اجراء کے دوران مدیون کی طرف سے فروختگی جائیداد

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 667

West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 13(3)--Suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, recovery of dowry articles--Execution proceedings--Attachment of property--Objection petition--Dismissed--Sale of property by judgment debtor during pendency of execution proceedings--Purchaser of property was defence witness of judgment-debtor--Shame transaction--Concurrent findings--Relationship between judgment debtor and petitioner--Delay of more than 12 years in execution of decree on basis of an inapplicable objection cannot under principles of equity, justice and fair play be allowed to defeat decree under execution--Sale transaction in present matter reeks of an audacious and unembarrassed attempt to push already marginalized and persecuted into further misery and thereby dampen liberation and emancipation of women in Pakistan--Judgment debtor only alienated his inherited property to frustrate judgment and decree passed against him much prior to sale deed and entire exercise was nothing but a shabby and synthetic attempt to frustrate judgment and decree passed by family Court--Petition dismissed.
[P. 674 & 675] C, D & F
1990 CLC 686 ref.
West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 13(3)--Execution proceedings--Section 13(3) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 empowered Family Court to execute its own decree for payment of money by adopting modes provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue. [P. 673] A
2002 SCMR 1950 & 2015 CLC 667 ref.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Jurisdiction--Judicial power-- The jurisdiction and judicial power emanating out of Article 199 of Constitution is conditioned upon principles of equity and fairness. [P. 674] B
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 25--Right of equal protection--In a written constitutional set up such as ours Courts are custodians and guardians of social contract between State and its citizens--The Constitution and right of equal protection of law as also command for affirmative action in favour of women (Article 25 refers) would become illusory if defeated litigants or those who claim under them are allowed to navigate through technical shelters and deprive decree holder of her just desserts. [P. 674] E
(1872) 14 Moor’s Indian Appeals 612 & (1973) 89 ITR 190 ref.
Nemo for Petitioner.
Mr. Tariq Hussain, Advocate for Respondents.
Date of hearing 23.6.2022.


 PLJ 2022 Lahore 667
Present: Muhammad Shan Gul, J.
NAEEM SHEHZAD--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ARIFWALA and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 208019 of 2018, heard on 23.6.2022.


