Grant of Khula and ground of dissolution of marriage due to taking additional wife in contravention of the provisions of The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

The terms of a contract of marriage between a man and a woman are contained in the Nikah Nama. The terms and conditions are meant to secure the rights and intentions of both the wife and the husband. The Nikah is a social contract between parties who are competent to enter into a valid marriage contract. It is settled law that a presumption of truth is attached to the Nikah Nama and it enjoys the status of a public document. A strong presumption of truth exists regarding entries recorded in the Nikah Nama. The titles of columns 13 to 16 relate to 'dower'. Column 17 of the prescribed form is titled as 'special conditions if any'. The prescribed form nor the headings of the entries are conclusive for the purpose of ascertaining the intentions of the two parties to the marriage contract. This Court has held in the Haseen Ullah’s case that the Nikah Nama is the deed of marriage contract entered into between the parties and its clauses/columns/contents are to be construed and interpreted in the light of the intention of the parties. The headings are not sufficient to determine the intention of the parties. It is also a settled principle of interpreting a contract that a court cannot imply something that is inconsistent with the express terms and a stipulation not expressed in the written contract can also not be applied merely because it appears to be reasonable to the court. We will now examine what the parties had intended regarding the dower which was settled between them and duly recorded in the relevant entries of the Nikah Nama. It is noted that 'dower' is obligatory because it is an essential requirement of a valid marriage contract. The validity of marriage remains effective even if the dower has not been expressly mentioned in the marriage contract because, in such a case, a reasonable dower, 'Mehr-ul-Misal' is presumed. Dower may be prompt or deferred. In case the parties have not specified the nature of the payment of dower then in such an eventuality it is presumed to be prompt as has been provided under section 10 of the Ordinance of 1961. It can be in the form of cash or property or both. In the case before us, the parties had settled an amount of Rs.500,000/- to be paid as cash 'on demand' and this was recorded in column 13 of the Nikah Nama. In column 14 the nature of dower i.e whether prompt or deferred was not specified Haseen Ullah’s case1 that the Nikah Nama is the deed of marriage contract entered into between the parties and its clauses/columns/contents are to be construed and interpreted in the light of the intention of the parties. The headings are not sufficient to determine the intention of the parties. It is also a settled principle of interpreting a contract that a court cannot imply something that is inconsistent with the express terms and a stipulation not expressed in the written contract can also not be applied merely because it appears to be reasonable to the court.2 We will now examine what the parties had intended regarding the dower which was settled between them and duly recorded in the relevant entries of the Nikah Nama. It is noted that 'dower' is obligatory because it is an essential requirement of a valid marriage contract. The validity of marriage remains effective even if the dower has not been expressly mentioned in the marriage contract because, in such a case, a reasonable dower, 'Mehr-ul-Misal' is presumed. Dower may be prompt or deferred. In case the parties have not specified the nature of the payment of dower then in such an eventuality it is presumed to be prompt as has been provided under section 10 of the Ordinance of 1961. It can be in the form of cash or property or both. In the case before us, the parties had settled an amount of Rs.500,000/- to be paid as cash 'on demand' and this was recorded in column 13 of the Nikah Nama. In column 14 the nature of dower i.e whether prompt or deferred was not specified There are various modes for lawfully dissolving the contract of marriage between a husband and wife. The primary mode is pronouncement of divorce by the husband or in case the right has been delegated to the wife then exercise of such right by her. The Act of 1939 was enacted to consolidate and clarify the provisions of Muslim law relating to suits for dissolution of marriage by women who are married under the Muslim law. Section 2 sets out the grounds for a decree for the dissolution of a marriage. The statute was amended and a new ground was inserted i.e. clause (iia) in the Act of 1939 through Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 (‘Ordinance VIII’). These amendments were made to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission on Marriages and Family Laws. Later section 13 of the Ordinance VIII was omitted through section 3 read with item no.18 of the second schedule of the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance, 1981 (‘Ordinance of 1981’). It is noted that the insertion of clause (iia) in section 2 of the Act of 1939 had taken effect and was enforced. It is an admitted position that the Act of 1939 was not amended nor was clause (iia) of section 2 omitted or repealed there from. The effect of omission of section 13 of Ordinance VIII through the Ordinance of 1981 did not affect the insertion of clause (iia) in section 2 of the Act of 1939. Moreover, it is obvious from the language of section 13 of Ordinance VIII that the insertion made in the Act of 1939 was not intended to be of transitory nature nor that it shall take effect for a limited period. There is nothing in the language to construe that it was intended that the insertion would lapse on a specific date or on the happening of some contingency. The ground of dissolution of marriage inserted in section 2 of the Act of 1939 as clause (iia), i.e taking an additional wife in contravention of the provisions of the Ordinance of 1961, hence continued to be validly enforced and subsisting. This Court in the case of Abdul Majid has observed that the purpose of such omission or repeal was to strike out unnecessary enactments and cannot be construed as having brought any change in the relevant statute which was amended or in which provisions were inserted. The aim of the repeal or omission of those sections through which some other statute was amended was termed by this Court as 'legislative spring cleaning'. Section 7 of the Ordinance of 1981 expressly saved the effect of the repealed laws. It expressly provides that the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment unless a different intent was expressly stated in the law by which the amendment was made. Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act 1897 (‘Act of 1897’) provides that where any Central Act or Regulation repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal. As already noted, it is obvious from the clear language used in section 13 of Ordinance VIII that a different intention cannot be construed. The learned counsel for the defendant has drawn our attention to the judgment of the Peshawar High Court in the case of Rashid Ali4 in support of his contention that clause (iia) inserted in section 2 of the Act of 1939 stood repealed. With great respect, the view taken by the High Court appears to have been formed without taking into consideration the above factors, particularly section 7 of the Ordinance of 1981. The opinion of the High Court is per incuriam.

