Father had not filed any tangible evidence to establish that minor was residing with mother at place 'R' and on mere presumptions, he had invoked territorial jurisdiction of Family Court at place 'R'.

-S. 25---Custody of minor---Application of petitioner/father for custody of minor was rejected on the ground that the same be filed before Family Court---Contention of petitioner/father was that defendant/mother, after her second marriage had shifted to place 'R' and was residing with her second husband along with the minor, hence, custody of minor be handed over to father---Mother's plea was that she was residing at place 'R', however, minor had been residing with her (mother's) parents at place 'M' and father, only to settle his amount of enmity had filed the application for custody of minor---Validity---Father had not filed any tangible evidence to establish that minor was residing with mother at place 'R' and on mere presumptions, he had invoked territorial jurisdiction of Family Court at place 'R'---Perusal of record reflected that minor had been residing at place 'M' and proceeding for determination of her custody at place 'R', would cause hardship for production of minor from place 'M' before Family Court at place 'R'---Constitutional petition of father being devoid of merits, was dismissed, accordingly.

2017 M L D 2041
[Sindh (Sukkur Bench)]
Before Shahnawaz Tariq, J
MUZAMIL AHMED---Petitioner
Versus
Mst. MEHNAZ PARVEEN---Respondent

Ss. 25 & 9 (1)---custody of minor ---Territorial jurisdiction ---Determination---Words 'minor 's ordinary place of residence" occurring in S.9(1), Guardians and Wards Act, 1890--

 2017 YLR 994 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

Side Appellant : FARAZ ALAMGIR
Side Opponent : ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE VIII
Ss. 25 & 9 (1)---custody of minor ---Territorial jurisdiction ---Determination---Words 'minor 's ordinary place of residence" occurring in S.9(1), Guardians and Wards Act, 1890---Scope---Mother had gone abroad with the minor ---Father moved petition for custody of minor in court at place K (Pakistan) but same was returned for want of territorial jurisdiction ---Validity---minor 's "ordinary place of residence" had to be determined by finding out as to where the minor was "ordinarily residing" and whether removal of minor abroad was effected from that very place---New place to which minor might have gone/removed could become the ordinary residence only after the minor had settled down at that place for a reasonably long period---Word "ordinarily" would mean more than mere temporary residence---Courts below had overlooked the fact that wife was still in the wedlock of applicant and both the spouses and minor were Pakistan nationals and custody of minor was removed from the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistan in a deceitful manner---Courts below had erred in refusing to exercise their jurisdiction ---Impugned orders passed by the courts below were set aside---Family Court was directed to rehear the case of applicant and decide the question of territorial jurisdiction afresh---Constitutional petition was disposed of in circumstances.

-Subsection (1) postulates that no man, during the subsistence of an existing marriage, shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the Arbitration Council, contract another marriage

 2023 YLR 2140

Polygamy---Scope---Polygamy is a subject matter covered by S. 6 of the Muslim Family ⁰Laws Ordinance, 1961---Subsection (1) postulates that no man, during the subsistence of an existing marriage, shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the Arbitration Council, contract another marriage, nor shall any such marriage contracted without such permission be registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Subsection (5) stipulates consequences for contracting another marriage without the permission of the Arbitration Council in terms of making him liable to pay immediately the entire amount of the Dower , whether prompt or deferred, due to existing wife or wives, if not so paid, to be recovered as arrears of land revenue and prescribes it to be an offence triable upon complaint and punishable on conviction with simple imprisonment which may extend to one year and with fine of five hundred thousand rupees

Execution of decree passed by Family Court --- Decretal amount not paid by judgment - debtor --- Liability of surety , enforcement of -

2023 CLC 2169

 Execution of decree passed by Family Court --- Decretal amount not paid by judgment - debtor --- Liability of surety , enforcement of --- Proceedings against the surety --- Contention of the petitioner / surety was that he stood surety only for a certain amount and not for entire satisfaction of decree , while said / certain amount had already been paid by him during execution proceedings , therefore , he was liable to be released and his property de - attached --- Validity --- Record revealed that the judgment - debtor was sent to civil prison due to non - payment of decretal amount and thereafter , the petitioner , being surety , was summoned to satisfy the decree --- It was also evident from the contents of the surety bond as well as the statement recorded before the Court by the petitioner / surety , that he himself had made him liable to pay the decretal amount in place of the judgment - debtor on his failure to satisfy the decree , thus , the petitioner later could not wriggle out of his own undertaking --- However , High Court directed the Executing Court to decide the pending objection petition of surety after framing of issues and recording of evidence of parties regarding the amount paid or to be paid by the petitioner / surety to the decree - holder --


Bare perusal of column No.5 and 5-A of Nikahnama Form (used in this case) makes it crystal clear that column No.5 required to mention that whether bride was maiden,.......