Judgment

Through this judgment the titled constitutional petition is sought to be decided.
2. The question confronting the Court pertains to the status of a property sold by a judgment debtor during the pendency of an execution petition emanating out of a family suit in order to avoid and frustrate enforcement of a judgment and decree.
3. The petitioner before this Court is the real biological brother of judgment debtor Zainul Abidin. It is this aspect of the matter which makes the reading ahead even more interesting.
4. Facts in brief are that a family suit titled “Nazia Aziz etc v. Zainul Abidin etc” was filed on 10.06.2014 and through this suit dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, recovery of dowry articles and payment of delivery expenses was claimed. Since preliminary reconciliation efforts failed the marriage was dissolved on the basis of “Khula”, while vide judgment and decree dated 06.05.2016 the Respondent Nazia Aziz and minor Zainab Bibi were granted maintenance allowance as also delivery expenses.
5. An appeal filed against the said judgment by Respondent Nazia Aziz was allowed and the impugned judgment and decree was modified and the maintenance allowance granted by the trial Court was enhanced from Rs. 3000/-per month to Rs. 6000/-per month. Thereafter Respondent Nazia Aziz filed an execution petition since her former husband Zainul Abidin was not willing to respect and comply with the judgments and decrees in question. Respondent Nazia Aziz filed an execution petition on 17.09.2016.
6. During execution proceedings Respondent Nazia Aziz moved an application to attach property consisting of land measuring 0-marla and 5-sarsai situated in Chawk No. 61-EB Tehsil Arifwala. This application was allowed by the learned executing Court vide order dated 10.02.2017 and the said property was ordered to be attached. This led the petitioner before this Court to file an objection petition maintaining that he had purchased the said property from his real brother Zainul Abidin (judgment debtor) vide registered sale deed dated 06.09.2016 bearing Mutation No. 20807 and that he was in possession of said property and therefore prayed for the order of attachment dated 10.02.2017 to be recalled. Respondent Nazia Aziz contested this application on the ground that the sale deed resulted out of a sham transaction and since the property was sold after a decree had been obtained by Respondent Nazia Aziz so as to frustrate execution proceedings with respect thereto, the objection petition merited to be dismissed.
7. The executing Court vide order dated 05.01.2018 dismissed this objection petition by relying on the fact that the objection petitioner Muhammad Naeem Shahzad was cited as a witness on behalf of his brother Zainul Abidin, the judgment debtor, in the family suit and he was well aware of the proceedings in the main suit. The executing Court noted that the main suit was decreed on 06.05.2016 and an appeal against the same was dismissed on 23.08.2016 and consequently an execution petition was filed on 17.09.2016. That, interestingly on 03.09.2016 judgment debtor Zainul Abidin acquired the disputed property i.e. 5 Sarsai through inheritance mutation No. 20593 and thereafter within three days i.e. on 06.09.2016 he transferred the disputed property through a registered sale deed dated 06.09.2016. The executing Court noted that since the present petitioner before this Court was a witness on behalf of the judgment debtor and had knowledge of the judgment and decree passed in the main suit, he was therefore well aware of the judgment and decree passed against the judgment debtor and having knowledge about such a decree and being well familiar with the recalcitrance of the judgment debtor in not playing ball it was evident that the sale deed in question was an artificial transaction and had only been executed to frustrate the process of the Court as also to cheat the Court. The executing Court, therefore, dismissed the objection petition and ordered for the registered deed to be cancelled.
8. This led the petitioner Muhammad Naeem Shahzad to file an appeal before the District Court Arifwala and the appellate Court dismissed the appeal by noting as follows:-
Record reveals that respondent Mst. Nazia Aziz instituted suit on 10.06.2014. Said suit was contested by the judgment debtor Zain-ul-Abideen and he submitted list of witnesses and Appellant Naeem Shehzad was mentioned as witness in the said list of witnesses. Said suit was decreed by the learned trial Court on 06.05.2016 thereafter appeal was preferred against the said judgment and decree dated 06.05.2016 in the Court of learned Additional District Judge Arifwala which decided the appeal on 23.08.2016. Thereafter execution petition was filed by the Respondent Nazia Aziz on 17.09.2016. Property in question was acquired by the judgment debtor Zain-ul-Abideen through mutation of inheritance No. 20593 on 03.09.2016 and judgment debtor transferred the said property in name of Appellant Naeem Shehzad who is his real brother on 06.09.2016. The judgment debtor and appellant was fully aware of the decree in execution and it is established that judgment debtor transferred his property to his brother Naeem Shehzad, the appellant, after passing the decree in execution which has not been assailed before any honourable competent Court as per available record as such same has attained finality. It is further held that judgment debtor transferred the said property in the name of his brother just to defeat the execution of decree and process of law. So in these circumstances learned trial Court did not commit any illegality while dismissing the objection petition.
9. This, in turn led the petitioner to file the present constitutional petition which is sought to be decided.
10. Leaned counsel for the petitioner was not present on the last date of hearing i.e. 08.04.2021 and has chosen to absent himself even today despite the fact that his name stands reflected conspicuously in the cause list. There is no intimation available about reasons for his absence. However, since the present constitutional petition has been listed in the red list, it has been taken up to be adjudicated on the basis of the available record and the grounds taken in the constitutional petition.
11. The grounds taken in the petition reveal as follows: That the petitioner is neither a judgment debtor nor party to the execution proceedings and even then his property was not only attached but the sale deed on the basis of which he become owner of the property was declared to be of no legal effect. That it is only the property of a competing party that can be attached for the satisfaction of decree or even a property in dispute can be attached but in his case a stranger’s property has been attached and taken away.
12. In response, learned counsel for the respondents states that since the petitioner is the real biological brother of the judgment debtor who was cited as a witness in the family suit on behalf of the judgment debtor and who allegedly bought the property in issue after the passage of a judgment and decree in favour of Respondent Nazia Aziz, the orders under challenge were unexceptionable and needed no interference.
13. Hence the question before the Court as to the status of a property sold by a judgment debtor during the course of execution proceedings but after the passage of a judgment and decree.
14. Had the judgment debtor sold the property in question to a stranger or to somebody who was not related to him the grounds taken in the petition may have been appealing. However, the relationship between the judgment debtor Zainul Abidin and the present petitioner and the undue haste with which the property in issue was alienated by the judgment debtor i.e. within three days of having inherited the property read with the fact that the property was sold after the passage of the judgment and decree against the judgment debtor restrains this Court from subscribing to the stance taken by the petitioner. What makes the sale deed dated 06.09.2016 even more questionable is the fact that the petitioner was cited as a defence witness by the judgment debtor in the family suit and therefore had adequate knowledge about the passage of the judgment and decree against the judgment debtor and who being his real biological brother was also not in the dark about his brother’s precarious financial condition.
15. These factors noted above can only lead the Court to one conclusion and which is that the transaction of sale was a sham transaction between two real brothers meant only to frustrate the judgment and decree passed by a family Court and only to allow the judgment debtor to wriggle out of the liability legally imposed on him. The relationship between the judgment debtor and the petitioner does not allow this Court to reach any other conclusion.
