for recovery of personal belongings valuing Rs. 21,19,000/- was dismissed.

2. Brief facts necessary for decision of instant writ petition are that Suriya Nafees petitioner was married with Respondent No. 1 in consideration of 10-tolas gold as dower but no issue was born out of this wedlock. Petitioner was serving as Nurse and she after her marriage purchased one kanal land and constructed Maternity Home over it along with necessary equipment/articles valuing Rs. 21,19,000/-. Thereafter, the petitioner was ousted from her aforesaid property and the same is in possession of Respondent No. 2. The petitioner filed a suit for recovery of her personal belongings before Judge Family Court (concerned) which was contested by Respondent No. 1 by filing written statement and raising many factual objections. After hearing the parties, learned Judge Family Court dismissed the aforesaid suit vide order dated 09.01.2014 by holding that the suit is not family suit in nature and same is not maintainable in its present form. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner preferred an appeal before learned Addl: District Judge which was also dismissed by the said Court vide judgment dated 18.02.2016. Hence, this writ petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that impugned order and judgment have been passed by both the Courts below while ignoring the relevant law and facts of the case, therefore, same are not sustainable in the eyes of law; claim of the petitioner needs to be proved after recording of evidence of the parties but suit of the petitioner has illegally been dismissed by the learned Judge Family Court being not maintainable; as per amended Schedule of Family Courts Act, 1964, suit for recovery of personal property and belongings of a wife falls within the category of family suit which is maintainable before Judge Family Court (concerned).

4. Notice was issued to Respondent No. 1 but no one has turned up on his behalf despite service effected upon him, therefore, he was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 31.05.2018.

5. Arguments heard. Record perused.

6. It has been noticed that claim of the petitioner is that she was serving as Nurse and after her marriage she purchased one kanal land and constructed Maternity Home over it along with necessary equipment/articles valuing Rs. 21,19,000/- which was in possession of Respondent No. 1. The question before this Court is that whether Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit where contention of the lady is that these articles/belongings were purchased by the lady herself after the marriage which were in possession of the husband at the time of separation between the parties. Section 5 of the Family Court Act, 1964, says that the following matters fall within the jurisdiction of Family Court:-

1.       Dissolution of marriage [including Khula].

2.       Dower.

3.       Maintenance.

4.       Restitution of conjugal rights.

5.       Custody of children [and the visitation rights of parents to meet them]

6.       Guardianship.

7.       Jactitation of marriage.

8.       Dowry.

9.       Personal property and belongings of a wife.

Rule 6 of the Act ibid deals with the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit under the Act. Learned Judge Family Court straight away refused to entertain the suit with the observation that the subject matter of the instant suit is not mentioned in the Family Court Act, 1964, as the property alleged to have been purchased or made after the marriage and most of the articles mentioned in the list are relating to the health center. The order passed by learned Judge Family Court when assailed before learned Addl: District Judge, he maintained the same by mentioning some different reasons that in the earlier suits filed by the petitioner and her mother mostly the same articles were mentioned in the list and said suits have already been decided by the competent Courts. This was particularly not the question before the 1st appellate Court because in-fact said learned Court was bound to decide the matter regarding jurisdiction of the Family Court (concerned) to the effect that whether a suit filed by the lady regarding personal belongings or personal property which have been allegedly purchased by her after marriage while residing with her husband comes

within the jurisdiction of the Family Court or not. As per Schedule mentioned above, the Family Court Act, 1964, clearly empowers the Family Court to hear such suits but those are also subject to prove. On this legal point, both the Courts below have erred in law and committed illegality. Primarily petitioner cannot be ousted on
the point of jurisdiction by the Family Court (concerned). Both the Courts below have not rightly passed the impugned order and judgment.

7. In view of what has been discussed above, instant writ petition is accepted, impugned order and judgment passed by both the Courts below are set aside and the case is remanded to the learned District Judge, Faisalabad, for its entrustment to the Court of competent jurisdiction for trial afresh. However, as this writ petition was filed in the year 2016 whereas the matter in hand pertains to the year 2012, therefore, learned Judge Family Court seized with the matter shall decide the same expeditiously.

