-Validity--"Islam" does not force on the spouses a life devoid of harmony and happiness and if the wife is not desirous to live with her husband for any reason, even not recognized by the Statute, it permit separation, on basis of "Khula"--Plaintiff has failed to prove any cruelty on the part of husband and despite the fact the wife is not ready to live with the husband-

 PLJ 2014 Peshawar 81 (DB)

Muslim Family Court Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 10(4)--Mechanism for trial of matrimonial and family dispute between spouse--In pre-trial proceedings if no compromise or reconciliation is possible between the parties, Court shall proceed and shall decide the matter after recording pro and contra evidence.      [P. 86] A

Khula--

----Power to dissolve marriage on unclaimed ground i.e. Khula--It is by now will settled law that if the dissolution of marriage is claimed by the wife on any ground recognized under Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, then it is her duty to prove allegation--If she succeeded to prove the allegation then the Court shall grant her decree for dissolution of marriage along with other benefit--But if she failed to prove then the mere fact that wife could not establish her allegation qua grounds taken for dissolution of marriage would not disentitle her for termination of marriage contract on ground of "Khula". [P. 86] B

Khula--

----Legal obligation to grant decree for dissolution of marriage--Fertility or infertility is beyond control of human being and an act of nature--Validity--"Islam" does not force on the spouses a life devoid of harmony and happiness and if the wife is not desirous to live with her husband for any reason, even not recognized by the Statute, it permit separation, on basis of "Khula"--Plaintiff has failed to prove any cruelty on the part of husband and despite the fact the wife is not ready to live with the husband--No alternate with the Court but to dissolve the marriage on the basis of khula notwithstanding the fact that she has not claimed her dissolution on the ground of "Khula".     [P. 86] C & D

Mr. Arshad Jamal Qureshi, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Niaz Wali Khan, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 27.3.2013.


 PLJ 2014 Peshawar 81 (DB)
Mst. SAEEDA JAVAID--Petitioner
versus
W.P. No. 1962 of 2010, decided on 27.3.2013.


Judgment

Rooh-ul-Amin Khan, J.--Through this single judgment we propose to dispose of the instant writ petition and connected Review Petition N. 18/2011 with CM No. 12/2011 in W.P No. 2201/2010. Petitioner has assailed judgment and decree dated 20.3.2010 passed by learned Additional District Judge-VII, Peshawar, whereby appeal of the respondent was accepted while the appeal filed by petitioner-plaintiff was also allowed but to the extent of dowry articles as prayed for as per list, however, the dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty was converted into khula and the claim of house and gold ornaments stands abandoned/infructuous and modified the judgment and decree passed by the Judge Family Court accordingly. Petitioner also seeks review of judgment and order dated 15.2.2010 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 2201/2010.

2.  Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner herein filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance @ Rs.2000/- per month from May 2007 and for future, cash amount of Rs.20,000/- as dower, 15 tolas gold ornaments or its market value, house Bearing No. 3036 measuring four marla, boundaries mentioned in plaint, and dowry articles as per list annexed with the plaint. According to the plaint the marriage of the parties was solemnized on 14.2.1998, in lieu of the dower and maintenance etc. mentioned above. Just after the marriage the attitude of the defendant became inhuman and cruel, who oftenly used to beat her, but she endued this cruelty for the sake of better future and matrimonial ties. She also claimed that the defendant is barren, infertile and not capable to born, children. The defendant has ousted her in her three wears and since then she is residing with her parents. The defendant has not paid her dower and maintenance allowance and he has also not tried to take her back or to meet out the demand of the plaintiff. On summon the defendant contested the suit through filing written statement and strongly rebutted the allegation of cruelty and non-payment of dower. From divergent pleadings of the parties the learned Judge Family Court reduced the controversy into fifteen issues including relief and one Additional Issue. Pro and contra evidence were recorded and after hearing the parties the learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff to the extent of dissolution of marriage, recovery of half dower, cash amount of Rs.20,000/- and gold weighing 07 tolas. Some of the dowry articles and maintenance allowance, as prayed for, was also decreed in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner.

3.  Both the parties, feeling aggrieved of the said judgment and decree filed separate appeals before the District Judge, which were marked to Additional District Judge-VII, Peshawar, who vide judgment and decree dated 20.3.2010 accepted the appeal filed by respondent, set aside the judgment and decree dated 14.12.2009, passed by the Judge Family Court. The marriage was dissolved on the basis of Khula instead of cruelty and the claim of house and gold ornaments stands abandoned/ infructuous. while the appeal filed by petitioner-plaintiff was also allowed to the extent of dowry articles as prayed for as per list.

4.  Dissatisfied with the judgment of Appellate Court, the petitioner approached this Court through the instant constitutional petition, as well as Writ Petition No. 2201 of 2010, which were decided by this Court vide judgment dated 15.12.2010.

5.  The petitioner, aggrieved from the judgment dated 15.12.2010, passed by this Court in W.P. No. 2201 of 2010, filed review petition No. 18 of 2011, while the respondent, dissatisfied from the aforesaid judgment of this Court passed in instant writ petition, approached the august Supreme Court of Pakistan through C.P No. 110-P/2011. The august Supreme Court after granting leave accepted the Appeal No. 30-P of 2011, set aside the judgment of this Court dated 15.12.2010 and remitted the case back to this Court for decision afresh on merit in accordance with law.

6.  Arguments of learned counsel for the parties heard and record of the case gone through.

7.  Record divulged that plaintiff-petitioner filed suit for dissolution of her marriage on the ground of cruelty and infertility of respondent-defendant. To this effect a specific issue reproduced below was framed by the trial Court.

"Additional Issue:

1-A.     Whether the plaintiff is entitled for dissolution of marriage on the basis of infertility and cruelty, if so its effect?"

8.  After adducing pro and contra evidence by the parties, the learned trial Court arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove any physical torture or cruelty yet the marriage was dissolved and the wife was held entitled for recovery of dower, and maintenance for the reason that the defendant had concealed his infertility from the plaintiff, which amount to cruelty. The Additional District Judge set at naught the finding of the trial Court and held that the conclusion of the trial Court is based on misreading of evidence of the parties and mis-appreciation of law on the subject, thus the marriage between the parties was dissolve on the basis of Khula.