16. In (2015 SCMR 128) “Amjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others” in which the respondent had filed a suit for maintenance against her father and which suit was decreed on 18.04.1998 and an appeal against which was dismissed and where the respondent filed an execution petition and where the judgment debtor failed to honour the decree and was detained in civil prison and upon his release made Hibah of his residential house in favour of his second wife and where the successful respondent moved an application for recovery of decretal amount by means of sale of residential house so gifted by stating that the Hibah had only been made to avoid the decree and was thus a fraudulent transaction and where the executing Court declared the said Hibah to be unlawful and proceeded to attach the house, it was held at para 6 as follows:
The Executing Court through its order dated 14-5-2011 declared such Hiba to be unlawful and such order of the Executing Court appears to have been maintained by the revisional Court. Once the Hiba itself was declared to be unlawful, any further transaction on the basis of the said Hiba could only be a nullity in the eye of law for that the donee of the Hiba did not have legal title to the house to sell the same to the petitioner. Both Hiba as well as the purported sale in favour of the petitioner were nothing but sham transactions and its purpose was to ensure that the decree is not satisfied. The decree was nothing but for the maintenance of Respondent No. 2's own minor daughter. Unfortunately, the Respondent No. 2 in sheer disregard of his parental obligation has indulged in making all these unlawful transactions. What intent the Respondent No. 2 had in his mind but to starve his own minor daughter of her basic needs for survival. The Court while exercising parental jurisdiction cannot just sit and be a spectator in this unholy and unlawful conduct of the Respondent No. 2.
Description: A17. The honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan went on to hold that the technical trappings of execution provided in the Code of Civil Procedure were not strictly applicable to execution proceedings before a Family Court and that Section 13(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 empowered the Family Court to execute its own decree for payment of money by adopting modes provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue.
18. That, likewise, in (2002 SCMR 1950) “Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabir Sultana” where an agreement to sell and subsequently a sale deed was executed to frustrate a judgment and decree passed by a Family Court, the sale deed was declared to be invalid and it was held that the sale deed was invalid having been effectuated only to frustrate the judgment and decree of the Family Court and was thus a fraudulent transaction.
19. Similarly in (2015 CLC 667) “Saima Perveen and 2 others v. Naeem Ahmad Nasir and 3 others” in which an agreement to sell dated 08.08.2007 and which agreement to sell had been judicially approved vide judgment and decree dated 28.12.2008 was in issue with such transactions taking place subsequent to the decree of maintenance passed in favour of the estranged wife and minor children of the seller who was also the judgment debtor and where the respondents were close relatives, it was held at paragraph 7 as follows:
Undeniably, the alleged agreement to sell, filing of the suit for specific performance and the judgment and decree passed in favour of Respondent No. 1 are all subsequent events to the decree of maintenance allowance passed in favour of the petitioner. I am of the considered opinion that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, closely related, in connivance with each other have tried to frustrate the decree of maintenance allowance passed in favour of the petitioner. Any agreement to sell executed by the judgment debtor regarding his property after the decree passed against him is illegal and unlawful and does not create any right in favour of the subsequent/alleged purchaser.
20. Seen even from a different perspective it is obvious that the dictates of equity and fairness also compel this Court to not to perpetuate the case of the petitioner because the significance of never being oblivious of what would constitute fairness in a situation has been stressed upon by jurists since centuries and in the words of Allahabad High Court in (1973) 89 ITR 190, “even when the Courts step into the world of legal fantasy the principles of equity and justice cannot be lost sight of.”
Description: BDescription: C21. The jurisdiction and judicial power emanating out of Article 199 of the Constitution is conditioned upon principles of equity and fairness. Furthermore, according to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal and others” (2017 SCMR 321), “in terms of law, the proceedings of the learned Family Court, whether as a trial Court or an executing Court, are governed by the general principles of equity, justice and fair play. The circumstances of the present case, namely, delay of more than 12 years in the execution of the decree on the basis of an inapplicable objection cannot under the principles of equity, justice and fair play be allowed to defeat the decree under execution.”
Description: D22. The sale transaction in the present matter reeks of an audacious and unembarrassed attempt to push the already marginalized and persecuted into further misery and thereby dampen liberation and emancipation of women in Pakistan. As the Hon’ble Sindh High Court has observed in “Abdur Rehman and 2 others v. CityBank N.A.” (1990 CLC 686) in the context of a case where innocence is claimed by a party causing loss to the other, “the rule of equity which applies to an innocent person signifies that the one who could prevent the loss must suffer and not the other who was powerless to do so.”
Description: E23. In a written constitutional set up such as ours the Courts are the custodians and guardians of the social contract between the State and its citizens. The Constitution and the right of equal protection of law as also the command for affirmative action in favour of women (Article 25 refers) would become illusory if defeated litigants or those who claim under them are allowed to navigate through technical shelters and deprive the decree holder of her just desserts. Endorsing such a course would tantamount to doing what the Privy Council warned against in (General Manager of the Raj Darbhanga v.
Moharaj Coomar Rampus Singh, (1872) 14 Moor’s Indian Appeals 612), “the difficulties of a litigant in India would begin when he has obtained a decree. …….”
Description: F24. Having considered the matter from all perspectives it is evident that judgment debtor Zainul Abidin only alienated his inherited property to frustrate the judgment and decree passed against him much prior to the sale deed and therefore the entire exercise was nothing but a shabby and synthetic attempt to frustrate the judgment and decree passed by the family Court.
25. In view of what has been noted above, the concurrent findings of the Courts below are unexceptionable and not susceptible to any correction or modification. The same are upheld and this constitutional petition is dismissed.
(Y.A.) Petition dismissedاجراء کے دوران مدعیون کی طرف سے بیچے گئی جائیداد کا سٹسس کیا ہوگا ۔۔۔۔ جانیے اس فیصلے کی روشنی میں
PLJ 2022 Lahore 667
Present: Muhammad Shan Gul, J.
NAEEM SHEHZAD--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ARIFWALA and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 208019 of 2018, heard on 23.6.2022.
West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 13(3)--Suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, recovery of dowry articles--Execution proceedings--Attachment of property--Objection petition--Dismissed--Sale of property by judgment debtor during pendency of execution proceedings--Purchaser of property was defence witness of judgment-debtor--Shame transaction--Concurrent findings--Relationship between judgment debtor and petitioner--Delay of more than 12 years in execution of decree on basis of an inapplicable objection cannot under principles of equity, justice and fair play be allowed to defeat decree under execution--Sale transaction in present matter reeks of an audacious and unembarrassed attempt to push already marginalized and persecuted into further misery and thereby dampen liberation and emancipation of women in Pakistan--Judgment debtor only alienated his inherited property to frustrate judgment and decree passed against him much prior to sale deed and entire exercise was nothing but a shabby and synthetic attempt to frustrate judgment and decree passed by family Court--Petition dismissed.
