-Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and suit for recovery of dower--Suit for maintenance was partially decreed and suit for recovery of dower was dismissed-

 PLJ 2021 Islamabad 23
Present: Fiaz Ahmad Anjum Jandran, J.
MUHAMMAD SHAKIR--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ISLAMABAD-WEST, etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 867 of 2020, decided on 20.11.2020.

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----Ss. 7 & 17(a)(4)--Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and suit for recovery of dower--Suit for maintenance was partially decreed and suit for recovery of dower was dismissed--Petitioner was jobless--Contribution for payment of school fees of minors--Working lady--Financial capability--Question of--Whether course adopted by Family Judge and affirmed by appellate Court qua fixation of maintenance, to be paid by petitioner/father in accordance with evidence on record besides law on subject--Witness admitted that during cohabitation, petitioner had been contributing to some extent in terms of maintenance out of his income; that she is serving in BPS-11 with monthly salary of Rs. 27,000/-; that she is also doing private job and earning Rs. 30,000/- per month; that she has no knowledge as to whether petitioner is currently jobless; that at time of Nikah her Rukhsti had not taken place and that petitioner had been contributing for payment of school fees of minors during Abadi--Respondent No. 3 in her statement has not given details or even remote hint whereby financial status of petitioner could be ascertained while on other hand a suggestion was also put to her that petitioner is jobless--In such an eventuality, when legitimate source of income of petitioner is shrouded in mystery and it is established that Respondent No. 3, is a working lady, had been contributing towards maintenance parallel to petitioner, awarded maintenance appears to be excessive and in contravention of financial capability of petitioner particularly, when there is nothing on record regarding his financial capability--Amount so fixed thus warrants modification--It was incumbent upon Courts to determine income of father for which recourse in terms of sub-section 4 of Section 17 (A) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 can be adopted which is meant to facilitate Court to determine financial position of father--Petition was allowed. [Pp. 30 & 31] A, B & C
PLD 2013 SC 557, 2012 SCMR 671, PLD 2018 Lah. 916 &
2019 MLD 820 ref.
Ch. Muhammad Javed Gujjar, Advocate for Petitioner.
Malik Muhammad Haseeb, Advocate for Respondents No. 3
to 6.
Date of hearing: 28.9.2020.
Judgment
Through the instant writ petition, petitioner impugns judgment and decree dated 9.7.2019 and 21.12.2019 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-III Guardian Judge, Islamabad-West and learned Additional District Judge, Islamabad-West, whereby suit for recovery of maintenance allowance filed by the respondents was partially decreed while appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed.
2. Facts, relevant for the disposal of instant writ petition are that Respondents 3 to 6 have filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance against the petitioner whereby Respondent No. 3 sought maintenance for herself at the rate of Rs. 5000/- per month w.e.f. April 2011 while for the respondents 4 to 6 at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month w.e.f. June 2013 till their majority besides Rs. 2,68,350/- school fee of Respondent No. 4 and Rs. 71,600/- the amount paid by her parents as educational fee of the petitioner. Besides the said suit, Respondent No. 3 also filed a suit for recovery of dower amount to the tune of Rs. 1 Million and twenty tolas gold ornaments.
3. The petitioner contested the suit by filing written statement he controverted the stance of the respondents by asserting that he was living in the house of parents of Respondent No. 3; that he was expelled out of the house in June 2016 and that he had been paying all the school fee of the respondents 4 to 6 from his own pocket till June 2016.
4. The learned trial Court out of divergent pleadings of the parties, framed necessary issues and recorded evidence of the parties. Respondent No. 3 appeared as PW- 1, tendered affidavit PI, Nikah Nama P2, Form B Mark PA, birth certificates of minors Mark A2 to Mark A4, marriage registration certificate Mark A5, fee challans Mark A6/1 to Mark A6/19. On the other hand, petitioner’s father Muhammad Younas appeared as DW-1 and tendered power of attorney and affidavit Ex.Dl and Ex.D2 respectively. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties, dismissed the second suit of Respondent No. 3 for recovery of dower amount and gold ornaments while partially decreed the suit of the respondents for recovery of maintenance in terms that respondents 4 to 6 were held, entitled to recovery maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month each -- from July 2016 till their legal entitlement with 5% annual increase while claim of the respondent, No. 3 for recovery of maintenance allowance was dismissed. Hence, the instant writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the evidence on record establishes the fact that the petitioner since day one of the marriage had been living in parental house of Respondent No. 3; that petitioner has no legitimate source of income at present while on the other hand, Respondent No. 3 is a working lady having permanent job and source of income while it is also established from the evidence that the petitioner had been contributing towards payment of maintenance, therefore, in absence of sufficient financial means, the impugned maintenance is too excessive, therefore, impugned judgment and decree to this extent are liable to be modified.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents 3 to 6 argued that from the statement of witness of petitioner, it is evident that the petitioner hails from a well-off family and living with his parents while the maintenance fixed, in the present days of inflation, in no way can be termed excessive, therefore, petition is liable to be dismissed.
7. Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.
8. The pivotal point in the case is that whether the course adopted by the learned Family Judge and affirmed by the learned Appellate Court qua fixation of maintenance, to be paid by the petitioner/father is in accordance with the evidence on record besides the law on the subject.
9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case law reported as “Muhammad Asim v. Mst. Samro Begum” (PLD 2018 SC 819), has held that:
“Where a husband was required to maintain his wife or children and was required to pay maintenance, including the arrears of maintenance, his present and past earnings must be disclosed by him, because his financial status would determine the amount of maintenance that should be awarded. The family Court should try to ascertain the salary and earnings of husband/father, who was required to pay maintenance.” [Emphasis added]
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in another judgment reported as “Humayun Hassan v. Arslan Humayun and another (PLD 2013 SC 557) expounded the law in the following terms:
“4. Heard. There can be no, cavil with the proposition that the maintenance issue(s), in relation to Muslim relatives shall be governed and regulated by the principles/injunctions of Islam i.e. as per the personal law of the parties. In this context, according to Section 369 of the Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mullah, maintenance means and includes food, raiment and lodging. However, it may be observed that from the very language of the above section, such definition is neither conclusive nor exhaustive and in our view it undoubtedly has a wider connotation and should be given an extended meaning, for the purposes of meeting and catering for the present days social, physical, mental growth, upbringing and well-being of the minor, keeping in mind the status of the family, the norms of the society and his educational requirement, which has now attained utmost importance but obviously corresponding to and commensurating with the means and the capacity of the father to pay. Anyhow, the same jurist in Section 370 of the book has elucidated the liability of the father to pay the maintenance to his children as follows:--
“370. Maintenance of children and grandchildren.--(1) A father is bound to maintain his sons until they have attained the age of puberty. He is also bound to maintain his daughters until they are married. But he is not bound to maintain his adult sons unless they are disabled by infirmity or disease. The fact that the children are in the custody of their mother during their infancy (section 352) does not relieve the father from the obligation of maintaining them. But the father is not bound to maintain a child who is capable of being maintained out of his or her own property.
(2) If the father is poor, and in capable of earning by his own labour the mother, if she is in easy circumstances, is bound to maintain her children as the father would be.
(3) If the father is poor and infirm, and the mother also is poor, the obligation to maintain the children lies on the grandfather, provided he is in easy circumstances.”
And at the end an additional note on the compendia of the principal of Muslim Personal Law was also made in the following terms:
“When a Court of law is to adjudicate upon parental or filial obligations of a Muslim it is only the legal principles concomitant to such obligations which are relevant and not the social or moral principles. A father, or any of the parents in a given case, may be under a social or moral expectation, compulsion or obligation to maintain a minor offspring for as long as the offspring does not attain the requisite physical, mental, intellectual and financial capacity to survive and sustain on his own but the case in hand before the learned trial Court was only in respect of maintenance of a minor son by his father which issue, on the legal plane, could not have been stretched by the learned executing Court and the learned Judge-in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court, Lahore to a stage beyond the sons’s minority by blurring the distinction between social and moral obligations and legal obligations under the principles of Muslim personal law.