 2023 MLD 2016

Bare perusal of column No.5 and 5-A of Nikahnama Form (used in this case) makes it crystal clear that column No.5 required to mention that whether bride was maiden, a widow or a divorcee and column No.5-A of the Nikahnama Form required to mention that if bride is a widow or a divorcee and she has children then mention number and names whereas column No.21-A required to mention that whether bridegroom is widower or divorcee and has children then to mention the number and names. It goes without saying that word “then” used in column No.5-A and 21-A is of vital importance and as per P RAMANATHA AIYAR’S ADVANCED LAW LEXICON (THE ENCYCLOPAEDIC LAW DICTIONARY WITH WORDS & PHRASES, LEGAL MAXIMS AND LATIN TERMS) 4th Edition, Volume 4, word “then” means “in that event” or “in that case”. As per WORDS AND PHRASES PERMANENT EDITION, Volume 41B, word “then” is an adverb of time, it also means “in that case or event” and perusal of column No.5-A reflects that if bride is widow or divorcee and she has children only in that event or in that case she has to mention the number and names of the children and if she does not have children then there is no need to mention the same and this column is not requiring to disclose that whether bride is maiden, widow or divorcee and for said purpose column No.5 is crystal clear which expressly requires bride to mention that either she is maiden, widow or divorcee and if in column No.5-A intention of the Legislature would have been to get disclosed that bride is maiden, widow or divorcee then there was no need to separately incorporate column No.5 prior to that in sequence, hence plain reading of column No.5 and column 5-A reflects that column No.5 requires bride to mention that either she is maiden, widow or divorcee whereas column No.5-A does not require so and only requires to mention number and names of children if she is widow or divorcee and having children but any column having language like column No.5 was not available in the Nikahnama Form (used in this case) for bridegroom and its column No.21-A is having same language as of column No.5-A, therefore, in its column No.21-A, bridegroom was not required to tell that he was widower or divorcee but if he was widower or divorcee and having children from said marriage(s) then to tell number and names of the children. Wisdom of Legislature behind column No.5-A and 21-A is that bride and bridegroom must know liabilities of children (if any) of each other from earlier marriage(s); and in this case it is admitted fact that respondent No.5 was having no children from earlier marriage. So, any column expressly requiring bridegroom to disclose that he was widower or divorcee was not available in the Nikahnama Form used in this case.
Though in 2017 when this marriage was contracted, Nikahnama Form which was to be used, of course, requires bridegroom to expressly mention that either he is widower or divorcee yet Nikahnama Form which was used in this case was not containing the column to expressly mention said fact. If Nikah Registrar has not incorporated contract of Nikah of the parties on appropriate and amended Form then it is no fault on part of bridegroom. It is well settled principle of law that for the purpose of invoking criminal law, benefit of each and every doubt at each and every stage goes to the accused/proposed accused and when it is not the case of the petitioner that Form of Nikahnama (Annex-B) was used in this case due to any act or omission of respondents No.5 to 8 and admittedly said Nikahnama Form was not containing any column which expressly required to mention that either bridegroom/respondent No.5 was widower or divorcee then respondents No.5 to 8 cannot be burdened with any criminal liability.

Divorce proceedings --- Jurisdiction --- Parties had settled in USA , after their marriage in Lahore but relations became............

2023 CLC 2025

 Divorce proceedings --- Jurisdiction --- Parties had settled in USA , after their marriage in Lahore but relations became strained and divorce proceedings were initiated before authorities in USA --- Petitioner defendant / husband initiated divorce proceedings under S.7 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance , 1961 , before Union Council concerned in Lahore , Pakistan --- Respondent / plaintiff wife invoked jurisdiction of Civil Court and got injunction against divorce proceedings before Union Council concerned --- Suit filed by respondent / plaintiff was rejected --- Lower Appellate Court allowed appeal and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh --- Validity --- Union Council and / or Chairman , which would have jurisdiction in the matter would be the Union Council and / or the Chairman within whose territorial jurisdiction respondent / plaintiff / wife was residing at the time of pronouncement of divorce --- Wife was residing abroad during such time --- As per notification S.R.O.No. 1086 ( K ) 61 dated 09-11-1961 , officers of Pakistan Mission abroad were authorized to discharge functions of Chairman under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance , 1961 --- Chairman , Union Council at Lahore had no authority to exercise such authority which he had exercised ---