[P. 674 & 675] C, D & F
1990 CLC 686 ref.
West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 13(3)--Execution proceedings--Section 13(3) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 empowered Family Court to execute its own decree for payment of money by adopting modes provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue. [P. 673] A
2002 SCMR 1950 & 2015 CLC 667 ref.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Jurisdiction--Judicial power-- The jurisdiction and judicial power emanating out of Article 199 of Constitution is conditioned upon principles of equity and fairness. [P. 674] B
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 25--Right of equal protection--In a written constitutional set up such as ours Courts are custodians and guardians of social contract between State and its citizens--The Constitution and right of equal protection of law as also command for affirmative action in favour of women (Article 25 refers) would become illusory if defeated litigants or those who claim under them are allowed to navigate through technical shelters and deprive decree holder of her just desserts. [P. 674] E
(1872) 14 Moor’s Indian Appeals 612 & (1973) 89 ITR 190 ref.
Nemo for Petitioner.
Mr. Tariq Hussain, Advocate for Respondents.
Date of hearing 23.6.2022.
Judgment
Through this judgment the titled constitutional petition is sought to be decided.
2. The question confronting the Court pertains to the status of a property sold by a judgment debtor during the pendency of an execution petition emanating out of a family suit in order to avoid and frustrate enforcement of a judgment and decree.
3. The petitioner before this Court is the real biological brother of judgment debtor Zainul Abidin. It is this aspect of the matter which makes the reading ahead even more interesting.
4. Facts in brief are that a family suit titled “Nazia Aziz etc v. Zainul Abidin etc” was filed on 10.06.2014 and through this suit dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, recovery of dowry articles and payment of delivery expenses was claimed. Since preliminary reconciliation efforts failed the marriage was dissolved on the basis of “Khula”, while vide judgment and decree dated 06.05.2016 the Respondent Nazia Aziz and minor Zainab Bibi were granted maintenance allowance as also delivery expenses.
5. An appeal filed against the said judgment by Respondent Nazia Aziz was allowed and the impugned judgment and decree was modified and the maintenance allowance granted by the trial Court was enhanced from Rs. 3000/-per month to Rs. 6000/-per month. Thereafter Respondent Nazia Aziz filed an execution petition since her former husband Zainul Abidin was not willing to respect and comply with the judgments and decrees in question. Respondent Nazia Aziz filed an execution petition on 17.09.2016.
6. During execution proceedings Respondent Nazia Aziz moved an application to attach property consisting of land measuring 0-marla and 5-sarsai situated in Chawk No. 61-EB Tehsil Arifwala. This application was allowed by the learned executing Court vide order dated 10.02.2017 and the said property was ordered to be attached. This led the petitioner before this Court to file an objection petition maintaining that he had purchased the said property from his real brother Zainul Abidin (judgment debtor) vide registered sale deed dated 06.09.2016 bearing Mutation No. 20807 and that he was in possession of said property and therefore prayed for the order of attachment dated 10.02.2017 to be recalled. Respondent Nazia Aziz contested this application on the ground that the sale deed resulted out of a sham transaction and since the property was sold after a decree had been obtained by Respondent Nazia Aziz so as to frustrate execution proceedings with respect thereto, the objection petition merited to be dismissed.
7. The executing Court vide order dated 05.01.2018 dismissed this objection petition by relying on the fact that the objection petitioner Muhammad Naeem Shahzad was cited as a witness on behalf of his brother Zainul Abidin, the judgment debtor, in the family suit and he was well aware of the proceedings in the main suit. The executing Court noted that the main suit was decreed on 06.05.2016 and an appeal against the same was dismissed on 23.08.2016 and consequently an execution petition was filed on 17.09.2016. That, interestingly on 03.09.2016 judgment debtor Zainul Abidin acquired the disputed property i.e. 5 Sarsai through inheritance mutation No. 20593 and thereafter within three days i.e. on 06.09.2016 he transferred the disputed property through a registered sale deed dated 06.09.2016. The executing Court noted that since the present petitioner before this Court was a witness on behalf of the judgment debtor and had knowledge of the judgment and decree passed in the main suit, he was therefore well aware of the judgment and decree passed against the judgment debtor and having knowledge about such a decree and being well familiar with the recalcitrance of the judgment debtor in not playing ball it was evident that the sale deed in question was an artificial transaction and had only been executed to frustrate the process of the Court as also to cheat the Court. The executing Court, therefore, dismissed the objection petition and ordered for the registered deed to be cancelled.
8. This led the petitioner Muhammad Naeem Shahzad to file an appeal before the District Court Arifwala and the appellate Court dismissed the appeal by noting as follows:-
Record reveals that respondent Mst. Nazia Aziz instituted suit on 10.06.2014. Said suit was contested by the judgment debtor Zain-ul-Abideen and he submitted list of witnesses and Appellant Naeem Shehzad was mentioned as witness in the said list of witnesses. Said suit was decreed by the learned trial Court on 06.05.2016 thereafter appeal was preferred against the said judgment and decree dated 06.05.2016 in the Court of learned Additional District Judge Arifwala which decided the appeal on 23.08.2016. Thereafter execution petition was filed by the Respondent Nazia Aziz on 17.09.2016. Property in question was acquired by the judgment debtor Zain-ul-Abideen through mutation of inheritance No. 20593 on 03.09.2016 and judgment debtor transferred the said property in name of Appellant Naeem Shehzad who is his real brother on 06.09.2016. The judgment debtor and appellant was fully aware of the decree in execution and it is established that judgment debtor transferred his property to his brother Naeem Shehzad, the appellant, after passing the decree in execution which has not been assailed before any honourable competent Court as per available record as such same has attained finality. It is further held that judgment debtor transferred the said property in the name of his brother just to defeat the execution of decree and process of law. So in these circumstances learned trial Court did not commit any illegality while dismissing the objection petition.
9. This, in turn led the petitioner to file the present constitutional petition which is sought to be decided.
10. Leaned counsel for the petitioner was not present on the last date of hearing i.e. 08.04.2021 and has chosen to absent himself even today despite the fact that his name stands reflected conspicuously in the cause list. There is no intimation available about reasons for his absence. However, since the present constitutional petition has been listed in the red list, it has been taken up to be adjudicated on the basis of the available record and the grounds taken in the constitutional petition.
11. The grounds taken in the petition reveal as follows: That the petitioner is neither a judgment debtor nor party to the execution proceedings and even then his property was not only attached but the sale deed on the basis of which he become owner of the property was declared to be of no legal effect. That it is only the property of a competing party that can be attached for the satisfaction of decree or even a property in dispute can be attached but in his case a stranger’s property has been attached and taken away.
12. In response, learned counsel for the respondents states that since the petitioner is the real biological brother of the judgment debtor who was cited as a witness in the family suit on behalf of the judgment debtor and who allegedly bought the property in issue after the passage of a judgment and decree in favour of Respondent Nazia Aziz, the orders under challenge were unexceptionable and needed no interference.
13. Hence the question before the Court as to the status of a property sold by a judgment debtor during the course of execution proceedings but after the passage of a judgment and decree.
