Case Law and Judgment S.5, Sched.---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.5--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199-Constitutional petition-Suit for recovery of dower-

(a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S.5, Sched.---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.5--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199-Constitutional petition-Suit for recovery of dower---Registration of marriage-Interpolation in entries of Nikah Register---Remedy---Presumption of truth attached to duly registered Nikahnama---Scope---Suit filed by petitioner/wife was dismissed by Trial Court and the same was upheld by appellate Court--- Contention of the wife was that both the courts below have misread the . contents of Nikahnama according to which an amount of Rupees Two Lac, Ten tolas gold and house was fixed as dower-- Respondent/husband took the plea that the entries mentioned in Nikahnama were forged, fabricated and manipulated with the connivance of Nikah Registrar---Validity---Nikahnama was a public document which was registered under the provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and as such presumption of truth was attached to the same-According to law, four copies of the Nikahnama were prepared, out of which one was kept by Nikah Registrar, second was sent to the concerned Municipal Corporation or Union Council, third copy was supplied to the bride and the fourth one was given to the bridegroom---Very object behind providing copies to all concerned was that each party could verify the entries in Nikahnama according to the terms of marriage settled between them-If the respondent/husband was of the view that Nikah Registrar had interpolated in the entries of Nikah Register, he could approach the Deputy Commissioner who was the controlling authority and could get the same corrected but he did not bother to avail his remedy against the alleged interpolation in Nikahnama---Both the courts below had wrongly dismissed the suit of the petitioner/wife and she was entitled to recover the same dower amount, gold and a house from the respondent husband as settled between them at the time of Nikah-Constitutional petition was allowed.

Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Suraya PLD 2000 Lah. 355 rel.

(b) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---

----Ss. 5 & 10---West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Transaction of dower-Completion of---Suit for recovery of dower---Transaction of dower would become complete on the day of marriage and the endorsement of dower against column in Nikahnama was a verification of settlement and arrangement already reached between parties-If wife make a demand through filing a suit for recovery of dower, the person contending the entries in Nikahnama were not correct was bound to rebut said entries through a strong evidence otherwise the court was bound to give a solemn affirmation to the entries in Nikahnama.

Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Suraya PLD 2000 Lah. 355 rel.

(c) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Recovery of dower---Immoveable property---Proof--- Description, non mention of---Description of immoveable property claimed by wife as dower, was not mentioned in Nikahnama---Effect-- Description of house/immoveable property was not mentioned in the Nikahnama, which fact was not fatal to the claim of the petitioner/wife-- Revenue Authorities were directed to inquire about the market value of the house owned by husband at the time of marriage and husband was directed to pay the amount evaluated by Revenue Authorities to wife---Constitutional petition was allowed.

Dr. Asma Ali v. Masood Sajjad and others PLD 2011 SC 221 rel.

Mrs. Sarkar Abbas for Petitioners.

Javed Akhtar Bhatti for Respondent No.l.

Date of hearing: 9th September, 2013.


 Mst. NABEELA SHAHEEN VS ZIA WAZEER BHATTI
P L D 2015 Lahore 88
Before Muhammad Farrukh Irfan Khan, J
Mst. NABEELA SHAHEEN and others---Petitioners
Versus
ZIA WAZEER BHATTI and others---Respondents
Writ Petition No.3237 of 2011, heard on 09/09/2013.

JUGMENT

MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, J.---Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 the petitioners have sought for modification of the judgments and decrees dated 13-4-2011 and 20-9-2011, of the learned Judge Family Court, and Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, respectively, to the extent of their maintenance allowance and its annual enhancement and further prayed for decree of the suit as per their claim by setting aside rest of the impugned judgments.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioners filed a suit for recovery of maintenance, maternity expenses (on the birth of petitioner No.2), dower of Rs.200,000, a house, 13-1/2 tolas gold and dowry articles worth Rs.3,82,441. The suit was contested. Issues were framed whereupon evidence of the parties was recorded. The learned trial Court partially decreed the suit, vide judgment and decree dated 13-4-2011 in the following terms:---

"the maintenance allowance of minor plaintiff No.2 is fixed at the rate of Rs.5000 (rupees five thousand only) per month from the date of institution of this suit with 10% annual increase till further orders whereas the instant suit is hereby dismissed to the extent of recovery of maintenance allowance of plaintiff No.l. The instant suit to the extent of recovery of delivery expenses of Rs.50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only), gold ornaments, deferred dower of Rs.2,00,000 (Rupees two lacs only) and a house is also dismissed. However, the plaintiff No.1 is held entitled to the recovery of dowry articles as per list Ex.D-11."

3. Feeling aggrieved, both the parties filed separate appeals. The learned lower Appellate Court dismissed both the appeals, with the modification in the judgment and decree of the trial Court to the effect that petitioner No.1/Mst. Nabeela Shaheen was also held entitled to the recovery of her maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs.5,000 per month. The petitioners being dissatisfied have now invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by filing the instant writ petition.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Mrs. Sarkar Abbas, Advocate, at the very outset submitted that she does not press this petition to the extent of claim of maternity expenses incurred by petitioner No.2 on the birth of petitioner No.l. Regarding rest of the claim the learned counsel contended that the findings of both the courts below are against the law and facts on the record; that judgments and decrees of both the courts below are based on surmises and conjectures; that both the courts have misread the evidence available on the record; that petitioner No.1 had brought strong evidence on the record to prove the contents of the nikahnama according to which an amount of Rs.200,000, 10 tolas gold and a house was fixed as dower but the same was misinterpreted by both the courts below and illegally turned down her prayer; that the maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs.5000 per month granted to petitioners is insufficient in this age of inflation. Moreover, petitioner No.2 is school going and also suffers from disease of asthama ,as such, extra money is needed to cater for his requirements; that respondent is a UK national and earns a handsome amount and he is bound to maintain the petitioners according to his status and income;