Visitation schedule --- Welfare of minor --- Scope --- While deciding a guardian petition , including chalking of a visitation schedule , it is the ' welfare of the minor ' which is of paramount consideration --

2023 CLC 2110

 Visitation schedule --- Welfare of minor --- Scope --- While deciding a guardian petition , including chalking of a visitation schedule , it is the ' welfare of the minor ' which is of paramount consideration --- Limited hours of meeting within the Court premises is the policy generally adopted by the Courts which is certainly not an appropriate solution inasmuch as it only enable a minor to identify his relation with the non - custodial parent without developing any bonding due to the lack of proper interaction between the minors and such non - custodial parent because of non - conducive environment of the Court premises --- As a natural corollary , there is great chance that the minor will turn against such non custodial parent --- Thus , the Courts are to consider the impact that the proposed visitation schedule may have on the child --- Failure to protect the development of healthy and secure attachment of a minor with non - custodial parent can have long term negative effects on the development of the minor , hence , the basic consideration while chalking out the visitation schedule is to ensure that the minor will not turn against one parent because of inadequacy of time given to the non-custodial parent.


Custody of minors --- Visitation schedule --- Modification of earlier visitation schedule chalked out by the Guardian Court --- Mother contracting second marriage -

2023 CLC 2110

 Custody of minors --- Visitation schedule --- Modification of earlier visitation schedule chalked out by the Guardian Court --- Mother contracting second marriage --- Over night stay of minor with non - custodial parent , importance of --- Perusal of the visitation schedule revealed that the Trial Court had granted fortnightly overnight stay of the minor with the petitioner / father being non - custodial parent which had been converted by the Appellate Court into day stay in the Court premises --- Similarly , the trial Court had granted overnight stay on the second day of both Eid - ul - Fitr and Eid - ul - Azha which had also been converted into second day stay on both Eids --- Per Trial Court , the fortnightly overnight stay of the minor would continue during summer and winter vacations till the minor turned 7 years of age whereafter subject to the pleasure of the minor , the same would extend to 03 days - On the other hand , as per the Appellate Court , the minor would stay first two days of winter holidays with the father and first 7 days with the father during summer vacations --- Admittedly , the mother had remarried having a child from the second marriage whereas the father was still unmarried --- Similarly , the minor was residing with the maternal grandparents and maternal uncle , which fact had been asserted by the petitioners side and same had not been denied by the respondents --- Most crucial aspect of the case was that the minor was residing without the supervision and control of both the parents under the custody of the maternal grandparents and maternal uncle --- In the absence of overnight stay with the father ( petitioner ) , it could have an extremely detrimental impact on the well - being and welfare of the minor as he would lead his life without both the parents which aspect had been overlooked by the Appellate Court --- Since the mother had contracted second marriage and left the minor behind with her father and brother , therefore , the plea of the petitioner ( father ) being non - custodial parent , to have more access to the minor was not only tenable but also in the interest and welfare of the minor --- Denial of overnight stay with the father in such like situation was likely to result in social estrangement of the minor and it was also unjustified to deprive the petitioner of overnight stay of his son particularly when the minor was not even residing with the mother / custodial parent --- Case of the petitioner ( father ) in the present case was on better footing as the minor was not residing with the mother rather with his maternal grand - parents and maternal uncle --- Said fact made it imperative that the petitioner ( father ) being non custodial parent who had already relinquished his right to custody as a good - will gesture got more time to spend with his son in order to develop fatherly bond and intimacy.


چچا کیخلاف دعوی نان ونفقہ دائر نہ ہو سکتا ہے

 Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mulla is neither a statute nor a custom or usage, therefore, not binding on Courts. Claim of maintenance from grandfather and paternal uncle is on different principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, hence paternal uncle could not replace the grandfather, as defendant, after his death.

Family.62482/22
Mahnoor Shabbir through Sajida Safdar Vs ADJ etc
Mr. Justice Shahid Jamil Khan
12-12-2023
2023 LHC 6415








It is well settled principle that law helps the vigilant and not the indolent.

