Was enacted which shows that without any ambiguity the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, an earlier statute, was not only kept intact but it was given an overriding effect on any other statute on the subject. In this regard, section 5 and section 21.........

 2023 MLD 1928

After the promulgation of the Ordinance, 1961, West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1964) was enacted which shows that without any ambiguity the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, an earlier statute, was not only kept intact but it was given an overriding effect on any other statute on the subject. In this regard, section 5 and section 21 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 are relevant.
On a conjunctive reading of the aforementioned provisions it also clearly emerges that there was no impediment in the way of respondent No.1 in making an application u/s 9(1) of the Ordinance, 1961, as she could make such an application/prayer for allowing maintenance to her besides any other legal remedy available to her for the purpose. In this way, the right of respondent No.1 invoke provisions of section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 could not be taken away on any pretext including filing of proceedings before any other forum.
A perusal of record it appears that respondent No.1 claimed her maintenance by filing application under section 9 ibid on 25.07.2013 whereas she filed suit before the Family Court claiming maintenance for her as well as for her child on 31.07.2013. Further, respondent No.1 was granted maintenance vide impugned order dated 26.08.2013 where suit for maintenance to her extent was dismissed on 19.03.2015, hence she was not obliged to challenge the validity of judgment & decree of the learned Family Court. 9. This court is cognizant of the fact that when a party has more than one forum for redressal of its grievance and if it opts for one of them then it cannot be allowed to switch over to the rest of the remedies. Insofar as the case in hand is concerned, if proceedings before two forms were not maintainable the suit before the Family Court, being latter in time, could be attacked on the said point but by no stretch of imagination order dated 26.08.2013 could be declared illegal mere dismissal of suit by the learned Judge Family Court on 19.03.2015.
Section 9(1) of the Ordinance, 1961, postulates that Arbitration Council may issue a certificate specifying the amount which shall be paid as maintenance by the husband. From the word ‘maintenance’ it cannot be gathered that it relates to past or future rather in wide sense it covers all kinds of maintenance payable to the the wife either during subsistence of her marriage or for Iddat period, as the case may be. Therefore, in no way Section 9(1) curtailed the power of Arbitration Council to grant past maintenance to the wife. The husband’s obligation to maintain his wife commences simultaneously with the creation of marital bond and being in obligation and not an ex gratia grant it is enforceable even with respect to the past period of marital life, although, the same was not claimed during that period by the wife, subject to consideration of limitation and circumstances of the case itself. In this scenario, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived hence repelled.
So far as the point that Chairman cannot assume himself to be Arbitration Council is concerned, suffice it to note that Rule 5 of the West Pakistan Family Court Rules framed under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, provides answer to this query. Sub-clause (6) of the Rule under reference envisages that all decisions of the Arbitration Council shall be taken by majority and where no decision can be so taken the decision of the Chairman shall be the decision of the Arbitration Council. Same was done in the case in hand.
Similarly sub-clause (2) of Section 9 of the Ordinance, 1961, further clarified that a husband or wife may in the prescribed manner within the prescribed period and on payment of prescribed fee prefer an application for revision of the certificate before the Collector concerned and his decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. The words ‘within the prescribed period’ means not beyond the period stipulated under the Rules. In this regard clarification is made under sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the West Pakistan Rules made under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.
From the above provision of law it is crystal clear that petitioner had to file revision before the Collector/respondent No.3 within 30-days from the issuance of order of respondent No.2 but he failed to do so. From perusal of record it reveals that petitioner filed revision on 07.06.2016 against order of respondent No.2 after passing of more than two and half years and that too without furnishing any lawful reason except bald assertion that he was abroad (Kuwait) and as soon as he came to know about these proceedings he filed the revision before the Collector. The learned District Collector, Gujrat/respondent No.3 while dismissing the revision of petitioner gave sound and logical reasons that revision filed by the petitioner was hopelessly barred by time and under the Statute impugned order passed by respondent No.3 was not challengeable before any Court. Furthermore, when the statute itself prescribed the period for availing remedy before the higher forum the provisions of Limitation Act, 1908 would not be applicable.

--Custody of minor---Right of hizanat-Scope---Petitioner being mother of minor, aged about 2 years, sought his recovery...........