9.  From perusal of record it transpired that the plaintiff herself has admitted before the Court, while recording her statement, that at the time of her marriage she was in knowledge of the fact about incapability of defendant to create children. She has also admitted that except the medical receipt and prescription of 1999 she has not brought on record any medical evidence to prove that the defendant is still suffering from the said disease.

10.  Infertility is not a recognized ground for dissolution of marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages, Act 1939, thus, it could not be based for dissolution of marriage. The fertility or infertility or any other incapacitation is beyond the control of human being and an act of nature. In this regard we would sought guidance from the Holly Quran, which is a complete code of life. There are two stories of infertility in Holly Quran out of which the first is that of Hazrat Ibraheem Aleh Salam and his wife Sara. The two main account of this story is as follows:

"And his wife was standing (there) and she laughed: But we gave her glad tidings of Isaac and after him, of Jacob. She said "Alas for me; Shall I bear a child, seeing I am an old woman, and my husband here, is an old man? That indeed would be a wonderful thing" They said; "Dost thou wonder at Allah's decree? The grace of Allah and His blessing on you. O ve people of the house! For He is indeed worthy of all praise full of Glory!" 11:71:73.,

And they (angels) gawe him (Ibrahim) glad tidings of a son endowed with knowledge. But his wife came forward clamoring she smote her forehead and said: "A barren old woman!" They said "Even so has thy Lord spoken and He is full of wisdom and knowledge" 51-28-30".

The detail concerning the life of Sara and Ibrahim Aleh Salam received from Ahadith reveals that the Sara was old about ninety years and Ibrahim Aleh Salan was 100 years old, and God blessed them with a child. Here one can take a lesson that the life of spouses do not end, because they have no children. One must also accept, what Allah has planned for mankind. It is also important to take notice of the example set by Hazrat Ibrahim Aleh Salam and his barren wife Sara. Both were never harsh to each other in words or deeds, nor they abandoned each other. The bond of marriage, love, faith and tenderness kept the couple together even during infertility. Second story relates to Hazrat Zakariya Aleh Salam and his wife Ishba. Allah says in Quran Majeed:

"And (remember) Zakariya, when he cried to his Lord: "O my Lord! Leave me not without offspring, though thou art the best of inheritors." So We listened to him: and We granted him Yahya: We cared his wife's (Barrenness) for him. These (three) were ever quick in emulation in good works; they used to call on Us with love and reverence, and humble themselves before Us.21:89:90.

From the above quoted two cases, it is clear then crystal that Ibrahim Aleh Salam did not shunned, shammed, divorced or look down his wife for the reason of infertility. It is a lesson that all of the Ummah must learn, as Allah says "He leaves barren whom He wills 42:50:"

It is a decree from Allah and it is, therefore, the legislature while drafting and promulgating the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages, Act, 1939, very wisely not recognized the infertility as a valid ground for dissolution of marriage. If it would have been introduced in the statute then majority of the couples, having no children and issueless would have been living separately. Even the religion of "Islam" has never approved the dissolution of marriage on such a ground. However, even then if the wife or the husband desirous of children and any one of them is infertile and incapable to born, they can dissolve the marriage amicably i.e from the husband side through divorce (Talaq Salasa) or from the wife side through "Khula".

11.  Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that the plaintiff has never claimed dissolution of her marriage on the basis of "Khula", therefore, the Appellate Court was not vested with power to dissolve the marriage on the unclaimed ground i.e "Khula". He went on to say that the judgment of the Appellate Court against law and liable to be set aside.

12.  We are not agreed with the above arguments of learned counsel for petitioner as the same are flimsy and not convincing. The Muslim Family Court Act, 1964 provide a mechanism for trial of the matrimonial and family disputes between the spouses. Section 10(4) of the Act, ibid, provides that in pre-trial proceedings if no compromise or reconciliation is possible between the parties, the Court shall proceed and shall decide the matter after recording pro and contra evidence. It further provide that notwithstanding any decision or judgment of any Court or Tribunal, the Family Court in a suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation fail, shall pass decree for dissolution of marriage forthwith and also restore to husband the "Haq Meher" received by the wife in consideration of marriage. By inserting the above quoted provisions in the Act, ibid, the legislature has recognized the dissolution of marriage through "Khula". The legislature while introducing the amendment in the Act ibid, have derived wisdom from the Verse No. 229 "Sura Baqara of HOLLY QURAN and instances of "Khula:, whereby marriage of Sabit-Ibne-Qais was dissolved by the Molly Prophet Hazrat Muhammad (S.A.W) on a complaint made by Jamila (wife of Sabit-Ibne-Qais) for relieving her from the Nikah of Sabit-Ibne-Qais.

13.  It is by now will settled law that if the dissolution of marriage is claimed by the wife on any ground recognized under the Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, then it is her duty to prove the allegation. If she succeeded to prove the allegation then the Court shall grant her decree for dissolution of marriage along with other benefit. But if she fails to prove then the mere fact that the wife could not establish her allegation qua grounds taken for dissolution of marriage would not disentitle her for termination of marriage contract on the ground of "Khula". In such eventuality the Court is under legal obligation to grant decree for dissolution of marriage, but on the basis of Khula and for the same she shall remit the dower amount if not received or pay it back to the husband, if so received. "Islam" does not force on the spouses a life devoid of harmony and happiness and if the wife is not desirous to live with her husband for any reason, even not recognized by the Statute, it permit separation, on the basis of "Khula".

14.  In the instant case both the Courts below have arrived at a unanimous conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove any cruelty on the part of the defendant-husband and despite the fact the wife is not ready to live with the husband. In these circumstances there was no alternate with the Court but to dissolve the marriage on the basis of Khula notwithstanding the fact that she has not claimed her dissolution on the ground of "Khula".

