An agreement for dower was none the less binding on the petitioner as the same was made at the time of solemnization of marriage.

2024 LHC 676 

An agreement for dower was none the less binding on the petitioner as the same was made at the time of solemnization of marriage. Even as per para 336(2) of the Principles of Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mulla, if the marriage was consummated, the wife becomes entitled to immediate payment of whole of the unpaid dower both prompt and deferred. Dower is a sum of money or other property which wife is entitled to receive from husband in consideration of marriage. The word ‘consideration’, however, cannot be deemed at par with the sense in which the word is used under the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872.

A marriage is valid although no mention be made of the dower by the contracting parties as the term Nikah in its literal sense signifies a contract of union which is fully accomplished by the bond of a man and woman. Moreover, payment of dower is enjoined merely as a token of respect, therefore, the mention of it is not absolutely essential to the validity of marriage.
Any amount/property agreed to be paid by the husband to wife on the happening of some future event, by all intents and purposes be counted as a deferred dower to be paid by the husband on the happening of such event.
where no specific or definite period is settled for the payment of deferred dower, wife would become entitled to dower at the event of dissolution of marriage or on the death of any of the spouses. If deferred dower is agreed to be paid on the happening of some specified event, the same would become payable on the occurrence of that specified event. In the instant case, there was a specific stipulation in the Nikah Nama that in case of contracting of second marriage or divorcing the respondent, petitioner would pay an additional dower to the tune of Rs.500,000/-. Undeniably, petitioner has divorced the respondent, therefore, respondent was entitled to the dower to the tune of Rs.500,000/-as stipulated in Nikah Nama. It would not be out of context to mention here that initially petitioner did not admit the insertion of additional dower in Nikah Nama, therefore, he cannot argue that divorce was given by him on the asking of respondent and her father. Since it has been resolved by the courts below that the entry qua additional dower was a genuine entry, the same would be construed strictly and as a whole, therefore, stance taken by petitioner in his written statement that he pronounced divorce on the asking of respondent and her father needs to be taken up and resolved in view of evidence adduced by petitioner at trial. Petitioner simply failed to substantiate his stance as taken in his written statement in reply to paragraph No.5 of the plaint qua pronouncing of divorce upon respondent on her insistence. Neither Muhammad Akhtar nor Muhammad Amjad who were claimed to be the witnesses of the happening whereby respondent and her father insisted the petitioner for giving divorce to respondent, have been produced to substantiate the said version. Muhammad Ashiq DW-2 even did not say anything about demand allegedly made by respondent or her father for pronouncing divorce upon the respondent. In this view of the matter, it can conveniently and legitimately be resolved that petitioner at his own divorced the respondent and the sentence qua divorcing respondent on her asking as mentioned in the written statement was an afterthought tale presumably added by a design to counter in anticipation the stipulation mentioned against column No.17 of the Nikah Nama.

W.P. No.7630 of 2018
Muhammad Ghause Versus Additional District Judge, Bahawalpur & 02 others
Date of hearing:06.02.2024
2024 LHC 676












-Written reply within stipulated period--Application for striking-off defence--Petitioner assailed vires of judgments/orders passed by learned Courts below, whereby, his application for striking-off defence of respondent No. 3 was dismissed concurrently-

 PLJ 2024 Lahore (Note) 7
[Multan Bench, Multan]
PresentAhmad Nadeem Arshad, J.
MUHAMMAD AZHAR--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 13379 of 2023, decided on 7.9.2023.

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----Family Courts Rules, 1965, R. 22--Written reply within stipulated period--Application for striking-off defence--Petitioner assailed vires of judgments/orders passed by learned Courts below, whereby, his application for striking-off defence of respondent No. 3 was dismissed concurrently--Respondent No. 3 could not file written reply within stipulated period as prescribed by Family Courts Act, 1964--Petitioner moved an application for striking-off defence of respondent No. 3--The learned Trial Court after obtaining its reply and hearing arguments of both side, dismissed same--He preferred a time barred appeal which also met same fate and dismissed by learned appellate Court--Written reply on behalf of respondent No. 3 has be filed--Learned Trial Court shall definitely decide case after observing all procedure including recording evidence of parties once for all--This petition having no force/substance is dismissed.                                                                                      

                                                               [Para 1, 2, 4 & 5] A, B, C & D

KhQaisar Butt, Advocate for Petitioner.

Date of hearing: 7.9.2023.