5. Conversely, it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that that maintenance allowance fixed by the Courts below does not commensurate with his source of income as he is jobless; that the learned lower appellate Court has illegally granted to petitioner No.1 the maintenance allowance which was rightly declined by the learned trial Court; that at the time of `nikah' only Rs.2000 was fixed as prompt dower and the entries mentioned in column No. 14 of the `nikahnanna' are forged and fabricated and are result of manipulation with the connivance of the concerned Nikah Registrar; that petitioner No.1 was given 10 tolas gold ornaments by respondent at the time of `nikah' which are still with her; that there is no description of the house given in the `nikahnama'; that the dowry list appended with the plaint also contained such articles which were never given at the time of marriage and the receipts thereof produced by the petitioner were maneuvered later on.

6.Arguments heard, Record perused.

7. Admittedly, the respondent is a UK national ever since his marriage with petitioner No.1. He has taken inconsistent pleas with regard to his source of income in his written statement and during the arguments addressed by his counsel before this Court. In the written statement he stated that he has no permanent source of income while it is argued by his learned counsel that he is jobless. But he has not been able to deny that he is getting sufficient subsistence allowance being a UK national. In the circumstances, when there is no evidence that petitioner No.1 has been living apart from her husband without any lawful excuse, she is entitled to get maintenance allowance as prayed for in her suit till the subsistence of marriage. Similarly, petitioner No.2, who is minor son of the respondent is a school going child. He being a patient of asthma is also required to meet considerable expense on his medication. In these circumstances, his maintenance fixed at the rate of Rs.5000 per month seems' to be insufficient to meet his requirements. This Court is, therefore, inclined to enhance his rate of maintenance from Rs.5000 to Rs.10000 with 10% annual increase.

8. So far as the question of dower, a house and 10 tolas gold is concerned, the petitioner has produced evidence from which it can safely be inferred that at the time of marriage Rs.200,000 was fixed as dower, in addition to 10 tolas gold and a house. The respondent's own witness Zaheer Ahmed while appearing as D.W.2 admitted in his cross-examination that an amount of Rs.200,000 was fixed as dower. The respondent has failed to adduce any cogent evidence to rebut version of the petitioner. There is no weight in the arguments that the entries in the `nikahnama' have been interpolated. `Nikahnama' is a public document which is registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and as such presumption of truth is attached to it. According to law, four copies of the `nikahnama' are prepared, out of which one is kept by Nikah Registrar, second is sent to the concerned Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee or Union Council, third copy is supplied to the bride and the fourth one is given to the bridegroom. The very object behind it is so that each party may verify the entries in the Nikahnama according to the terms of marriage settled between them. The' `nikah', between the parties was solemnized on 19-8-2007, the suit was filed on 19-12-2009 and during the period .from 19-8-2007 to 19-12-2009 and even thereafter the respondent did-not bother to avail his remedy against the alleged interpolation in the `nikahnama': During the course of evidence he has equally failed to bring op record any thing to prove that the entries in column No.14 were changed. In the case of Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Suraya (PLD 2000 Lahore 355) it has been held that if any party was of the view that Nikah Registrar had interpolated in the entries, of Nikah Register, such party could approach the Deputy Commissioner who was the Controlling Authority and could get the same corrected. In the cited case it has also been held that transaction of dower would become complete on the day of marriage and that endorsement of dower against column in `nikahnama' was a verification of settlement and arrangement already reached between the parties. And that whenever a woman makes a demand through filing a suit for recovery of dower, the person who contends that the entries in Nikahnama are not correct is bound to rebut these entries through strong evidence otherwise the Courts are bound to give a solemn affirmation to the entries in Nikahnama. Keeping in view the evidence available on the record this Court is of the opinion that both the courts below have wrongly dismissed the suit of the petitioner qua the claim regarding dower amount of Rs.200,000, 10 tolas gold and a house. She was entitled to recover the same from the respondent as settled between the parties at the time of `nikah'. No doubt description of the house is not mentioned in the `nikahnama' but this fact is not fatal to the claim of the petitioner. In the case cited as Dr. Asma Ali v. Masood Sajad and others PLD 2011 SC 221 wherein no description of land was given in `nikahnama' in terms of agricultural land's khasra numbers or identifying data, Supreme Court directed the trial Court to appoint commission comprising of a member of Revenue hierarchy to determine the average price of per kanal of agricultural land and thereafter wife was held entitled to receive as dower market value of 100 kanals of agricultural land as determined. Seeking guidance from the cited judgment this Court is inclined to direct the District Officer (Revenue), Rawalpindi to inquire as to which one of the house at the time of marriage was owned by the respondent and what was its value. The market value so evaluated by the Revenue Authorities will be payable by the respondent to the petitioner No. l.

9. For what has been discussed above, the instant writ petition is accepted in the terms enumerated above.

JJK/N-55/LPetition allowed.