15.  In view of the above discussion, we hold that the judgment of the learned appellate Court is based on proper appreciation of evidence and does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity. The instant writ petition and review Petition No. 18/2011 in W.P No-2201/2010 are hereby dismissed.

(R.A.)  Petitions dismissed

-Where one of spouses denies existence of marriage it amounts to jactitation of marriage and is within exclusive domain of Family Court to decide dispute-

 PLJ 2014 Islamabad 308

Family Courts Act, 1964--

----S. 5--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Constitutional petition--Suit for dissolution of marriage--Denying existence of marriage contract and raised objection--Question of law--Whether Family Court can decide dispute where existence of matrimonial relationship was denied in written statement--Validity--Where one of spouses denies existence of marriage it amounts to jactitation of marriage and is within exclusive domain of Family Court to decide dispute--Petitioner make it evident that dispute involved therein pertained to inheritance and existence of marriage of predecessor was brought under dispute by third person and is not under dispute between spouses--Petition was dismissed.        [Pp. 310 & 311] A & B

Mr. Khurram M. Qureshi, Advocate for Petitioner.

Date of hearing: 29.5.2014.


 PLJ 2014 Islamabad 308
Present: Muhammad Anwar Khan Kansi, C.J.
versus
W.P. No. 2647 of 2014, decided on 29.5.2014.


Order

This petition assails Order dated 27.03.2014 passed by Mr. Mubashar Hassan, learned Judge Family Court-West, Islamabad, whereby petitioner's objection upon the maintainability of family suit was set aside.

2.  Brief facts of the case are that while claiming herself to be the wife of petitioner, Respondent No. 2 instituted suit for dissolution of marriage wherein, he filed written-statement denying existence of marriage contract between the parties and raised objection that the suit does not fall within the jurisdiction of Family Court. However, learned trial Court by rejecting the objection vide Order dated 27.03.2014 proceeded to frame the issues and called evidence of parties.

3.  Learned Counsel submits that neither relationship of husband and wife exists between the parties nor any NIKAHNAMA has been produced by the Respondent No. 1, due to which Family Court had no Jurisdiction to decide the case.

4.  It is next submitted that Respondent No. 2 is already married to one Rehan Ahmad Shamsi who is residing in United Kingdom, that marriage is still intact and it is impossible for a muslim woman to marry another person during subsistence of a valid marriage.

5.  Learned Counsel further averred that in a case where matrimonial status is under dispute, proper course for the Family Court is to pass a direction to file suit for declaration before the Civil Court. He placed reliance on case titled as `Mst. Jameela Akhtar vs. Public-at-Large' [2002 SCMR 1544] wherein it was held;

"..the trial Court while granting succession certificate to the Respondent No. 2, should have directed that no share of the said amount should be paid to Mst. Umat Ul Hameed unless she gets a decree from the Civil Court about her status as widow of Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, deceased, for such, a question could not be decided in summary proceedings."

6.  Learned Counsel further relied upon unreported judgment dated 10.05.2013 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Case of Mst Mehnaz Bibi & Mst. Saba Noor Vs Mst. Farhat Nigar etc [Civil Petition 1057 of 2011] & unreported judgment dated 02.05.2011 passed by the Hon'ble Peshawar High Court in Case of Mst Farhat Nigar Vs Mst. Mehnaz Bibi [CR 524 of 2009] wherein the dispute qua succession was held to be triable by learned Civil Court.

7.  Heard and record perused.

8.  The question of law emanating from the facts and circumstances of the instant case is `whether a Family Court can decide a dispute where existence of matrimonial relationship is denied in written statement?'

9.  The jurisdiction of a Family Court is provided under Section 5 of the Family Court Act, 1964 which is as following;

(1)  "Subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, the Family Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon the matters specified in Part I of the Schedule."

10.  In part I of the Schedule at Item No 7 Jactitation of Marriage is mentioned which makes it clear that where one of the spouses denies existence of marriage it amounts to jactitation of marriage and is within the exclusive domain of the Family Court to decide the dispute.

11.  The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of `Abdul Waheed Vs Asma Jehangir' [PLD 2004 Supreme Court 219] held as following:

"Question of validity of a marriage failing within the exclusive domain of the Family Court established under the West Pakistan Family Court Act, 1964, High Court could and ought to have avoided the needless controversy on the subject."

12.  Further in case of Abdul Hamid Vs Munaza Fakhar [2006 YLR 2622 Lahore] wherein it is held as following;

"Ordinary dictionary meaning of the word jactitation clearly indicate that it arises in the situation when one person intends to keep the other silent in respect of boasting of existence of marital relations between the two. According to my analysis, the laws promulgated for settlement of dispute between the husband/wife is that in case any part of the married couple disputes, such suits certainly would come before the Courts of exclusive jurisdiction established in this behalf and he/she cannot maintain civil suit but where such relief is claimed by a person other than husband/wife, suit in this behalf shall be entertained, adjudicated tried and decided by the Civil Court of ultimate jurisdiction."

13.  The case laws referred by the petitioner make it evident that dispute involved therein pertained to inheritance and the existence of marriage of  the  predecessor  was  brought  under  dispute  by  the third person and is not under dispute between the spouses, hence the referred case laws are distinguished.

14.  In view of above, there is no justification for interference in the impugned Order hence the petition is dismissed in limine.

(R.A.)  ?????

 

-S. 2(ii) & (iv)--Family Courts Act, 1964, S. 10(4)--Ordered for return of benefits--Suit for dissolution of marriage on ground of non-payment of maintenance allowance non-performance of matrimonial obligation--

 PLJ 2014 Lahore 960

Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939--

----S. 2(ii) & (iv)--Family Courts Act, 1964, S. 10(4)--Ordered for return of benefits--Suit for dissolution of marriage on ground of non-payment of maintenance allowance non-performance of matrimonial obligation--Applicability of Family Courts Act, to dissolution of marriage on basis of Khula and not to dissolution of marriage on ground available to wife u/S. 2 of Act, 1939--Validity--It is quite evident that among others, ground for non-payment, of maintenance allowance for a period of two years and non-performance of conjugal rights for a period of three years entitles a wife to a decree for dissolution of marriage--Wife was entitled to decree for dissolution of marriage on basis of non-provision of maintenance allowance and non-performance of conjugal rights on the part of husband--Therefore, wife was not obliged to return the benefits, derived by her from the husband on account of marriage--When wife had claimed decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds enumerated, in the plaint and she had succeeded, in establishing the grounds, Family Court was obliged, to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage, on basis of grounds and not on the ground of Khula and he did so, hence, wife was not obliged to return the benefits, which she had received from husband.           [Pp. 962 & 964] A, B & C

PLD 2007 Lah. 626, 2006 MLD 83 & 2006 SCMR 100, rel.