14. Had the judgment debtor sold the property in question to a stranger or to somebody who was not related to him the grounds taken in the petition may have been appealing. However, the relationship between the judgment debtor Zainul Abidin and the present petitioner and the undue haste with which the property in issue was alienated by the judgment debtor i.e. within three days of having inherited the property read with the fact that the property was sold after the passage of the judgment and decree against the judgment debtor restrains this Court from subscribing to the stance taken by the petitioner. What makes the sale deed dated 06.09.2016 even more questionable is the fact that the petitioner was cited as a defence witness by the judgment debtor in the family suit and therefore had adequate knowledge about the passage of the judgment and decree against the judgment debtor and who being his real biological brother was also not in the dark about his brother’s precarious financial condition.
15. These factors noted above can only lead the Court to one conclusion and which is that the transaction of sale was a sham transaction between two real brothers meant only to frustrate the judgment and decree passed by a family Court and only to allow the judgment debtor to wriggle out of the liability legally imposed on him. The relationship between the judgment debtor and the petitioner does not allow this Court to reach any other conclusion.
16. In (2015 SCMR 128) “Amjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others” in which the respondent had filed a suit for maintenance against her father and which suit was decreed on 18.04.1998 and an appeal against which was dismissed and where the respondent filed an execution petition and where the judgment debtor failed to honour the decree and was detained in civil prison and upon his release made Hibah of his residential house in favour of his second wife and where the successful respondent moved an application for recovery of decretal amount by means of sale of residential house so gifted by stating that the Hibah had only been made to avoid the decree and was thus a fraudulent transaction and where the executing Court declared the said Hibah to be unlawful and proceeded to attach the house, it was held at para 6 as follows:
The Executing Court through its order dated 14-5-2011 declared such Hiba to be unlawful and such order of the Executing Court appears to have been maintained by the revisional Court. Once the Hiba itself was declared to be unlawful, any further transaction on the basis of the said Hiba could only be a nullity in the eye of law for that the donee of the Hiba did not have legal title to the house to sell the same to the petitioner. Both Hiba as well as the purported sale in favour of the petitioner were nothing but sham transactions and its purpose was to ensure that the decree is not satisfied. The decree was nothing but for the maintenance of Respondent No. 2's own minor daughter. Unfortunately, the Respondent No. 2 in sheer disregard of his parental obligation has indulged in making all these unlawful transactions. What intent the Respondent No. 2 had in his mind but to starve his own minor daughter of her basic needs for survival. The Court while exercising parental jurisdiction cannot just sit and be a spectator in this unholy and unlawful conduct of the Respondent No. 2.
Description: A17. The honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan went on to hold that the technical trappings of execution provided in the Code of Civil Procedure were not strictly applicable to execution proceedings before a Family Court and that Section 13(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 empowered the Family Court to execute its own decree for payment of money by adopting modes provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue.
18. That, likewise, in (2002 SCMR 1950) “Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabir Sultana” where an agreement to sell and subsequently a sale deed was executed to frustrate a judgment and decree passed by a Family Court, the sale deed was declared to be invalid and it was held that the sale deed was invalid having been effectuated only to frustrate the judgment and decree of the Family Court and was thus a fraudulent transaction.
19. Similarly in (2015 CLC 667) “Saima Perveen and 2 others v. Naeem Ahmad Nasir and 3 others” in which an agreement to sell dated 08.08.2007 and which agreement to sell had been judicially approved vide judgment and decree dated 28.12.2008 was in issue with such transactions taking place subsequent to the decree of maintenance passed in favour of the estranged wife and minor children of the seller who was also the judgment debtor and where the respondents were close relatives, it was held at paragraph 7 as follows:
Undeniably, the alleged agreement to sell, filing of the suit for specific performance and the judgment and decree passed in favour of Respondent No. 1 are all subsequent events to the decree of maintenance allowance passed in favour of the petitioner. I am of the considered opinion that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, closely related, in connivance with each other have tried to frustrate the decree of maintenance allowance passed in favour of the petitioner. Any agreement to sell executed by the judgment debtor regarding his property after the decree passed against him is illegal and unlawful and does not create any right in favour of the subsequent/alleged purchaser.
20. Seen even from a different perspective it is obvious that the dictates of equity and fairness also compel this Court to not to perpetuate the case of the petitioner because the significance of never being oblivious of what would constitute fairness in a situation has been stressed upon by jurists since centuries and in the words of Allahabad High Court in (1973) 89 ITR 190, “even when the Courts step into the world of legal fantasy the principles of equity and justice cannot be lost sight of.”
Description: BDescription: C21. The jurisdiction and judicial power emanating out of Article 199 of the Constitution is conditioned upon principles of equity and fairness. Furthermore, according to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal and others” (2017 SCMR 321), “in terms of law, the proceedings of the learned Family Court, whether as a trial Court or an executing Court, are governed by the general principles of equity, justice and fair play. The circumstances of the present case, namely, delay of more than 12 years in the execution of the decree on the basis of an inapplicable objection cannot under the principles of equity, justice and fair play be allowed to defeat the decree under execution.”
Description: D22. The sale transaction in the present matter reeks of an audacious and unembarrassed attempt to push the already marginalized and persecuted into further misery and thereby dampen liberation and emancipation of women in Pakistan. As the Hon’ble Sindh High Court has observed in “Abdur Rehman and 2 others v. CityBank N.A.” (1990 CLC 686) in the context of a case where innocence is claimed by a party causing loss to the other, “the rule of equity which applies to an innocent person signifies that the one who could prevent the loss must suffer and not the other who was powerless to do so.”
Description: E23. In a written constitutional set up such as ours the Courts are the custodians and guardians of the social contract between the State and its citizens. The Constitution and the right of equal protection of law as also the command for affirmative action in favour of women (Article 25 refers) would become illusory if defeated litigants or those who claim under them are allowed to navigate through technical shelters and deprive the decree holder of her just desserts. Endorsing such a course would tantamount to doing what the Privy Council warned against in (General Manager of the Raj Darbhanga v.
Moharaj Coomar Rampus Singh, (1872) 14 Moor’s Indian Appeals 612), “the difficulties of a litigant in India would begin when he has obtained a decree. …….”
Description: F24. Having considered the matter from all perspectives it is evident that judgment debtor Zainul Abidin only alienated his inherited property to frustrate the judgment and decree passed against him much prior to the sale deed and therefore the entire exercise was nothing but a shabby and synthetic attempt to frustrate the judgment and decree passed by the family Court.
25. In view of what has been noted above, the concurrent findings of the Courts below are unexceptionable and not susceptible to any correction or modification. The same are upheld and this constitutional petition is dismissed.
(Y.A.) Petition dismissed

