نشے کی حالت مین دی گئی طلاق موئثر نہی ہوگی

Pronouncement of divorce/talak in intoxication condition can't be called valid .

There is a man who used to get drunk and beat his wife, and he divorced her several times verbally; for example, he used to say to her “You are thrice divorced (talaaq)” when he was not sober, then after that he used to make up with her. But now he has repented to his Lord; he has started to pray and he regrets what he used to do. What is the Islamic ruling in this case?
Divorce
Related topic
Answer
Praise be to Allah.
The scholars differed concerning the divorce issued by one who is drunk, if he became drunk by consuming that which Allah has forbidden of all types of intoxicants (khamr): does it count as a divorce or not? There are two views:
The first view
The first view is that the divorce does count as such. This is the view of Abu Haneefah and Maalik, and it is one of the two views narrated from ash-Shaafa‘i and Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on them).
They said: That is because his reason has diminished because of sin, so the divorce counts as such, as a punishment to him and as a deterrent to committing the sin.
See: al-Mughni by Ibn Qudaamah, 7/289. They quoted evidence to support their view.
The second view
The second view is that his divorce does not count as such. This is the view of the literalists and is the second view narrated from ash-Shafaa‘i and Ahmad. This is the view that Imam Ahmad finally settled on. They quoted several things as evidence, including the following:
1.
The words of Allah (interpretation of the meaning): “O you who believe! Approach not As-Salat (the prayer) when you are in a drunken state until you know (the meaning) of what you utter” [an-Nisa’ 4:43]. Here Allah, may He be glorified, states that the word of one who is drunk does not count for anything, because he does not know what he is saying.
2.
It is narrated in a saheeh report from the Prophet (blessings and peace of Allah be upon him) that a man came to him and confessed to zina (fornication or adultery) and he said: “Has he been drinking wine?” A man got up and smelt his mouth, and did not detect any smell of wine. Narrated by Muslim (1695). This indicates that if he had drunk wine, then his confession would not be acceptable. By the same token, divorce issued by someone in this state does not count as such.
3.
Because this is the view of ‘Uthmaan ibn ‘Affaan and Ibn ‘Abbaas (may Allah be pleased with them), and no one among the Sahaabah differed with them.
Imam al-Bukhaari (may Allah have mercy on him) said:
‘Uthmaan said: The one who is insane or drunk cannot issue a divorce. Ibn ‘Abbaas said: Divorce issued by one who is drunk or one who is compelled does not count as such.
Ibn al-Mundhir (may Allah have mercy on him) said: This is proven from ‘Uthmaan, and we do not know of anyone among the Sahaabah who disagreed with him.
4.
Because he has lost control of his will, he is like one who is compelled.
5.
Because he has lost his mind or his reason, he is like one who is insane or asleep.
6.
Because being of sound mind is a condition of accountability, and there is no accountability for one who does not understand the religious teachings.
See: Majallat al-Buhooth al-Islamiyyah, 32/252; al-Mawsoo‘ah al-Fiqhiyyah, 29/18; al-Insaaf, 8/433
The second view was regarded as more correct by a number of scholars, such as Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah and his student Ibn al-Qayyim; fatwas were issued on this basis by Shaykh Ibn Baaz and Ibn ‘Uthaymeen (may Allah have mercy on them).
Shaykh Ibn Baaz (may Allah have mercy on him) was asked: Does divorce issued by one who is drunk count as such? If it does count as such, then will he be brought to account for other transgressions he may commit, such as zina, murder and stealing? If that is the case, then what is the difference between the two?
He replied: The scholars differed as to whether divorce issued by one who is drunk counts as such. The majority of scholars are of the view that his divorce does count as such, and he is also accountable for his actions; his sins are not an excuse for waiving his divorce, just as they are not an excuse for waiving accountability for his actions such as murder, stealing or zina, and so on.
Some of the scholars are of the view that divorce issued by one who is drunk does not count as such; this is what is narrated from the Rightly-Guided Caliph ‘Uthmaan (may Allah be pleased with him), because he is not in his right mind at that time, so he is not accountable for things he says that harm others, and divorce harms him and others. So he is not accountable for it, because the punishment for drunkenness is flogging; making his divorce count as such is not part of his punishment. The same applies if he manumits a slave or engages in other transactions, such as selling, buying, giving gifts and so on – they are all invalid.
With regard to his deeds and actions, he is accountable for them, and his being drunk is not an excuse for him in the case of zina, stealing, murder or anything else, because a person is accountable for his actions whether he was sober or not. He may have taken drunkenness as a means of doing things that Allah has forbidden of reprehensible actions, and he may be using it as an excuse so as to evade the rulings on these sins. Hence the scholars are unanimously agreed that he is accountable for his actions.
However the correct view is that he is not accountable for it. If it is known that he issued the divorce in a state of drunkenness when he was not of sound mind, then the divorce does not count as such. By the same token, if he manumitted his slave or disposed of his wealth when he was in a drunken state, then he is not accountable for that (and it is not valid). The same applies if he sold or bought anything, and the same applies to all other conduct in which being of sound mind is necessary; they are not valid or binding, because this comes under the heading of verbal conduct, as explained above. This is the correct view, on the basis of which we issue our fatwa, which is that his divorce does not count as such when it is proven that he was drunk at the time of issuing the divorce and was not sober at that time.
But if he was not sinning, in the sense that he was given a drink and did not know that it was an intoxicant, or he was forced to drink it, and he consumed the drink because he was compelled to do so, then he is not sinning, and the divorce issued in this case does not count as such, according to all scholars, because his state of drunkenness did not result from deliberate actions, so he is not accountable for it; rather he was wronged or deceived.
End quote from Fataawa at-Talaaq, p. 29
See: ash-Sharh al-Mumti‘, 10/433, al-Maktabah at-Tawfeeqiyyah edn.
Based on that, the divorce mentioned does not count as such. We praise Allah, may He be exalted, for having enabled him to repent and having guided him to the right way, and we ask Allah to make us and him steadfast.
And Allah knows best.
Source