Case Laws and Judgment related Section 5 & Sched., Nikahnama ,Nikah-- Validity---Dower

(a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5 & Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Fixation and payment of dower---Wife's entitlement to dower property as per its entry in Nikahnama---Husband denied fixation of dower and its incorporation in the deed----Effect---Courts below concurrently found wife to be entitled to dower which had been entered in Nikahnama at the time of Nikah-- Validity---Dower claimed by wife was incorporated in relevant column of Nikahnama---Husband's denial of fixation of dower in toto was negatived by concurrent findings of Courts below, who found Nikahnama to have been duly executed---Husband could not advance any reason to dislodge presumption attached to such document ---Nikahnama being public document, execution thereof, was verified by Nikah Registrar who is public officer and even certified copy can be produced in proof of its contents and in absence of any rebuttal it would hold the ground---Genuineness and execution of Nikahnama was, thus, not questionable and wife would be entitled to the property incorporated in Nikahnama.

Mst. Zubaida Bibi and others v. Mst. Majidan and another 1994 SCMR 1978 rel.

(b) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---

----S. 5---West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5-- Registration Act (XVI of 1908), Ss. 17 & 49---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Transfer of immovable property by husband to wife through Nikahnama which had not been registered under Registration Act, 1908---Validity---Nikah of parties was in the form prescribed under Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and the rules framed thereunder and same was registered with the Nikah Registrar in accordance with prescribed mode and thus, Nikahnama had a different status than any other unregistered document through which some immovable property had purportedly been transferred-- Nikahnama was a public document executed by a Public Officer, certified copy whereof, was sufficient for proof of its contents unless its rebuttal was effected through cogent evidence---Dower deed by which immovable property was purported to be transferred was, thus, not considered to be compulsorily registerable under Registration Act, 1908, and wife was entitled to claim immovable property on basis of Nikahnama wherein same was incorporated in lieu of dower.

Mst. Zubaida Bibi and others v. Mst. Majidan and another 1994 SCMR '1978; Umar Bakhsh.v. Mst. Zamrut Jan and 9 others PLD 1973 Pesh. 63; Mst. Allah Jawai v. Allah Ditta PLD 1975 Lah. 1399; Inayat Ullah v. Perveen Akhtar 1985 CLC 1454; 1989 SCMR 1871; 1989 CLC 1327; Khawaja and another v Nur Alam and others PLD 1953 LA. 277; Fazal-ur-Rehman v. Mst. Sosan Jan and others 1989 SCMR 651 and Arif Hussain and another v. The State PLD 1982 FSC 42 rel.

Haji Muhammad Zahir Shah for Petitioner.

Rasool Khan Khattak for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 29th August, 1995.


 AMJAD HUSSAIN VS SHAGUFTA
Re-edited
P L D 1996 Peshawar 64
Before Mian Muhammad Ajmal and Mian Shakirullah Jan, JJ
AMJAD HUSSAIN and another---Petitioners
versus
Mst. SHAGUFTA and 2 others---Respondents
Writ Petition No. 697 of 1994, decided on /01/.
th August, 1995.


JUDGMENT

MIAN SHAKIRULLAH JAN, J.--The controversy between the parties i.e. the husband (petitioner) and wife (responde4t), which is the subject-matter of the present litigation, is fixation and payment of the dower about which the petitioner is having the concurrent judgments and decisions against him of the two forums of the exclusive jurisdiction which have been questioned through the instant writ petition.

2. The admitted facts of the case are that (i) the existence of relationship of the parties as a husband and wife for the last about 16/17 years as the marriage has taken place in the year, 1978 and which (relationship as a husband and wife) still exists; (ii) the birth of the three children as a result of wedlock who are alive and residing with the wife; (iii) the contract of a second marriage by the petitioner after which the respondent began to reside with her parents with the only disputed fact as alleged by the petitioner that the second marriage was contracted with the consent of the respondent; and (iv) that the fixation of dower weighing 8 tolas of gold out of which according to the petitioner, 6 tolas were entrusted to the respondent while according to the respondent only 5 tolas were given to her. The main dispute between the parties is with regard to the fixation of dower of immovable property consisting of 1/2 share in the land measuring 6 Kanals 2 Marlas and 1/3 share in the house. The trial Court granted the decree of the dower claimed by the respondent i.e. with respect of the immovable property' consisting of 1/2 share in the land and 1/3 share in the house and 3 tolas golden ornaments with a further relief of preliminary decree to the extent of 1/3 share in the house. The appellate forum concurred with the findings and conclusions of the trial Court except with a modification that the Family Court has got no jurisdiction to grant a decree for possession through partition. It is these findings which have now been challenged by the petitioner through the instant Constitutional petition.

3. The respondent, in addition to the oral evidence, relied on the Nikahnama' Exh. PW 1/ 1 and the execution and contents of which were testified by the Nikah Registrar who appeared as P.W.1. The dower claimed by the respondent finds its incorporation in the relevant column of the Nikahnama. Though the petitioner denied the fixation of the dower in toto and also his thumb-impression on the Nikahnama but the two Courts below held otherwise i.e. found the Nikahnama to have been duly executed. Apart from the concurrent findings of the two forums of exclusive jurisdiction the petitioner could not advance any reason to dislodge the presumption attached to the document i.e. Nikahnama as being a public document and the execution of which was verified by the Nikah Registrar who is a public officer and even a certified copy may be produced in proof of its contents and in the absence of any rebuttal the same holds the ground. In this respect reliance can be placed on Mst. Zubaida Bibi and others v. Mst. Majidan and another 1994 SCMR 1978. This judgment after analysing and interpreting section 5 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, the definition of the public officer as given in section 2 at Serial No. 17 of the Civil Procedure Code and also sections 74 and 77 of the Evidence Act the corresponding Articles of which are 85 and 88 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 it was held:--

"This duty and system of remuneration to the Nikah Registrar makes the Nikah Registrar a 'Public officer' and the Nikahnama a public document. Section 77 of the Evidence Act provides that 'such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies'."

