Factum of Nikah----It has been well settled by now that factum of Nikah will be determined by learned Judge Family Court, seized with supra mentioned matters--I fortify my view from dictum laid down.

 PLJ 2022 Cr.C. 1455

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----S. 497(2)--Pakistan Penal Code, (XLV of 1860), Ss. 496-A, 376, 420, 468 & 471--Post-arrest bail, grant of--Further inquiry--Allegation of--Abduction and rape--Medical evidence and divergent statements of alleged victim make case one of further inquiry--Petitioner but divergent statements of abductee/victim prima facie make this case as doubtful--Reference can be made to case laws--Medical evidence do not support prosecution version because no mark of violence was observed by Lady Doctor on body of abductee/victim Mst. Sumaira Bibi--All supra mentioned facts make case of petitioner as one of further inquiry as contemplated under section 497 (2), Cr.P.C.-- Petitioner is behind bars since his arrest and is no more required for further investigation and concession of bail cannot be withheld as punishment.                                          [Pp. 1457 & 1458] A, B & D

2018 CPr.LJ 1025, 2015 MLD 1802, 2016 SCMR 2176, 2017 SCMR 366 and 2019 SCMR 1914.

Factum of Nikah--

----Returned home victim levelled allegations against her husband of rape and abduction--It has been well settled by now that factum of Nikah will be determined by learned Judge Family Court, seized with supra mentioned matters--I fortify my view from dictum laid down.                           [P. 1458] C

PLJ 1984 SC 192.

Jam Muhammad Nasir Fayyaz, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Javed Iqbal Bhayaa, ADPP for State.

Mr. Hussain Ahmad Madni, Advocate for Complainant.

Date of hearing: 3.1.2022.


 PLJ 2022 Cr.C. 1455
[Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench]
PresentMuhammad Tariq Nadeem, J.
MUHAMMAD AJMAL--Petitioner
versus
STATE and another--Respondents
Crl. Misc. No. 4516-B of 2021, decided on 3.1.2022.


Order

The petitioner namely Muhammad Ajmal seeks post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 154/2021 dated 24.07.2021 for offences under Sections 496-A, 376, 420, 468 & 471, PPC registered at Police Station, Sehja, District Rahim Yar Khan.

2. Tersely the allegations levelled in the F.I.R are that on 28.05.2021, petitioner alongwith his co-accused forcibly abducted Mst. Sumaira Bibi, sister of the complainant in a white colour car and took her to some unknown place where he committed rape with her, thereafter, petitioner obtained thumb impressions of abductee/victim on some papers and prepared a forged Nikah Nama. Hence this FIR.

3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he is totally innocent in this case and no offence is committed by him. Further submits that Mst. Sumaira Bibi the alleged abductee/victim of this case has contracted marriage with the petitioner with her own free will and consent on 01.06.2021. Further argued that the alleged abductee/victim has made contradictory statements on different occasions and she herself has filed a suit for jactitation of marriage against the petitioner as well as petitioner has also filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against alleged abductee/victim. It is also submitted by learned counsel that factum of nikah will be determined by the learned Judge Family Court and the case of the petitioner definitely fall within the remit of further inquiry as stipulated in sub-section (2) of Section 497, Cr.P.C.

4. Contrarily, learned ADPP assisted by learned counsel for the complainant has vociferously argued that the petitioner has abducted and committed rape with Mst. Sumaira Bibi, that the offence with which the petitioner has been charged is an offence against society, for the reason, he is not entitled for the concession of bail after arrest.

5. Tripartite arguments heard and record perused.

6. After going through the narration of FIR and the evidentiary material collected by the police and presented before this Court, it divulges that there is a delay of 1 month and 26 days, in registration of FIR and no plausible exegesis has been described by the prosecution in this regard, meaning thereby, the FIR has been got registered after due deliberation and consultation.

7. After scanning of record and going through the attested copies of documents appended with this petition, it transpired that the alleged abductee/victim filed a petition under Sections 22-A/22-B, Cr.P.C. in the Court of learned Ex- Officio Justice of Peace at Khanpur wherein she stated that she has contracted marriage with Muhammad Ajmal son of Ghulam Musatafa (petitioner) on 01.06.2021 with her own free will and consent. She had also appeared before the Court in support of her petition on 24.06.2021. Moreso, she also filed a private complaint under Sections 506, 148 & 149, PPC in the Court of learned Area Magistrate, Liaqatpur against her father namely Haq Nawaz and 3 others wherein she also reiterated the supra mentioned facts. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also appended with petition a certified copy of divorce deed as Annexure-C which manifests that Muhammad Faisal, previous husband of the victim/abductee divorced her on 22.07.2017; similarly, learned counsel for the petitioner has also annexed a certified copy of notice under Section 7 of The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 alongwith bail application as which depicts that Muhammad Faisal, previous husband of alleged abductee/victim namely Mst. Sumaira Bibi divorced her on 22.07.2017 and approached the concerned Secretary Union Council for effecting divorce. Although, alleged abductee/victim namely Mst. Sumaira Bibi has got recorded statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. against the petitioner that she was abducted and raped by the petitioner but the divergent statements of the abductee/victim prima facie make this case as doubtful. Reference can be made to the case laws titled as “Muhammad Shahbaz vs. The State and another (2018 P Cr.L J 1025) & “Fida Hussain and another vs. Basharat Hussain and 2 others” (2015 MLD 1802).