 2020 MLD 1891

S. 491--Habeas corpus---Custody of minor---Right of hizanat-Scope---Petitioner being mother of minor, aged about 2 years, sought his recovery from the illegal and improper detention of minor's father---First right of hizanat regarding custody of minor laid with the petitioner---Petitioner had claimed that the minor was snatched from her custody---Petitioner had also appended her affidavit along with the petition but no counter affidavit by the respondent was filed--Petition was allowed and the custody of minor was handed over to the petitioner, in circumstances.
Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), S. 25---Habeas corpus-Custody of minor-Pendency of petition before Guardian Court-Effect-Guardian court is the final arbitrator to adjudicate upon the question of custody of a child but this
does not mean that where a parent is holding custody of a minor lawfully and is deprived of such custody, such parent cannot seek remedy to regain the custody while the matter is sub judice before a Guardian Court-High Court, in exercise of its power under S. 491, Cr.P.C. has to exercise parental jurisdiction and is not precluded, in any circumstance, from giving due consideration to the welfare of the minor and to ensure that no harm or damage comes to him physically or emotionally by reason of breakdown of family tie between.
the parents.

No doubt Section 11(3) of the Family Court Act provides that the parties or their counsels may further examine, cross examine or re-examine the witnesses, however,.....

 2023 MLD 1968

No doubt Section 11(3) of the Family Court Act provides that the parties or their counsels may further examine, cross examine or re-examine the witnesses, however, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan that such provisions are not meant and designed for enabling a party to fill up the omissions in the evidence of witness who has already been examined, due to negligence and lapse of a party, rather the purpose, the nature and the scope of the power available to the Court in that regard is to enable it to seek clarification on any issue or to have a doubt cleared in the statement of a witness which if left outstanding and without which it would be difficult for the Court to take a right decision.
The principle of equality of arms, which is a judicial construct adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, means giving each party a reasonable possibility to present its cause in such conditions as would not put one party in disadvantage to its opponent. In other words, there must be a fair balance between the opportunities afforded to the parties involved in litigation.
Proper opportunity having already provided to the petitioner to cross-examine PWs, to allow another opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine any witness to fill up lacuna would be akin to place the petitioner at a comparative advantage over his opponent, which would be contrary to the principle of equality of arms and result in violation of Article 10A of the Constitution, therefore, the same could not be allowed.

New citation on 491 crpc improper custody,

Custody of minor/children was handed over to father.

Citation Name : 2020 YLR 1533
LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : ABID HUSSAIN
Side Opponent : RUKHSANA MUNIR
S. 491 ---Habeas corpus---Custody of minors---Minors, foreign nationals---Foreign judgment---Scope---Petitioner filed petition under S.491 , Cr.P.C. for issuance of an appropriate order with direction in the nature of habeas corpus---Contention of petitioner was that according to the parenting plan submitted by him and respondent in foreign court both parents would exercise joint parental authority over minors and the parents would consult each other when they planned any relocation of residence of the minors in custody of respondent---Matter of custody had already been decided by foreign courts and the minors were foreign nationals---Respondent had secretly, without consent and knowledge of the petitioner brought the minors to Pakistan---Petition was accepted and the custody of minors was handed over to the petitioner

Sec 7 & 25. Custody of minor children after death of their mother-Father as natural guardian of minors in ...........

 2018-SCMR-590.

Guardians and Wards Act-VII of 1890.
Sec 7 & 25. Custody of minor children after death of their mother-Father as natural guardian of minors in comparison of maternal grand mother.Petitiiner/father was natural guardian of children after their monther's death.On account of their respective ages, the right if Hazanat of the minors no longer vested in their maternal grand mother.Children could not be deprived of the company, love and affection of their real father.Prima facie,the best interest and welfare of the children laid their custody to their real father.Court deliver the custody of children to their real father.adas

- Any gift given to the groom at the time of engagement , cannot be treated as part of the dowry as the same..............

PLD 2023 Lahore 669

  Dowry articles -- Meaning --- Any gift given to the groom at the time of engagement , cannot be treated as part of the dowry as the same is not the property of wife rather ownership vests with the husband -- Dowry is only such articles that are given at the time of marriage to the bride and not the gifts to the bridegroom at the time of engagement .