4. In this view of the matter, both with regard to the factual and legal position the genuineness and execution of the Nikahnama is not questionable.

5. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner took another objection with regard to the transfer of immovable property through the Nikahnama which had not been registered under the Registration Act and relied on the judgment reported in Umar Bakhsh. v. Zamrut Jan and 9 others PLD 1973 Pesh. 63, but this objection was also untenable and the judgment referred to on behalf of the petitioner relates to a dower deed dated 1918 and not having the backing of any statutory law but in the instant case the Nikahnama is in the form prescribed under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and the rules framed thereunder and which is registered with the Nikah Registrar in accordance with the rules prescribed therefore and having a different status than any other unregistered document through which some immovable property had purportedly been transferred and the legal status of such document was evident from the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above to be a public document executed by a public officer and the certified copy of which was sufficient for the proof of its contents unless having some appropriate rebuttal. Even otherwise in the subsequent judgments of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court the dower deed by which the immovable property is purported to be transferred was not considered to be compulsorily registerable under the Registration Act: In a judgment reported in Mst. Allah Jawai. v. Allah Ditta PLD 1975 Lahore 1399 wherein it was held:--

"Ordinarily in a transfer of immovable property by a Muslim husband to his wife in lieu of dower, there are two distinct gifts, one by each party to the other. The husband transfers by gift the property while the wife makes the gifts of her right to recover dower--in other words she makes a gift of the dower debt. The transaction is essentially Hiba-bil -Ewaz.

As already considered such a transfer by a Muslim husband in favour of his wife in lieu of her dower being essentially a gift was not required to be effected through a registered instrument.

The document in the form of entry in the Nikahnama EXh.P/1 relating to the transfer was not compulsorily registerable."

6. This view was re-affirmed in another case reported in Inayat Ullah. v. Perveen Akhtar 1985 CLC 1454 where in it was held:------

"The objection raised by the appellant that Exh.P.1. being an unregistered document does not create any interest or right in the disputed house in favour of the respondent in view of provisions of section 49 of the Registration Act is not tenable in view of the fact that the disputed house was given by the appellant to the respondent in lieu of her dower and the transaction under the circumstances must be considered as one of the Hibba-bil-Ewaz. The provisions of sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act are not attracted to the facts of the case and as held in Mst. Allah Jawai's case the transfer of property by the husband to his wife in lieu of her dower can be effected even without a registered instrument."

7. The judgment referred to above was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as reported in 1989 SCMR 1871. In another case reported in Anwar Khan and 16 other. v. Mst. Sahibzada and 3 others 1989 CLC 1327 the Hon'ble Judge while dealing with the case held that the dower deed was a document which not creating or extinguishing right in immovable property--Execution of such document thereto only acknowledged the factum of transfer of immovable property in favour of his wife in lieu of dower. The relevant part of which is reproduced for the sake of convenience:------

"As regards the plea of the non-registration of the deed in question, the careful perusal thereof would show that the same was not a document creating or extinguishing right in immovable property worth more than Rs.100 but the executant thereof only acknowledged the factum of transfer of immovable property in favour of his wives in lieu of dower having already taken place 3/4 years prior thereto. Under section 17 of the Registration Act only those instruments which create or extinguish rights in immovable property worth more than Rs.99 require compulsory registration. The instant document does not offend against the said provision of law inasmuch as it neither creates nor extinguishes rights but is an acknowledgment deed, whereby the executant simply admits an existing ownership in property through a valid transfer, having been completed much earlier than the time of execution. In this view of the matter, I am fortified by the judgment of the Peshawar High Court in case Mst. Zarin Qaisha v. Arbab Wali Muhammad Khan and 5 others reported as PLD 1976 Pesh. 128 and those of the Lahore High Court in case Fateh Muhammad v. Muhammad Shafi and another reported as PLD 1953 Lah. 251 and Khawaja and another v. Nur Alam and others PLD 1953 Lah. 277. The deed copy Exh.P.W.2/1, therefore, did not require registration and was rightly relied upon by the Courts below in arriving at their conclusions."

8. In another case reported in Fazal-ur-Rehman. v. Mst. Sown Jan and others 1989 SCMR 651, the Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the objection with regard to the non-registration or non-entry of the dower deed in the revenue record by holding that the column in the Nikahnama indicate that they refer to arrangement that had already been subscribed to by the parties and the record was prepared only to verify the events which had already happened. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced as follows:--

"This distinction between the solemnization of the marriage and its being recorded and got registered has been recognized in the case of Arif Hussain and another v. The State PLD 1982 FSC 42. In the context of section 5 of the Ordinance it is clear that solemnization of marriage and maintaining a record of it are two different acts. Solemnization of the marriage precedes the completion of the formalities with regard to the preparation of record, of it and getting it registered. Even the columns contained in the Nikahnama clearly indicate that they refer to arrangement that has already been subscribed to by the parties. In such a situation it cannot be taken to be an instrument or document of transfer of property but it has to be taken merely as a record of it."

9. In this view of the matter this objection is also untenable.

10. Consequently, this writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.

A.A./1927/PPetition dismissed.