-Khula in lieu of dower---Relinquishment of dower---Cruelty by husband--

 P L D 2021 Lahore 757

(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----Ss. 5, Sched. & 10(4)---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S. 2(ii)(viii)---Suit for dissolution of marriage---Khula in lieu of dower---Scope---Relinquishment of dower---Cruelty by husband---Thirty-two (32) tolas gold ornaments were fixed as dower---Wife/petitioner filed suit on the grounds of cruel behavior and failure to pay maintenance, however, Family Court on failure of reconciliation between the parties dissolved the marriage on the basis of Khula in lieu of dower; which decree was maintained by the appellate Court---Held, that the wife, for decree of dissolution of her marriage, had to forego her claim of dower only in the event of failure of reconciliation between the parties---Family Court on its own could not deprive the lady from the dower and could not order to relinquish the dower as the dower was the right of the lady given by Shariah---Said right could not be discretionarily or arbitrarily exercised by the Court---Family Court in a suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation failed, shall pass decree for dissolution of marriage forthwith and shall restore to the husband the Haq Mehr received by the wife at the time of marriage---Such option could only be exercised if the lady had opted to relinquish the benefit but the Court could not exercise its jurisdiction---Although the Court was empowered to pass a decree on the basis of Khula, but subject to the fact that all the conditions required were fulfilled---In the present case, neither the lady agitated the ground of Khula nor it was her request while making statement before the Court and certain other grounds existed on the basis of which decree for dissolution of marriage could have been passed ---High Court set aside impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below and dissolved the marriage between the parties on the basis of grounds asserted by the petitioner---
b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----Ss. 5, Sched. & 10(4)---Suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula Talaq-e-Baain---Scope---Held, that if the marriage was dissolved on the basis of Khula, it would be Talaq-e-Baain---If the husband and wife compromised with each other, then only the Nikah would be repeated.
(c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----Ss. 5, Sched. & 10(4)---Suit for dissolution of marriage---Khula---Scope---Allegation (cruelty etc) asserted by wife---Scope---Held, that the Court framed the issues regarding the allegations asserted by the lady and those were not proved by her ; at such stage the Court could pass decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of some condition, but it would not be dissolution of marriage on basis of Khula---Wisdom behind this was that the parties should not be forced to live in a hateful union.
(d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----Ss. 5, Sched. & 10(4)---Suit for dissolution of marriage---Khula---Scope---Held, that decree of Khula could be passed even when there existed no ground but lady was not willing to settle down with the husband, however, the condition had to be fulfilled ; and the lady might be asked to return the benefits, but not the full dower rather the half one---Certainly in such situation the lady would have to forego rights which she had gained from the husband.
(e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----Ss. 5, Sched. & 10(4)---Dissolution of marriage---"Talaq" and "Khula"---Distinction---Held, that there was difference in Talaq and Khula---Dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula is on the demand of the lady---If offer is accepted by the husband, then Talaq would be effected otherwise in case of refusal by the husband, the condition of Khula had to be fulfilled.
(f) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----Ss. 5, Sched. & 10(4)---Suit for dissolution of marriage---Khula---Scope---Procedural mistakes in passing decree noted/explained---Decree of dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula cannot be passed ex-parte---Court had to put the offer of the lady to the husband and on the reply of husband in positive, the decree of Khula could be passed; secondly, if the conditions were put by the lady, for which the husband was not ready or he put some more conditions, then the same would be put to the lady---Unless the spouses were ready on the conditions, the decree could not be passed on the basis of Khula---Now the Court would frame the issues, regarding the other grounds agitated by the lady for dissolution of marriage and would decide the same on the basis of available record.