(Y.A.)  Petition accepted

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Suit for dissolution of marriage --- Fiqah - e - Jafria --- Non - pronounce ment of seegha -

 PLD 2023 Lahore 38

Suit for dissolution of marriage --- Fiqah - e - Jafria --- Non - pronounce ment of seegha --- Effect --- Petitioner assailed order passed by Family Court whereby the marriage between the petitioner and respondent was dissolved on the basis of Khula in view of their statements recorded on the same day --- Contention of petitioner was that according to Shia personal law , the marriage could not be dissolved unless the " Seeghajaat " were read in presence of the parties wither by the husband or his representative / nominee / wakeel in presence of respondent or her representative / nominee / wakeel --- Validity --- Shia male could always pronounce divorce in accordance with Shia Law which would be protected only by reading the " Seeghajaat " directly or through a representative / wakeel in the presence of female her representative / wakeel whereafter divorce could become effective --- Such exercise could be undertaken in the present case even with retrospective effect , if need be

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فیملی مقدمات میں نان و نفقہ مقرر کرنے بارے لاھور ہائیکورٹ کا رہنما فیصلے۔

ہائیکورٹ نے اس فیصلہ کی نقول پنجاب کے تمام ججز اور پنجاب جوڈیشل اکیڈمی بھجوانے کی ھدایت کی ہے

Justice Jawad Hassan authored a landmark judgment on the issue of maintenance fixed family courts in a mechanical manner and observed that "Adjudications in Family Courts reflect their detachment from the realities of the current socio-economic situations of the Country. Stereotype orders are passed arbitrarily and mechanically, that too, in deviation to the legislation which can benefit nothing, but they will make way for multiplication of litigation amongst parties forcing them not only into unfathomable agonies, but burdening them with certain financial obligations as well ending up in further economic distress and plight.

This constitutional petition decided an important question of law with regard to procedure provided for fixing maintenance allowance enacted in shape of Section 17A(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (the “Act”) which is being ignored frequently by the Family Courts resulting into arbitrarily fixing amount of maintenance and passing of stereotype orders/judgments eventuating in serious miscarriage of justice in utter disregard of intent of Statute; pathology of Section 17A(4) of the Act; anatomy of Schedule under Section 5, Part-1 and judicial anthology of the decisions of apex as well as this Court which are binding on the Family Courts under Article 189 and 201 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the “Constitution”). The Issue.

The subject matter, is of great technical complexity, but the legal question which falls for determination by this Court is the fixing of maintenance allowance by the Family Court without considering the provisions of law and how it can be applied for the benefit of parties at lis.

Section 17-A of the “Act” was amended in 2015, wherein Section 17-A(1) starts with the words “suit for maintenance” and it deals with the interim maintenance of wife and the child, whereas Section 17-A(4) deals with final maintenance allowance. In order to elucidate and interpret Section 17-A(1) ibid the legislature has emphasized to pay interim maintenance on first appearance of the defendant. Upon assiduous perusal of the provisions of Section 17-A ibid, it can be gleaned that the use of the terms “fix” and “fixing” in sub-section 1 and 4 of the said Section 17-A is of much relevance. The term “fix” in itself is defined by the Black’s Law Dictionary as “to liquidate or render certain”. Whereas, “fixing” is the act of doing so. The, use of both said terms “fix” and “fixing” respectively arise in Section17-A (1) of the “Act” to fix interim maintenance and in Section17-A (4) of the “Act” for fixing final maintenance. 13. The question now arises whether the Family Court has unguided un-fettered and un-bridled and arbitrary powers to fix maintenance while employing its discretionary dominion at its discretion or is it required to proceed on pragmatic, rational and judicial basis? The answer, of course, is that it should proceed on the later. Family Court should adopt an objective approach and broadly look into the social status of the parties, the earning of the defendant, his capacity to pay and most importantly, the requirements of the claimants while fixing the maintenance.

It can not be denied at all that a husband is under legal, moral religious obligation to maintain his legally wedded wife. Section 272 of Mohammdan Law by Mullah provides that husband is bound to maintain his wife so long she is faithful to him and obeys his reasonable orders but he is not bound to maintain her if she refuses herself to him or otherwise disobeys. Section 278 postulates that if a husb and refuses to maintain his wife, she may sue for maintenance. Nafqa Hence, it is t he obligation of husband to pay or maintenance, if construed in accordance with the principles as laid down in "HIDAYA" Hamilton in Chapter XV such as "Nafqa" translated by Charles , in the language of law, signifies all those things which are necessary to support of life, such as food, clothes and lodging. Moreover, it is further demonstrated that when a woman surrenders herself into the custody of her husband, it is incumbe nt upon him to supply her with food, clothing and lodging, whether she be a Muslim or an infidel, because maintenance is a recompense for matrimonial restrain, whence it is that where a person is in the custody of another on account of any demand, or so fo rth, his subsistence is incumbent upon the other. demonstrates that The jurisprudence developed by Islam it is the duty of a Muslim wife to perform her part of obligation first for setting in with claim of maintenance. The husband may refuse to maintain hi s wife when she refuses to 5 . live with him and if a wife refuses to live in the house of her husband and not ready to perform her part of duty and denies to live with him as his wife, she is not entitled for maintenance.

In Islamic law, a father is under legal, moral and obligation to maintain his children till the religious age specified by law/sharia and it shall not be out of context to mention here that his such obligation originates from esteemed dictates of Holy Quran.