We, therefore, hold that the repeal of section 13 of Ordinance VIII through the Ordinance of 1981 did not affect the validity and enforcement of the insertion made in the Act of 1939 and, therefore, clause (iia) of section 2 of the Act of 1939 continues to be one of the valid, effective and subsisting grounds for dissolution of marriage. Clause (iia) of section 2 of the Act of 1939 enables a woman married under the Muslim Law to obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage if the husband has taken an additional wife in contravention of the provisions of the Ordinance 1961. Section 6 of the Ordinance of 1961 sets out the requirements and procedure which are to be complied with by a husband who intends to take an additional wife. It provides that a husband, during the subsistence of an existing marriage, shall not contract another marriage except with the previous permission in writing of the Arbitration Council. In conformity with these provisions a husband is required to file an application for permission under sub-section 1 of Section 6 of the Ordinance of 1961 to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council, stating therein the reasons for the proposed marriage and whether the consent of the existing wife or wives has been obtained thereto. On receiving the application, the Chairman asks the applicant and his existing wife or wives to nominate their respective representative. After the Arbitration Council is satisfied that the marriage was necessary and just, it may grant permission subject to such conditions, if any, as it may deem fit to impose. In deciding the application the Arbitration Council is required to record its reasons for the decision. Any party may prefer the remedy of revision before the Collector concerned. The consequences for taking an additional wife in contravention of the aforementioned provisions have been expressly described under sub-section 5 of section 6 ibid. In case of contravention the husband becomes immediately liable to pay the entire amount of dower, whether prompt or deferred, due to the existing wife or wives and, secondly, on conviction may be sentenced to simple imprisonment which may extend to one year, or a fine or both. In order to invoke the ground under clause (iia) of section 2 of the Act of 1939 all that the wife is required to show is that the husband had taken the additional wife in contravention of the Ordinance of 1961 as set out in section 6 ibid. In the case before us, the defendant had taken an additional wife while the appeals against the decrees passed by the trial court were pending. An additional ground was taken by the plaintiff and it is obvious from the judgment of the appellate court that such a ground was entertained. It is also apparent from the judgment that the defendant had submitted a reply. It stood established that the provisions of the Ordinance of 1961 had been contravened since neither any application was filed nor the permission of the Arbitration Council was sought in accordance with the requirements set out under section 6 ibid. However, instead of adjudicating this ground, the appellate court had ordered the dissolution of the marriage on the basis of Khula. This form of dissolution was accepted by the defendant as it was not challenged by him before the High Court. The learned counsel for the defendant has argued that the matter should be remanded to the appellate court because it would require recording of evidence. He has also advanced arguments in support of the dissolution of marriage by the appellate court on the basis of Khula. Before we examine the argument regarding remanding the case to the appellate court, it would be appropriate to advert to the question of whether the appellate court was justified in ordering dissolution of the marriage on the basis of Khula.
Khula is one of the modes for dissolving a marriage. It can either be on the basis of mutual settlement/arrangement between the spouses or it can be ordered by a court if the requisite conditions are met. This court in the case of Khurshid Bibi5 has held that Khula is a right and privilege of the wife to seek dissolution of marriage. It is a right which is exclusively conferred on the wife. Khula through judicial order is thus dissolution of marriage by the court/Qazi on the demand of the wife. It authorises the court to dissolve the marriage in an appropriate case against the will or consent of the husband. However, a court on its own cannot order dissolution of the marriage on the basis of Khula when it has not been sought by the wife either expressly or impliedly. It has further been observed that the question of Khula was a subject matter of a specific issue between the parties in the case before this Court. It has been noted in the judgment that the wife in her plaint had consented to the dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula. The learned counsel for the defendant has placed reliance on Muhammad Arif’s case6 in support of his contention that a court is competent to order dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula even though it may not have been sought by or consented to by the wife. We have carefully perused the judgement rendered by a Bench consisting of two hon’ble judges of this Court but, with respect, we have noted that the Bench had not considered the law enunciated by this Court in Khurshid Bibi's case (supra) which was rendered by a larger bench consisting of five hon’ble judges. The appellate court, therefore, fell in error by granting a decree for the dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula when it was not sought by the plaintiff nor had she given express or implied consent thereto as was the case in Khurshid Bibi's case supra. The next question is whether the High Court had validly modified the decrees by ordering the dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty.
The Act of 1939 has set out the grounds which entitles a wife married under the Muslim Law to obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage. Clause (a) provides that a marriage could be dissolved if the husband treats the wife with cruelty i.e. habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable even if such conduct does not amount to physical ill-treatment. Cruelty may be mental or physical. This court, in the case of Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen,7 has dealt with various forms of conduct or behaviour that would entitle a wife to seek a decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. In this case the trial court had framed a specific issue whether the plaintiff was mentally or physically tortured by the defendant. The former could not discharge the onus placed upon her and, therefore, it was decided in the negative. The High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction vested under Article 199 of the Constitution, could not have decided questions involving determination of facts requiring recording of evidence. No further evidence was recorded after the trial was concluded by the trial court. The High Court has also not recorded any reasons in support of its conclusion to order dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. The High Court, therefore, fell in error by ordering dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty.