Section 9(2) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 („Act‟) clearly provides that where a defendant relies upon a document in his possession or power, he shall produce it or ..........

 Section 9(2) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 („Act‟) clearly provides that where a defendant relies upon a document in his possession or power, he shall produce it or copy thereof in the Court along with the written statement. Sub-section (4) of Section 9 ibid requires copies of the documents referred to in subsection (2) to be given to the plaintiff along with the written statement on the date fixed for that purpose.

Although the word “shall” has been used in subsections (2) & (4) of Section 9 of the Act, however, that does not make these provisions mandatory thereby rendering non-compliance thereof absolutely fatal so as to prevent a defendant from belatedly filing and producing in evidence any document that was not filed along with the written statement. This is primarily for the reason that no such penal consequences have been specified by the legislature in Section 9 of the Act. It thus remains discretionary for the Family Court to permit a defendant to file any document, deliver a copy thereof to the plaintiff that was not filed along with the written statement and produce the same in evidence in a suit. The question then arises what are the principles governing the exercise of such discretion by the Family Court?
It is well settled that a purposive rather than literal approach to the interpretation is to be adopted while interpreting provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1964, therefore, an interpretation which advances purpose of the Act is to be preferred over an interpretation which defeats its object. It cannot be lost sight of that a special forum of the Family Court has been created by the legislature for expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs, as manifest from preamble of the Act. Section 12A of the Act has specified a period within which such cases have to be disposed of by a Family Court. It is a quasi-judicial forum which can draw and follow its own procedure provided such procedure is not against the principles of fair hearing and trial.
Keeping in view the principle of purposive interpretation as also the aforementioned object of the Act, it is held that permission for belated filing and production of a document in evidence cannot be granted as a matter of routine. The discretion should be exercised by the Family Court through a speaking order keeping in view the facts and circumstances in each case. The relevant considerations for the Family Court in this regard include the stage of proceedings at which the permission is sought, reason furnished by a defendant that prevented him from filing and producing the document at the relevant time, nature of the document sought to be filed and produced (such as admissible per se or otherwise required to be proved), delay in conclusion of the proceedings likely to be occasioned by the permission and likelihood of any other prejudice to the plaintiff if the permission sought is granted.
It is abundantly clear that permission to produce additional evidence in this case has been denied to the petitioner for having been made at the fag end of proceedings in the suit after recording of evidence by the parties and that too to adduce a private document which is not admissible per se. No valid reason preventing the petitioner from filing and producing the document sought to be tendered in evidence at the relevant time has been advanced and it has been rightly found to be an attempt to fill in lacuna after evidence of the parties has been recorded. The permission sought, if granted, would not only cause serious prejudice to the case of the respondent-plaintiff but also defeat the object of the Act i.e. expeditious disposal of the dispute. Therefore, the exercise of discretion on part of the Courts below in this case is clearly not arbitrary, capricious or whimsical but manifestly based on valid reasons which do not warrant interference by this Court.

WP 65227/23
Muhammad Nawaz Vs ADJ Hafizabad etc
Mr. Justice Raheel Kamran
05-10-2023
 2023 LHC 4878







طلاق ، خلع ، عدت اور حلالہ کے بارے وفاقی شرعی عدالت کا تازہ ترین تفصیلی فیصلہ

 PLD 2023 FSC 286

Islamic law --- Khula ' and ' Talaq ' --- Distinction between their legal effect --- ' Halala ' -- Scope --- According to Shariah , Khula operates as a single irrevocable divorce , which means that both the spouses can contract a fresh marriage with mutual consent , of course if they want to , without any intermediary marriage of the wife with another person , which is known as " Halala " --- Iddat shall be incumbent upon the wife if she wants to contract marriage with someone else after Khula --- However , when a husband pronounces divorce ( Talaq ) to his wife for the third time and that attains finality , then if he wants to remarry that lady , a Halala is required i.e. the lady marries somebody else and that marriage dissolves in normal course either by divorce or due to the death of her second husband and she becomes a widow .