Ch. Muhammad Javed, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mian Tanvir Kamran, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 20.11.2013.


 PLJ 2014 Lahore 960
[Multan Bench Multan]
Present: Arshad Mahmood Tabassum, J.
MUHAMMAD SHAHID FAROOQ--Petitioner
versus
JUDGE FAMILY COURT, etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 14882 of 2012, heard on 20.11.2013.


Judgment

This petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 calls in question judgment and decree dated 24.10.2012, passed by the learned Judge Family Court, Mozaffargarh, whereby he decreed the suit for dissolution of marriage, filed by the Respondent No. 2 Mst. Nusrat Parveen. The grievance of the petitioner appears to be that the Judge Family Court while decreeing the suit has not passed the order regarding return of the benefits, which the respondent had derived by way of dower weighing 4-tola and a house constructed on a piece of land, measuring 4-marla.

2.  Learned, counsel for the petitioner has argued that under Section 10(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, it was incumbent upon the learned Judge Family Court to have ordered for return of the said benefits, hence, the impugned decree may be modified to that extent. He has relied upon the case of Mst. Hameedan Yasmin (2009 CLC 438).

3.  Conversely, the learned, counsel for the respondent has fully supported the impugned, judgment and decree.

4.  Heard. Record perused.

5.  It appears that Respondent No. 2 instituted a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of non-payment of maintenance allowance to her by the petitioner for a period of three years and one month; non-performance of matrimonial obligations for the said period and subjecting her to mal-treatment and not on the basis of Khula. Similarly, the suit was decreed by the learned Judge Family Court on the said grounds, hence, to my mind, the question of return of benefits, which the respondent had derived from the petitioner did not arise. It is noteworthy that decree for recovery of maintenance allowance had been passed against the petitioner obliging him to make payment of maintenance allowance to the respondent from January, 2009, but till the time when the impugned decree for dissolution of marriage dated 24.10.2012 was passed, the petitioner had not made payment of even a single penny towards the maintenance allowance of the petitioner. It was in this background that the learned Judge Family Court in the impugned judgment elaborately held as under:

"She has further deposed that the defendant has neither paid maintenance allowance nor paid dower as well as dowry articles. It is pertinent to mention here that the execution petition titled as Nusrat Perveen vs. Muhammad Shahid Farooq for recovery of maintenance allowance, dower and dowry articles is pending in this Court in which the defendant has not paid even single penny to the plaintiff."

6.  The grounds for the decree for dissolution of marriage available to a Muslim woman have been enumerated in Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Grounds "ii" and "iv" thereof read, as under:

"(ii) that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years;

(iv) that the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable cause, his martial obligations for period of three years"

7.  It is quite evident that among others, ground for non-payment of maintenance allowance for a period of two years and non-performance of conjugal rights for a period of three years entitles a wife to a decree for dissolution of marriage. The respondent/wife had specifically taken the said, grounds in her plaint and had produced evidence in this regard, which remained unrebutted, thus, she was entitled to the decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of non-provision of maintenance allowance and non-performance of conjugal rights on the part of the petitioner/husband. Therefore, she was not obliged to return the benefits, derived by her from the petitioner/ husband on account of marriage.

8.  It is also worth mentioning here that Section 10(4) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 is applicable to the dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula and not to the dissolution of marriage on the grounds available to a wife under Section 2(ii) & (iv) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. If any precedent in this regard is required, reliance may be placed on the case of Khalid Mahmood (PLD 2007 Lahore 626). The relevant portion of the same reads as under:--

"11.  The condition or the wife to restore to husband the dower received by her at the time of marriage, while seeking dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula, according to provisos to sub-section (4) of Section 10 of Family Courts Act, is explicitly indicative of fact that this provision of law (brought through amendment vide Ordinance, 2002) is only meant to apply in suits in which dissolution of marriage is prayed for only on the basis of Khula. Further in such like situation the decree is passed straightway on failure of reconciliation. This proviso is not applicable, where the decree is not passed forthwith, on failure of reconciliation proceedings and where the dispute cannot be resolved without recording of evidence. Proviso was introduced to absolve the Court from following normal procedure of trial and to empower it pass a decree, on failure of reconciliation, without framing of issues and recording of evidence Word "and" used between the sentences, "If reconciliation fails, shall pass a decree for dissolution of marriage forthwith" and "shall also restore to husband the Haq Mehr" has been employed insightfully. This envisages that order for dissolution of marriage and restoration of Haq Mehr, was to be passed simultaneously; When question of dissolution of marriage is determined after proper trial then proviso, (ibid) is not applicable and Court can dissolve the marriage according to the circumstances of each case. The power of the Family Court to fix any consideration for dissolution of marriage, cannot be curtailed. The Court can dissolve the marriage on the basis of Khula, even without any compensation, when it finds that Khula, is being claimed due to the fault, on the part of husband."

9.  A Full Bench of Peshawar High Court in the case of Mst. Saima Irum and three others (2006 MLD 83) has also expressed similar view. Relevant portion of the same is reproduced as under:

"6.  Therefore, in our view, the word `Khula' should be construed as subject to the presumption that the legislature does not intent, by its general language, to subvert the established principles of Shariah on the subject and has left it for the Family Courts to decide whether to dissolve the marriage between the spouses on the ground of Khula or not. If from the plaint submitted by the wife, the only prayer of the wife is to dissolve her marriage on the ground of Khula, then the Family Court under added provisos to Sections 9 and 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 could dissolve the marriage between them on the ground of Khula and could also order for restoration of the Haq Mahr received by the wife in consideration of marriage, but if the claim of the wife is based on other grounds also, such as cruelty etc., then the Family Courts shall proceed with the case in accordance with law to determine by recording of evidence that the fault lies in which of the parties and which of the parties are entitled to it.