C.P.L.A.308-P/2019
Dr. Faryal Maqsood & another v. Khuram Shehzad Durani & others
Mr. Justice Athar Minallah
23-10-2024




















فیملی کورٹ کسی بھی کیس کو منطقی انجام تک پہنچانے کے لیے کوی بھی طریقہ کار اختیار کرسکتی ہے۔۔جب تک وہ طریقہ کار خصوصی طور پر منع نہ ہوں۔۔۔ اجراء کے دوران Executing Court اجراء سے متعلق کوی بھی Issue Resolve کرنے کے لیے Issue frame کرکے شہادت ریکارڈ کراسکتی ہے۔۔

 

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Family Court is a quasi-judicial forum which can organize its own procedure and which forum has been implicitly authorized to adopt and pursue any procedure which is not specifically barred or prohibited. Even if the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has not been made directly applicable to the proceedings in a suit filed under the auspices of the Family Courts Act, 1964, it does not at the same time mean that the Code of Civil Procedure is odious insofar as proceedings before the Family Court are concerned and moreso in the case of execution proceedings.
As long as there is no conflict between the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on the one hand and those of the Family Courts Act, 1964 on the other, such provisions can be employed and adopted. The logic behind this rule is rooted in the fact that after all the Family Court has to adopt and pursue some principles and procedure and, therefore, what better than the tried and tested procedure contained in a law that has remained successfully in force since the past 113 years. A Family Court can, therefore, proceed on the premise that every procedure is permissible unless a clear prohibition is forthcoming. As long as procedure so adopted does not compromise the aim and sweep of the Family Courts Act, 1964, which is to provide expeditious relief in matrimonial and family matters there is no reason in law to deny a Family Court to adopt such procedure.
It may be mentioned here that since the Family Court is quasi-judicial forum it partakes most elements and characteristics generally associated with a judicial forum. Naturally, it has to have a procedure it will follow in the event of deciding a particular lis.
The aspect of hearing of parties, the element of passing decisions which are reasoned and speaking, recording and appraisal of evidence etc. make it incumbent on a Family Court to adopt and pursue some procedure in the absence of any specific procedure having been made applicable.
Writ Petition No. 18067 of 2021
Mst. Haseena Bibi Versus Civil Judge Ist Class Vehari and another