11. In another judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Khadija Bibi and another v. Abdul Rahim and another” (2012 SCMR 671) by remanding matter to the learned Family Court held as under:
“3. The other question as to automatic annual increase in the maintenance for the minor children has been dealt with by the High Court in para 7 of the impugned judgment At present, there appears to be no factual basis brought on record to justify such annual increase. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, states that he will be in a position to lead evidence in the form of financial statistics including the Sensitive Price Index (“SPI”) to persuade the trial Court to grant annual increase in line with such statistical data.
4. In the foregoing circumstances, the appellate judgment dated 23.02.2010 and the impugned judgment dated 04.08.2011 are set aside. The ivatter is remanded to the Trial Court which shall proceed to frame specific issues relating to the dowry articles as well as enhancement of maintenance awarded to the minor children and shall thereafter allow the parties to lead evidence before deciding the case afresh. During this period, maintenance at the rate of 2,000 per month shall continue to be deposited by the Respondent No. 1/Grandfather.”
12. The Hon’ble Lahore High Court in the case of “Nazia Bibi and others v. Additional District Judge Ferozewala and others” (PLD 2018 Lahore 916) held that:
“9. Quantum of maintenance requires due consideration of all factors on the basis of which the Court can determine the actual need of the minor. In this regard, it is important for the Court to first determine the expenses incurred or likely to be incurred on the minors. For this purpose the Court must look into the living conditions of the minor and the manner and means by which the mother is maintaining the minors which will include factors like where they reside, whether the mother is dependent upon her family, if so what is the income on the basis of which the minor is also being cared whether she has a job and whether she has any source of independent income. Special needs of the minor which will include medical or physical needs or special educational needs should a/so be seen. Special needs, will vary from case to case, if relevant, as it is unique to the situation and individual. Yet for the purpose of maintenance it is the obligation of the father to fulfill these special needs. In the case of enhancement, the Court must also determine as to what extent the maintenance already fixed meets the requirement and expenses of the minor and for what purpose, further enhancement is required. At the same time the Court must determine the income of the father either through proper documentary evidence or on the basis of the social status and earning capacity of the father. In order to ensure that proper information is before the Court, it may always require the father to produce documents such as his salary slips or any bank statement or property document on the basis of which he is able to show his monthly income of earning or his financial status. In this regard, the assets owned by the father are relevant as it contributes towards establishing the financial status of the a has to be probed into by the Court and based on attending circumstances the Court can conclusively establish the means through which the father will be able to maintain the minors. It is also important to take into consideration any liability of the father that is whether he is paying any bank loan or debt, whether he has remarried or has other children or whether his parents are dependent on him. In this way the Court can determine the manner in which the income of the father is spent and balance the income and capacity with the reasonable requirements of the minors seeking maintenance. [Emphasis added]
13. The Hon’ble Lahore High Court in case reported as “Khalid Mahmood v. Naseem Akhtar” (2019 MLD 820 Lahore) held that Section 17-A (4) of the Family Court Act, 1964 provided that paramount duty of the Family Court is to keep in mind the financial status of the father before fixing the quantum of maintenance. Likewise, in case laws reported as 2004 MLD 1325 Peshawar and 2009 CLC 1819 Lahore, same principle was reiterated.
14. That evidence of PW-1 (Respondent No. 3) is available on record, wherein, in her cross-examination she stated as under:
یہ درست ہے کہ میں سرکاری جاب کرتی ہوں۔ یہ درست ہے کہ میری جاب محکمہ (PWD) میں ہے۔
یہ درست ہے کہ میرے نکاح میں میرے والد صاحب بھی شامل نہیں تھے۔ یہ درست ہے کہ میری والدہ میرے نکاح میں شامل تھیں۔
ہماری شادی love کی شادی تھی۔
یہ درست ہے کہ مدعا علیہ بوقت نکاح زیر تعلیم تھا اسکی کوئی جاب نہ تھی۔
یہ درست ہے کہ مدعا علیہ دوران آبادی اپنی آمدن میں سے معمولی سا خرچا مجھے دیتا تھا۔
میں BPS-9 میں جاب کرتی ہوں۔ دوبارہ کہا کہ اب میں BPS-11 میں جاب کرتی ہوں۔ میں بطور UDC جاب کرتی ہوں۔ میری گراس سیلری/تنخواہ 27,000/- روپے ہے۔ یہ درست ہے کہ میں سرکاری ملازم کے علاوہ بھی پرائیوٹ طور پر ایک جاب کر رہی ہوں۔ میں اپنی پرائیوٹ جاب سے ماہانہ 30,000/- روپے تنخواہ لے رہی ہوں از خود کہا کہ میری پرائیوٹ جاب پارٹ ٹائم ہے۔
یہ درست ہے کہ ہماری کالونی کے اندر بھی سرکاری سکول موجود ہے۔ یہ درست ہے کہ متذکرہ سکول پیدل مسافت پر واقع ہے۔
مجھے علم نہ ہے کہ مدعا علیہ اپنے اخراجات کے سلسلہ میں اپنے والدین پر انحصار کرتا ہے۔
دوران آبادی مدعا علیہ بچوں کی فیس ادائیگی میں حصہ ڈالتا رہا ہے۔
15. The above referred testimony of the Respondent No. 3 when considered in light with the other pleadings then it transpires that judgments of the two Courts below is lacking regarding determination of quantum of maintenance for the private respondents, in the light of above referred case laws.
16. It is incumbent upon all Courts of the country to adhere legal pronunciation by the Apex Court of the land and to seek guidance while deciding the matter before them which has not been considered in the present case by the lower forum.
17. The principle ibid, guides to hold that before determination of the quantum of the maintenance, the learned Family Court, is under obligation to determine the financial capability of the father vis-a-vis amount claimed in that respect. The test provided for the purpose is that there should be some tangible, concrete and confidence inspiring material preferably in the shape of documents and thereafter proper maintenance is to be fixed.
18. Now it is to be seen that whether the maintenance fixed and affirmed by the two learned Courts is inconsonance with income of the petitioner and for ascertaining the same, evidence has been gone through.
19. The statement of Respondent No. 3/PW-1 is very material in this respect and as a matter of fact, reflects the true story. She in cross-examination admitted that she is doing government job in PWD; that no rent is being deducted from them for the residence wherein they are residing; that no member from the family of petitioner attended the Nikah ceremony; that even her father had not participated in the Nikah; that it was a love marriage; that at the time of Nikah, petitioner had been studying and was jobless.
Description: A20. The witness admitted that during cohabitation, petitioner had been contributing to some extent in terms of maintenance out of his income; that she is serving in BPS-11 with monthly salary of
Rs. 27,000/-; that she is also doing private job and earning Rs. 30,000/- per month; that she has no knowledge as to whether the petitioner is currently jobless; that at the time of Nikah her Rukhsti had not taken place and that petitioner had been contributing for payment of school fees of the minors during the Abadi.
Description: B21. The careful analysis of the statement of the Respondent No. 3 lead to draw conclusion that it was a love marriage, petitioner had been studying at that time, while they after the marriage, lived in the parental house of the Respondent No. 3, which is an official accommodation. It also borne out from the evidence that the petitioner, as admitted by the Respondent No. 3 highlighted above, had been contributing in terms of maintenance and payment of school fee of the children at par with his financial capability. The Respondent
No. 3 in her statement has not given the details or even remote hint whereby the financial status of the petitioner could be ascertained while on the other hand a suggestion was also put to her that the petitioner is jobless. In such an eventuality, when the legitimate source of income of the petitioner is shrouded in mystery and it is established that Respondent No. 3, is a working lady, had been contributing towards maintenance parallel to the petitioner, the awarded maintenance appears to be excessive and in contravention of the financial capability of the petitioner particularly, when there is nothing on record regarding his financial capability. The amount so fixed thus warrants modification.
Description: C22. The sequel of above discussion is that while fixing maintenance, both the learned Courts have overlooked the important aspects highlighted in para-14 (supra), which are essential to determine the financial capability of the father vis-a-vis independent source of income of the Respondent No. 3/mother. It was incumbent upon the Courts to determine the income of the father for which recourse in terms of sub-section 4 of Section 17 (A) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 can be adopted which is meant to facilitate the Court to determine the financial position of the father.
23. Consequently, impugned judgments and decrees dated 9.7.2019 and 21.12.2019 are set-aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Senior Civil Judge-III/Guardian Judge, Islamabad-West for decision afresh within a period of one month from the receipt of this judgment after giving due opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence, if so desire. The petitioner shall continue paying maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 3500/- per month per child, which he is already paying, till the final disposal of the suit. There shall be no orders as to costs.
(Y.A.) Petition allowed