7.  In this case, the learned Judge Family Court vide order dated 26.2.2004 has not only dissolved the marriage between the parties without specifying as to whether the marriage is being dissolved on the ground of Khula or otherwise, but a look at the plaint of the petitioner/wife would also reveal that she has not at all asked for `Khula' divorce and merely sought it on the grounds of cruelty, non-maintenance, non-payment of dower, desertion/ separation for more than one and a half year and failure upon respondent/husband to perform his marital obligation without any reasonable cause, reason and fault on the part of petitioner/wife.  In  such a situation, if the learned Judges of the Family Court are correct in dissolving the marriage between the spouses in the pre-trial conciliation proceedings by invoking the provisions of the added proviso to Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, they are wrong on the point of restoration of the dowered property, because neither the case would be proceeded only for adjudging the entitlement of the husband to the restoration of the Haq Mahr, nor the issue of dower would become redundant, but it would proceed for proper determination of the entitlement of both the parties to the receipt of dower even if the marriage is dissolved on the ground of Khula."

Reliance may also be placed in this regard, on the case of Abid Hussian (2006 SCMR 100).

10.  In the light of above discussion, it is quite clear that when the respondent/wife had claimed decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds enumerated in the plaint and she had succeeded in establishing the said grounds, the learned Judge Family Court was obliged, to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of said, grounds and not on the ground of Khula and he did so, hence, the respondent/wife was not obliged to return the benefits, which she had received from the petitioner/husband.

11.  In the light of above discussion, this petition has no merit, which fails and the same is hereby dismissed.

(R.A.)  Petition dismissed

-Family Court, was in such a tearing hurry to stay suit of petitioner regarding dower that he did not wait even for a certified or unattested copy of order High Court, Islamabad--Entries in Niaka Nama are still intact, and have not been declared forged and fabricated to date by any competent Court of law-

 PLJ 2014 Lahore 333

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----Ss. 5 & 12-A--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Constitutional petition--Suit for recovery of dower and maintenance--Suit for declaration cancellation of documents and injunction--Injunctive order--Family Court was directed to decide suit pending before him within two months--Violative of specific direction issued by High Court--Determination--Suit for defendant, challenging entries recorded in Nikah Nama was dismissed--On appeal operation of suit so dismissed was suspended--Family Court, was in such a tearing hurry to stay suit of petitioner regarding dower that he did not wait even for a certified or unattested copy of order High Court, Islamabad--Entries in Niaka Nama are still intact, and have not been declared forged and fabricated to date by any competent Court of law--If Family Courts are allowed to abandon and abdicate their jurisdiction on ground that defendant has also instituted a civil suit regarding entries contained in Nikah Nama, it would provide a stick to defendant in every suit instituted by a lady, on basis of Nikah Nama, to beat her with it--Civil suit usually takes years and years together, while a family suit is a time-limit case in which proceedings are to be carried out on a fast track so as to be concluded within six months, as is mandated under Section 12-A of Family Courts Act, 1964--Therefore, under no circumstances can a family suit be allowed to be temporized or clubbed with a civil suit nor can same be made to be dependent upon outcome of civil suit.   [Pp. 338 & 339] A, B, C, D, E & F

Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--

----Art. 199--It is self-evident and axiomatic that he is subject to supervisory jurisdiction of High Court, and his orders are amenable to judicial review by High Court under Art. 199 of Constitution--On 02.12.2013, he was asked not to be sidetracked so as to conclude proceedings within two months, but he has circumvented aforesaid order by adopting a sophisticated, albeit highly objectionable approach--He has also made a vain attempt to pit and confront one High Court with another High Court, and, that too, without any basis--If he is enjoying vicarious pleasure, it is high time that he was disabused of this notion.          [P. 339] G

M/s. Muhammad Khalid Ashraf Khan and Muhammad Mehmood Ashraf Khan, Advocates for Petitioners.

M/s. Aziz Akbar Baig, Rana Miraj Khalid and Syed Javaid Akbar, Advocates for Respondent No. 2.

Date of hearing: 16.1.2014.



 PLJ 2014 Lahore 333
Present: Mahmood Ahmad Bhatti, J.
MEHVISH GILLANI, etc.--Petitioners
versus
JUDGE FAMILY COURT, etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 15464 of 2013, decided on 16.1.2014.


Order

This writ petition has been filed to impugn Paragraph No. 6 of the order dated 17.12.2013 passed by learned Judge Family Court, Multan, whereby he stayed the proceedings in the suit titled `Mehwish Gillani versus Aamir Nasim Sheikh' to the extent of the recovery of dower/Haq-ul-Mehr.

2. Succinctly put, the facts are that Mehwish Gillani, the petitioner and Muhammad Ahmad Aamir, her minor son instituted a suit for the recovery of dower and maintenance on 24.10.2012.

3. On 04.02.2013, Aamir Nasim Sheikh, the defendant/ respondent entered appearance, and his learned counsel took the plea that a stay has already been issued by learned Judge Family Court at Islamabad. To be exact, Aamir Nasim Sheikh had instituted a suit for declaration, cancellation of documents and injunction. He had not denied the solemnization of marriage, but had questioned the entries contained in Columns Nos. 13 & 14 of the `Nikah Nama' dated 02.06.2011. After some time, learned Judge Family Court at Islamabad declined to proceed with the suit on the ground that he lacked the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the plaint was presented to the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad which passed a sort of restraining order on 29.11.2013. Thereupon, learned Judge Family Court, Multan virtually adjourned the hearing of the suit sine die to the extent of the claim of Mehwish Gillani for the recovery of dower vide order dated 25.04.2013, making her rush to the Islamabad High Court to seek the clarification of the injunctive order passed by it. On 04.07.2013, it was observed by the Hon'ble Judge of the Islamabad High Court that:-

`Such an order has no concern with the proceedings going on before the learned Senior Civil Judge/learned Judge Family Court, Multan.'