عورت کے حق خلع پر وفاقی شرعی عدالت کا تازہ ترین انتہائی عالمانہ فیصلہ

 I) Whether the right of Khula is an absolute right of a woman in Islam and what are the requirements that are necessary to obtain Khula?

II) Whether a Judge can grant Khula when so demanded by a wife of a person and the husband is not agreeing to grant it to his wife?
These are considered by scholars of Ahadith as the basic Ahadith that explain the legality of Khula as a right of women in the Islamic Law because it was granted to them by the Holy Prophet (SAW) when so demanded by the ladies in lieu of Mahar. The abovementioned Ayat No.229 of Surah Al-Baqarah and Ahadith give us some fundamental points of guidance necessary for a court of law to keep in mind while passing a decree and judgment of dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula. These points are as follows:
Firstly, it is the fundamental right of a woman according to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah to claim decree for dissolution of marriage from the court of law, which cannot be denied.
Secondly, to seek a decree of dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula from the court of law, levelling of any allegation of maltreatment or mistreatment and misbehavior is not at all necessary. It is sufficient for her to state that she dislikes her husband to the extent that she cannot live with him as his wife within the limits prescribed by Allah for the court to proceed upon her demand. The wordings of these Ahadith are also very relevant that any kind of subjective feeling regarding disliking of a husband is a valid ground of dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula, no additional ground or proof is required by the court to prolong the matter.
Thirdly, in addition to that, the statement which is referred to in the preceding paragraph, if woman wants Khula from her husband and she willfully returns the full amount of Mahar to her husband as Badal-e-Khula (بدل خلع), then the court should pass a decree of Khula without delay.
We would like to highlight this important point regarding Khula that it is not always necessary or binding on the woman to completely forego her dower for seeking dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula. The amount of monetary compensation, which is to be paid by a woman, in a case of Khula cannot be greater than the dower amount received by her from her husband.
However, if a wife claims that she is forced to seek a decree of Khula because of her husband's ill-treatment or mistreatment, etc., the Court may reduce the amount of compensation if it finds the husband at fault after recording of evidence so much so that in severe cases, the Court may grant divorce in case of Khula to a wife without paying back any amount of Mahar at all. Many great Muslim jurists are of this opinion, like Imam Muhammad Hassan Al-Shaybani, Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam al-Kasani etc.
This point was also elaborated by this Court in our earlier judgment reported as PLD 2022 FSC 25 (Imran Anwar Khan v. Government of Punjab, etc.). We have already declared in our abovementioned judgment that under the Islamic law, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, no Badl-e-Khula can be fixed by a statute as a mandatory amount for claiming Khula from the husband through a Court. In case a woman voluntarily surrenders the entire amount of dower she received at the time of her marriage in lieu of claiming Khula or Badl-e-Khula through a Court, then the Court has no option but to grant the decree of dissolution of marriage in her favour, after providing a chance to the spouses for reconciliation before passing of any decree of Khula. However, if a lady claims that she wants to seek Khula from her husband through a Court due to any maltreatment, mistreatment or ill-treatment, then the Court will decide the quantum of amount to be returned by the lady to the husband for seeking Khula based on the evidence and circumstances of the case after determining who is responsible for breakdown of the marriage.
The right of Khula granted to women by the Holy Quran and Sunnah is an absolute and a unique right, whereby a marriage can be dissolved through a Court at her will. A wife can get this right by showing her willingness to return the Mahar to her husband and in addition by simply stating in a court of law that she can no longer live with her husband as his wife within the prescribed limits set by the Almighty Allah as a reason for dissolution of marriage. This right of women cannot be denied by the court of law.
Section 10(5) was declared as against the injunctions of Islam by this Court through its judgment, dated 17.02.2022, in case reported as PLD 2022 FSC 25 (Imran Anwar Khan v. Government of Punjab, etc.), wherein this Court specifically mentioned the date of 01.05.2022 for becoming Section 10(5) of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 as null and void under Article 203D(2)(b) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan

SHARIAT PETITION NO. 16/I OF 2022
Haji Saif-ur-Rahman Shaheen son of Haji Fazal Din Ansari. PETITIONER VERSUS Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Government of Pakistan through Attorney General of Pakistan, Islamabad
Date of Judgement: 06.10.2023















Dower admittedly fixed as Rs.500,000/- and 25 tola gold ornaments in the light of Entry against Column No.15 of the nikahnama between the parties, which ...