فیملی کورٹ کے چند منفرد فیصلے جو روٹین سے ہٹ کر ہیں اور امید ہے آپ کی نظر سے نہیں گزرے ہوں گے

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

فیملی لاء ایک سپیشل لاء ہے۔ اس میں اجراء کی درخواست کے لیے کوئی میعاد مقرر نہ ہے۔
2018 YLR 1501
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹ کی یہ ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ یکطرفہ ڈگری پاس ہونے کے بعد مدعا علیہ کے پتہ پر ڈگری کی مصدقہ کاپی بھیجے۔
2017 CLC N 69
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
اگر والد کے پاس نابالغ کی پرورش کے لیے ذرائع نہیں ہیں تو والدہ کی ذمہ داری ہے کہ نابالغ کی پرورش کرے۔ اس کے علاوہ اس کیس لاء میں تفصیل سےنابالغان کے حوالےسے والدین کی ذمہ داریوں کا تعین کیا گیا ہے۔
PLD 2013 SC 557
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی عدالت یکطرفہ ڈکری پاس کرنے سے پہلے مدعا علیہ کو نوٹس حاضری بھیج سکتی ہے۔
2017 PLJ Pesh 01
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہیز کیس کے اجراء میں ضامن کی یہ قانونی ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ کسی بھی ڈیفالٹ کی صورت میں جہیز ادا کرے۔
2016 PLD Pesh 109
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
خلع کے علاوہ باقی حقائق کے خلاف درخواست منسوخی ڈگری کی مدت اس وقت شروع ہوگی جب مدعا علیہ/ججمنٹ ڈیٹر کو اس ڈکری کا علم ہوگا۔
2017 CLC N 69
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
بیوی کو حق مہر ادا نہ کرنا بھی ظلم/Cruelty ہے۔ جوکہ خلع کے لیے بہترین گراؤنڈ ہے۔
2018 CLC 93
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کیس میں Interim Order کے خلاف رِٹ پٹیشن نہیں ہوسکتی۔
2018 CLC N 47
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹ کے لیے یہ ضروری ہے کہ وہ فیملی کیس کا 6 ماہ کے اندر اندر فیصلہ کرے۔
2018 YLR 1231
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
باپ اپنے بچے کو خرچہ نان و نفقہ دینے کا پابند ہے۔ اس کا یہ بہانہ نہیں سنا جائے گا کہ اس کے پاس ذرائع آمدن نہیں ہیں۔
2018 CLC N 47
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
بیوی خاوند کی Cruelty ثابت نہ کرسکی۔ عدالت نے حکم دیا کہ بیوی شادی کے تحائف واپس کرے اور شوہر حق مہر ادا کرے۔
2018 PLD Pesh 34
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی لاء ایک سپیشل لاء ہے۔ اس میں خاوند کے لیے Past Maintenance کے لیے کوئی میعاد مقرر نہ ہے۔
2018 YLR 1501
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
پردہ نشیں عورت اپنے والد کے ذریعے اپنی شہادت ریکارڈ کروا سکتی ہے اگر اس کے والد کو کیس حالات کا اچھی طرح سے پتہ ہوتو۔
2002 CLC 1336
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
ہائی کورٹ فُل بینچ نے فیملی قوانین کی تشریح کرتے وقت یہ قرار دیا کہ فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ 1964 اور مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈینیس 1961 کی متعلقہ دفعات غیرقانونی ہیں کہ خلع کی صورت میں بیوی کو حق مہر کی رقم بھی واپس کرنی پڑے گی جبکہ اسلامی اصولوں کے تحت اسے صرف شادی کے تحائف واپس کرنے چاہئیں۔
PLD 2009 Pesh 92
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہاں بیوی/عورت رہتی ہوگی اسی جگہ فیملی کیس دائر کیا جاسکتا ہے۔ علاقائی اختیار سماعت نہیں دیکھا جائے گا۔
PLD 2006 Pesh 189
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
طلاق یافتہ بچی اگر ماں کے پاس ہوتو باپ اس کا خرچہ نان و نفقہ دینے کا پابند ہے۔
2014 MLD 351 Pesh
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
شادی کی تاریخ کے بعد منتقل کی گئی پراپرٹی حق مہر یا گفٹ کے ضمرہ میں نہیں آتی۔
PLD 2012 Lah 43
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
ماں بچے کا خرچہ باپ کو معاف بھی کردے تو باپ دینے کا پابند ہے۔
2014 MLD 351 Pesh
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
نکاح نامہ میں لکھی گئی پراپرٹی حق مہر یا گفٹ کے ضمرہ میں آتی ہے اور فیملی کورٹ اس حوالہ سے ڈکری پاس کرسکتی ہے۔
PLD 2016 SC 613
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
شادی کی تاریخ کے بعد منتقل کی گئی پراپرٹی حق مہر یا گفٹ کے ضمرہ میں نہیں آتی۔
PLD 2009 Lah 227
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہیز کی رقم مدعیہ کے والد کے بنک اکاؤنٹ میں جمع کروائی گئی۔ اب Controversy باپ اور بیٹی کے درمیان ہے۔ خاوند کو اس بات کا ذمہ دار نہیں ٹھہرایا جاسکتا۔ یہ سول کورٹ کا معاملہ ہے فیملی کورٹ کا نہیں۔
2013 YLR 1903
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
شادی کی تاریخ کے بعد منتقل کی گئی پراپرٹی حق مہر یا گفٹ کے ضمرہ میں نہیں آتی۔
PLD 2011 Kar 196
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہاں طلائی زیورات یا انکی قیمت واپس کرنے کی ڈکری پاس ہوجائے تو اس صورت میں قیمت Date of Payment کے حساب سے دیکھی جائے گی۔
2013 SCMR 1049