At this stage, it is pertinent to mention here that civil suit `Mian Aamir Nasim Sheikh versus Mehwish Gillani etc.' was finally dismissed by the Islamabad High Court vide order dated 29.11.2013. Resultantly, Mian Aamir Nasim filed RFA No. 170/2013 before the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad. Meanwhile, both Mehwish Gillani and Respondent No. 2 instituted Writ Petition Nos. 8350/2013 and 9505/2013 before this Court, which were disposed of on 02.12.2013 by this Court. It was a consensual arrangement, which finds reflection in the aforesaid order dated 02.12.2013. In any case, the learned Judge Family Court was directed to decide the suit pending before him within two months, focusing on the main suit, without being distracted by the side winds.

4. On 07.12.2013, learned Senior Civil Judge/Judge Family Court, Multan passed a fresh order in the wake of the dismissal of the suit of Mian Aamir Nasim Sheikh pending adjudication before the Islamabad High Court, the relevant portion therefrom reads as under:-

`My learned predecessor vide order dated 25.04.2013 directed the defendant to submit written statement only to the extent of claim of the plaintiffs for recovery of maintenance allowance. Hence, the defendant is directed to submit written statement as a whole including the claim of Plaintiff No. 1 for recovery of "Haq-ul-Mehr". Since a direction has been issued by the Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Multan Bench Multan for disposal of the main case within a period of two months, hence, the defendant is directed to submit written statement.'

5. On 17.12.2013, learned Judge Family Court, Multan passed yet another order. In Paragraph No. 6, it was held by him as under:-

`Vide judgment and decree dated 29.11.2013, the Hon'ble Islamabad High Court Islamabad was pleased to dismiss the suit titled `Mian Aamir Naseem vs. Mst. Mehwish Gillani and others'. As per certificate of learned counsel for the defendant, the order dated 29.11.2013 has been challenged before the Hon'ble Division Bench of Islamabad High Court and the Hon'ble Islamabad High Court was pleased to suspend the operation of impugned judgment and decree dated 29.11.2013. Obviously, an appeal is continuation of the suit. Since, the operation of impugned judgment and decree has been suspended and as such in my humble opinion, as observed by my learned predecessor in order dated 15.04.2013, conducting of further proceedings in respect of recovery of `Haq-ul-Mehr' would be violation of the order dated 17.12.2012 of the Division Bench of Hon'ble Islamabad High Court. In these circumstances, the defendant cannot be required to submit written statement to the extent of recovery of `Haq-ul-Mehr. Written statement to the extent of recovery of maintenance allowance has already been submitted.'

6. As stated above, it is the aforesaid part of the order dated 17.12.2013 passed by learned Judge Family Court, which has been brought under challenge before this Court through the instant writ petition.

7. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is violative of the specific direction issued by this Court vide order dated 02.12.2013, by which the learned Judge Family Court was required to focus his attention on the main suit so as to decide it within two months. He was at a loss to understand why the learned Judge Family Court continued to equivocate and attempted to make his orders conform to the orders and directions issued by the Islamabad High Court. He pointed out that to show deference to the order passed by another High Court is one thing, but to make obeisance to the same is quite another. In order to fortify his submissions, he drew the attention of the Court to the Articles 201 and 203 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. He forcefully argued that even the order dated 17.12.2013 passed by a Division Bench of the Islamabad High Court would not make any impact upon the proceedings to be carried out by the learned Judge Family Court, Multan not did it prevent him from proceeding with the suit of the petitioner regarding the recovery of dower/Haq-ul-Mehr. To him, Paragraph No. 6 of the order dated 17.12.2013 passed by Respondent No. 1 is a classical example of the colourable exercise of jurisdiction.

8. Respondent No. 2 engaged three counsel, whose submissions were recorded in the Court as follows.

9. Mr. Javed Akbar, Advocate/learned counsel for the respondent contends that the very maintainability of the writ petition is open to question; that the order is not void ab initio; that no injustice has been done to the petitioner; that only the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad is vested with the authority to entertain a suit in respect of the entries contained in the Nikah Nama, and the jurisdiction of all Courts, including learned Judge Family Court, Multan is ousted; that since the petitioner has already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court, she cannot turn round and question its jurisdiction afterwards. He adds that Mst. Mehwish Gilani did not assail the validity of the order dated 29.11.2013 passed by a learned Single Judge in Chambers, Islamabad High Court, Islamabad which goes to show that she has virtually acquiesced to the same. Learned counsel elaborates that there is no gainsaying that the learned Judge Family Court, Multan is not subordinate to the Islamabad High Court, but in due deference to the order dated 29.3.2013 passed by a learned Single Judge in Chambers, Islamabad High Court, he deferred/put on hold the suit of Mst. Mehwish Gilani vide order dated 15.4.2013. According to him, the aforesaid order passed by the learned Judge Family Court was in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience. Besides, it was intended to avoid the conflicting judgments to be passed by the two competent Courts of law. He concludes his submissions by stating that the learned Judge Family Court did not pass a fresh order, rather, the order dated 17.12.2013 is just a rehash of the earlier orders dated 15.4.2013 and 25.4.2013 passed by the Court. As such, the order dated 17.12.2013 may be regarded as a continuation of those orders.

10. Rana Miraj Khalid, Advocate/another learned counsel for the respondent contends that the petitioner did not challenge the orders dated 15.04.2013 and 25.04.2013, whereby the respondent was ordered to file reply only to the extent of maintenance of the minor. He implies that by acquiescing to those orders, the petitioner now stands estopped from reagitating the same matter. He further argues that the judgment/order dated 29.11.2013 passed by the Hon'ble single judge in chamber, Islamabad High Court, on the basis of which the learned Judge Family Court, Multan ordered Respondent No. 2/defendannt to submit written reply to the whole of the suit, has already been suspended in the RFA No. 170/13, with the result that the latter order now holds the field and the learned Judge Family Court has rightly passed the impugned order.".