--S. 17-A--Muslim Family Law Ordinance, (VIII of 1961), Ss. 8 & 9--Maintenance allowance of minor--Right to defend suit was struck-off--Financial position-

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 744

Family Court Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 17-A--Muslim Family Law Ordinance, (VIII of 1961), Ss. 8 & 9--Maintenance allowance of minor--Suit for dissolution of marriage--Decreed--Appeal--Accepted Conditionally--Non-payment of maintenance allowance--Right to defend suit was struck-off--Financial position--Determined liability--Petitioner failed to abide by terms of judgment passed by appellate Court, trial Court as also appellate Court in second round, rightly found against petitioner and both judgments are, unexceptionable--Petitioner has not appended any document with this petition that he was incapacitated to deposit outstanding liability in question--Appeal of petitioner on condition of payment of outstanding interim--It is evident from petitioner’s bank statement that each month an amount in excess of Rs. 1,30,000/- is deposited in his account by way of salary, a huge amount of money was deposited in his bank account between 26.4.2021 to 31.12.2021 from different sources and it is not as if petitioner is a pauper or not in a comfortable financial position to look after and provide sustenance to his own daughters--The petitioner did not intend to pay outstanding maintenance but merely agreed to pay same to get judgment & decree dated 07.02.2022 reversed and only prolong litigation--Petitioner is not acquainted with age-old saying “no other love in world is like that of love of a father for his girl”--Moreover, “and clothing and maintenance must be borne by father in a fair manner’ (Al-Baqarah, 233).          [Pp. 748, 749, 751 & 753] A, B, D, G & H

Family Court Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 17-A--Fail to pay interim maintenance allowance-- Section 17(A) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 provides that a family Court shall decree suit for maintenance straightaway if a defendant fails to pay interim maintenance so fixed.                                                                                [P. 749] C

Family Court Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 17-A--Discretion and obligation--The discretion bestowed on Family Courts was converted into an obligation and use of word “shall" repeatedly reflecting in current statutory provision leaves no room for Family Courts to either not fix interim maintenance allowance or to allow any defendant to continue defending suit without first making payment of interim maintenance.                                                       [P. 751] E

Family Court Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

----S. 17-A--Right of defend suit--Section 17-A makes right of any defendant to defend suit against him, otherwise guaranteed to him, conditional upon his payment of interim maintenance already fixed by Court.  [P. 752] F

Mr. Shahzad Saleem Khawaja, Advocate for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

Date of hearing 5.7.2022.


 PLJ 2022 Lahore 744
PresentMuhammad Shan Gul, J.
MUHAMMAD NAVEED AKHTAR--Petitioner
versus
Mst. GHAZALA BATOOL, etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 43023 of 2022, heard on 5.7.2022.


Judgment

Through this judgment the titled constitutional petition is sought to be decided.

2. The petitioner has laid challenge to a judgment and decree dated 26.4.2022 passed by a learned Judge Family Court whereby his right to defend the suit filed by Respondent No. 1 has been struck-off and the suit of Respondent No. 1, only to the extent of recovery of maintenance, has been decreed. Likewise, a challenge has also been laid to a judgment and decree dated 22.6.2022 whereby an appeal filed by the petitioner against the judgment and decree dated 26.4.2022 has been dismissed as well.

3. Facts in a nub are that a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dissolution of marriage was filed by Respondent No. 1 Ghazala Batool against the petitioner. Maintenance allowance for minors Ayesha and Fajar Fatima i.e. Respondents No. 2 and 3 in the present petition was also prayed for.

4. The petitioner submitted a written statement. However, the suit filed by Respondent No. 1 to the extent of dissolution of marriage was decreed on 06.12.2021 and marriage was dissolved on the basis of Khula. Interim maintenance allowance of minors i.e. Respondents No. 2 and 3 was fixed @ Rs. 10,000/- per month per head from the date of institution of suit.

5. The petitioner failed to adhere to the payment schedule and, therefore, his right to defend the suit was struck-off under Section 17(A) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 vide order dated 07.2.2022 and he was ordered to pay maintenance allowance to his minor daughters @ Rs. 20,000/- per month per head from the date of institution of suit till their legal entitlement. The petitioner was, likewise, saddled with the responsibility to pay Rs. 50,000/- to Respondent No. 1 on account of dues of maintenance for the period of Iddat only.

6. This was brought under challenge by the petitioner by means of an appeal and on 25.3.2022 a learned Addl. District Judge, Pir Mahal accepted the appeal and ordered for the payment of entire outstanding interim maintenance allowance within a period of one month. The petitioner again failed to cough up the payment of maintenance allowance and the trial Court was left with no choice, since it was bound by the order passed by the appellate Court, and again the right of the petitioner to defend the suit was struck-off on 26.4.2022 and suit of the respondents to the extent of recovery of maintenance allowance was decreed in terms of earlier judgment and decree dated 07.2.2022.

7. This prompted the petitioner to approach the appellate Court again and the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed on 22.6.2022 and against which the petitioner has now approached this Court.

8. It was held by the appellate Court in its judgment dated 22.6.2022 that the petitioner could not make payment of outstanding maintenance allowance despite having been given adequate opportunity by the appellate Court in the first round. It was also highlighted during the course of proceedings in appeal that the petitioner was contumaciously trying to avoid the payment of interim maintenance allowance because even in the proceedings initiated for execution of the decree he did not appear voluntarily when he was summoned by ordinary means and rather his appearance before the executing Court was only brought about by means of arrest. So much for the willingness of the petitioner to abide by the decree!

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the judgments and decrees under challenge are harsh, disproportionate and unfair because the petitioner's right to defend the suit has been struck-off in an unfair manner.

10. Heard. Record perused.

11. In the first round of litigation the petitioner failed to provide interim maintenance allowance to the minors as also to his former wife and his right to defend the suit for maintenance (only) was struck-off on 07.2.2022 by a learned Judge Family Court under Section 17(A) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 and he was directed to pay Rs. 20,000/- per month per head to the minors till their legal entitlement as also pay Rs. 50,000/- in lump sum only for Iddat period to his former wife as maintenance. This prompted the petitioner to file an appeal which was accepted on 25.3.2022. Order dated 25.3.2022 reads as follows:

“Consequently, the same is hereby set-aside however subject to clearance of all outstanding interim maintenance as fixed by the trial Court on 06.12.2021, within one month of the date of this order, failing which the trial Court may again strike out the defence of the defendant/present appellant.”