Nikahnama is forged and has a cause of action about adjudgment of Nikahnama, would be a cause of action under Section-5 of the Act, 1964

The Hon‟ble Lahore High Court in case of “Irshad Ahmad V. Muhammad Sharif and another (PLD 2006 Lahore 260), in an irresistible manner expounded that “when anyone of the parties i.e. husband/wife alleges that Nikahnama is forged and has a cause of action about adjudgment of Nikahnama, would be a cause of action under Section-5 of the Act, 1964.” 

Part of Judgment : 

JUDGMENT SHEET IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD 
Writ Petition-219-2020 -
Author:
Honourable Mr. Justice Fiaz Ahmad Anjum Jandran

Case Law and Judgment West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss. 5, Sched & 10---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199-- Constitutional petition---Dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula-- Khula,

West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----Ss. 5, Sched & 10---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199-- Constitutional petition---Dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula-- Khula, meaning of---`Khula' was a release from the matrimonial bond and right of Khula vested in the woman according to the dictates of Holy Qur'an---Jurisdiction vested with the Court to determine whether condition of Khula existed in the pleadings or the evidence led by the parties--- Court would release the woman from her matrimonial bond by way of Khula---Such right purely rested with the woman according to the dictates of Holy Qur'an/because if a woman demanded right of Khula, she had to return all the benefits received by her from her husband---Defendant woman, in the present case, had not filed suit for dissolution of marriage and had not asked for Khula even in her written statement in suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by her husband-- While determining the right of Khula, Court had to use its best prudence, capability and capacity to find out the truth and the prevalent conditions existing for such rights---Decree would follow the prayer in the plaint---No suit for dissolution of marriage was filed by defendant in case with the averment that she wanted dissolution of marriage on basis of Khula, but Family Court keeping in view the amended provisions of S. 9 of West Pakistan Family. Court Act, 1964 treating written statement of defendant woman filed in suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by her husband, as plaint, dissolved marriage on basis of Khula and dismissed suit filed by plaintiff-husband---Validity---Court could not pass decree on basis of Khula while dismissing the suit for restitution of conjugal rights---Chairman Arbitration Council on receiving judgment and decree passed by Family Court passed order by way of approving reconciliation---Family Court being corum non judice summoned Chairman on application of plaintiff husband and directed him to issue a certificate of divorce which was arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction by Family Court---Family Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the proceedings of Chairman Arbitration Council after being functus officio and could not direct Chairman to issue certificate of Talaq on basis of decree passed in suit for restitution of conjugal rights-- Judgments of Family Court were set aside being without lawful authority and case was remanded to be decided afresh in accordance with law.

Malik Ijaz Hussain Gorcha for Petitioner.

 Mst. SOFIA RASOOL VS Miss ABHAR GULL, JUDGE, FAMILY COURT, LAHORE and others
2004 C L C 1932
[Lahore]
Before Mrs. Fakhar-un-Nisa Khokhar, J
Mst. SOFIA RASOOL---Petitioner
Versus
Miss ABHAR GULL, JUDGE, FAMILY COURT, LAHORE and others---Respondents
Writ Petitions Nos.8503 and 398 of 2004, heard on 21/06/2004.

JUDGMENT

This be considered as admitted case. Through this single judgment Writ Petition No.8503 of 2004 and 398 of 2004 are decided. Respondent No.2 is proceeded ex parte.

2. Brief facts in the instant writ petition are that a decree of dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula was issued by learned Judge Family Court, Lahore which according to the petitioner was never claimed by her as she did not file a suit for dissolution of marriage. She was at America and after getting knowledge regarding the same she rushed to Pakistan and has filed instant writ petitions.

3. Pre-admission notices were issued to respondent No.2 and his counsel has appeared and this case was heard at length but during the proceeding there was likelihood of compromise between the parties and the case was adjourned to 16-6-2004 and on that day learned counsel for the respondent No.2 in order to avoid this Court filed application for adjournment. He was given another opportunity to filed application for arguments or reply but he failed to do so, made against the respondent No.2.

4. Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that learned Judge Family Court issued a decree in a suit filed by the respondent No.2 for restitution of conjugal rights and the petitioner filed written statement but in the written statement she never claimed decree on `the basis of Khula'. Even after the decree was issued illegally by the learned Judge, Family Court on the basis of Khula respondent No.2 filed an application for issuance of certificate of Talaq before the Chairman Arbitration Council /respondent No.3. The petitioner appeared before the Chairman Arbitration Council and asserted that neither she has demanded Talaq on the basis of Khula nor she wants the same in any manner for the sake of her kids and she does not want Khula. Respondent No.2 absented himself before the Nazim and on the basis of statement of petitioner the Chairman accepted reconciliation and passed order, dated 17-2-2004 by way of approving reconciliation Allan-e- Masalhet. After getting the knowledge of order, dated 17-2-2004, respondent No.2 gave an application before the learned Judge Family Court respondent No.1 malafidely and learned Judge, Family Court being functus officio on 15-4-2004 directed respondent No.3 Chairman, Arbitration Council to issue certificate of Talaq on the basis of decree, dated 4-12-2003. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that on 10-5-2004 when the case was called by respondent No.1ilearned Judge Family Court, respondent No.3 was present in the Court and learned Judge Family Court directed respondent No.3 to present certificate of Talaq to respondent No.2 without any delay otherwise she will send him to judicial lock-up. Learned Judge, Family Court acted in an arbitrary manner which wag not called for through the judgment and decree passed by learned Judge Family Court on the basis of Khula while considering the written statement as plaint under section 9 of the Family Court Act, 1964, is entirely illegal and the direction of respondent No.3 to issue certificate of Talaq to petitioner is glaring illegality and arbitrary. As the order, dated 17-2-204 passed by Chairman could only be assailed in a writ petition before the High Court and the learned Judge Family Court being corum non judice had no authority under the law to direct respondent No.1 to issue certificate of Talaq keeping in view the reconciliation order, dated 17-2-2004 by Chairman Arbitration Council. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that, being aggrieved from the manner of conducting aforesaid case by the learned Judge Family Court petitioner preferred an application for transfer and requested the learned Judge Family Court to adjourn the case in view of transfer application moved to the learned District Judge as the same Court had issued notice to other party and summoned the record of the case and even the case was fixed for 2-1-2004, learned trial Court without any hesitation dismissed the suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the plaintiff and passed the decree on the basis of Khula through impugned judgment and decree, dated 4-12-2003 which is entirely against law and facts of the case as no assertion was made by the petitioner to get the decree on the basis of Khula as the petitioner had children out of her wedlock and she alongwith her kids is living happily in America and she never wanted to disturb herself or her kids by way of getting Khula and she tried to locate telephone number and address of respondent/plaintiff but failed.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.