11. Mirza Aziz Akbar Baig Advocate, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 adds that the order dated 29.3.2013 passed by the Islamabad High Court was explained and clarified by it in the subsequent order dated 04.07.2013. The effect of the latter order was that the proceedings before the learned Judge Family Court Multan to the extent of Haq-ul-Mehr of Mst. Mehwish Gilani were stayed, while they were to continue to the extent of the recovery of the maintenance of the minor.

12. I have given patient hearing to the learned counsel for the parties, and have also gone through the record appended to the writ petition, with their assistance.

13. It is amazing how a seasoned Judicial Officer donning the mantle of learned Judge Family Court has so blithely abdicated his jurisdiction, working on the assumption that he has been stopped from exercising it by a learned Judge of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad. In the first place, there was no basis whatsoever to entertain such a notion. He and he alone was to decide whether he had got jurisdiction in the matter or not. And for this to determine, he was to turn to Section 5 of W.P. Family Courts Act, 1964 as well as the Schedule thereto. Unless there is a final determination by a competent Court of law as to the genuineness or otherwise of the entries contained in the `Nikah Nama' the learned Judge Family Court Multan was to proceed apace in a suit for the recovery of Haq-ul-Mehr/dower. It was altogether overlooked by him that the solemnization of marriage between the Defendant/ Respondent No. 2 and the plaintiff/writ petitioner is not in dispute. It is also an admitted fact that she bore him a child by the name of Muhammad Ahmad Aamir.

14. It bears repeating that the petitioner and her son instituted the suit for recovery of maintenance and dower before the learned Judge Family Court, Multan on 24.10.2012. On the other hand, respondent/defendant instituted a suit for declaration before the learned Senior Civil Judge-I, Islamabad on 31.01.2013. The plaint in the latter suit was returned on 25.03.2013, whereafter the defendant instituted the said suit before the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad on 28.03.2013. I would refrain from dwelling upon the same lest it should prejudice the case of either of the parties. Be that as it may, the suit of the respondent/defendant challenging the entries recorded in the Nikah Nama was dismissed. And on the appeal operation of the suit so dismissed was suspended. This would lead to the only inescapable conclusion that the things are back to square one. I am at a loss to understand why the learned Judge Family Court, Multan was in such a tearing hurry to stay the suit of the petitioner regarding dower that he did not wait even for a certified or unattested copy of the order of the Islamabad  High Court, Islamabad passed by it on 17.12.2012. How could he comprehend the implications, ramifications and overtones of an order, which was not before him? To put it simply, the entries in the Niaka Nama are still intact, and have not been declared forged and fabricated to date by any competent Court of law.

15. There is yet another aspect of the matter under consideration. If the Family Courts are allowed to abandon and abdicate their jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant has also instituted a civil suit regarding the entries contained in the Nikah Nama, it would provide a stick to the defendant in every suit instituted by a lady, on the basis of Nikah Nama, to beat her with it. The net result would be that all Family suits would be put in cold storage or put on hold indefinitely. The law of the land would never countenance such an absurdity. Furthermore, a civil suit usually takes years and years together, while a family suit is a time-limit case in which proceedings are to be carried out on a fast track so as to be concluded within six months, as is mandated under Section 12-A of the W.P. Family Courts Act, 1964. Therefore, under no circumstances can a family suit be allowed to be temporized or clubbed with a civil suit nor can the same be made to be dependent upon the outcome of the civil suit.

16. On the face of it, Paragraph No. 6 of the order dated 17.12.2013 passed by Respondent No. 1, Judge Family Court, Multan is the result of colorable exercise of jurisdiction. It is also a case of abdication of jurisdiction on his part. In order to streamline the proceedings pending before him, Paragraph No. 6 of the order dated 17.12.2013 is liable to be struck down and the same shall not be deemed to be forming part of the same, with the result that the suit instituted by the petitioner shall be tried as a whole and not in piecemeal.

17. Before parting with this order, I cannot help observing that the learned Judge Family Court, Multan should always bear in mind Articles 189, 201 and 203 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. It is self-evident and axiomatic that he is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, and his orders are amenable to judicial review by this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. On 02.12.2013, he was asked not to be sidetracked so as to conclude the proceedings within two months, but he has circumvented the aforesaid order by adopting a sophisticated, albeit highly objectionable approach. In a way, he has attempted to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. He has also made a vain attempt to pit and confront one High Court with another High Court, and, that too, without any basis. If he is enjoying vicarious pleasure, it is high time that he was disabused of this notion.

18. For what has been stated above, this writ petition is allowed. In order to avoid unpleasantness, the family suit titled `Mehwish Gillani and another vs. Aamir Nasim Sheikh' for the recovery of maintenance and dower pending adjudication in the Court of Senior Civil Judge/Judge Family Court, Multan is hereby withdrawn; and the learned District Judge, Multan shall entrust the same to another learned Judge Family Court, Multan who would conclude the proceedings before the 15th March, 2014, without fail and without being deflected and sidetracked by any miscellaneous applications already moved or to be made by any of the parties to the suit.