فیملی کورٹ کسی بھی کیس کو منطقی انجام تک پہنچانے کے لیے کوی بھی طریقہ کار اختیار کرسکتی ہے۔۔جب تک وہ طریقہ کار خصوصی طور پر منع نہ ہوں۔۔۔ اجراء کے دوران Executing Court اجراء سے متعلق کوی بھی Issue Resolve کرنے کے لیے Issue frame کرکے شہادت ریکارڈ کراسکتی ہے۔۔

 Family Court is a quasi-judicial forum which can organize its own procedure and which forum has been implicitly authorized to adopt and pursue any procedure which is not specifically barred or prohibited. Even if the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has not been made directly applicable to the proceedings in a suit filed under the auspices of the Family Courts Act, 1964, it does not at the same time mean that the Code of Civil Procedure is odious insofar as proceedings before the Family Court are concerned and moreso in the case of execution proceedings.

As long as there is no conflict between the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on the one hand and those of the Family Courts Act, 1964 on the other, such provisions can be employed and adopted. The logic behind this rule is rooted in the fact that after all the Family Court has to adopt and pursue some principles and procedure and, therefore, what better than the tried and tested procedure contained in a law that has remained successfully in force since the past 113 years. A Family Court can, therefore, proceed on the premise that every procedure is permissible unless a clear prohibition is forthcoming. As long as procedure so adopted does not compromise the aim and sweep of the Family Courts Act, 1964, which is to provide expeditious relief in matrimonial and family matters there is no reason in law to deny a Family Court to adopt such procedure.
It may be mentioned here that since the Family Court is quasi-judicial forum it partakes most elements and characteristics generally associated with a judicial forum. Naturally, it has to have a procedure it will follow in the event of deciding a particular lis.
The aspect of hearing of parties, the element of passing decisions which are reasoned and speaking, recording and appraisal of evidence etc. make it incumbent on a Family Court to adopt and pursue some procedure in the absence of any specific procedure having been made applicable.

Writ Petition No. 18067 of 2021
Mst. Haseena Bibi Versus Civil Judge Ist Class Vehari and another












Family Court is a quasi-judicial forum which can organize its own procedure and which forum has been implicitly authorized to adopt and pursue any procedure which is not specifically barred or prohibited

 Even if the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has not been made directly applicable to the proceedings in a suit filed under the auspices of the Family Courts Act, 1964, it does not at the same time mean that the Code of Civil Procedure is odious insofar as proceedings before the Family Court are concerned and moreso in the case of execution proceedings.

As long as there is no conflict between the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on the one hand and those of the Family Courts Act, 1964 on the other, such provisions can be employed and adopted. The logic behind this rule is rooted in the fact that after all the Family Court has to adopt and pursue some principles and procedure and, therefore, what better than the tried and tested procedure contained in a law that has remained successfully in force since the past 113 years. A Family Court can, therefore, proceed on the premise that every procedure is permissible unless a clear prohibition is forthcoming. As long as procedure so adopted does not compromise the aim and sweep of the Family Courts Act, 1964, which is to provide expeditious relief in matrimonial and family matters there is no reason in law to deny a Family Court to adopt such procedure.
It may be mentioned here that since the Family Court is quasi-judicial forum it partakes most elements and characteristics generally associated with a judicial forum. Naturally, it has to have a procedure it will follow in the event of deciding a particular lis.
The aspect of hearing of parties, the element of passing decisions which are reasoned and speaking, recording and appraisal of evidence etc. make it incumbent on a Family Court to adopt and pursue some procedure in the absence of any specific procedure having been made applicable.