Order

Through this Constitutional Petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner assailed the vires of judgments/ orders dated 27.04.2023 & 05.08.2023 passed by learned Courts below, whereby, his application for striking-off the defence of Respondent No. 3 was dismissed concurrently.

2. Facts in brevity are that petitioner filed an application for the custody and visitation. Of his minor daughter namely Rida Azhar aged about 04 years on 15.10.2022. On 28.10.2022 power of attorney was filed on behalf of Respondent No. 3 and the case was fixed for filing of written reply. Respondent No. 3 could not file the written reply within stipulated period as prescribed by Family Courts Act, 1964. On 07.12.2022 the petitioner moved an application for striking-off the defence of Respondent No. 3. The learned trial Court after obtaining its reply and hearing arguments of both side, dismissed the same vide order/judgment dated 27.04.2023. Being aggrieved, he preferred a time barred appeal which also met the same fate and dismissed by the learned appellate Court vide judgment/order dated 05.08.2023. Being dis-satisfied he filed the instant Constitutional Petition.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at full length and perused the record with his able assistance.

4. Law favours adjudication of lis on merits and one should be given proper opportunity of hearing to defend his case. In guardianship cases welfare of the minor was the paramount consideration. Petitioner himself admitted in para No. 4 of the petition that written reply on behalf of Respondent No. 3 has been filed on 22.12.2022, so, the learned trial Court shall definitely decide the case after observing all procedure including recording evidence of the parties once for all. From the act of petitioner as well as record it is manifestly clear that he is using delaying tactics and dragging Respondent No. 3 in un-necessary litigation. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to -point out any illegality, irregularity, or mis-reading and non-reading of record on the part of lower fora.

5. For what has been discussed above, this petition having no force/substance is dismissed-in-limine. No order as to costs. However, before parting with this judgment, the learned trial Court is directed to accelerate the proceedings and decide the same strictly in accordance with law within a period of 03 months after the receipt of certified copy of this order.

(M.A.B.)

Section 6 of the "Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961" places a restriction on the second marriage of husband unless he obtains prior permission in writing of the Arbitration Council.

 Section 6 of the "Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961" places a restriction on the second marriage of husband unless he obtains prior permission in writing of the Arbitration Council. Sub-section 5 of section 6 of the "Ordinance, 1961" provides consequences of contracting second marriage by a man without permission of Arbitration Council, one of which is that he has to face prosecution in complaint and if it is proved that he contracted second marriage without permission of the Arbitration Council, he shall be liable to be convicted and punishable with the simple imprisonment which may extend to one year and with fine of five hundred thousand rupees. The petitioner being wife of "respondent" lodged a complaint under section 6 of the "Ordinance, 1961" before the Senior Civil Judge (Family Division), Tehsil Sarai Alambir, District Gujrat through her special attorney Naveed Hanif s/o Muhammad Hanif, which was dismissed being not proceedable through attorney. "Ordinance, 1961" does not prescribe any procedure for the trial of the complaint, however, the Rules under the "Ordinance, 1961" (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1961") framed under section 11 pave way for the trial of offences under the "Ordinance, 1961". Needless to mention here that Rule 21 of the "Rules, 1961" ordains that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Ordinance or these rules save on a complaint in writing by the Union Council, stating the fact constituting the offence. It would not be out of context to mention here that Rule 21 was later on reconstituted by the orders of the Governor of Punjab in exercise of powers conferred upon him by section 11 of the "Ordinance, 1961" through S.O X-1-15/75-Vol.II published in Gazette of Punjab, Extraordinary, 14th October, 1976 and words "aggrieved party" were inserted in place of "Union Council".

Writ Petition-Family-Miscellaneous
97-24
SONIA SHARIEF VS ADJ ETC
Mr. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf
25-01-2024
2024 LHC 381











Family suit---Right of defendants to submit written statement, closing of---Powers of the Family Court---Scope---Contention of the petitioner / defendant was that there was no provision in the Family Courts Act, 1964, to close defendant's right to file his written statement-