8. Another intriguing aspect of this case is that medical evidence do not support the prosecution version because no mark of violence was observed by the Lady Doctor on the body of the abductee/ victim Mst. Sumaira Bibi. All the supra mentioned facts make the case of the petitioner as one of further inquiry as contemplated under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C. Reliance is placed upon the following case laws titled as “Haibat Khan vs. The State and others” (2016 SCMR 2176) and “Muhammad Tanvir vs. The State and others” (2017 SCMR 366).

I have also observed that after returning her home, Mst. Sumaira Bibi got recorded her statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. on the asking of her parents against the petitioner and levelled allegation of abduction and rape against him and also filed a suit for jactitation of marriage against the petitioner, which is also pending for adjudication. I am of the considered view that it has been well settled by now that factum of Nikah will be determined by the learned Judge Family Court, seized with the supra mentioned matters. I fortify my view from the dictum laid down in case titled as “Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal & others” (PLJ 1984 SC 192) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held as under:--

“The foregoing discussion and Question Nos. 1 to 3 regarding effect of the decision of the Family Court regarding the plea of Nikah on the same plea before the criminal trial Court, would show that the view of the Federal Shariat Court in this behalf expressed in the case of Din Muhammad mentioned in Question No. 6 is, with respect, not correct. The judgment of the Family Court, in the circumstances discussed already would be binding in all relevant respects. Moreover it will not be correct to say that the statement made by a party in the case before the Family Court will be relevant only for purpose of contradiction under Section 145, Evidence Act. It will also be a piece of evidence before the criminal trial Court regarding conduct and as to what was the plea in that Court. It was so held, as already noticed, in the case of Malik Din. On the stay of proceedings on the criminal side, pending decision by the Family Court the approach of the Federal Shariat Court was not correct. When it is known that the decision of that forum original/appeal, will have a determining effect on the outcome of the criminal trial, it would be in the interest of justice and fairness to stay the latter proceeding or the appeal therefrom. Question No. 6 is answered accordingly.”

9. The petitioner is behind the bars since his arrest and is no more required for further investigation and concession of bail cannot be withheld as punishment. Reliance is placed upon the case titled as “Husnain Mustafa vs. The State” (2019 SCMR 1914).

10. As a corollary of above mentioned discussion, this petition is accepted and the petitioner Muhammad Ajmal is allowed post-arrest bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court.

11. Before parting with this order, I deem it necessary to hold that the observations made hereinabove are tentative in nature and shall have no bearing on any of the other proceeding connected to this case.

(A.A.K.)          Petition accepted

"Second family execution petition" maintainable.