Writ Petition No. 18067 of 2021
Mst. Haseena Bibi Versus Civil Judge Ist Class Vehari and another












اگر مرد بغیر اجازت کے دوسری شادی کرے گا تو اسکو فوراً پہلی بیوی کا واجب الادا حق مہر ادا کرنا ہو گا۔۔۔ سپیریم کورٹ آف پاکستان

PLJ 2021 SC 28

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----Ss. 6 & 6(5)(a)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 185(3)--Suit for recovery of dower, dowery articles and maintenance allowance--Partially decreed--Filling of separate appeals--Allowed--Case was remanded--Partially decreed after remand proceedings--Appeal--Allowed--Modification in judgment--Petitioner was contracted second marriage without prior permission by first wife--Filling of suit for dissolution of marriage--Decreed--Writ petition--Dismissed--Modification to extent of payment of maintenance allowance-- Challenge to--Section 6 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 prohibits contracting second marriage without previous permission in writing of Arbitration Council--Entire amount of dower fixed at time of marriage whether prompt or deferred is immediately payable on account of second marriage--petitioner No. 1 by entering into second marriage without seeking prior permission either from existing wife i.e. Respondent No. 1 or Arbitration Council, dower even if it is termed as deferred or prompt has become payable without any delay--So far as recovery of maintenance allowance is concerned, counsel for petitioner has failed to point out any good reason qualifying interference into judgment impugned before us--High Court has rightly declined prayer; hence, no other exception is called for. [Pp. 31 & 32] A, C, D & E

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----S. 6(5)(a)--Prompt payment of dower--Second marriage without permission of arbitration council--Dower becomes immediately payable--It would be advantageous to reproduce said section:

Polygamy:   (1)…….

                   (2)……..

                   (3)……..

                   (4)……..

                   (5)     Any man who contracts another marriage without permission of Arbitration Council shall:-

                   (a)     Pay immediate entire amount of dower whether prompt or deferred, due to existing wife or wives which amount, if not so paid shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue; and

                   (b)     ……..                                                      [P. 32] B

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondents.

Dates of hearing: 12.8.2020.


PLJ 2021 SC 28
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
Present: Umar Ata Bandial and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ.
MUHAMMAD JAMIL and others--Petitioners
versus
Mst. SAJIDA BIBI and others--Respondents
Civil Petition No. 4690 of 2018, decided on 12.8.2020.
(Against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar ul Qaza) Swat dated 17.10.2018 passed in Writ Petition
No. 319-M/2018).


Judgment

Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J.--The instant civil petition has assailed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 17.10.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of Peshawar High Court in Writ Petition No. 319-M/2018 with a prayer to set aside the same in the interest of justice.

2. Brief facts leading to file the instant petition are that Respondent No. 1 along with minors filed a family suit against the petitioners for recovery of dower in shape of 05 tolas of gold ornaments, 03 tolas gold ornaments as personal ownership of Respondent No. 1 or its market value, maintenance @ Rs.6000/- per month since November 2013 till disposal of the suit and afterwards with 30% increase per annum for Respondent No. 1, maintenance @ Rs.3000/- per month since November, 2013 till attaining age of majority plus 30% increase per annum each for petitioners Nos.2 and 3 and Respondents Nos.2 and 3 (all minors) and recovery of dowry articles according to list annexed with plaint or market value thereof i.e. Rs.229500/-. Respondent No. 1 also sought custody of petitioners Nos.2 and 3 till their attaining the age of majority.

The suit was contested by petitioner No. 1. He filed written statement with divergent stance. The learned trial Court framed issues on the basis of pleadings of both parties and thereafter the evidence of the parties was recorded. Thereafter the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 16.09.2015 partially decreed the suit to the extent of 05 tolas dower and maintenance @ Rs.1000/- per month each for Respondents Nos.2 and 3 since November 2013 with 25% increase per annum during the period they reside outside the house of petitioner No. 1. The plea of petitioner No. 1 for restitution of conjugal rights was decreed in his favour.