6. The suit for restitution of conjugal rights was filed by the respondent/plaintiff Muhammad Nadeem Qadir with a prayer that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights be passed in his favour on 5th March, 2003. Written statement was filed by the petitioner. On preliminary objection of non-maintainability of suit and the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis that plaintiff is residing in Singapore and defendant is residing in America having the nationality of America, that there were issues out of the wedlock of plaintiff and defendant; and no maintenance allowance has been paid by the plaintiff and he deserted himself from the house of the defendant and that the plaint is not signed by him and he was estopped by his conduct and that he has taken 20,000 dollars and jewellery worth Rs.10,00,000 from the defendant and there is no chance of reconciliation. In the prayer she prayed for that the suit of the plaintiff be dismissed and decree for maintenance at the rate of 1000 dollars per month per child may be passed against him.

7. It is always settled law that the decree follows the prayer in the plaint. No suit for dissolution of marriage was filed by the petitioner with the averment that she wants dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula, Learned Judge Family Court, keeping in view the amended provision of section 9 of Family Courts Act, 1964 treating it as plaint dissolved the marriage on the basis of Khula and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. The provisions of section 9 are reproduced as below:---

"Amendment of section 9 W.P. Act XXXV of 1964. In the said Act in section 9---

(1b) A defendant wife may, in-the written statement to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, make a claim for dissolution of marriage including Khula which shall be deemed as a plaint and no separate suit shall be for it:

Provided that the proviso to subsection (4) of section 10 shall apply where the decree for dissolution of marriage is to be passed on the ground of Khula.

8. From the perusal of written statement the petitioner has nowhere pleaded for dissolution .of marriage on the basis of Khula nor she prayed for dissolving the marriage on the basis of Khula. It is astonishing how learned Judge Family Court even without filing suit for dissolution of marriage treating the written statement as plaint has granted Khula when no prayer for Khula is made nor any prayer for dissolving the marriage on the basis of Khula is added in the written statement.

9. Moreover, section 10 of Family Court Act as amended is reproduced below:---

"provided that notwithstanding any decision or judgment of any Court or Tribunal, the Family Court in a suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation fails, shall pass decree for dissolution of marriage forthwith and shall also restore to the husband the Haq Mehr received by the wife in consideration of marriage at the time of marriage."

If reconciliation fails then learned Judge Family Court is bound to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage forthwith and restore Haq Mehr to the husband in consideration of marriage at the time of marriage. From the record it is apparent that the plaintiff/respondent was in America proposition of reconciliation was not made by the Court in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights on 4-12-2003 respondent made the following statement:

And thereafter learned Judge Family Court passed the impugned judgment which is re-produced below:---

This is glaring illegality committed by the learned Judge Family Court who has arbitrarily passed decree on the basis of Khula in consideration of Haq Mehr without even recording the statement of defendant or her counsel.

10. " Khula" is a release from the matrimonial bond. The right vest in the woman according to the dictates of Holy Qur'an. Jurisdiction vests with the Court to determine whether condition of Khula exist in the evidence, in the pleadings or the evidence led by the parties. The Court' will release the woman from her matrimonial bond by way of Khula. This right purely rests with the woman according to the dictates of Holy Qur'an because if a woman demands right of Khula she has to return all the benefits received by her from her husband but here is a case where a woman has not filed a suit for dissolution of marriage and has not asked for Khula even in the written statement filed in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights. While determining the right of Khula Court is desired by law to use his best prudence, capability and capacity to find out the truth and the prevalent condition existing for such right. While going through the prayer of written statement it does not contain any prayer for Khula instead in the written statement the petitioner has prayer for allowing maintenance allowance and dismissal of suit for, restitution of conjugal rights, therefore, the Court could not pass a decree on the basis of Khula while dismissing the suit for restitution of conjugal rights.

11. In the second writ petition grievance of the petitioner is that Chairman Arbitration Council passed an order, dated 17-2-2004 by way of approving reconciliation "ﺖﺤﻠﺎﺻﻣﻦﻼﻋﺍ" and the learned Judge Family Court being coram non judice summoned the Chairman on an application filed by respondent No.2 and directed him to issue a certificate of) divorce, which is arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction.