This Court is in no doubt that the Family Court should keep in consideration the following aspects and legal requisites before passing the interim and final maintenance allowance under Section 17-A(1and 4) ibid: (i) Basis of averments in plaint; (ii) other supporting documents on record; (iii) summoning all relevant documentary evidence; (iv) determining the estate; and (v) determining resources of the defendant.

Procedure to be followed by the Family Courts

.............

For implementation of purpose of the “Act” aimed at much needed expeditious disposal of disputes, the “Act” has brought in certain powers, procedure and parameters for the Family Courts for being adhered to. Hence, there can be no qualms about the fact that the Family Court has to exercise its powers so conferred vide provision of Section 17-A of the “Act”. Thus, the Family Court is legally obliged to assess the quantum of maintenance as per dictate and criteria mentioned in Section 17-A(4) of the “Act”.

In connection thereto, time and again formulated guidelines as well as principles settled by superior courts are overlooked by the Family Court. In a bright/clear situation of abovementioned inability of Respondent and shortfall on his part, Family Court itself was empowered to step ahead with procedure enunciated in sections 17 (4) and 17B ofA the “Act” for requisite inquiry destined for absolute and unambiguous determination of his ‘estate’ and ‘resources’ including his salary/monthly income to finally fix maintenance allowance in issue. Nonsettled adherence of law, formulated guidelines and principles thus can’t be guarded for being allowed to breath any further.

Judicial resources need to be promptly and consistently available to litigants for the core functions of fact finding, particularly when law itself is available for rescue. Therefore, in all cases where the occupation, job or source of income of the person is definite and identified and of such a n ature remuneration, income or earnings wherefrom can be traced in a documented form then by all extent and measures, it is the duty of the Family Court to ascertain the ‘estate’ and ‘resources’ of the defendant defined above, in all such cases where the sa me stands undetermined or pleadings are evasive or just formal without substantive or believable proof in this regard and by way of summoning the relevant documentary evidence instead to settling with sole reliance upon the pleadings/averments of the parti es without due application of mind and exercise of its powers specifically conferred by way of legislation. It is neither unusual nor whimsical for the Family Courts to delve into the relevant documentary evidence dealing with the financial status of the d . efendant to determine the maintenance.

It is well established that the procedural laws are enacted to advance ca use of justice and not to thwart the same, which intent of law is no doubt always aimed at the welfare of its subjects. So, it is need of the day to employ legislated processes that are more accessible and more responsive for children, parents, and familie s. The Family Courts must adopt therapeutic and holistic approach to the Court structure and processes, as well as to decision making in family disputes.

The Registrar of this Court is also directed to make sure transmission of copy of this judgment to all District Judges of the Punjab for its circulation amongst Family Courts discharging duties under their supervision for strictly following provisions of the “Act” in true spirit whilst dealing with issue of fixing maintenance allowance. A copy of this judgment shall also be sent to Director General, Punjab Judicial Academy which functions under Section 4 of the Punjab Judicial Academy Act, 2007 and prescribes manner of training to judicial officers in terms of Section 5 of the Act ibid.

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پنجاب تحفظِ خواتین ایکٹ اسلامی احکامات کے خلاف نہیں، شرعی کورٹ

 شرعی کورٹ کے فیصلے میں لکھا گیا ہے کہ اسلام میں تشدد کو ناپسند اور اس پر سختی سے کنٹرول کیا گیا ہے—فائل فوٹو

وفاقی شریعت کورٹ نے پنجاب اسمبلی سے خواتین کے تحفظ کے لیے منظور کیے گئے قانون کی تائید کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ یہ قانون اسلامی احکامات کے خلاف نہیں ہے۔

چیف جسٹس ڈاکٹر سید محمد انور اور جسٹس خادم حسین ایم شیخ پر مشتمل وفاقی شریعت کورٹ کے بینچ نے ’پنجاب پروٹیکشن آف ویمن اگینسٹ وائلنس ایکٹ 2016‘ پر محفوظ کیا گیا فیصلہ سناتے ہوئے کہا کہ یہ قانون قرآن پاک اور پیغمبر اسلام حضرت محمدﷺؑ کی سنت کی تعلیمات کے عین مطابق ہے۔

پنجاب اسمبلی کی طرف سے بنایا گیا قانون ملک میں اپنی نوعیت کا پہلا قانون ہے جو خواتین کو متعدد جرائم سے مکمل تحفظ فراہم کرتا ہے۔

وفاقی شرعی عدالت کے فیصلے میں لکھا گیا ہے کہ اسلام میں تشدد کو ناپسند کیا گیا ہے اور خواتین کو ہر قسم کے تشدد سے تحفظ بھی فراہم کیا گیا ہے۔

فیصلے میں کچھ احادیث کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے لکھا گیا ہے کہ اسلام خواتین کو ہر قسم کے تشدد سے تحفظ دینے اور ان کا خیال رکھنے کے عمل کی بھرپور حوصلہ افزائی کرتا ہے۔

