PLD 2020 Lahore 811
-Entry in Nikah Nama regarding age of bride/petitioner was recorded as "almost sixteen (16) years"---High Court observed that it was common practice in the society that whenever somebody's age was mentioned in approximate figures, it tended to show that he /she was yet to achieve that age and it was always treated as less than the age mentioned therein.
P L D 2021 Lahore 783
--Custody of minors--Male children was handed over to father, who was a civil servant and even educated person--
PLJ 2009
Constitution of
----Art. 199--Constitutional petition--Custody of minors--Male children was handed over to father, who was a civil servant and even educated person--Application for custody to extent of the male children was accepted--Appeal was dismissed--Challenged through writ petition--Right of custody for male minors who are above 7 years--Validity--Question raised through writ petition is that change of custody from mother to father shall change the scenario, and would damage the future of minors--Held: Civil servant being an educated person will not care for future of his minor sons for whom he was much concerned all along--Right of custody for male minors who are above 7 for father is to be preferred as he is in a better position to facilitate and arrange schooling--No illegality or infirmity calling for interference in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court--Petition was dismissed. [P. 358] A
Mr. Muhammad Sana Ullah Khan, Advocate for Petitioner.
Date of hearing: 22.1.2009.
PLJ 2009 Lahore 356Present: S. Ali Hassan Rizvi, J.KOUSAR PERVEEN alias SHAMEEM--PetitionerversusMUHAMMAD FAYYAZ and 2 others--RespondentsW.P. No. 1068 of 2009, decided on 22.1.2009.
Order
The petitioner is aggrieved of the judgment of the learned trial Court dated 14.07.2008 whereby the custody of the minors male children was handed over to Respondent No. 1 and the dismissal of the appeal on 22.11.2008, there-against.
2. Brief facts of the present case are; that the petitioner was married with Respondent No. 1 and out of the wedlock five children were born. Respondent No. 1 filed an application seeking custody of four children, namely, Mst. Ishrat Fatime, (12), Naeem Sultan, (11), Saleem Sultan, (09), and Waseem Sultan, (07) on the ground that petitioner-respondent left his house and a suit for restitution of conjugal rights was pending. The minors were studying in
(i) Whether the applicant is entitled for the custody of the minors as Welfare of minors lies with him? OPA
(ii) Whether the application/suit is false and frivolous and same has been filed just to avoid the payment of maintenance allowance? OPR
(iii) Relief.
After recording evidence, learned
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has alleged that the minors are getting education in a school and change of custody shall jeopardize their future. In his view, change of educational institution is sufficient ground as in the circumstances the minors shall suffer with a set back, qua their education, which is supreme.
4. Heard. Respondent No. 1 as PW1 in his main petition has alleged that male minors Naeem Sultan, Saleem Sultan and Waseem Sultan were student of
5. Perusal of the record reveals that there is no rebuttal of the above version. A suit for restitution of conjugal rights is also pending. The admitted fact is that Respondent No. 1 is a civil servant and an educated one. The male minors all are above 7. They were studying in
(R.A.) Petition dismissed.
-Purpose of enacting S.4 in Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, was to cater the need of grandchildren to remove their sufferings but this provision could not be interpreted in a manner affecting the shares of other descendants in the property in accordance with law of Shariah-
2005 SCMR 1595
Law of Shariah was not overridden by S.4 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and consequently the parties would not get more than their shares in the property in accordance with law of Shariah---Widows and daughters of predeceased son would get what they were entitled on the death of predeceased son, after opening of succession of father of the predeceased son---Purpose of enacting S.4 in Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, was to cater the need of grandchildren to remove their sufferings but this provision could not be interpreted in a manner affecting the shares of other descendants in the property in accordance with law of Shariah---Heirs of predeceased children, according to law of Shariah, would inherit what their father or mother would have inherited during their life time on the opening of succession.
Whether predeceased daughter’s legal heirs, who died before the promulgation of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, are entitled to inherit the estate of their grandfather who died after the promulgation of “Ordinance 1961” in terms of section 4 of the Ordinance, 1961.?
Undeniably, under the Islamic Sharia, predeceased children are not entitled to any inheritance as only the survivors to a deceased are entitled to inheritance. In the year 1961, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 was promulgated on 15.07.1961 and was commenced after issuance of Notification which was published in PLD 1961 Central Statutes at Page 337, wherein section 4 was introduced, by virtue of which, legal heirs of pre-deceased son or daughter of propositus would be entitled to inheritance on re-opening of the succession.
Whether predeceased daughter’s legal heirs, who died before the promulgation of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, are entitled to inherit the estate of their grandfather who died after the promulgation of “Ordinance 1961” in terms of section 4 of the Ordinance, 1961.?