Being aggrieved, both the parties preferred separate appeals before appellate Court who vide consolidated judgment and decree dated 09.06.2016 set aside the decree of the family Court and remanded the case with the direction to record findings on issue No. 07 relating to custody of the minors. Upon which learned family Court decided the suit afresh vide judgment and decree dated 22.02.2017 by giving following findings:--

“In view of the facts and circumstances narrated above, suit of the plaintiffs, to the extent of five tolas gold dower of plaintiff No. 1 and maintenance amount for plaintiffs Nos.4 and 5 as Rs.1000/- with 25% per annum increase from November, 2013 till maturity or their marriages, whichever happens earlier, is decreed, while rest of the suit is dismissed.”

In second round of litigation, both the parties approached to appellate Court who vide consolidated judgment and decree dated 23.09.2017 partially allowed the appeal of Respondent No. 1 and modified the judgment and decree of learned family Court.

It is pertinent to mention here that Respondent No. 1 also filed another suit on the ground that the petitioner No. 1 has contracted second marriage without seeking permission from her, hence, she filed suit for dissolution of marriage on 10.02.2017 which was decreed in her favour vide judgment dated 25.01.2018.

Feeling dissatisfied from the impugned judgment dated 23.09.2019, passed by Additional District Judge, the petitioner filed constitutional petition before learned High Court Peshawar. The learned Single Bench after taking into consideration facts and circumstances dismissed the constitution petition in limine, however, the judgment of the appellate Court was modified to the extent of payment of maintenance till the expiry of period of “Iddat”.

3. At the very outset, learned counsel for the petitioner argued the matter half-heartedly. The main stay of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for petitioner No. 1 is that the recovery of dower is against the facts and prevailing law. Further contends that Mst. Sajida Bibi, the Ex-wife of the petitioner is not entitled to maintenance allowance when the petitioner No. 1 has been granted decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Lastly, it is argued that judgments and decree passed by the learned Courts below are liable to be set aside.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and gone through the record.

Description: AThere is no denial to this fact that the petitioner No. 1 has contracted second marriage during subsistence of his marriage with Mst. Sajida Bibi (Respondent No. 1) without her permission or from Arbitration Council and Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 prohibits contracting second marriage without previous permission in writing of the Arbitration Council. The Respondent No. 1 filed suit for recovery of dower, dowry articles, gold ornaments and maintenance whereas the petitioner No. 1 in his written statement prayed for restitution of conjugal rights as counter claim and the claim of the petitioner No. 1 for restitution of conjugal rights was decreed whereas the suit filed by the Respondent No. 1 was partially decreed to the extent of five Tolas of gold as dower of Respondent No. 1 and maintenance amount for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 as Rs.1000/- with 25% per annum increase from November, 2013 till maturity or their marriage which ever happens earlier and rest of the claim was dismissed. It is pertinent to mention here that the Respondent No. 1 afterwards filed a suit for dissolution of marriage which was decreed in her favour vide judgment and decree dated 25.01.2018 by the learned Judge Family Court. As the petitioner No. 1 has contracted second marriage without the permission of his first wife i.e. Respondent No. 1 and Arbitration Council, therefore, as per Section 6(5)(a) of Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, the dower becomes immediately payable. It would be advantageous to reproduce said section:-

Polygamy:   (1)…….

                   (2)……..

                   (3)……..

Description: B                   (4)……..

          (5)      Any man who contracts another marriage without the permission of the Arbitration Council shall:-

(a)      Pay immediate the entire amount of dower whether prompt or deferred, due to the existing wife or wives which amount, if not so paid shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue; and

(b)      ……..

Description: CDescription: DDescription: EIt is now abundantly clear that the entire amount of dower fixed at the time of marriage whether prompt or deferred is immediately payable on account of second marriage. The petitioner No. 1 by entering into second marriage without seeking prior permission either from the existing wife i.e. Respondent No. 1 or the Arbitration Council, the dower even if it is termed as deferred or prompt has become payable without any delay. Otherwise the provision of Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is in consonance with the injunctions of Islam. The said provisions has not placed any restriction to contract second marriage, rather it only relates to seeking permission before entering into second marriage in order to regulate the structure of society as a whole. Any deviation from the provision of Section 6 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, it might ensue number of issues which would frustrate the fabric of relationship within society, therefore, the judgment of the learned Single Bench of Peshawar High Court for immediate payment of dower (5) Tolas of gold) is quite in accordance with law. So far as recovery of maintenance allowance is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any good reason qualifying interference into the judgment impugned before us. The learned High Court has rightly declined the prayer; hence, no other exception is called for. As a consequence, this petition is dismissed. Leave to appeal is declined.