طلاق، خلع، عدت اور حلالہ کے بارے وفاقی شرعی عدالت کا تازہ ترین تفصیلی فیصلہ-

PLD 2023 FSC 286

Islamic law --- 'Khulla
and
'Talaq' --- Distinction between their legal effect --- 'Halala' -- Scope --- According to Shariah, Khulla operates as a single irrevocable divorce, which means that both the spouses can contract a fresh marriage with mutual consent, of course if they want to, without any intermediary marriage of the wife with another person, which is known as "Halala" --- Iddat shall be incumbent upon the wife if she wants to contract marriage with someone else after Khula ---
However, when a husband pronounces divorce (Talaq) to his wife for the third time and that attains finality, then if he wants to remarry that lady, a Halala is required i.e. the lady marries somebody else and that marriage dissolves in normal course either by divorce or due to the death of her second husband and she becomes a widow.

Case Laws: Grand Father is responsible to pay maintenance

  *2014 SCMR 1481*

*Grand Father is responsible to pay maintenance of his grand childrens...!!*
Judgments on Maintenance by Grandfather:
(PLD 2012 Lahore 445)
(PLD 2012 Lahore 148)
(PLD 2011 Lahore 610)
(PLD 2010 Lahore 119)
(2005 SCMR 1293)
(2004 YLR 616)
(2016 PLD 622 LAHORE)
Ss. 13 & 5, Sched---Maintenance allowance---Grand father, liability of---execution petition---Procedure---execution of a decree against a person who was not party to the suit---Scope---Minors filed suit for maintenance allowance against their father which was decree d---Judgment debtor (father) was sent to civil prison till the satisfaction of decree and property belonging to the grandfather was ordered to be attached---Contention of grandfather was that he was not party to the suit and decree could not be executed against him---Validity---Liability of grandfather to maintain his grandchildren would start when father was poor and infirm and mother was also not in a position to provide maintenance to her children---Such liability of grandfather was dependent upon the fact that he was in easy circumstances---If father and mother were alive then grandfather could not be held responsible for maintenance of his grandchildren unless it was first determined that he was in easy circumstances---family Court was bound to first adjudicate and determine such fact which could not be done unless he was a party to the suit having fair opportunity to explain his status and position---No decree could be executed against a person who was not a party to the proceedings---Executing court could not go beyond the decree ---decree passed by the family Court would remain in field to the extent of actual judgment-debtor even after suffering civil prison unless it was satisfied---Process of execution of decree could not shift towards the grandfather only on account of mere fact that judgment-debtor had failed to discharge his liability under the decree --family Court could adopt the procedure provided in Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for execution of its decree ---Judgment-debtor could be sent to civil prison for one year--Impugned order for attachment of property of grandfather was un-warranted by law which was declared illegal and unlawful---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.
*Judgments on Maintenance by Grandfather*
*PLD 2012 Lahore 445*
*PLD 2012 Lahore 148*
*PLD 2011 Lahore 610*
*PLD 2010 Lahore 119*
*2005 SCMR 1293*
*2004 YLR 616*
If some more effort is made few other judgments may also be found.
*2016 PLD 622 LAHORE*
Ss. 13 & 5, Sched---Maintenance allowance---Grand father, liability of---execution petition---Procedure---execution of a decree against a person who was not party to the suit---Scope---Minors filed suit for maintenance allowance against their father which was decree d---Judgment debtor (father) was sent to civil prison till the satisfaction of decree and property belonging to the grandfather was ordered to be attached---Contention of grandfather was that he was not party to the suit and decree could not be executed against him---Validity---Liability of grandfather to maintain his grandchildren would start when father was poor and infirm and mother was also not in a position to provide maintenance to her children---Such liability of grandfather was dependent upon the fact that he was in easy circumstances---If father and mother were alive then grandfather could not be held responsible for maintenance of his grandchildren unless it was first determined that he was in easy circumstances---family Court was bound to first adjudicate and determine such fact which could not be done unless he was a party to the suit having fair opportunity to explain his status and position---No decree could be executed against a person who was not a party to the proceedings---Executing court could not go beyond the decree ---decree passed by the family Court would remain in field to the extent of actual judgment-debtor even after suffering civil prison unless it was satisfied---Process of execution of decree could not shift towards the grandfather only on account of mere fact that judgment-debtor had failed to discharge his liability under the decree --family Court could adopt the procedure provided in Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for execution of its decree ---Judgment-debtor could be sent to civil prison for one year--Impugned order for attachment of property of grandfather was un-warranted by law which was declared illegal and unlawful---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

It is the function of the Local Government to register births, deaths, marriages, and divorces and issue certificates in respect thereof.