2023 MLD 2073

It is well settled principle that law helps the vigilant and not the indolent.

The Petitioner was granted fair opportunities to file written statement and pursue his case before the Court below, but he himself deliberately disappeared from scene despite having knowledge of the proceedings of “former suit” and no valid justification is set out by him regarding his said default even before this Court.

It would also be beneficial to mention here that before enactment of the Act, female litigants had to wait for years to meet with final reliefs i.e. recovery of dower, maintenance, other ancillary matters and particularly, in cases of dissolution of marriage. By the time of obtaining decree, majority of the wives used to become grey haired much beyond the remarriage-able age, beside incurring heavy expenses on getting the relief with regard to a meager amount of maintenance, dower etc. 

Certain amendments were made in various sections of the Family Courts Act, the aim and object of which was to address and minimize miseries & plight of the wives seeking relief through the obsolete law then in vogue, as such, not only all matrimonial disputes were brought under one and the same umbrella of the Family Court but such amendments also provided for the target dates for deciding the relevant lis for both, the Family Court and the Lower Appellate Court. Deviation from and violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act, would amount to frustrate and reverse the efficacious remedies available under the new scheme of law

The preference of the minor in favour of his/her father cannot be the sole criterion in determining the welfare of the minor especially in case of a female child between the age of 10 to 15 years.

PLJ 2023 Lahore 912

 The preference of the minor in favour of his/her father cannot be the sole criterion in determining the welfare of the minor especially in case of a female child between the age of 10 to 15 years. Held that one cannot lose sight of a very germane biological aspect of the matter concerning the puberty and the privacy of the minor. The care and concern, on part of a custodial parent, needed by a minor girl of her age is of pivotal importance in this case. Had the minor been a male child and exhibited the preference, which the minor in the instant case has shown before this Court, in favor of the petitioner, this Court would have not hesitated to grant the permanent custody of the minor to the petitioner, however, in the instant case, the minor is a daughter and this Court is of the opinion that a female child between the age of ten (10) to fifteen (15) years face such biological changes that, at the said age, she would need her natural mother the most, as opposed to any other person including father and/or the step mother or a grandmother, more particularly when there is nothing on record to establish that the respondent has any disability like contracting second marriage etc., on account of which she might be deprived of the permanent custody of the minor although second marriage of the mother, as observed earlier, is also not the sole ground to deprive a mother from the custody of the minor.


16 سال سے کم عمر لڑکی کی شادی باطل نہ ہے اور نہ ایسا ازدواجی تعلق زنا (Rape) کے زمرے میں آتا ہے۔ بیان زیر دفعہ 164 ض ف قلمبند کرنیکا طریقہ کار۔

 Legal age to enter into matrimonial tie.