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جس کیس میں مدعیہ صرف طلائی زیورات کی بابت استدعا کرے اور ان کی مالیت کرنسی میں نہ بتائے تو اس صورت میں مدعاعلیہ کے پاس آپشن ہوگی کہ وہ یاتو طلائی زیورات بمطابق وزن واپس کرے یا پھر اتنی رقم ادا کرے جس سے اس وزن کے طلائی زیورات اوپن مارکیٹ سے خریدے جاسکیں۔
2014 CLC 895
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
ہر باپ کا حق ہے کہ وہ اپنے بچے سے ملاقات غیر مشروط طریقے سے کرے۔ ملاقات کے لیے Surety Bonds مشروط کرنا غیرآئینی ہے اور اسے 199 کے تحت چیلنج کیا جاسکتا ہے۔
2014 CLC 1168
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
اگر Pendency کے دوران دعویٰ Partly واپس لیا جائے تو نیا سوٹ فائل کیا جاسکتا ہے۔ اس پر Res Judicata کا اصول لاگو نہیں ہوگا۔
2012 MLD 1795
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
معزز ہائیکورٹ نے مشاہدہ کیا کہ 99 فیصد سامان جہیز کے کیسز میں جھوٹ بولتی ہے کہ لِسٹ شادی کے وقت تیار کی گئی تھی۔ اور 1 فیصد کیسز میں وہ ضِد کرتی ہے کہ وہ جھوٹ نہیں بول رہی۔
2013 MLD 939 Lah
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
خرچہ نان و نفقہ ایک فائدہ نہیں بلکہ حق ہے۔ اگر خلع کے کیس میں خرچہ نان و نفقہ کو بطور شرط معاف کیا گیا تو یہ غیرقانونی ہے اور اسکی کوئی قانونی حیثیت نہیں۔
2012 MLD 1943
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
چونکہ CPC فیملی لاء پر اپلائی نہیں ہوتی مگر پھر بھی جو طریقہ کار CPC میں دیا گیا ہے انصاف کے بہترین حصول کے لیے وہ فیملی لاء میں اختیار کیا جاسکتا ہے۔
2012 MLD 1795
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹس ترمیمی ایکٹ 2015 کے تحت خرچہ نان و نفقہ 10 سے 5 فیصد کیا گیا۔ لیکن اس فیصلہ میں معزز سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان نے دوبارہ خرچہ نان و نفقہ 10 فیصد بحال کردیا۔
2016 SCMR 2069
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
باپ اپنے بچے کو خرچہ نان و نفقہ دینے کا پابند ہے۔ اس کا یہ بہانہ نہیں سنا جائے گا کہ اس کے پاس ذرائع آمدن نہیں ہیں۔
2018 CLC N 47
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
بیوی خاوند کی Cruelty ثابت نہ کرسکی۔ عدالت نے حکم دیا کہ بیوی شادی کے تحائف واپس کرے اور شوہر حق مہر ادا کرے۔
2018 PLD Pesh 34
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی لاء ایک سپیشل لاء ہے۔ اس میں خاوند کے لیے Past Maintenance کے لیے کوئی میعاد مقرر نہ ہے۔
2018 YLR 1501
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
پردہ نشیں عورت اپنے والد کے ذریعے اپنی شہادت ریکارڈ کروا سکتی ہے اگر اس کے والد کو کیس حالات کا اچھی طرح سے پتہ ہوتو۔
2002 CLC 1336
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی لاء ایک سپیشل لاء ہے۔ اس میں اجراء کی درخواست کے لیے کوئی میعاد مقرر نہ ہے۔
2018 YLR 1501
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
ہائی کورٹ فُل بینچ نے فیملی قوانین کی تشریح کرتے وقت یہ قرار دیا کہ فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ 1964 اور مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈینیس 1961 کی متعلقہ دفعات غیرقانونی ہیں کہ خلع کی صورت میں بیوی کو حق مہر کی رقم بھی واپس کرنی پڑے گی جبکہ اسلامی اصولوں کے تحت اسے صرف شادی کے تحائف واپس کرنے چاہئیں۔
PLD 2009 Pesh 92
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہاں بیوی/عورت رہتی ہوگی اسی جگہ فیملی کیس دائر کیا جاسکتا ہے۔ علاقائی اختیار سماعت نہیں دیکھا جائے گا۔
PLD 2006 Pesh 189
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔…
2016 PLD Pesh 109
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
خلع کے علاوہ باقی حقائق کے خلاف درخواست منسوخی ڈگری کی مدت اس وقت شروع ہوگی جب مدعا علیہ/ججمنٹ ڈیٹر کو اس ڈکری کا علم ہوگا۔
2017 CLC N 69
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔.................................
بیوی کو حق مہر ادا نہ کرنا بھی ظلم/Cruelty ہے۔ جوکہ خلع کے لیے بہترین گراؤنڈ ہے۔
2018 CLC 93
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کیس میں Interim Order کے خلاف رِٹ پٹیشن نہیں ہوسکتی۔
2018 CLC N 47
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹ کے لیے یہ ضروری ہے کہ وہ فیملی کیس کا 6 ماہ کے اندر اندر فیصلہ کرے۔
2018 YLR 1231
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹ کی یہ ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ یکطرفہ ڈگری پاس ہونے کے بعد مدعا علیہ کے پتہ پر ڈگری کی مصدقہ کاپی بھیجے۔
2017 CLC N 69
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
اگر والد کے پاس نابالغ کی پرورش کے لیے ذرائع نہیں ہیں تو والدہ کی ذمہ داری ہے کہ نابالغ کی پرورش کرے۔ اس کے علاوہ اس کیس لاء میں تفصیل سےنابالغان کے حوالےسے والدین کی ذمہ داریوں کا تعین کیا گیا ہے۔
PLD 2013 SC 557
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی عدالت یکطرفہ ڈکری پاس کرنے سے پہلے مدعا علیہ کو نوٹس حاضری بھیج سکتی ہے۔
2017 PLJ Pesh 01