 PLD 2024 Lahore 443

It is the function of the Local Government to register births, deaths, marriages, and divorces and issue certificates in respect thereof.
Under section 51(2)(x) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, the Municipal Committees were charged with this duty. The Punjab Local Government Act, 2019 (read with the Third and Fourth Schedules), the Metropolitan Corporations, Municipal Corporations, Municipal Committees, and the Town Committees performed this function. And now, under section 33(1)(j) of the recently-enacted PLGA 2022, it is the mandate of the Union Council. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that Section 21 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000, ordains that the marriage or divorce of a citizen should be reported to NADRA.
Section 202 of PLGA 2022 empowers the Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the said Act. However, it has not framed any rules for the registration of divorces of minorities in general and the Christian community in particular and the issuance of divorce certificates. The local governments have also not made any bye-laws in this regard in terms of section 203.
The Petitioner is not the only person who has complained of non-issuance of a divorce certificate by a Union Council. This is a general issue that the Christian community is facing. This Court considers that rules/bye-laws under sections 202/203 of the PLGA 2022 are necessary to meet the situation. Accordingly, the Government of the Punjab is directed to frame the requisite rules and issue notifications and letters, etc., within 90 days from the date of announcement of this judgment.
During the proceedings, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that NADRA’s Registration Policy dated 06.04.2021 (Version 5.0.2) allows a change of marital status of a divorcee on the basis of an affidavit in the prescribed form. Until the Provincial Government frames rules as directed above, NADRA shall accommodate the Christian community in accordance with the Registration Policy.
WP 66288/22
Mst Shumaila Sharif Vs The Secretary etc

Custody of minor--Principles governing custody of a minor and guidelines --The father is the natural guardian while...

 P L D 2024 Supreme Court 629
SHAISTA HABIB Versus MUHAMMAD ARIF HABIB and others
Civil Petition No.3801 of 2022