The nub of the matter is the contest between the parties in respect of the prompt dower admittedly fixed as Rs.500,000/- and 25 tola gold ornaments in the light of Entry against Column No.15 of the nikahnama between the parties, which in the instant case has been crossed by putting an oblique/cross line. As per respondent's case, the prompt dower was paid at the time of marriage and nothing has been left as deferred or ?on demand' whereas as per learned counsel for the petitioner since Entry No.15 was crossed off, it means nothing was paid and the same was left to the demand of the petitioner. Held: This Court is of the opinion that it is only the deferred dower that becomes due upon certain exigencies, such as death and divorce, whereas once the mode of payment of some part of dower is settled by way of declaring it as prompt, in Column No.15, the obligation to pay prompt dower needs to be clearly mentioned as having been paid at the time of nikah or left payable on demand of the wife. Entry in respect of Column No.15 has been crossed off by putting an oblique line and the same cannot be interpreted to the disadvantage of the petitioner, for the reason that dower, in the context of Muslim marriage, is an obligation under the Holy Quran and Hadith. Burden to prove that said obligation has been discharged is on the husband. The said burden can only be discharged through leading positive evidence.

WP 35641/19
Hira Masood Vs Additional District Judge etc
Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain
15-09-2023
2023 LHC 4933











 

PLD 2023 Lahore 669.

 Suit for recovery of dowry articles --- Alternate price of dowry articles --- Appreciation of value of dowry , articles --- Scope --- Husband's ( petitioner ) case was that there was no evidence that the car was given at the time of marriage as part of the , dowry and that the Appellate Court had wrongly decreed the suit --- Wife's ( respondent ) case was that alternate price of the car had not been properly determined / ascertained by the Appellate Court and the prayer was made for award of current market value of the car and not the date on which it was given --- Validity --- In case of articles such as the car , while determining / ascertaining amount of money as an alternate price , the principle of appreciation should be kept in mind inasmuch as if the principle of depreciation is to be considered with respect to one set of the dowry articles such as furniture , etc. , which involves depreciation of articles on account of wear and tear , the principle of appreciation must also be taken into account with respect to such other articles that involve increase in value --- Failure to do so would not only by iniquitous but would also put premium on the unlawful retention of such dowry articles by the husband even after the dissolution of marriage or demand for return of the same by the wife Wife was held entitled to recover the market value of the car as on the date of realization of the decree

EFFECT OF ENTRIES IN NIKAHNAMA

Column No. 13 of Nikahnama. Dower amount was mentioned as Rs. 80000/- whereas in Col. No. 14 of amount Rs. 500/- was mentioned, in Col. No. 15 it was mentioned that in case of Talaq without any cause to the plaintiff or contracting 2nd marriage, the defendant shall pay an amount of Rs. 80000/- Defendant in circumstances, was liable to pay R. 80000/- to the plaintiff on account of dower amount