(R.A.)  Petition allowed

-A wife can file a family suit at a place of her residence and there arises no question of residence of her ex-husband in such like suits-

 PLJ 2014 Lahore 200

Family Court Rules, 1965--

----R. 6--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Constitutional petition--Territorial jurisdiction of Family Court--Application for dismissal of suits on ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction--Challenge to--Validity--A wife can file a family suit at a place of her residence and there arises no question of residence of her ex-husband in such like suits--Even it does not appeal to prudent mind that a plaintiff's wife, who is a lady, will file a suit at a place which is far off from a suit at a of residence which might cause more hardships to herself rather than to her husband who can move in society freely and more easily as compared to counterpart--Trial Court had rightly dismissed applicants to dismiss the suits on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction--No interference was called for--Petition was dismissed.    [Pp. 203 & 204] A & C

Family Court Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 17-B--No law for appointment of local commission for ascertainment of place of residence of a lady in a family suit--It is discretionary upon family Court to appoint a local commission to examine any person or to make a local investigation and inspect any property or document but at same time, it is obligation of a party who arrests some fact to prove same through production of evidence and local commission cannot be appointed to collect evidence or to prove or disprove assertion of a party--Petition was dismissed.         [P. 203] B

Mr. Hameed-uz-Zaman, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Zahid-ur-Rehman Tayyab, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 17.9.2013


Present: Atir Mahmood, J.
Syed ASIF HUSSAIN--Petitioner
versus
JUDGE FAMILY COURT etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 5524 of 2012, heard on 17.9.2013.


Judgment

Through this writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 20.09.2012 passed by learned Judge, Family Court, Bahawalpur whereby the applications of the petitioner for dismissal of the suits on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction and for appointment of a local commission for ascertainment of place of residence of the respondent-plaintiff was dismissed. The said applications were filed by the petitioner in suits filed by the respondents for recovery of dower, dowry articles and maintenance allowance.

2.  Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contends that the learned Judge Family Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suits of the respondent-plaintiff as these were not filed for dissolution of marriage but for recovery of dower, dowry articles and maintenance allowance. He asserts that without prayer for dissolution of marriage, the suits for recovery of dower, dowry articles and maintenance allowance could not be filed at Bahawalpur because both the respondent and the petitioner were residing in Tehsil Ahmedpur Sharqia. He contends that the learned trial Court has wrongly dismissed the application of the petitioner for appointment of a local commission for determination of place of residence of the plaintiffs. He argues that in order to reach a just and proper conclusion, the trial Court should have appointed a local commission as the plaintiffs have shown their incorrect address in the plaint. He prays that the impugned order be set aside, the applications of the petitioner be allowed and the suit of the petitioner be dismissed on ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. In support of his assertions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the law laid down in case titled "Shahzad Hussain vs. Judge Family Court, Lahore and two others (2011 CLC 820)."

3.  On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff submits that the respondent-plaintiff has shown her correct address and she is residing in Islamia Colony, Bahawalpur. He asserts that under the family laws, a wife can file a family suit at a place of her residence and it is not necessarily to be filed at the place of residence of her husband ex-husband. He further asserts that there is no law for appointment of a local commission for ascertainment of place of residence of a lady plaintiff in a family suit. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the evidence of plaintiff has already been concluded whereas the evidence of petitioner-defendant is yet to be recorded. He avers that moving of applications at such a belated stage is nothing but a mere attempt to linger on the matter. He submits that the applications in question were without any merit and were rightly dismissed by the trial Court.

4.  Arguments heard. Record perused.

5.  Scanning of record shows that initially, three suits for recovery of dowry articles, haqul mehr and maintenance allowance were filed by the respondent and two minor children of the petitioner. All these suits were tried together through consolidation. Subsequently, a suit for restitution of conjugal rights was filed by the petitioner at Ahmerpur Sharqia. On application of the petitioner-defendant to transfer the suits of the respondent-plaintiff from Bahawalpur to Ahmedpur Sharqia, the learned District and Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur transferred the suit of the petitioner-defendant from Ahmedpur Sharqia to Bahawalpur vide order dated 18.01.2012 which order was not assailed by the petitioner before any competent forum. The suit of the petitioner was also consolidated with the suit of the respondent, consolidated issues were framed and consolidated evidence of the respondent-plaintiff was recorded till 21.07.2012. Afterwards, the petitioner moved application for dismissal of the suits on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. He also filed an application for appointment of a local commission to determine the place of residence of the respondent-plaintiff. Both the applications were dismissed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 20.09.2012 which has been assailed by the petitioner before this Court.

6.  As regards the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the Family Court at Bahawalpur had no territorial jurisdiction as the children of the respondent are statedly studying in Ahmedpur Sharqia is misconceived. The respondent has categorically asserted in the plaint and has submitted while appearing as her own witness that she is residing at Bahawalpur. Mere statement of one witness that the minors are studying at Ahmedpur Sharqia cannot oust the territorial jurisdiction of Family Court at Bahawalpur. Evidence of the petitioner/defendant is yet to be recorded who may produce his evidence to prove that the respondent is not residing at Bahawalpur which will be dealt with by the trial Court in accordance with law.

7.  Under Rule 6 of West Pakistan Family Court Rules, 1965, the territorial jurisdiction of the Family Court has been specified as under:

"6.  The Court which shall have jurisdiction to try a suit will be that within the local limits of which:

(a)        the cause of action wholly or in part has arisen, or

(b)        where the parties reside or last resided together:

                        Provided that in suits for dissolution of marriage or dower, the Court within the local limits of which the wife ordinarily resides shall also have jurisdiction." (underline is mine)

8.  In view of the above, I am of the considered view that a wife can file a family suit at a place of her residence and there arises no question of residence of her husband/ex-husband in such like suits. Even it does not appeal to a prudent mind that a plaintiff wife, who is a lady, will file a suit at a place which is far off from her ordinary place of residence which might cause more hardships to herself rather than to her husband/defendant who can move in the society freely and more easily as compared to his counterpart.

9.  As regards the question of appointment of a local commission, it is discretionary upon the family Court under Section 17-B of West Pakistan Family Court Act, 1964 to appoint a local commission to examine any person or to make a local investigation and inspect any property or document but at the same time, it is the obligation of a party who asserts some fact to prove the same through production of evidence and local commission cannot be appointed to collect the evidence or to prove or disprove the assertion of a party.

10.  The learned trial Court has rightly dismissed the applications of the petitioner to dismiss the suits of the respondent-plaintiffs on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any illegality, irregularity or infirmity in the order impugned which can be interfered with  by  this  Court  in  its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. The law relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is also not applicable to the case in hand. No interference is called for.

11.  In view of the above, this writ petition is without any substance. The same is dismissed.

(R.A.)  Petition dismissed

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