Undeniably, under the Islamic Sharia, predeceased children are not entitled to any inheritance as only the survivors to a deceased are entitled to inheritance. In the year 1961, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 was promulgated on 15.07.1961 and was commenced after issuance of Notification which was published in PLD 1961 Central Statutes at Page 337, wherein section 4 was introduced, by virtue of which, legal heirs of pre-deceased son or daughter of propositus would be entitled to inheritance on re-opening of the succession.
—Provisions of S. 48 C.P.C. cannot be pressed into service for execution of such decree, in that, S. 17 of Family Courts Act, 1964 postulates that C.P.C. except Sections 10 and 11 thereof, would not be applicable to proceedings before Family Court-As for limitation, reliance has to be placed on residuary Art. 181 of Limitation Act which provides period of three years when right to apply accrues-
PLJ 2001 SC 288 [Appellate Jurisdiction]
Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
Mr. Basharatullah, Sr. ASC and Mr. Mehta W.N. Kohli, AOR for Petitioner.
Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing; 1.11.2000.
PLJ 2001 SC 288 [Appellate Jurisdiction]Present: IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY AND DEEDAR HUSSAIN SHAH, JJ. Syed MUHAMMAD-PetitionerversusMst. ZEENAT and others-Respondents C.P. No. 134-Q of 1998, decided on 1.11.2000.(On appeal from the judgment dated 23.6.1998 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in Constitutional Petition No. 284 of 1999)
ORDER
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, J.-Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against judgment dated 23rd June 1998 passed by High Court of Balochistan whereby Constitutional Petition No. 284 of 1997 filed by Respondent No. 1 was allowed and as a consequence whereof the order of executing Court/Family Judge dated 22nd February 1997 was restored.
2. Succinctly stating facts of the case are that petitioner and private respondent are related to each other as husband and wife. The tie of marriage also exist between them. The Respondent No. 1 obtained a decree for recovery of prompt dower against the petitioner from the Court of Family Judge Turbat as back as on 24th October 1979. However, proceedings for execution of decree were filed by her on 10th November 1996. Petitioner raised objection on execution of the decree being barred by time. Learned executing Court vide order dated 27.2.1997 over-ruled the objection and directed the petitioner to satisfy the decree. Feeling aggrieved from said order petitioner preferred appeal which came up for hearing before Additional District Judge, Turbat who vide order dated IQth June 1997 accepted the same, as a consequence whereof execution application of private respondent was dismissed. Under the circumstances a Constitutional Petition was filed by respondent which has been allowed vide impugned judgment by a Division Bench in Chambers of High Court of Balochistan.
3. Learned counsel contended that execution application filed by respondent on 10th November 1996 for execution of decree dated 24th October 1979 was hopelessly barred by time, therefore, Additional District Judge/Appellate Court has rightly set aside order of executing Court dated 27.2.1997 but learned Division Bench in Chambers of High Court of Balochistan without taking into consideration that under Section 48 CPC a maximum period of 6 years for execution of decree has been prescribed and any such application submitted beyond the prescribed period shall not be entertained because due to lapse of time the decree became in-executable.
4. We have heard learned counsel for petitioner at length and have also examined the impugned order carefully. At the outset it may be noted that respondent while instituting Constitutional petition, challenged order dated 10.6.1997 mainly on two scores, firstly the appeal filed by petitioner against order of executing Court dated 27.2.1997 was not maintainable under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964; and secondly no period has been prescribed for recovery or dower under the Limitation Act because during subsistence of marriage recurring cause of action accrues to decree holder to recovery the dower. Learned High Court decided former question against the respondent holding that appeal was competent against order of the executing Court in terms of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, therefore, this aspect of the case needs no further consideration because in instant petition competency of appeal against an order passed by executing Court is not open to challenge as far as petitioner is concerned.
5. In respect of latter question, however, it was held that decree of dower cannot be refused to be executed being barred by limitation. Therefore, we would cotifine ourselves only to this aspect of the case. According to Article 103 of Limitation Act all suits for the decree of prompt dower can be instituted within three years from its demand whereas time prescribed for the suit of deferred dower is three years under Article 104 of ihe Limitation Act. In the instant case as tie of marriage exists between the parties, therefore, decree dated 24th October 1979 for recovery of dower would be deemed to be in respect of her prompt dower which consists of both the money as well as the property. Now the question for consideration is that what should be the period of limitation for filing of execution application for satisfaction of prompt dower. As far as Section 48 CPC is concerned its provisions cannot be pressed into service because under Section 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 except its Sections 10 and 11 is not applicable to proceedings before any Family Court. As far as Limitation Act is concerned under its Article 182 period for execution of a decree of any