12. From a perusal of the order-sheet of the trial Court appended with this petition it is clear that in the second round the matter was initially fixed for hearing on 09.4.2022 and on which date counsel for both parties were present and in their presence the next date i.e. 26.4.2022 was fixed for the purpose of provision of outstanding dues of maintenance and since the one month time period fixed by the lower appellate Court expired on the said date i.e. 26.4.2022. However, surprisingly, on 26.4.2022 no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner and hence there was no deposit of the outstanding maintenance allowance amount and which meant that the order passed by the appellate Court and on which the petitioner based his case was flouted with impunity. Hence on 26.4.2022, on account of the contumacious non-cooperative conduct of the petitioner, his right to defend the suit was struck-off again and the suit of the respondents only to the extent of maintenance was decreed in terms of earlier judgment and decree dated 07.2.2022 and the petitioner was directed to pay the outstanding maintenance allowance as decreed.

13. It is indeed interesting to note that the trial Court had the benefit of having before it the bank statement of the petitioner which showed his salary to be around Rs. 1,30,000/- per month which was being deposited in his account regularly each month. That, likewise, a huge amount of money i.e. Rs. 78,34,000/- was also credited into the account of the petitioner from 26.4.2021 to 31.12.2021 and which clearly revealed that the petitioner is a man of means and in a comfortable financial position to provide sustenance to his own daughters. Therefore, it is not as if the trial Court has shot in the dark and it is only after being convinced about the comfortable financial position and worth of the petitioner that the trial Court fixed the amount of maintenance as Rs. 20,000/- per month per head for two minor daughters of the petitioner.

14. It is also obvious that on 26.4.2022 i.e. date fixed by the trial Court (since the one month period expired on the said date) no one appeared and hence no deposit of outstanding liability of maintenance was made and, therefore, the defence of the petitioner was rightly struck-off. Since the judgment of the appellate Court dated 25.3.2022 in the first round provided a foothold to the petitioner to go back to the trial Court and defend the suit and mandated him to deposit the outstanding dues within one month and since this part of the judgment was of the essence and since the petitioner failed to abide by it he cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate and at the same time, Court and rely on one portion of the judgment and resile from and ignore, another portion of the same judgment.

Description: A15. Since the petitioner failed to abide by the terms of the judgment passed by the appellate Court, the trial Court as also the appellate Court in the second round, rightly found against the petitioner and both judgments are, therefore, unexceptionable. Since the trial Court was bound by the judgment of the appellate Court, it had no option but to do as it has done. Likewise, the appellate Court also noted in the second round that the petitioner had failed to honour the judgment passed by the appellate Court in the first round and hence the trial Court had rightly struck-off his defence after providing him an opportunity on 26.4.2022 vide order dated 09.4.2022. In fact, it was ordered by the lower appellate Court in its judgment dated 25.3.2022 that in case the petitioner did not make payment of outstanding maintenance allowance within one month then the trial Court was well within its rights to strike off his defence again.

Description: A16. The Honble Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Moon Enterpriseser CNG Station, Rawalpindi v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through General Manager, Rawalpindi and another” (2020 SCMR 300) has noted that if after grant of last and final opportunity right to produce defence evidence is struck-off, if the same is not forthcoming, then there is nothing illegal or irregular about it and such an order if passed after due caution cannot be interfered with.

17. The lame pretext urged by the counsel for the petitioner about the mother of the petitioner being unwell is of little significance because even if the mother of the petitioner was unwell on 26.4.2022, the petitioner had to arrange for payment of monies prior to that date and ought not have waited for the last date in this respect. Even otherwise, the petitioner was not indisposed or incapacitated himself and there were many avenues available to him for arranging and depositing the payment in question. The appellate Court has rightly noted that no record whatsoever was even sought to be produced before the appellate Court establishing such serious ailment of the mother of the petitioner which could support the incapacity of the petitioner in depositing the amount of monies that he was so ordered to deposit.

Description: B18. Even here before this Court the petitioner has not appended any document with this petition which could have even remotely established the fact that he was incapacitated to deposit the outstanding liability in question. A mere prescription for certain medicines from a private Maternity Home and Laboratory does not suffice in any case!

Description: C19. Section 17(A) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 provides that a family Court shall decree the suit for maintenance straightaway if a defendant fails to pay interim maintenance so fixed. In the present matter the petitioner has not failed once but twice on the same count, has evidently tried to avoid and wriggle out of the liability so imposed, has been recalcitrant in honouring his commitment before the Court and has even failed to appear voluntarily in the execution proceedings where he was arrested and produced before the Court. Even otherwise, instead of one opportunity the petitioner has been granted ample opportunities to follow the law but he has failed. The petitioner cannot be allowed to abuse the process of law!

20. The learned Appellate Court vide judgment dated 25.03.2022 only allowed the appeal of the petitioner on the condition of payment of outstanding interim maintenance already fixed by the trial Court, which even otherwise, was his determined liability. The petitioner did not challenge the condition imposed by the Appellate Court and his case ought to fail merely for the reason that his default in complying with the condition imposed by the learned Appellate Court revived the judgment and decree dated 07.02.2022.

21. In “Rai Muhammad Riaz (decd) through L.Rs. and others v. Ejaz Ahmed and others” (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 761), it has been held as follows:

“10. As noted above, in the first instance, the suit of the petitioners was dismissed for non-prosecution on 28.01.2014 and was conditionally restored vide order dated 19.01.2016 on the basis of a conceding statement of the Respondents. However, such restoration was conditional upon payment of costs which were admittedly never paid by the petitioners. Further, at no stage was any application moved seeking extension of time for payment of costs. Strictly speaking and on the basis of principles of law laid down by this Court in Muhammad Arshad & Co v. Zila Council (2006 SCMR 1450), it is settled law that where revival of the suit is based upon a conditional order and such condition is not fulfilled by the Applicant, for all intents and purposes the suit does not get restored.”