Custody of minor---Welfare of child---Scope---Any decision regarding the custody of a child without assessment and determination of the latter's welfare and best interests by taking into consideration the relevant factors and variables cannot be sustainable, nor can the exercise of discretion be lawful---Welfare of a minor and the latter's best interest is the foundational principle for deciding custody disputes.
Principles governing custody of a minor and guidelines which are to be taken into consideration by courts while deciding custody disputes stated.
The father is the natural guardian while the mother is entitled to the custody (hizanat) of a male child till the age of seven years while in case of a female till she attains puberty. This right continues notwithstanding a divorce or separation. As a natural guardian it is the obligation of the father to maintain the child even if the custody is with the mother. The inability of the mother to financially support the child is not a determinate ground to deprive her from custody because in such an eventuality the father's obligation regarding maintenance is not extinguished. The rule that the father is a natural guardian and, therefore, entitled to the custody of the child nor that the mother loses the right of hizanat after the minor has attained the prescribed age or puberty, as the case may be, is not absolute, rather subject to exceptions. The decision regarding custody of a child is governed on the fundamental principle, the paramount and overarching consideration is the welfare of the child i.e. to ascertain the course which is in the latter's best interest. The crucial criterion is, therefore, the best interest and welfare of a child while determining the question of custody. The rights or aspirations of the parents or some other person are subservient to this principle and each case of custody must be decided on the basis of ascertaining a course which is in the 'best interest of the child'. The factors or variables that may be taken into consideration while determining the question of custody of a child are not exhaustive but they would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The guiding principle is to ensure that the determination of custody promotes the rights of the child as well as the latter's wellbeing. The overriding consideration must be to protect the child from any physical, mental or emotional injury, neglect or negligent treatment. The mother's disability, illiteracy or financial status are not the sole determinant factors. The second marriage contracted by the mother also cannot become a stand-alone reason to disqualify her from obtaining the custody of the child. The question of custody involves taking into consideration the factors which are relevant to the upbringing, nursing and fostering of the child. It essentially extends to the emotional, personal and physical wellbeing of a child. The sole object is to ensure that the overall growth and development of the child is guaranteed.
The overarching principle in cases involving the question of custody and visitation rights of the parents is, therefore, determination of the welfare of the child, i.e. to ascertain a course that would serve the best interest of the child. It is the duty of the court to form an opinion and adopt a course on the basis of the paramount principle of the welfare of the child.
While determining the welfare of the child in the context of custody disputes the court may grant the custody to a person other than the parents e.g. the grandparents or aunt, if doing so would promote the welfare and best interest of the child.
The court, in its endeavor to assess and determine the welfare of a child, is not bound to follow rigid formalities, strict adherence to procedure or rules or technicalities if doing so may hamper the determination or undermine the fundamental criterion of the best interest of the child.
Welfare of child---Scope---Mother contracting second marriage---Not a bar to granting custody to the mother---In the present case admittedly, the petitioner (mother) has contracted another marriage after her divorce and her second husband had children from his first wife---From the reasoning recorded in the judgments rendered by the Guardian Judge/Judge Family Court as well as the appellate court it appeared that the petitioner's second marriage and the age of the minor were the two factors that had prevailed for granting custody of the minor to the respondent (father)---Validity---In the present case, the minor was confident, intelligent and mature enough to form his own preferences---He had unambiguously stated before the Supreme Court that his father was no more than a stranger because he had not had the opportunity to spend time with him---He had also stated that he was not familiar with the other members of his father's family and thus for him they too were strangers---Minor visibly appeared to be happy and comfortable with his mother and his relationship with his step father also seemed to be pleasant---It was obvious from the record that the respondent, despite being his father, had not made a serious and meaningful effort to assert his visitation rights---Minor was definitely not prepared nor willing to live with his father at this stage---He unambiguously stated that he preferred to remain in the custody of his mother with whom he had lived since his birth---Crucial factor of the welfare of the minor and his best interest was not taken into consideration by the courts---In such an eventuality the minor would have been compelled, without his consent, to abruptly shift to a new abode where all the inhabitants would have been strangers to him---It would have definitely exposed him to unimaginable mental and emotional trauma---It could have resulted in irreversible lifelong psychological scars---It was obvious from the record that neither the family court nor the appellate court had taken appropriate steps to assess the welfare of the minor and, instead, the question of custody was decided on the basis of other factors---Factors taken into consideration could not override the criterion of adopting the course which would have been in the best interest of the child---Courts had erred in failing to inquire into or assess the emotional and psychological impact on the minor in case of an abrupt displacement from the custody of his mother with whom he had lived since his birth---Relevant factors such as the parenting capacity, relationship of the child with each parent, the mental health of both the parents as well as the minor, the latter's emotional and mental needs and such other relevant factors in the context of determining the welfare of the child were not taken into consideration let alone assessment and determination of a course that would have been in the best interest of the child---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; the impugned judgments/orders were setaside, and consequently it was directed that the custody of the minor shall be retained by the petitioner (mother)---Supreme Court expected that as reasonable and responsible parents the respondent and the petitioner would amicably settle the custody dispute having regard to the best interest and welfare of the minor, and that a visitation schedule would also be settled by them in such manner which would not breach the principle of the welfare of the minor.
JUDGMENT
---The High Court has dismissed the petition of Shaista Habib ("petitioner"), who had invoked the jurisdiction vested under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("Constitution"). She had challenged the orders of two competent courts, whereby the question of custody of a child, Mohammad Ibrahim, was decided against her. Through this petition she has sought leave against the judgment, dated 21.09.2022, of the High Court.
2. Muhammad Arif Habib ("respondent") and the petitioner had tied the knot on 21.6.2012. They were blessed with a son, Muhammad Ibrahim ("minor") on 17.4.2013. The matrimonial differences which developed between the spouses had initially led to their separation but, subsequently, the marriage ended in a divorce on 22.11.2016. The petitioner and the minor moved to the house of the former's mother after separation. The relationship between the parties became unpleasant to such an extent that, on acceptance of the respondent's petition, the Justice of the Peace, vide order dated 02-01-2017, ordered registration of a criminal case against the petitioner. The respondent filed an application on 28-01-2017 under section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 ("the Act of 1890") seeking the custody of the minor. The Guardian Judge/Judge Family Court, Kahuta, allowed the application on 30.06.2021 while the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 20.06.2022. The constitutional petition filed by the petitioner did not succeed and it was dismissed by the High Court vide the impugned judgment dated 21.09.2022.