 2022 SCMR 1481

Multiple Relief s sought in a suit---Main Relief barred by limitation---Effect---When the main Relief sought in a suit is barred by time, the consequential Relief , even if be within time, is of no legal avail
2018 SCMR 2092
Recording of evidence---
Duty of Court----
Inadmissible evidence---Trial judge had to check admissibility of evidence without waiting for any such objection from either side because the judge was required to be vigilant and had to play an active role while recording the evidence of witnesses---Trial Court was duty bound to decide an objection regarding admissibility of evidence then and there and should not defer the same till the end of the trial.
"Second family execution petition" maintainable.
Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dower was decreed and execution petition for the same was filed by the wife (respondent); when the parties entered into a compromise and the execution petition was withdrawn by the wife.
P L D 2012 Peshawar 159
Before Attaullah Khan and Waqar Ahmad Seth, J
IFTIKHAR KHAN and another---Petitioners
Versus
Mst. AMINA BIBI and 2 others---Respondents
Writ Petition No.1030 of 2011, decided on 22nd March, 2012.
(a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
Ss. 17, 13 & 5---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.48---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Second execution petition, maintainability of---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dower was decreed and execution petition for the same was filed by the wife (respondent); when the parties entered into a compromise and the execution petition was withdrawn by the wife.
Subsequently, the wife filed a second execution petition which was dismissed by the Executing Court, but the Appellate Court accepted the same.
Contention of the husband (petitioner) was that second execution petition was not maintainable and that after the compromise, the case was a fresh cause of action which required evidence to be recorded---Validity.
After the compromise, the husband/judgment-debtor had not taken any ground that any amount towards the satisfaction of the decree was paid privately to the wife.
Withdrawal of first execution petition on the basis of compromise was not absolute but was on the basis of settlement arrived at that time, and till the satisfaction of a decree, it could be executed within the given aggregate period of six years, from the date of the decree.
Family Court could exercise its own powers to prevent the course of justice being deflected from its path.
Family Court had to regulate its own proceedings in accordance with provisions of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 and in doing so, it had to proceed on the premise that every procedure was permissible unless a clear prohibition for the same was found in law, meaning thereby that the Family Court could exercise its own powers but was not debarred to follow the principles of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 coupled with the facts of a case.
West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 and the Rules made thereunder had not expressly prohibited the filing of a second execution petition especially in the circumstances when there was nothing on record that after the compromise and withdrawal of the first execution petition, any payment had been made or efforts were completed for satisfying the decree privately.
Constitutional petition was dismissed.
PLD 2011 Kar. 24; PLD 2010 SC 891 and 1999 CLC 555 rel.
(b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
S. 17 & 5--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Preamble---Jurisdiction of Family Court
Scope--Family Court could exercise its own powers to prevent the course of justice being deflected from its path
Family Court had to regulate its own proceedings in accordance with provisions of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 and in doing so, it had to proceed on the premise that every procedure was permissible unless a clear prohibition for the same was found in law, meaning thereby that the Family Court could exercise its own powers but was not debarred to follow the principles of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 coupled with the facts of a case.
Kamaluddin Khattak for Petitioners.
Hassan U.K. Afridi, for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 22nd March, 2012.