(Y.A.)  Appeal declined

PROCEDURE IN FAMILY COURT

PROCEEDINGS IN FAMILY COURT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, FAIR PLAY AND JUSTICE.

2017 SCMR 321
-
CASE BY THE HUSBAND
HUSBAND CAN FILE CASE FOR RECEIVING THE GIFT ETC IN FAMILY COURT AND NOT IN CIVIL COURT, ON APPLYING COURT FEE.
2014 CLC 87
-
2ND MARRIAGE
2nd MARRIAGE WITHOUT IDDAT
2016 CLC Lah 717
2004 YLR FSC 619
-
POWER OF FAMILY COURT
FAMILY COURT HAS POWER TO REVIEW HIS OWN ORDER TO SOME EXTENT.
2016 PLD Lah 73
-
GOLD IN DOWRY
PRICE OF GOLD ORNAMENT IN SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF GOLD ORNAMENT WILL BE DETERMINED FROM THE DATE OF INSTITUTION OF THE CASE.
1996 SCMR 1063
2017 SCMR 321
2013 SCMR 1049
PLJ 2013 SC 626
2014 CLC 895
2013 CLC 492
PLD 2012 Lah 165
2015 CLC 105
2012 MLD 1594
-
EVIDENCE IN FAMILY CASES
WHEN THE DIRECT EVIDENCE TO PROVE A FACT WAS AVAILABLE IN THE SHAPE OF ORAL AS WELL AS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THEN THERE WAS NO NEED TO SEEK EXPERT OPINION WHICH OTHERWISE IS A THIRD PERSON OPINION AND CAN’T UNDO THE DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES.
2015 SCMR 284
PLD 2015 Lah 500
PLD 2010 Lah 422
QANOON E SHAHADAT NOT STRICTO SENSU APPLICABLE IN FAMILY COURT. OBJECT OF THE FAMILY COURT IS TO ADVANCE JUSTICE AND TO AVOID TECHNICALITIES. CONCURRENT FINDING OF THE FACT. CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION DISMISSED.
2016 MLD Lah 668
MERE FACT THAT THE PARTY DID NOT FORMALLY PROVE THE DOCUMENT IS OF NO LEGAL VALUE. PETITION DISMISSED.
2012 MLD 756.
NEW NAME OF THE WITNESSES ARE ALLOWED.
PLD 2103 SC 255
2005 MLD 1776
2009 CLC 269
-
NIKAH NAMA
UNDERTAKING GIVEN IN NIKAH NAMA, PART OF DOWER. MATTER OF ADJUCATION BY FAMILY COURT.
PLD 2016 SC 613
PROPERTY MENTIONED IN NIKAH NAMA, TO BE GIVEN TO WIFE.
2016 MLD 925
2010 YLR 2452
2013 YLR 1118
2015 PLD 88
ANY CONDITION, MENTIONED IN NIKAH NAMA BY THE HUSBAND, IN CASE OF PRONOUNCING TALAQ ETC BY HUSBAND, NO LEGAL VALUE.
2008 SCMR 186
PLD 2011 SC 260
2012 CLC 837
GIFTS GIVEN TO THE WIFE, MENTIONED IN COLUMN NO 16, RIGHT OF WIFE, NOT REFUNDABLE.
2010 YLR 349
NIKAH NAMA, PER SE ADMISIBLE IN EVIDENCE, FOR TRANSFER OF PROPERTY IN LIU OF DOWER.
PLD 2000 Lah 236
-
CASE OF MAINTENANCE ALLOWNCE
SUIT OF MAINTENANCE ALLOWANCE BY THE MOTHER AGAINST HER SON, MAINTAINABLE.
2012 MLD 148
2013 CLC 452
DIVORCED DAUGHTER CAN FILE SUIT FOR MAINTENANCE AGAINST HER FATHER.
PLD 2012 Lah 154
WIFE NOT ENTITLED FOR MAINTENANCE WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS THE ONLY SON OF THE PARENTS AND WIFE DEMANDED SEPARATE HOUSE TO LIVE.
PLJ 2010 Lah 271
-
DOWER
DOWER, BETWEEN SPOUSES CAN BE INCREASED SUBSEQUENTLY.
2017 PLJ 41
2016 SCMR 2170
2016 MLD 1411
SNATCHING OF DOWER AFTER GIVING THE WIFE, MATTER FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURT.
PLD 2015 Lah 57
-
APPEAL/DECREE/EX PARTE DECREE BY FAMILY COURT.
SECTION 5 OF LIMITATION NOT APPLICABLE BEFORE FAMILY COURT. LIMITATION FOR SETTING ASIDE EX PARTE DECREE IS 30 DAYS FROM DATE OF DECREE AND NOT FROM DATE OF KNOWLEDGE.