3. The petitioner appeared in person along with the minor, Mohammad Ibrahim. The latter was smartly dressed and we found him to be visibly confident and mature for his age. He responded to our queries intelligently and his self assured demeanor was noticeable, despite having been exposed to the vicissitudes of separation followed by the divorce of his parents. He has unequivocally stated that although he acknowledged the respondent to be his father but he was a stranger to him, since they had hardly met after leaving his house. He, therefore, unequivocally expressed his reluctance to be separated from his mother i.e. the petitioner so as to live with his father. It was obvious that the respondent and the minor did not have a relationship or a bond in order to justify uprooting the latter from the custody of his mother. The learned counsel for the respondent was also heard.
4. The petitioner and the respondent are litigating over the custody of the minor since 2017. The marriage had ended in a divorce in 2016 and the respondent had filed an application before the family court in 2017 for obtaining the custody of the minor. The minor was an infant when he had left the house of the respondent and since then he has lived with the petitioner. The record shows that the respondent had not made a serious and meaningful effort to enable him to spend time with the minor, either through intervention of the court or otherwise. Admittedly, the petitioner has contracted another marriage after her divorce and the second husband has children from his first wife. It appears from the reasoning recorded in the judgments rendered by the Guardian Judge/Judge Family Court as well as the appellate court that the petitioner's second marriage and the age of the minor were the two factors that had prevailed for granting custody of the minor to the respondent. The variables in the context of assessing the welfare of the minor were not taken into consideration. The evidence produced by the parties appears to have been found sufficient to decide the custody dispute. The evidence relied upon by both the courts was not in the context of those factors which should have been considered in order to assess the welfare of the minor. The courts also did not seek professional assistance in order to assess the crucial factor of the welfare of the minor, nor such a professional service or facility appears to have been accessible to the courts. The minor was at the centre stage of the custody battle between feuding parents and the assessment of his interests and welfare was most crucial. This was definitely an overarching principle which ought to have been considered while deciding the custody dispute. The rights of the parents were subservient to the welfare of the minor and thus it was the duty of the courts to assess and determine a course that would have served the best interest of the minor. Any decision regarding the custody of a child without assessment and determination of the latter's welfare and best interests by taking into consideration the relevant factors and variables cannot be sustainable, nor can the exercise of discretion be lawful. The welfare of a minor and the latter's best interest is the foundational principle for deciding custody disputes. In order to appreciate the significance of the principle governing custody disputes it would be beneficial to highlight the settled law which ought to guide a court.
5. It is settled law that the father is the natural guardian while the mother is entitled to the custody (hizanat) of a male child till the age of seven years while in case of a female till she attains puberty. This right continues notwithstanding a divorce or separation. As a natural guardian it is the obligation of the father to maintain the child even if the custody is with the mother. The inability of the mother to financially support the child is not a determinate ground to deprive her from custody because in such an eventuality the father's obligation regarding maintenance is not extinguished. The rule that the father is a natural guardian and, therefore, entitled to the custody of the child nor that the mother loses the right of hizanat after the minor has attained the prescribed age or puberty, as the case may be, is not absolute, rather subject to exceptions.1 The decision regarding custody of a child is governed on the fundamental principle, the paramount and overarching consideration is the welfare of the child i.e. to ascertain the course which is in the latter's best interest. The crucial criterion is, therefore, the best interest and welfare of a child while determining the question of custody. The rights or aspirations of the parents or some other person are subservient to this principle and each case of custody must be decided on the basis of ascertaining a course which is in the 'best interest of the child'. The factors or variables that may be taken into consideration while determining the question of custody of a child are not exhaustive but they would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The guiding principle is to ensure that the determination of custody promotes the rights of the child as well as the latter's wellbeing. The overriding consideration must be to protect the child from any physical, mental or emotional injury, neglect or negligent treatment. The mother's disability, illiteracy or financial status are not the sole determinant factors.2 The second marriage contracted by the mother also cannot become a stand-alone reason to disqualify her from obtaining the custody of the child.3 The question of custody involves taking into consideration the factors which are relevant to the upbringing, nursing and fostering of the child. It essentially extends to the emotional, personal and physical wellbeing of a child. The sole object is to ensure that the overall growth and development of the child is guaranteed. The process adopted in order to determine the best interest has been described by the House of Lords4 "…….connotes a process, whereby all the relevant facts, relationship, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to follow will be that which is best in the interest of the child."
7. The overarching principle in cases involving the question of custody and visitation rights of the parents is, therefore, determination of the welfare of the child, i.e. to ascertain a course that would serve the best interest of the child. Sections 17 and 25 of the Act of 1890 set out the broad guidelines which are to be taken into consideration while deciding custody disputes. It is the duty of the court to form an opinion and adopt a course on the basis of the paramount principle of the welfare of the child. Section 17 explicitly provides that a court shall be guided by what appears in the circumstances to secure the welfare of the minor, consistent with the law to which the minor is subject. Subsection (3) provides that if the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference then the court may consider that preference. As already noted above, while determining the welfare of the child in the context of custody disputes the court may grant the custody to a person other than the parents e.g. the grandparents or aunt, if doing so would promote the welfare and best interest of the child.5. As a general rule the guardian and family court is the final arbiter for determining the question of custody, except when it has made a determination in an arbitrary, capricious or fanciful manner i.e. when the fundamental principle of welfare of the child has not been considered or determined in the light of the variables which are relevant in the given circumstances.6 If the court has ignored the welfare of the child and the latter's best interest or has given preference to some other ground then the decision would not be sustainable. The court, in its endeavor to assess and determine the welfare of a child, is not bound to follow rigid formalities, strict adherence to procedure or rules or technicalities if doing so may hamper the determination or undermine the fundamental criterion of the best interest of the child.7 In a nutshell, the overarching and fundamental principle that must prevail and guide a court in determining custody disputes is the welfare of a child. The court has to adopt a course that would be in the best interest of the child because his/her welfare must always be the paramount consideration.