Divorce--Effectiveness---Husband administered the divorce and notified the same to Chairman of Arbitration/Union Council whereupon certain...........

 2009 MLD 1478.
Ambreen Afshan V/S
Mrs. Idrees Qazu (Lahore)


S.7 Muslim Family Laws Ord. 1961. Divorce--Effectiveness---Husband administered the divorce and notified the same to Chairman of Arbitration/Union Council whereupon certain proceedings were taken and ultimately a certificate for the effectiveness of divorce was issued through the impugned order. Wife was well aware of the fact that husband had pronounced divorce to her for which consequential proceedings before the Arbitration/Union Council had also been taken. Father of the wife had been pursuing the matter before Arbitration Council. Case of the wife who had challenged effectiveness of the divorce was that the submission of divorce deed with a notice before the Arbitration Council could not ipso facto, operate and result into the dissolution of marriage. In the present case it could not be disputed that the period much beyond 90 days had expired from the date of notice of the divorce when impugned certificate of its effectiveness was issued, in the circumstances, especially keeping in view all the relevant facts of service of notice on the Chairman Union Council, the initiation of the proceedings by the Arbitration Council, the repeated appearance of father of the wife who was holding a power of attorney on her behalf in those proceedings and actual knowledge of the wife about the pendency and fact of those proceedings, divorce and its pronouncement had become effective. Failure to send a notice to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council would not render the divorce in-effective in Shariah. Effect of pronouncement of divorce in Shariah would not justify interference with impugned order nor would warrant exercise of discretion in favor of the petitioner/wife under Art.199 of the Constitution.