22. In “Ghani-ur-Rehman v. National Accountability Bureau and others” (2015 C L C 1144), it has been held as follows:-

“11. After having held such view, the Learned Single Judge granted the conditional leave to the appellant to defend his claim against which order he filed a petition for review, however, it appears that he did not press it subsequently and resultantly the same was disposed of on 17-5-2004. The same order has attained finality having never been challenged by the appellant. By conducting himself in such a way, the appellant agreed to defend the suit conditionally and was estopped from raising the same plea subsequently without first fulfilling the condition subject to which he was granted leave to defend the suit. The failure of the appellant to comply the order had left no option with the Court but to decree the suit. ..”

Description: D23. On a different note, the petitioner has only been ordered to pay monthly maintenance allowance to his own daughters. It is evident from his bank statement that each month an amount in excess of
Rs. 1,30,000/- is deposited in his account by way of salary, a huge amount of money (nearly Rs. 80,00,000/-) was deposited in his bank account between 26.4.2021 to 31.12.2021 from different sources and it is not as if the petitioner is a pauper or not in a comfortable financial position to look after and provide sustenance to his own daughters. A paltry amount of Rs. 650/- per day per head is neither exorbitant nor fantastic in the present day world where massive price hike, sky- rocketing inflation and steep increase in prices of everyday goods have resulted in the cost of living increasing manifold.

24. It is also pertinent to highlight here that considering the hardships faced by mothers and children in getting their legal as well as religious share of maintenance, while awaiting final adjudication, Section 17-A was inserted through Family Courts (Amendment) Ordinance 2002 (LV of 2002). In its original form, the said Section 17-A empowered the Family Court to strike off the defence of the defendant and read as under:

“17A. Interim order for maintenance.--At any stage of proceedings in a suit for maintenance, the Family Court may pass an interim order for maintenance, where under the payment shall be made by the fourteenth of each month, failing which the Court may strike off the defence of the defendant and decree the suit.”

Description: ELater through Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act 2015 (XI of 2015), the discretion bestowed on the Family Courts was converted into an obligation and the use of the word “shall" repeatedly reflecting in the current statutory provision leaves no room for the Family Courts to either not fix interim maintenance allowance or to allow any defendant to continue defending the suit without first making payment of interim maintenance.

“S. 17-A. Suit for maintenance.--(1) In a suit for maintenance, the Family Court shall, on the date of the first appearance of the defendant, fix interim monthly maintenance for wife or a child and if the defendant fails to pay the maintenance by fourteen day of each month, the defence of the defendant shall stand struck off and the Family Court shall decree the suit for maintenance on the basis of averments in the plaint and other supporting documents on record of the case”.

25. This Court in “Muhammad Sajid v. Judge Family Court and others” (2020 CLC 1524) has already held that the word “shall sufficiently clarifies the legislative intent and since an adverse consequence is expressly provided for defiance of an order of payment of interim maintenance, such consequence would mandatorily follow.

7. The use of the word "shall" in the amended Section
17-A of the Act whereby the word "may" has been replaced, clarifies the intention of the legislation that in case of non-compliance of order for payment of interim maintenance allowance within time fixed by the law, not only the defence is to be struck off but as a consequence thereof, the suit is to be decreed; therefore, the said provision is to be treated as mandatory in nature
 on the basis of the principles laid down in The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Muhammad Din & Sons (2017 SCMR 1427), of course, subject to certain exceptions to be decided on case to case basis, whereas no such exception has been pointed out by the petitioner.”

Description: F26. Section 17-A makes the right of any defendant to defend the suit against him, otherwise guaranteed to him, conditional upon his payment of interim maintenance already fixed by the Court. Such condition, though not assailed by the Petitioner, has been applied strictly by the Honble Superior Courts of Pakistan consistently.

27. In “Talha Asif Taufiq v VTH Additional District Judge and 3 others” (2016 MLD 742), it has been held as follows:

“8. It may also be appreciated that from the bare reading of Section 17-A of the Act, 1964, it is manifestly clear that the right of further adjudication of the defendant is contingent subject to fulfillment of contingency of Section 17-A of the Act, in other words if the defendant desires to contest the family suit, he is required to comply with the interim order passed by the Family Court pursuant to Section 17-A of the Family Courts Act.

9.  From the above discussion, it appears that the Family Court can pass an order for payment of interim maintenance during the pendency of the suit and failure to comply with such order, can take necessary steps for penal action of closing the right of defence. The conduct of the petitioner is very much relevant in this case that since 18.12.2007 when the interim order was passed, not a single penny was deposited by him in compliance of the orders of the family Court till 04.7.2009 when his right of defence was closed.”

Description: G28. The right of any litigant to defend his cause before passage of any adverse order, as sacrosanct as it is, cannot be allowed to interfere in the dispensation of justice especially in a manner so as to endorse his repeated defiance of valid orders passed against him. The Petitioner neither challenged the order fixing the maintenance allowance nor that of the Appellate Court imposing condition of payment of interim allowance. It seems that the petitioner did not intend to pay the outstanding maintenance but merely agreed to pay the same to get the judgment & decree dated 07.02.2022 reversed and only prolong the litigation. Coming to his aid will reverse centuries old jurisprudence i.eEx turpi causa non oritur actio (from a dishonorable cause an action does not arise).

29. In “Muhammad Tariq and 6 others v. The State and another” (2020 P.Cr.LJ 1315), it has been held as follows:

“6. The concept of fair trial is central to the administration of justice. The right to cross-examine witnesses is a component of the right to a fair trial and is considered to be "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth ……

14. Admittedly, there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, which specifically empowers the trial Court to guillotine the accused's right of cross-examination. However, this does not mean that he can abuse the process of law with impunity and take the Court hostage.”

Description: H30. The social, legal and religious responsibilities of the petitioner also bind him to support his own biological daughters, provide for their maintenance and do so in a good and respectable way. It seems that the petitioner is not acquainted with the age-old saying “no other love in the world is like that of the love of a father for his girl. Moreover, “and clothing and maintenance must be borne by the father in a fair manner’ (Al-Baqarah, 233).

31. Seen from whatever angle the petition in question merits to be dismissed since judgments under challenge are unexceptionable, therefore, this petition is dismissed.

(J.K.)   Petition dismissed

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