12. Legislature has deviated from the proceedings of C.P.C. and Qanun-e-Shahadat. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge, Family Court is compulsorily sent to the Chairman Arbitration Council and the Chairman Arbitration Council treats the same as proceedings in section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and upon receipt of such copy the Chairman shall proceed as if he has received an intimation of divorce and shall constitute an Arbitration Council for bringing about reconciliation between the parties and take all steps necessary to bring about such reconciliation. In the present case when the respondent No.2 filed an application for issuance of certificate of divorce before the Chairman Arbitration Council the present petitioner after service of notice appeared and stated that she has not demanded Talaq on the basis of Khula nor she wants the same in any manner in the larger interest of her kids. The Chairman passed an order, dated 17-2-2004 by way of approving the reconciliation "Elan e-Masalhet". Learned Judge Family Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the proceedings of Chairman Arbitration Council after being functus officio and could not direct the Chairman to issue a certificate of Talaq on the basis of decree, dated 4-12-2003 in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights.

13. Therefore, the learned Judge Family Court wrongly assumed the jurisdiction which was not vested in the Court concerned to set aside the order passed by learned Chairman Arbitration Council. Both the writ petitions are accepted and the impugned judgments being without lawful authority are set aside and the case is remanded to the learned District Judge to entrust the same to some other Court of competent jurisdiction to proceed in accordance with law. No order as to costs.

H.B.T./S-168/L Petition accepted.

Family Courts have no unfettled or unbridled powers to fix the interim maintenance at its discretion as they are required to adopt a pragmatic, rational and judicial approach, broadly keeping in mind the social status of the parties, the earnings of the petitioner/father, his capacity to pay and requirement of the minor.

11. In addition to above, in case reported as 2015 YLR 2364 (Tahir Ayub Khan v. Miss Alia Anwar), it has been held that: 

Family Courts have no unfettled or unbridled powers to fix the interim maintenance at its discretion as they are required to adopt a pragmatic, rational and judicial approach, broadly keeping in mind the social status of the parties, the earnings of the petitioner/father, his capacity to pay and requirement of the minor.  

Part of Judgment : 

JUDGMENT SHEET IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD 
Dr. Aqueel Waris VS Ibrahim Aqueel etc
Writ Petition-1475-2019 | 2020 CLC 131
Honourable Mr. Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani

PLD Judgment Muhammadan Law.. ----Divorce---Khula'---Concept---Khula' 'Khula or 'Khul' is a release from the matrimonial bonds. This right vests with the woman according to the dictates of Holy Qur'an. If a woman demands right of 'Khula' she has to return all benefits received by her from her husband.

Muhammadan Law..

----Divorce---Khula'---Concept---Khula' is a release from the matrimonial bond, the right vests with the woman according to the dictates of Holy Qur'an---Conditions for grant of Khula'---Duty of Court/Tribunal-- Jurisdiction vests with the Court/Tribunal to determine whether conditions of Khula' existed in evidence led by the parties and after due appraisal of the same the Court may release the woman from her matrimonial bond by way of KhuW even ignoring other grounds entitling her dissolution of marriage.

'Khula or 'Khul' is a release from the matrimonial bonds. This right vests with the woman according to the dictates of Holy Qur'an. If a woman demands right of 'Khula' she has to return all benefits received by her from her husband.

The question whether a woman who does not ask expressly for 'Khula' can be granted dissolution by way of 'Khula'? The answer to this query is that 'Khula' is a vested right given by the Injunctions of Holy Qur'an as well as the law of the land exclusively to a woman under certain conditions. While deciding a case every Court is desired by law to use its best prudence; capability and the capacity to find out the truth and the prevalent conditions existing for such right after going through the whole evidence. After careful scrutiny and due appraisal of the same if they come to the conclusion that the conditions exist in the evidence produced by the parties where it is impossible for the parties to live within the limits prescribed by God Almighty and their re-union will give birth to the hateful union, the Courts are bound to give and grant the vested right of 'Khula' to a woman whether she expressly claims or omits to claim the same in her pleadings if the law permits the grant of right the Courts are bound to safeguard the individual who has made recourse to them. The jurisdiction vests with the Tribunals to determine whether condition of 'Khula' exists in evidence led by the parties and after due appraisal of the same the Court may release the woman from her matrimonial bond by way of 'Khula' even ignoring other grounds entitling her for dissolution of marriage.

In the present case the wife had failed to prove other issues of cruelty, non-maintenance and so on. The only issue which was decided in her favour was that of aversion developed against husband and this issue was expressly about the entitlement of the wife for 'Khula'.

Azam Suherwardy, Advocate.

 RUBINA GUL VS HASHIM RAZA KHAN
P L D 1995 Lahore 283
Before Mrs. Fakhrun Nisa Khokhar, J
RUBINA GUL ... Petitioner
versus
HASHIM RAZA KHAN---Respondent
Writ Petition No.1494 of 1995, decided on 03/04/1995.

ORDER

The sole point argued in the instant petition is that decree on the basis of Khula' was awarded to the petitioner although she never asked for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula' in her plaint and wanted dissolution of marriage on the grounds other than Khula'.

2. Through this petition the petitioner has challenged the judgment and decree dated 11-11-1993 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Lahore decreeing the suit of the petitioner on the basis of Khula' and that of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore dated 24-7-1994 affirming the same.

3. The petitioner filed a suit for dissolution of marriage while the respondent (Hashim Raza Khan) filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. Both the suits were consolidated and the following consolidated issues on the pleadings of the parties were framed:--

(1)Whether the defendant treated the plaintiff with cruelty? OPP.

(2)Whether the defendant failed to provide maintenance to the plaintiff? OPP.

(3)Whether the plaintiff has developed hatred for the defendant and she is entitled' to Khula', if so, what should be consideration for Khula'? OPP.