Maintenance of minors

نابالغان کا والد وفات پا گیا۔ انکا دادا جو عبوری خرچہ نان و نفقہ نابالغان ادا کر رہا تھا وہ بھی وفات پا گیا۔ لاہور ہائیکورٹ نے قرار دیا کہ نابالغان کے چچا جو اپنے والد(نابالغان کے دادا) کی وفات کے بعد اسکی جائیداد کے مالک تھے اپنے نابالغ بھتیجوں کا دو تہائی خرچہ نان و نفقہ ادا کرنیکے پابند ہیں۔
خرچہ نان و نفقہ کے حوالے سے لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا انتہائی تفصیلی معلوماتی فیصلہ
If the minor had no property or the income from his/her properties is insufficient to meet his/her needs after its possession has been handed over to him/her, the uncles would be liable to pay 2/3rd of the maintenance fixed by the court on account of their kinship and rest of 1/3rd would be contributed by the mother of the minor.

WRIT PETITION NO.50 of 2024
MUHAMMAD MAROOF and others versus Mst. MARIAM FAROOQ and others
2024 LHC 2111

Marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized in accordance with provisions of Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 in Pakistan. Respondent divorced petitioner which was.............

 1998 MLD 85.
 Farah Khan V/S
Tahir Hamid Khan & another (Lah.)

Marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized in accordance with provisions of Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 in Pakistan. Respondent divorced petitioner which was endorsed by Arbitration Council. Validity. Originally both petitioner and respondent were Pakistani citizens and after three years of marriage only respondent had acquired citizenship of USA. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, would extend to whole of Pakistan and applied to all muslim citizens of Pakistan wherever they might be in terms of S.(2) of the Ordinance. Provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, could be invoked where one of the party to marriage was Muslim citizen of Pakistan. Even if it was presumed that Arbitration council had no jurisdiction to entertain notice of talaq given by respondent under provisions of S.7 Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, right of talaq vested in husband under Sharia had not been taken away from any Muslim, irrespective of the country to which he belonged. Despite restrictions contained in Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, husband’s right of talaq would prevail as given to him under Quranic injunctions. Divorce pronounced by respondent had, thus, taken effect under Islamic injunctions even if notice to Arbitration council intimating such talaq or subsequent proceedings taken in that regard and certificate issued by Arbitration council endorsing effectiveness of talaq, were ignored. Constitutional petition also suffered from laches which would not warrant interference by High court at such belated stage when talaq under Sharia had already become effective.

S.7. Talaq pronounced by husband to wife thrice …. Right of revocation by husband……. Legality …. Withdrawal of notice............

 1996 MLD 1689.
Zubaida Khatoon V/S
Administrator Union Council Uch Gillani (Lah.)

S.7. Talaq pronounced by husband to wife thrice …. Right of revocation by husband……. Legality …. Withdrawal of notice of talaq by husband from Administrator, Union Council…. Validity …. Talaq pronounced by husband to wife thrice would become “Bain” and husband would have no right of its revocation as per injunctions laid down in Holy Quran and Sunnah, relating to divorce and its revocation and to that extent provisions of S.7 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, would give its way to those injunctions as enshrined in the constitution.

بالغ بیٹا کن حالات میں خرچہ نان ونفقہ کا حقدار ہوگا

 Adult son is also entitled to get maintenance.

Obligation of the father to maintain his adult son who has not yet accomplished basic education, enabling him to earn his livelihood, may be considered by the court in an appropriate case, a factor falling with the exception to the general rule (supra).
Education is the necessary qualification which is required to a person to enable him to earn bread and butter. It does not include higher studies and studies abroad. From the analysis of above referred case laws, this Court has observed that the learned (naeem)Trial Court has to ascertain in the light of evidence of the parties as to which extent the father is bound to pay the educational expenses of an adult son. While doing so, following points must be taken into account by the learned Trial Court:-
i) First and the foremost consideration is the capacity and financial status of father.
ii) Age and conduct of the adult son.
iii) Whether the adult son has his own resources to sustain his studies.
iv) The nature and stage of studies.
v) Academic performance of adult and his passion & zeal towards the education
vi) The extent of education which is essential to enable him to earn his livelihood. Obviously, this shall not include the higher studies, especially studies abroad without there being a promise by the father to support him.
vii) Whether the son gives due respect and show regard to his father and in any case is not disobedient or estranged man.
It shall also be determined by the learned Trial Court after recording evidence of the parties and analyzing (naeem)status of the father as to whether the adult sons are entitled to receive maintenance allowance or not.
No doubt the court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out. The party who has no connection with the relief sought may be struck off from the record as a party.(naeem) The court can also strike out a party over whom it has no jurisdiction. Whether a party is to be struck out or not is to be determined on the basis of plaint as framed. The word „Party‟ has been defined in West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964