Consequences of marrying a girl who has not yet attained the minimum age provided by the law to enter into a matrimonial contract. In this regard, suffice it to say that it is a consistent view of Constitutional Courts of our Country that if a person marries an underage girl, the relevant law providing punishment for such an act is the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929.
The sexual offence mentioned in Section 375 PPC cannot be equated with the consensual consummation of marriage with a legally wedded girl, who has attained puberty, though she has not attained the minimum age provided under the Act of 1929. To do so would amount to declaring such marriage null and void. Regarding the validity of such marriage, it is worth noting that marriage is a significant institution in Islam and its validity or illegality can only be adjudged in the light of injunctions of Islam. The Act of 1929 only provides punishment for marrying a girl under 16 years of age but does not declare such marriage void. When confronted with this proposition, learned counsel for the petitioner has controverted the validity of this enactment. I am not in agreement with his stance because to declare a law or provision of law against the injunctions of Islam is the sole domain of the Federal Shariat Court established under Article 203-C of the Constitution.
It would not be out of place to discuss that during investigation resort is being made to Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. by the Investigating Officer, generally when statement of a witness or confession of an accused is to be recorded before the Magistrate. The statement of the witness must be recorded like a statement recorded from a witness in court. Before recording the statement, an oath is administered. The procedure of recording the statement of a witness is entirely different from the procedure of recording the statement/confession of an accused. Only before and after recording a confession of an accused, various precautionary measures including giving of reflection time to the accused have been prescribed. This rigorous exercise needs not to be followed for recording the statement of a witness under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. Section 364 of the Cr.P.C. is of general application as it only applies to the statement of an accused recorded during any proceeding. The confession of an accused is recorded under Section 164 read with Section 364 of the Cr.P.C. Every court is bound to comply with all the precautionary measures provided under Section 364 Cr.P.C. whenever statement of an accused is recorded.(Syed Naeem Ali Adv 03006762054) But in the case of recording the statement of a witness, Section 364 Cr.P.C. has no relevance.
Provision of S.164 CrPC is self-explanatory and only provides an opportunity of cross examining a witness, who is getting her/his statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., to the accused against whom such statement was made. Right to cross examine a witness during trial proceedings is provided under Article 132(2) of the Q.S. but sub-section (1-A) of Section 164 Cr.P.C. is a special provision enacted to provide an opportunity to the accused only to confront the witness who makes the statement against such accused before a Magistrate prior to the commencement of trial. Allowing the petitioner to cross examine Mst. Yasmeen would mean that Magistrate had considered and declared Mst. Yasmeen as ‘a hostile witness’ and allowed the petitioner to put questions to her under Article 150 of the Q.S. which was based upon wrong assumption of law because these were not the trial proceedings during the course of which a witness could be declared hostile and party producing such witness could be allowed to put questions to such a witness. Thus, act of learned Magistrate to allow petitioner to cross examine the alleged victim Mst. Yasmeen was not warranted by the law.
Provision of 164 CrPC makes it profusely clear that such memorandum is to be recorded only at the end of a confessional statement of an accused and there is no legal requirement to provide such memorandum at the end of the statement of a witness recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
In the view of above discussion, I have no hesitation to hold that the practice of allowing the persons other than the accused, to cross examine a witness after her/his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is recorded, and providing a memorandum as envisaged under Section 164(3) of the Cr.P.C. at the end of statement of a witness, is not in accordance with the law.
Competence of a witness of tender age to depose.

Criminal Proceedings
57371/23
Nazar Muhammad Vs DPO Okara etc.
Mr. Justice Ali Zia Bajwa
The order was pronounced on 19.10.2023 and after completion it was signed on 22.11.2023.













It is settled law that where parentage of a child cannot be easily ascertained, it is generally presumed either from express acknowledgment by the father or from a course of treatment given by the father in his lifetime.

 It is settled law that where parentage of a child cannot be easily ascertained, it is generally presumed either from express acknowledgment by the father or from a course of treatment given by the father in his lifetime.

Civil Revision-Civil Revision (Against Decree)
479-D-01
Zainab Bibi VS
Abdul Aziz
Mr. Justice Ahmad Nadeem Arshad
25-10-2023
2023 LHC 6187


















The petitioner being real father filed guardianship petition for custody of his minor daughter on the ground that respondent-mother has remarried and,..........

 The petitioner being real father filed guardianship petition for custody of his minor daughter on the ground that respondent-mother has remarried and, hence, violated the agreement between the parties upon their dissolution of marriage that minor son will be kept by the petitioner-father while the respondent-mother will retain custody of the minor daughter until she contracts second marriage. Held that the children cannot be treated as commodities and their welfare cannot be compromised by their parents by executing any agreement. Suffice to observe that such agreements are against public policy and hence, not enforceable under the law. This Court is of the view that placing a Sword of Damocles of losing the custody of the child upon remarriage on the respondent is not only illegal but also raises a logical question as why such a condition was not placed on the petitioner himself, disentitling him from keeping the custody of the minor son and seeking the custody of the minor daughter. In this regard, suffice to observe that it is well-settled principle of law that re-marriage of the mother is not a stand-alone ground for depriving her from keeping custody of her minor children. Case reported as Raja Muhammad Owais v. Nazia Jabeen and others (2022 SCMR 2123) is referred. Further held that the right of minor siblings to develop bond of love and ownness among themselves by remaining united and grow up in the companionship has been ignored. While parents may submerge and get themselves subsumed in their lives respectively, it is the minor siblings who have suffered the most by lack of mutual interaction, in the most innocent manner, during the most innocent period of their lives, the playful memories whereof would have been indelibly etched into their past memories to be relished in future. Therefore, this Court considers it obligatory to observe that the learned Judge of the Family Court, while deciding the guardian petition, must in addition to and/or apart from other factors, also evaluate the adverse effects of separating the siblings from each other.

Family 244677/18
Imtiaz Hussain Vs District Judge etc
Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain
13-11-2023
2023 LHC 6165









-Mode of payment of dower--Where no detail about mode of payment of dower is spelled out by parties in Nikahnamma or marriage contract, entire......