 Family suit---Right of defendants to submit written statement, closing of---Powers of the Family Court---Scope---Contention of the petitioner / defendant was that there was no provision in the Family Courts Act, 1964, to close defendant's right to file his written statement---Validly---Section 8 of the Family Courts Act ('the Act 1964') stipulates the issuance of summons in prescribed manner and S.9(1) of the Act, 1964, stipulates filing of written statement in prescribed manner on the next date of hearing---In case the written statement is not filed on that date, the Family Court may, for any sufficient reason, allow the defendant to file written statement on the next date not exceeding 15 days---Although there was no specific provision under the Act, 1964 for failure to file written statement, however, failure of a defendant to file written statement within stipulated time period entailed striking off his defence in terms of O.VIII, R.10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908---In absence of written statement, the defendant could still cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses, lead evidence to disprove the facts averred in the plaint and also take part in the arguments---Record revealed that the petitioner/defendant did not challenge the order of the Court closing the right of written statement before the Family Court or at the higher forum---When the evidence of the plaintiff was concluded, the Family Court fixed the case for final arguments, however, the petitioner agitated before the Court contending that his right to defence was still intact; then the Court passed a specific written order by virtue of which petitioner was given opportunity only to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the respondent/ plaintiff but not allowed to produce his evidence---Petitioner did not challenge the said order even , rather accepted the same by cross-examining the plaintiff's witnesses, which showed that he had no intention to lead his evidence to disprove the facts stated in plaint---Petitioner/ defendant was estopped by his own conduct and could not agitate his contention/ ground for the first time while invoking constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court

Raja IBADAT SAJJAD KHAN vs Mst. SHEHNAZ KOUSAR
2024 CLC 187

شوہر کے خلاف بغیر اجازت کے دوسری شادی کے بابت کمپلینٹ بذریعہ مختار فیملی کورٹ میں دائر نہیں کیا جاسکتا۔۔۔

 Section 6 of the "Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961" places a restriction on the second marriage of husband unless he obtains prior permission in writing of the Arbitration Council. Sub-section 5 of section 6 of the "Ordinance, 1961" provides consequences of contracting second marriage by a man without permission of Arbitration Council, one of which is that he has to face prosecution in complaint and if it is proved that he contracted second marriage without permission of the Arbitration Council, he shall be liable to be convicted and punishable with the simple imprisonment which may extend to one year and with fine of five hundred thousand rupees. The petitioner being wife of "respondent" lodged a complaint under section 6 of the "Ordinance, 1961" before the Senior Civil Judge (Family Division), Tehsil Sarai Alambir, District Gujrat through her special attorney Naveed Hanif s/o Muhammad Hanif, which was dismissed being not proceedable through attorney. "Ordinance, 1961" does not prescribe any procedure for the trial of the complaint, however, the Rules under the "Ordinance, 1961" (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1961") framed under section 11 pave way for the trial of offences under the "Ordinance, 1961". Needless to mention here that Rule 21 of the "Rules, 1961" ordains that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Ordinance or these rules save on a complaint in writing by the Union Council, stating the fact constituting the offence. It would not be out of context to mention here that Rule 21 was later on reconstituted by the orders of the Governor of Punjab in exercise of powers conferred upon him by section 11 of the "Ordinance, 1961" through S.O X-1-15/75-Vol.II published in Gazette of Punjab, Extraordinary, 14th October, 1976 and words "aggrieved party" were inserted in place of "Union Council".

Writ Petition-Family-Miscellaneous
97-24
SONIA SHARIEF VS ADJ ETC
Mr. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf
25-01-2024
2024 LHC 381












لاہور ہائیکورٹ کے تین ججز پر مشتمل فل بنچ نے اس امر کا حتمی تعین کردیا ہے کہ خرچہ نان و نفقہ کی ڈگری کے قابل اپیل ہونے کا تعین فی کس خرچہ نان و نفقہ سے ہوگا نہ کہ مدعیان کے مجموعی خرچہ نان ونفقہ سے۔

 ایک مقدمہ میں فیملی کورٹ اگر چار مدعیان کا خرچہ نان ونفقہ 4500 روپے ماہوار فی کس ڈگری کرتی ہے تو اس ڈگری کیخلاف اپیل دائر نہ ہوسکتی ہےخواہ مدعیان کامجموعی خرچہ نان ونفقہ 18000 روپے ماہوارکیوں نہ بنتا ہو

Question:
Whether a decree for maintenance granted for an amount less than Rs.5000/- per month to each of the plaintiffs is appealable under section 14(2)(c) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 by the judgment debtor if the aggregate amount of the decree is more than Rs.5000/- per month?
Answer:
In terms of section 14(2)(c) of the Act, a decree for maintenance granted for an amount less than Rs.5000/- per month to each of the plaintiffs is not appealable.

Writ Petition No.126306 of 2017
Muhammad Aslam Vs. Judge Family Court, Ferozewala, etc.
Announced in open Court on 13.02.2024


















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