(4)Whether the defendant compelled to lead an immoral life to the plaintiff? OPP.

(5)Whether the defendant has misappropriated the jewellery of the plaintiff? OPP.

(6)Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file r;he suit? OPD.

(7)Whether the suit for dissolution of marriage is 'liable to by stayed? OPD.

(8)Whether the defendant is entitled to decree for institution of conjugal rights? OPD.

(9)Relief.

It is worthmentioning that the respondent also filed an appeal having felt aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree on the ground that he was not given sufficient opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal. .The appeal filed by the respondent was also dismissed vide judgment dated f.4-7-1994 of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 11,etitioner never asked for a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula' as the evidence produced by her was not rebutted by the respondent ,and the Court without asking the petitioner for releasing her by way of Khula' could not grant a decree on the basis of Khula' in lieu of consideration of Haq Mohair.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at length and have also perused the plaints as well as the written statements filed by the petitioner and the respondent in both the suit. The petitioner appeared a s P.W.1 and has stated about her Haq Mehar of Rs.30,000. being unpaid and s; he has also stated that the defendant had sent a dealer to the present petitioner, and the petitioner apprehended a danger to her modesty and during that time her mother's phone came and she escaped. The defendant lock d the petitioner in a room and threatened her to dire consequences. She also stated that defendant's brother had murdered two women and that her modesty and life was in danger and outside the Court respondent's counsel also attacked her. He also came to her house and abused her and brought the police who came to arrest her and she cannot live with the respondent/defendant in no condi6on and no more because he brings strangers to her house. She has categorically denied that her character was not good. She reiterated that the used to pray 'Namaz' and read Qur'an. She also denied her illicit relationship with the property dealer and that she was seen in objectionable condition with him. The learned Judge, Family Court decided issues Nos.l, 2, 4, 5 and 6 against the present petitioner and decided only issues Nos. 3 and 13 in favour of the petitioner granting her rather entitling her to the right of ' Khula' on the basis of consideration of 'Haq Mehar' Rs.30,000 (as 'Khula consideration).

6. In appeal the judgment on all the issues was affirmed.

7. 'Khula' or 'Khul' is a release from the matrimonial bonds. This right vests with the woman according to the dictates of Holy Qur'an. If a woman demands right of 'Khula' she had to return all benefits received by her from her husband.

8. The question whether a woman who does not ask expressly for 'Khula' can be granted dissolution by way of 'Khula'? The answer to this query is that 'Khula' is a vested right given by the Injunctions of Holy Qur'an as well as the law of the land exclusively to a woman under certain conditions. While ' deciding a case every Court is desired by law to use its best prudence, capability and the capacity to find out the truth and the prevalent conditions existing for such right after going through the whole evidence. After careful scrutiny and due appraisal of the same if they come to the conclusion that the conditions exist in t e evidence produced by the parties where it is impossible for the parties to lie within the limits prescribed by God Almighty and their re-union will give birth to a hateful union, the Courts are bound to give and grant the vested writ of 'Khula' to a woman whether she expressly claims or omits to claim the, same in her pleadings if the law permits the grant of right the Courts are bond to safeguard the individual who has made recourse to them. The jurisdiction vests with the Tribunals to determine whether condition of 'Khula' exists inn evidence led by the parties and after due appraisal of the same the Court nay release the woman from her matrimonial bond by way of 'Khula' even ignoring other grounds entitling her for dissolution of marriage.

9. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not convincing. The petitioner has failed to prove other issues of cruelty, non -maintenance and so on. The only issue which was decided in her favour was issue No.3 that was aversion developed against the respondent/defendant by the petitioner/plaintiff and this issue was expressly about the entitlement of the petitioner for 'Khula'. The issues were framed on 25-11-1992 and an issue in respect of 'Khula' was also framed, neither the petitioner nor her counsel objected to the framing of the instant issue. Meaning thereby they had acceded to the right of 'Khula'. Moreover the other material fact which is worth consideration is that the consolidated suit for restitution of conjugal rights was also dismissed vide the same judgment and decree of the learned Judge, Family Court. The respondent has not assailed the appellate Court's judgment before this Court for the reason that he is satisfied with consideration of 'Khula' granted by the learned Judge, Family Court in respect of the suit for dissolution of marriage filed by the petitioner. Under such a state of affairs after the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below the petitioner cannot be given this right to assail the judgment of the Family Court on issue No.4 i.e. the only issue which is decided in her favour and she has assailed the same in the instant writ petition. After perusing the file and going through the judgment of both the Courts below, I see no substance in this petition to interfere into the findings of both the Courts below in my extraordinary jurisdiction. The same is dismissed in limine.

M.BA./R-183/LPetition dismissed.

Distinction between Khula and Mubaraat is that .......

10. The respondent also relied upon a reported judgment of Hon'ble Lahore High Court titled as Major (Retd) Ishtiaq Mehmood Vs. Mst. Zareen Gul (2002 CLC 1838), wherein it was held that the wife can refuse to live with husband, if her husband, on demand, does not pay the dower amount and that the distinction between Khula and Mubaraat is that in the former the wife desires a separation by giving some consideration for her release, while in Mubaraat both the parties agree and wife is entitled for half of the benefits. 

Part of Judgment : 

JUDGMENT SHEET IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD 
Raja Muhammad Khalil Akhtar VS Mst. Nadia Mir
Writ Petition-1490-2011 | -
Former Honourable Chief Justice Mr. Justice Muhammad Anwar Khan Kasi
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