 PLJ 2023 Lahore 844
Present: Abid Aziz Sheikh, J.
SAMINA--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 5278 of 2021, heard on 24.5.2023.

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 14--Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dower--Decreed to extent of maintenance allowance--Decree was not challenged by petitioner--Decree was attained finality--Appeal--dismissed--Prompt or deferred dower amount was not mentioned in Nikahnama--Question of--Whether dower amount is prompt or deferred--Challenge to--Modification in decree--Column No. 13 of Nikahnamma does not specifically mention that Five Hundred Thousand Rupees was prompt dower or deferred rather only mentions that same is dower payable on demand, which means that it is not deferred dower, payable only on dissolution of marriage either by death or divorce, but same is payable at time of demand even before dissolution of marriage--The dower being payable on demand could be claimed by petitioner even during subsistence of marriage--Petition accepted. [Pp. 847 & 848] C & E

2023 YLR 193, 2022 YLR 2067, PLD 2015 Balochistan 26,
PLD 2014 Pesh. 60 & 2015 YLR 2375 ref.

Words & Phrases--

----Ind-at-talab--The word “Ind-at-Talab” is word of Urdu language and its English translation is “on demand” as per “OXFORD Urdu--English Dictionary”.                               [P. 846] A

Muhammadan Law--

----Para 20--Prompt and deferred dower--The amount of dower is usually split into two parts, one called “prompt” which is payable on demand, and other called “deferred” which is payable on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce.                                                                                         [P. 847] B

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----S. 10--Mode of payment of dower--Where no detail about mode of payment of dower is spelled out by parties in Nikahnamma or marriage contract, entire amount of dower shall be presumed to be payable on demand and not necessarily means payable on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce.  [P. 848] D

Mr. Muhammad Ikram Ullah Khan, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Aftab Hussain Qureshi, Advocate for Respondent No. 3.

Date of hearing: 24.5.2023.

Judgment

Through this Constitutional Petition, the petitioner has challenged judgment and decree dated 23.02.2019, passed by learned Judge Family Court only to the extent of quantum of maintenance allowance, and the judgment and decree dated 11.09.2020, passed by learned Appellate Court in toto (impugned judgment & decree).

2. Relevant facts are that the petitioner filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dower amount of Rs. 500,000/-(dower) against the Respondent No. 3 (respondent) during subsistence of marriage. The said suit was decreed on 23.02.2019 for the dower amount of Rs. 500,000/-and for maintenance allowance @ Rs. 5,000/-per month with 10% increase per annum. The petitioner did not challenge the said decree, however, the respondent filed Appeal. The learned Appellate Court, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 11.09.2020, dismissed the Appeal against entitlement of maintenance allowance, however, accepted the Appeal against dower and declined the same on the ground that the dower being deferred cannot be claimed during subsistence of marriage. The respondent did not challenge the said judgment and decree, however, the petitioner being aggrieved has filed this Constitutional Petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the maintenance allowance of Rs. 5,000/-per month is inadequate. He further submits that the dower mentioned in Column No. 13 of the Nikahnamma (Exh.P1), being payable on demand, is prompt and not deferred dower, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree is not sustainable. He placed reliance on “Muhammad Qayyum Anjum vs. Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh and 2 others” (2022 MLD 416) and “Muhammad Sajjad vs. Additional District and Sessions Judge and 2 others” (PLD 2015 Lahore 405).

4. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that as no specific time for payment of the dower was stipulated, therefore, the dower being deferred is only payable on dissolution of marriage either by death or divorce. He placed reliance on “Dr. Noor Muhammad Saleemi Saggu vs. Additional District Judge and another” (2020 MLD 1008) and “Saadia Usman and another vs. Muhammad Usman Iqbal Jadoon and another” (2009 SCMR 1458). He further submits that the petitioner herself gave affidavit dated 02.06.2017 (Exh.D4) to the effect that the dower was not agreed in Nikahnamma, therefore, the same is not recoverable.