8. In the case before us, the minor was confident, intelligent and mature enough to form his own preferences. He had unambiguously stated before us that his father was no more than a stranger because he had not had the opportunity to spend time with him. He had also stated that he was not familiar with the other members of his father's family and thus for him they too were strangers. He visibly appeared to be happy and comfortable with his mother and his relationship with his step father also seemed to be pleasant. It is obvious from the record that the respondent, despite being his father, had not made a serious and meaningful effort to assert his visitation rights. The minor was definitely not prepared nor willing to live with his father at this stage. He unambiguously stated that he preferred to remain in the custody of his mother with whom he had lived since his birth. The crucial factor of the welfare of the minor and his best interest was not taken into consideration by the courts. In such an eventuality the minor would have been compelled, without his consent, to abruptly shift to a new abode where all the inhabitants would have been strangers to him. It would have definitely exposed him to unimaginable mental and emotional trauma. It could have resulted in irreversible lifelong psychological scars. It is obvious from the record that neither the family court nor the appellate court had taken appropriate steps to assess the welfare of the minor and, instead, the question of custody was decided on the basis of other factors. The factors taken into consideration could not override the criterion of adopting the course which would have been in the best interest of the child. The courts had erred in failing to inquire into or assess the emotional and psychological impact on the minor in case of an abrupt displacement from the custody of his mother with whom he had lived since his birth. There is nothing on record to even remotely show that the courts had undertaken an effective exercise to assess and determine the welfare of the minor and, thereafter, adopt a course that would have been in his best interest. The courts appear to have treated the delicate and sensitive dispute relating to child custody as if it was an ordinary civil matter. The judges who had dealt with the case may not have been professionally trained in order to enable them to identify the relevant variables and to assess and determine the question of custody of the child on the basis of the foundational principle of welfare of the child and then adopt a course that would have been in the latter's best interest. The relevant factors such as the parenting capacity, relationship of the child with each parent, the mental health of both the parents as well as the minor, the latter's emotional and mental needs and such other relevant factors in the context of determining the welfare of the child were not taken into consideration let alone assessment and determination of a course that would have been in the best interest of the child. The order regarding giving custody of the minor to the respondent in the circumstances could not have served his best interests. The psychological and emotional impact on the minor would have breached the foundational principle of his welfare and of adopting a course in his best interest. The impugned judgments are, therefore, not sustainable because the paramount fundamental criterion, the welfare of the minor, was not even considered, let alone its assessment and determination.
10. For the above reasons, we convert this petition into an appeal and the same is allowed. The impugned judgments/orders are hereby set-aside. Consequently, the custody of the minor shall be retained by the petitioner. We expect that as reasonable and responsible parents the respondent and the petitioner will amicably settle the custody dispute having regard to the best interest and welfare of the minor. We also expect that a visitation schedule will also be settled by them in such manner which will not breach the principle of the welfare of the minor. In case they fail to agree upon a schedule then the respondent shall be at liberty to approach a competent court to assert his visitation rights. In the meanwhile, the schedule, if any, settled by a competent court shall continue to be observed until it has been modified and varied.
11. We cannot turn a blind eye to the apparent failure of the State to fulfill its constitutional obligations in the context of safeguarding the rights of the children embroiled in litigation between the parents regarding their custody. The children are vulnerable and traumatic experiences early in life can leave lifelong scars which may profoundly affect the quality of their lives. The exposure of a child to the environment generally prevalent in the ordinary courts could profoundly affect their impressionable minds. Moreover, insensitivity or lack of special expertise on part of the presiding judges while dealing with matters relating to litigation involving the rights of children can gravely affect their rights and thus impact their lives adversely. The litigation involving the rights of children, such as custody disputes, requires special expertise, training and professional aptitude on part of the presiding judges. The environment of a court dealing with the rights of the children must also cater to their emotional and psychological needs. The courts must also be adequately equipped and enabled to professionally assess and determine the welfare of a child in each case. The courts must have access to professional consultation and advice of qualified experts such as psychologists. The parents and the courts must also have access to child welfare and social assistance services to protect and fulfill the rights of each child. Article 35 of the Constitution has explicitly made it an obligation of the State to protect the marriage, the family, and the mother and the child. The State has been defined in Article 7. It is a constitutional duty under Article 29(3) of the President or the Governor of the Province, as the case may be, to cause to be prepared and laid before the respective legislatures a report in respect of each year, inter alia, regarding observance and implementation of the obligation relating to children under Article 37 of the Constitution. Likewise, it is an obligation of the State to ensure that the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and fulfilled in the case of children. It is, therefore, implicit in the obligation of the State towards protecting the rights of the children to provide child friendly courts presided by specially trained professional judges. It is also the duty of the State to enable the child friendly courts to assess the welfare of the child in family matters, such as custody disputes, by providing access to professional consultation and opinions of experts e.g. psychologists etc. It is the State's responsibility to provide affective child care and social services to protect and facilitate fulfilling the rights of those children who get entangled in custody disputes between feuding parents. It is an obligation of the State of Pakistan under the United Nation Convention of Rights of the Child to ensure the protection and to take all necessary steps for child welfare. We direct the Registrar of this Court to send copies of this order to the President and the Governors of the Provinces to ensure compliance with their respective obligations under Article 29(3) of the Constitution in the context of Article 35 ibid. The Registrar is further directed to send copies of this order to the Chief Secretaries of the Provinces and the Chief Commissioner of Islamabad Capital Territory for fulfilling the obligations of the State in relation to the rights of the children as highlighted herein above. In addition, copies of the order is directed to be sent to the Director Generals of the Federal and Provincial Judicial Academies for their consideration to include special training courses for judges and staff of family courts, relating to dealing with child custody cases and to develop their capacity to assess and determine the criterion of welfare of the child.