JUDGMENT

WAQAR AHMAD SETH, J.--Petitioners have asked for setting aside order/judgment dated 22-2-2011 passed by learned District Judge, Kohat and for restoration of the judgment/order of the learned executing court dated 31-1-2011.
2. Precise facts leading to the writ petition are that respondent No.1 instituted a suit for recovery of dower and maintenance against the petitioner No.1, in the Family Court of Kohat on the basis of agreement/ Mehr Nama dated 3-3-1992, Exh.PW 1/1, which suit was decreed in her favour vide judgment and decree dated 5-11-2009. The petitioner No.1 also filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights which was decreed, conditionally in his favour vide the above said judgment.
3. Respondent No.1 filed first execution petition on 25-11-2009 for the recovery of dower and maintenance decree before the respondent No.3, executing court and during the pendency of the said proceedings petitioner No.1 and respondent No.1 entered into a compromise dated 22-1-2010, by patching-up the matter privately, outside the court, through the elders of the locality, with their free consent and without coercion. In this respect an agreement was also executed. The parties appeared before the executing court on 29-1-2010, respondent No.1 got recorded her statement on oath, by exhibiting the compromise deed as Exh.PA and prayed for withdrawal of execution petition without any further proceedings and without seeking permission of filing fresh execution petition, as such the learned executing court vide order dated 29-1-2010 consigned the execution proceedings to the record room, dismissed as withdrawn.
4. After the compromise once again the relationship
between the parties became strained, resultantly the respondent No.1 again filed second execution petition on 26-5-2010 on the basis of dower and maintenance decree passed on 5-11-2009; that the learned executing court dismissed the second execution petition of respondent No.1 vide order dated 31-1-2011. The respondent No.1 preferred an appeal against the said judgment and order of the learned executing court, before the appellate forum and the respondent No.2 vide impugned judgment and decree dated 22-2-2011 while accepting the appeal, set aside the findings of executing court, remanded the execution to the executing court to proceed with the execution petition in accordance with law, hence this writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that impugned judgment of the learned District Judge Kohat dated 22-2-2011 is illegal, against the law, without jurisdiction and of no legal effect, hence not tenable in the eyes of law; that important and legal question are involved in the matter which needs to be adjudicated on merits, and as to whether the second execution petition is maintainable or not after withdrawal of the first execution petition, without the permission to file fresh one; that when compromise was effected during the first execution petition and parties resided jointly then second execution petition cannot be filed as the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to the family court; that the wilful and deliberate withdrawal of first execution petition on the basis of voluntarily compromise wherein no permission to file fresh one was asked, cannot be filed, therefore, the compromise in the eyes of law is absolute and the chapter of execution stand closed; that when first execution was withdrawn unconditionally the second execution is not maintainable and competent; that the provision of C.P.C. are not applicable as the proceedings in family court are governed by West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder, wherein no provision regarding filing of second execution proceedings after voluntarily withdrawal of first execution, exist; that petitioner No.1 and respondent No.1 cohabitated in the house of the petitioners for about four months after the withdrawal of execution, therefore, executing court has rightly held that the dispute regarding payment of dower and maintenance requires evidence and the case is of fresh cause of action and that the appellate court without discussing all these matters, while accepting the appeal has remanded for proceedings on the execution petition which needs to be set aside. In this respect relied on PLD 2011 Karachi 24.
6. As against this, learned counsel for respondents contended that findings of the learned executing court are perverse, illegal, unsound and against the law, therefore, not sustainable and the findings of the appellate court are just legal and proper; that the quantum of dower and maintenance was already determined by the court which judgment and decree had attained finality as the same was not disturbed by any competent court of law, he pleaded that till the execution of the decree, respondent No.1 was entitled to submit successive application and there is no bar on the rights of the decree-holder, specially in the circumstances when judgment-debtor had admitted that decree has not been satisfied as he had made an offer that he will divorce the respondent No.1/decree-holder in lieu of her waiving the decretal amount. In this respect relied on PLD 2010 SC 891 and 1999 CLC 555.
7. Arguments heard and record perused.
8. The learned executing court has not held nor has formed the opinion that second application for execution of the decree was not maintainable or not competent but has simply dismissed the same on the ground that the decree holder has lived with the judgment-debtor for some period i.e. four months, therefore, it could not be ascertained that how much maintenance and dower amount was paid to her. The learned executing court decision that determination of the maintenance allowance and dower required further evidence is based on surmises and conjectures. The observation that whether any dower amount has been paid during the period when she remained with her husband after the compromise and withdrawal of the execution proceedings, the same requires evidence and is a fresh cause of action seems to be based on uncertainty because the grounds urged in the objection petition states that if the decree holder seek divorce then she should withdraw from the decree in her favour and the dower will be in lieu of Khula'.
9. In the objection petition nor at the appellate stage and even in the writ petition, the petitioners/judgment-debtors have not taken any ground that any amount towards the satisfaction of the decree was paid privately.
10. Respondent No.1/decree-holder recorded her statement in the executing court while exhibiting the compromise deed has submitted that she withdraws from the execution of the decree due to settlement of the jirga and in the said settlement deed Exh. PA there is no mention that the decretal amount has been paid outside the court. The judgment-debtor/petitioner No.1 recorded his statement in reference to the said compromise deed and he has never stated that anything privately has been paid or the decree was waived or was satisfied.
11. The withdrawal of the earlier execution proceedings on the basis of compromise was not absolute but was on the basis of a settlement arrived at between the parties and till the satisfaction of a decree it can be executed within the given aggregate period of six years, from the date of decree, second time.
12. The objection that there is no provision of second execution proceedings, after the withdrawal of first execution proceedings on the basis of compromise, without the permission to file fresh one, under the Family Court Acts and Rules thereof is concerned, in this respect we are not convinced with the arguments, as family court can exercise its own powers to prevent the course of justice being deflected from the path. The applicability of C.P.C., the family court has to regulate its own proceedings in accordance with the provision of Family Courts Act and in doing so it has to proceed on the premises that every procedure is permissible unless clearly prohibition is found in law, meaning thereby that Family Court can exercise its own powers but is not debarred to follow the principle of C.P.C. coupled with the facts.
13. Even otherwise, a decree is to be executed unless and until it is satisfied. The Family Courts Act and Rules made thereunder have not expressly prohibited the filing of second execution proceedings specially in the circumstances when there is nothing on record that after the compromise and withdrawal of the first execution petition, any payment has been made or efforts were completed for satisfying the decree, privately.
14. In view of the above, the learned appellate court very rightly concluded that the executing court wrongly held that determination of maintenance allowance and dower required further evidence because the same had already been settled by the competent court of law and that judgment had attained finality. The findings of the learned appellate court does not warrant interference in the constitutional jurisdiction as no illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect has been pointed out nor established. This writ petition is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
K.M.Z./107/P

فیملی کورٹ 1964 کے مطابق اجرا کو ہایئکورٹ کے ذریعہ دوسرے ضلع میں بھجوایا جانا ضروری نہ ھے.