5. Arguments heard. Record perused. So far as the claim of petitioner for enhancement of maintenance allowance is concerned, admittedly the petitioner did not challenge the quantum of maintenance allowance @ Rs. 5,000/-determined by learned Judge Family Court, vide judgment and decree dated 23.02.2019 at the relevant time, therefore, the said amount has already attained finality and cannot be challenged by the petitioner at this stage. Similarly, the plea of respondent that claim of the dower was abandoned by the petitioner in her affidavit (Exh.D4) cannot be urged, as the learned Appellate Court did not accept the said plea rather by treating the dower as deferred held that petitioner is not entitled for the dower during subsistence of marriage. The said finding of learned Appellate Court being not challenged by the respondent, he cannot argue that the dower is not payable at all in view of Exh.D4.

6. However, the only question which requires determination in this case is that whether the dower amount is prompt or deferred. In this context, perusal of Column No. 13 of the Nikahnamma shows that the dower of Rs. 500,000/-is عندالطلب (Ind-at-Talab). The word “Ind-at-Talab” is the word of Urdu language and its English translation is “on demand” as per “OXFORD Urdu--English Dictionary” of Oxford University Press as well as “FEROZSONS Urdu—English Dictionary” of Ferozsons (Pvt.) Ltd. The Urdu to Urdu Dictionary i.e. “فیروزاللغات” defines the word “Ind-at-Talab” in following terms:

"عندالطلب: مانگنے کے وقت۔ مطالبے پر۔"

The above dictionary meanings/translations of “Ind-at-Talab” make it abundantly clearly that the dower in-question is payable on demand.

7. Now the next ancillary question is that whether dower payable on demand is prompt or deferred dower. In this regard, Para-290 of the Muhammadan Law defines “Prompt” & “Deferred” dower as under:

“290 “Prompt and Deferred” dower. ---(1) the amount of dower is usually split into two parts, one called “prompt” which is payable on demand, and the other called “deferred” which is payable on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce.”

The august Supreme Court of Pakistan in Saadia Usman’s case supra, after detailed discussion while interpreting the ‘prompt and deferred’ dower, held as under:

“Thus, we are of the opinion that prompt dower is payable on demand during the subsistence of marriage tie whereas the deferred dower is payable on the time stipulated between the parties, but where no time is stipulated, it is payable on dissolution of marriage either by death or divorce. But, the deferred dower does not become “prompt” merely because the wife has demanded it.”

In terms of Para-290 of Muhammadan Law and the law settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Saadia Usman’s case supra, the “prompt dower” is payable on demand, whereas “deferred dower” is payable on dissolution of marriage either by death or divorce unless time is stipulated between the parties for payment of deferred dower.

8. In the present case, Column No. 13 of the Nikahnamma does not specifically mention that Five Hundred Thousand Rupees was prompt dower or deferred rather only mentions that same is dower payable on demand, which means that it is not deferred dower, payable only on dissolution of marriage either by death or divorce, but same is payable at time of demand even before dissolution of marriage. When under Para-290 of Muhammadan Law, prompt dower is payable on demand, then it will be a fallacy to argue that the dower payable on demand is deferred dower and payable only on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce. Learned High Courts repeatedly treated the “dower payable on demand” as prompt dower and not deferred dower, payable on dissolution of marriage due to death or divorce in the following case laws:

(i)         “Mukhtar Ahmad vs. District Judge and others” (2023 YLR 193)

(ii)      “Muhammad Rafique vs. Additional District Judge Sialkot and others” (2022 YLR 2067),


(iii)     “Muhammad Sajjad vs. Additional District and Sessions Judge and 2 others” (PLD 2015 Lahore 405),

(iv)     “Adam vs. Mst. Abida and 2 others” (PLD 2015 Balochistan 26),

(v)      “Mst. Salma Bibi and another vs. Muhammad Iqbal and 2 others” (PLD 2014 Peshawar 60).

(vi)     “Mst. Kulsoom Bibi through Attorney vs. Muhammad Waseem and 3 others” (2015 YLR 2375).

9. The above interpretation is also supported by Section 10 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance), according to said provision where no detail about the mode of payment of dower is spelled out by the parties in Nikahnamma or marriage contract, the entire amount of dower shall be presumed to be payable on demand and not necessarily means payable on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce. The learned Appellate Court has misconstrued the dower payable on demand, as deferred dower payable only on dissolution of marriage either by death or divorce. The dower being payable on demand could be claimed by the petitioner even during subsistence of marriage.

10. In view of above discussion, this petition is partially allowed to the extent that the petitioner shall be entitled for the dower amount of Rs. 500,000/-from the respondent. The impugned judgment and decree is modified accordingly.

(Y.A.)  Petition partially accepted

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