WP 62571/24
Muhammad Imran Vs Samina Kausar etc
Mr. Justice Ahmad Nadeem Arshad
11-10-2024
2024 LHC 4292













It is clear from the preamble of the Family Act that the law was enforced with a vivid object to take out the matters falling within the ambit thereof from the ordinary regime qua dispensation...........

 2024 SCMR 1642

It is clear from the preamble of the Family Act that the law was enforced with a vivid object to take out the matters falling within the ambit thereof from the ordinary regime qua dispensation of justice , and for the expeditious disposal of such matters , a special forum was created in which the rigors of procedural implications and the requirements of the Evidence Law ( Qanoon - e - Shahadat Order , 1984 ) were either dispensed with or were simplified ; with an addition of a statutory mechanism , enabling the parties for an amicable settlement of their dispute.
Since the legislature has conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the Family Courts , by virtue of section 55 of the Family Act , to expedite family cases and tried to cordon off family litigation to the extent of a single family appeal , it would not reflect well on a Constitutional Court to interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Writ Jurisdiction as provided under Article 199 of the Constitution , unless the jurisdiction exercised by the Family Courts was contrary to law and / or findings reached in exercise of said jurisdiction are perverse and without proper appreciation of evidence that non - interference would lead to a grave miscarriage of justice or for that matter injustice .
C.P.L.A.263-K/2024
Muhammad Shamim v. Mst. Asma Begum and others

نان ونفقہ میں سالانہ اضافہ ابتدائی ڈگری(basic)کی رقم بجائے موجودہ(current) رقم پر ہوگا مثلا اگر فیملی کورٹ 5000 روپے ماہوار خرچہ ناں و نفقہ ڈگری کرتی ہے تو پہلے سال سالانہ اضافہ 5000 روپے کی رقم پر ہوگا اگلے سال سالانہ اضافہ 5500 روپے اور اگلے سال سالانہ اضافہ 6050 روپے کی رقم پر ہوگا

 Section 17-A(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 interpreted to hold that it postulates compound calculation of annual 10% increase in the maintenance allowance.

It is abundantly clear that Section 17-A(3) of the Act is a beneficial, remedial or curative provision which calls for liberal interpretation. It is triggered when the Court omits to prescribe annual increase in maintenance or does not expressly specify if annual increase so prescribed will take effect on compound or non-compound basis while passing a decree under Section 17-A(2) read with Section 12(2) of the Act. If the legislature has not specifically provided for compound calculation in Section 17-A(3) of the Act, it is equally true that the legislature(naeem) has also not provided otherwise. The expression „the maintenance fixed by the Court shall automatically stand increased at the rate of ten percent each year” ordinarily imply that quantum of maintenance fixed under a decree does not remain static or constant but is a variable figure which is meant to increase after each year. After increase of 10% at the end of first year, a new quantum of maintenance comes in field and the amount gets merged or amalgamated in the quantum of maintenance(naeem) fixed by Court. The process is repeated after each year till the legal entitlement of wife or children under the decree. Therefore, annual increase of each year is required to be calculated on the merged amount of last preceding year for the reason that 10% increase is intrinsically linked with the principal amount and is an inseparable part of the decree. If the rent is traditionally increased with reference to the last prevailing rent, there is no reason why maintenance should not be increased based on the same principle. The compound calculation of maintenance not only caters for inflation and rising cost of living but also allows to account for growing needs and requirements of wife and children, thus, reducing the occasions to resort to Court seeking enhancement in maintenance allowance. Hence(naeem), it is concluded that when a decree of maintenance does not prescribe an annual increase or is silent qua calculation of prescribed annual enhancement on principal or aggregate amount of maintenance, Section 17A(3) of the Act will come into operation and the Executing Court shall calculate the due decreed amount on compound basis.

7340/24
Saba Gull Shahd & 2 Others Vs Additional District Judge Faisalabad etc
Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha
09-10-2024
2024 LHC 4177

















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