فیصلے میں لکھا گیا ہے کہ ’جس قانون کو متنازع بنایا گیا ہے اس میں ایسی کوئی شق شامل نہیں جن کی قرآن پاک اور اور پیغمبر اسلام حضرت محمدﷺ کی سنت مبارک میں نفی کی گئی ہو، لہٰذا قانون کو چیلنج کرنے والی درخواستوں کو مسترد کیا جاتا ہے کیونکہ درخواست گزاروں کے دلائل میں کوئی وزن نہیں ہے۔‘

عدالت نے ملتان میں اس قانون کے تحت قائم کیے گئے ’وائلنس اگینسٹ ویمن سینٹر‘ کے کام اور نتائج کے حوالے سے جواب دہندگان کی جانب سے جمع کی گئی رپورٹس کی تعریف کرتے ہوئے اسے مثبت قرار دیا۔

عدالت نے پنجاب حکومت کو قانون پر باضابطہ طور پر عمل کرتے ہوئے اسے تمام اضلاع میں نافذ کرنے کا بھی حکم دیا جبکہ عدالت نے قانون کے نفاذ سے متعلق تعمیلی رپورٹ بھی طلب کر لی۔

قانون کی اہمیت کو اجاگر کرتے ہوئے عدالت نے تجویز کیا کہ دیگر صوبے بھی اسی طرح کے قوانین بنائیں۔

خیال رہے کہ خواتین کو ہر قسم کے تشدد اور جرائم سے تحفظ فراہم کرنے کے لیے 24 فروری 2016 کو پنجاب اسمبلی سے یہ قانون منظور کیا گیا تھا جہاں اس سے 9ماہ قبل مئی 2015 میں صوبائی کابینہ نے اس کی منظوری دی تھی۔

قانون کی منظوری میں تاخیر کا سبب یہ تھا کہ اس پر حکمران جماعت مسلم لیگ(ن) کے کچھ اراکین نے اعتراض کیا تھا۔

پنجاب اسمبلی سے منظور کیے گئے بل کے تحت خواتین کو گھریلو تشدد، معاشی استحصال، جذباتی و نفسیاتی تشدد، بدکلامی اور سائبر کرائمز جیسے جرائم سے تحفظ دیا گیا ہے۔

تاہم قانون کی منظوری کے کچھ دن بعد اس کی کچھ شقوں کو وفاقی شرعی عدالت میں چلینج کیا گیا تھا جہاں درخواست گزار نے عدالت سے استدعا کی تھی کہ قانون کے سیکشن 7(سی)(ڈی) کو اسلامی احکامات کے خلاف قرار دیا جائے۔

قانون کے اس سیکشن میں مردوں کی نقل و حرکت پر نظر رکھنے کے لیے ان کی کلائی پر جی پی ایس ٹریکرز رکھنے کی تجویز دی گئی تھی۔

SHARIAT PETITION NO. 03/I OF 2016

1. Professor Muhammad Ibrahim Khan (Advocate), Al Markaz Al Islami, Sardar Garhi, G.T. Road, Peshawar.

2. Saifullah Gondal (Advocate), Chamber No.68, First Floor, Khawaja Sharif Block, District Courts, Rawalpindi. ……Petitioners

versus

Province of Punjab through its Secretary, Ministry of Law, Punjab Secretariat, Lahore. ……Respondent

LINKED WITH

SHARIAT PETITION NO. 01/I OF 2016

Dr. Mohammad Aslam Khaki, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan, Office No.4, 1st Floor, Pak Plaza, F-10 Markaz, Islamabad. ……Petitioner

versus

Province of Punjab through its Ministry of Law, Punjab through its Secretary, Punjab Secretariat, Lahore. ……Respondent

LINKED WITH

SHARIAT PETITION NO. 02/I OF 2016

M/s Najaat Welfare Foundation through its Coordinator Hafiz Habibullah son of Muhammad Yousaf, Resident of House No.P-756/A, Kot Khan Muhammad, Satiana Road, Faisalabad. ……Petitioner

versus

Province of Punjab through its Ministry of Law, Punjab through its Secretary, Punjab Secretariat, Lahore. ……Respondent

AND

SHARIAT PETITION NO. 01/L OF 2016

Naheed Baig, Advocate High Court, Office No.12/5, 8-Fane Road, SAF Centre, Lahore. ……Petitioner

versus

1. Government of the Punjab, through its Chief Secretary, Punjab, Lahore.

2. Ministry of Law & Justice Division Punjab through its Secretary, Civil Secretariat, Lahore. …

Dates of Institution: 12.03.2016, 03.03.2016, 05.03.2016 and 08.03.2016, respectively Date of Hearing: 14.11.2022

Date of Judgment: 29.11.2022

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