Khula is a basic right of a woman under Muslim family law---Right to seek Khula is ...........

 PLD 2024 Supreme Court 645

IBRAHIM KHAN vs Mst. SAIMA KHAN
Khula is a basic right of a woman under Muslim family law---Right to seek Khula is the exclusive and absolute right of the woman---She must in unambiguous and unequivocal terms express her intention to exercise such right before the court, that is to say, she must put her offer before the court that she seeks release from the marriage by waiving her dower and only then the court can grant her Khula ---Fundamentally, the principle is that Khula cannot be granted, if it has not been explicitly sought for by the woman because she has to give up her right to dower---Hence, a court cannot on its own pass the decree of Khula if it has not been sought for by the woman---Therefore, her consent is vital.

پہلی بیوی کی موجودگی میں یا پہلی بیوی کو طلاق دیکر عدت کی تکمیل سے قبل اس کی بہن سے شادی قابل تعزیر جرم ہے۔

 2024 YLR 1653

لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا قران و سنت اور اسلامی احکامات کی روشنی میں انتہائی معلوماتی فیصلہ
i) Is it permissible for an individual to marry two real sisters concurrently?
ii) Can an individual marry the sister of his divorced wife while the latter is undergoing the Iddat period?
Shared by: Syed Naeem Ali Advocate
Regarding criminal liability arising out of a marriage involving the marriage of two sisters, most Hanafi jurists, including Imam Abu Hanifa (R.A), argue that such unions do not warrant the imposition of Hadd punishment. However, they are unanimous that considering its serious repercussions, it must be dealt with seriously, and Tazir must be inflicted.
Crl. Misc. No. 67328/B/2023
Musawar Hussain Vs The State and another
Powered by Blogger.

Case Law Search