PLJ 2012 SC AJK 122
NO APPEAL LIES AGAINST DECREE OF DOWER AMOUNT.
2001 SCJ 297
-
DOWRY
TIME FOR FILING DOWRY SUIT, THREE YEARS.
2016 MLD Islamabad 313
2016 MLD 693
SOLITARY STATEMENT OF WIFE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CLAIM OF DOWRY.
PLJ 2015 Lah 7
2012 MLD 756
DETERMINATION OF VALUE OF DOWRY, SOLE STATEMENT OF WIFE HELD ENOUGH.
2015 MLD 1069
WIFE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF DOWRY OR BRIDAL GIFT
2011 YLR 1000
-
MANGNI
MANGNI HAS NO LEGAL EFFECT, UNDER MUSLIM LAW.
1990 MLD 792
-
DIVORCE
DIVORCE ON THE BASES OF KHULA, WOULD BE ONE DIVORCE. SPOUSES CAN OPT REUNION WITHOUT HALALA, EVEN AFTER 10 YEARS AND EVEN AFTER CERTIFICATE BY UNION COUNCIL
2011 CLC 1211
PLD 2011 Lah 458
PLD 2003 Pesh 169
PLD 2013 Sindh 209
PLJ 2010 Kar 97
ORAL DIVORCE HAVE NO IMPORTANCE.
PLD 2006 SC 457
DIVORCE IS NOT NECESSARY TO BE EXECUTED ON STAMP PAPER.
2004 CLC 984
-
DEATH OF THE HUSBAND
HUSBAND DIED BORE COMPLETION OF 90 DAYS OF DIVORCE, DIVORCE NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE, WIFE COMMITTED TO BE HIS WIDOW AND ENTITLED TO INHERIT HIS PROPERTY.
1994 SCMR 1720
PLD 1963 SC 51
2017 CLC 516 Sindh.
PLD 1974 SC 22
1998 SCMR 1812
-
JACTITATION OF MARRIAGE
CASE OF JACTITATION OF MARRIAGE, FILED BY OTHER THAN THE WIFE OR HUSBAND, NOT MAINTAINABLE IN FAMILY COURT.
PLD 2006 Lah 260
-
CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION
TO CHALLENGE THE ORDER ON THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT PROPERLY APPRECIATED, AS FINDING OF FACT RECORDED BY THE COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION COULD NOT BE DISTURBED SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT ANOTHER VIEW WAS POSSIBLE ON THE SAME EVIDENCE. IN CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION HIGH COURT COULD NOT SIT AS A COURT OF APPEAL.
2016 MLD Lah 801
2016 MLD Lah 693
PLD 2006 SC 457
FACTUAL CONTROVERSY COULD NOT BE RESOLVED IN WRIT.
2016 MLD Lah 693
-
INTERIM ORDER
17 A FCA, 1964, NONCOMPLIANCE OF INTERIM ORDER, COURT MAY STRUCK OFF THE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT AND CAN PASS DECREE.
2016 MLD Sindh 742
APPEAL AGAINST THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER NOT MAINTAINABLE
2014 CLC 11
-
PATERNITY
ACKNOWLEDGE OF PATERNITY. CHILD EVEN IF ILLEGITIMATE BY BIRTH BECOME LEGITIMATE BY FORCE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY.
1988 PLD SC 8
1980 PLD SC 228
1976 PLD SC 767
1973 PLD Baghdad UI Jadeed 48
IF MOTHER NOT MARRIED WITH OTHER PERSON, THE CHILD WHO IS BORN WITHIN A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS WILL BELONG TO THE 1ST HUSBAND.
PLD 2015 SC 327
-
GIFT
LAW OF GIFT DOES NOT REQUIRE A DONOR TO MENTION THE REASON FOR GIFTING PROPERTY T ANY PERSON AND EXCLUDING OTHER.
2016 YLR Lah 116
NO GIFT UNLESS TRANSFER OF POSSESSION TAKE PLACE.
PLD 1974 SC 185
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)
Powered by Blogger.

Case Law Search