*Reliance is placed on 2010 SCMR 930*
50 tolas of gold ornaments, agricultural land and 1 /2 share in a residential house were in addition to dower amount Rs. 20,00,000/- as the same were incorporated in Nikahnama through Iqrarnama. High Court modified the judgment & decree passed by the both the court below and includes properties and gold ornaments in the decree as envisaged in Nikahnama with Iqrarnama...
*Reliance is placed at 2008 MLD.1973*
Jewellery given to wife as gift by husband was mentioned in Cl. 17 of Nikahnama. High Court directed husband to hand over jewelry or its price to his wife within specified time.
*Reliance is placed at 2008 MLD 1692*
Nikahnama prevailed that if wife obtain Khula she would have to pay an amount of Rs. 250,000/- to the husband and if husband divorce wife, he would payan amount of Rs. 250,000/- to her, suit filed by wife for dissolution of marriage, condition declared against the basic principle of law.
*Reliance is placed on *2008 SCMR 186*
Commitment of the husband in Nikahnama that he shall pay that much amount to the wife in such like situation, need no determination u/s 17-A West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964...
*Reliance is placed on PLD 2008 Lah 398*
Entries in Nikahnama are sufficient proof of transfer of property and it requires no registration or any other document for completion U/S 5 of MFLO 1961
*Reliance is placed at 2005 MLD 376*
Any condition imposed in nikahnama for the award of damages on account of alleged unjustified divorce was against the basic principle of law and such claim was not actionable before the court
*Reliance is placed on 2012 CLC 837* ; *PLD2011 SC 260, & 2008 SCMR 186*
Entry of amount made in the column No.19, of Nikahnama to the effect that husband, in case of talaq without any cause or contracting second marriage, shall pay to the wife an amount of Rs.80,000/-. Wife can file a suit in the civil court for the recovery of said amount.
*Reliance is placed on 2010MLD930*
Claim of lady accruing to her upon an unjustified divorce , by all means was a property and fell within item No.9 of schedule read with S. 5 of WPFCA 1964.
*Reliance is placed on PLD 2004 Lah 588*
Whenever any woman makes demand through filing suit for recovery of dower, person who contends that entries in nikahnama were not correct, he was bound to rebut those entries through strong evidence otherwise courts were bound to give solemn affirmation to entries in nikahnama.
*Reliance is placed at PLJ 2000 Lah 872*
Nikahnama being a public document was admissible in evidence per se as evidence of the transfer of property in lieu of dower.
*Reliance is placed on PLD 2000 Lah 236*
When husband and wife admitted nikah then production of two witnesses would not be essential.
*Reliance is placed on 2016 YLR 793*

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. S. 6 --- Provisions of Evidence Act and Code of Civil Procedure not to apply --- Family Court as Judicial Magistrate --

2003 YLR 2140

 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. S. 6 --- Provisions of Evidence Act and Code of Civil Procedure not to apply --- Family Court as Judicial Magistrate --- Criminal proceedings --- Scope --- Section 17 ( 1 ) provides that the application of Qanun - e - Shahadat , 1984 , is excluded in respect of proceedings on matters falling in Part I of the Schedule to the Family Courts Act , 1964 --- However , such exclusion has no applicability vis - à - vis criminal proceedings for the offences specified in Part II of the Schedule or S. 20 of the Family Courts Act , 1964 , including the offence under S. 6 ( 5 ) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance , 1961 --- Therefore , the provisions of Qanun - e Shahadat , 1984 , are applicable in criminal proceedings before the Family Court .


Family Court as Judicial Magistrate --- Scope --- Section 20 of the Family Courts Act , 1964 , deems the Family Court to be the Judicial Magistrate of .....

2023 YLR 2140

 Family Court as Judicial Magistrate --- Scope --- Section 20 of the Family Courts Act , 1964 , deems the Family Court to be the Judicial Magistrate of the first class under the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1898 , for taking cognizance and trial of any offence , inter alia , under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance , 1961 --- Cognizance of such an offence can be taken on the complaint of the Union Council , Arbitration Council or the aggrieved party and the Family Court is required to conduct the trial of an offence in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXII of the Cr.P.C. relating to summary trials .


Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance of minor --- Quantum --- Financial status of father --- Poverty --

2023 YLR 2233 

Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance of minor --- Quantum --- Financial status of father --- Poverty --- Contention of the defendant was that he , being a driver , was a poor person having no stable source of income --- Validity --- Mere poverty was no ground for interference in the order passed by the Family Court passing decree far maintenance allowance of the minor to the tune of Rs . 10,000 / - per month , which amount was neither exorbitant nor unreasonable considering the inflation and cost of living --- No illegality or infirmity had been found in the impugned orders and decrees passed by both the Courts below --- Constitutional petition was dismissed , in circumstances .

Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance --- Decree . not assailed against all decree - holders - Effect - Record of the appeal having been preferred by the petitioner / defendant revealed that he challenged the order and decree passed by the Family Court without arraying the minor as respondent therein --- Said act of the petitioner meant that he had admitted the findings of the Family Court to the extent of relief given to the minor , so he could not take a somersault , before the High Court , on the ground that he had challenged the decree as a whole ---
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