 PLD 2022 Lahore 600

In order to avoid technical trapping, there remains no need to transfer the execution petition to any other Court out of one district to the other district where the judgment debtor resides. The learned Executing Court seized of the matter may adopt procedure provided under law by sending a precept through proper channel to the Court where the judgment debtor resides or has movable/immovable property so as to attach the same and recover the decretal amount as arrears of land revenue, following the methodology as provided in section 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Following directions are issued to be followed by the District Judges of the Punjab and the Family Courts in future:-
1. While passing the money decree in respect of maintenance allowance, alternate prices of dower or dowry articles, the provisions of section 13(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 should be adhered to, which provides that, „Where a decree relates to the payment of money and the decretal amount is not paid within the time specified by the Court [not exceeding thirty days] the same shall, if the Court so directs, be recovered as arrears of land revenue, and on recovery shall be paid to the decree-holder.‟
2. The District Judge will designate a Civil Judge as Executing Court in the District as well as Tehsils, as the case may be, where the execution petitions for satisfaction of decrees passed by the Judge Family Court will be filed and executed/satisfied in accordance with law by adopting all measures in this regard.
3. In case the judgment debtor resides in some other District and owns property, precept will be transmitted for attachment purposes and further proceedings will be taken in accordance with law

اجراء کے دوران مدیون کی طرف سے فروختگی جائیداد

 PLJ 2022 Lahore 667

West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 13(3)--Suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, recovery of dowry articles--Execution proceedings--Attachment of property--Objection petition--Dismissed--Sale of property by judgment debtor during pendency of execution proceedings--Purchaser of property was defence witness of judgment-debtor--Shame transaction--Concurrent findings--Relationship between judgment debtor and petitioner--Delay of more than 12 years in execution of decree on basis of an inapplicable objection cannot under principles of equity, justice and fair play be allowed to defeat decree under execution--Sale transaction in present matter reeks of an audacious and unembarrassed attempt to push already marginalized and persecuted into further misery and thereby dampen liberation and emancipation of women in Pakistan--Judgment debtor only alienated his inherited property to frustrate judgment and decree passed against him much prior to sale deed and entire exercise was nothing but a shabby and synthetic attempt to frustrate judgment and decree passed by family Court--Petition dismissed.
[P. 674 & 675] C, D & F
1990 CLC 686 ref.
West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 13(3)--Execution proceedings--Section 13(3) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 empowered Family Court to execute its own decree for payment of money by adopting modes provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue. [P. 673] A
2002 SCMR 1950 & 2015 CLC 667 ref.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Jurisdiction--Judicial power-- The jurisdiction and judicial power emanating out of Article 199 of Constitution is conditioned upon principles of equity and fairness. [P. 674] B
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 25--Right of equal protection--In a written constitutional set up such as ours Courts are custodians and guardians of social contract between State and its citizens--The Constitution and right of equal protection of law as also command for affirmative action in favour of women (Article 25 refers) would become illusory if defeated litigants or those who claim under them are allowed to navigate through technical shelters and deprive decree holder of her just desserts. [P. 674] E
(1872) 14 Moor’s Indian Appeals 612 & (1973) 89 ITR 190 ref.
Nemo for Petitioner.
Mr. Tariq Hussain, Advocate for Respondents.
Date of hearing 23.6.2022.


 PLJ 2022 Lahore 667
Present: Muhammad Shan Gul, J.
NAEEM SHEHZAD--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ARIFWALA and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 208019 of 2018, heard on 23.6.2022.


Judgment

Through this judgment the titled constitutional petition is sought to be decided.
2. The question confronting the Court pertains to the status of a property sold by a judgment debtor during the pendency of an execution petition emanating out of a family suit in order to avoid and frustrate enforcement of a judgment and decree.
3. The petitioner before this Court is the real biological brother of judgment debtor Zainul Abidin. It is this aspect of the matter which makes the reading ahead even more interesting.
4. Facts in brief are that a family suit titled “Nazia Aziz etc v. Zainul Abidin etc” was filed on 10.06.2014 and through this suit dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, recovery of dowry articles and payment of delivery expenses was claimed. Since preliminary reconciliation efforts failed the marriage was dissolved on the basis of “Khula”, while vide judgment and decree dated 06.05.2016 the Respondent Nazia Aziz and minor Zainab Bibi were granted maintenance allowance as also delivery expenses.
5. An appeal filed against the said judgment by Respondent Nazia Aziz was allowed and the impugned judgment and decree was modified and the maintenance allowance granted by the trial Court was enhanced from Rs. 3000/-per month to Rs. 6000/-per month. Thereafter Respondent Nazia Aziz filed an execution petition since her former husband Zainul Abidin was not willing to respect and comply with the judgments and decrees in question. Respondent Nazia Aziz filed an execution petition on 17.09.2016.
6. During execution proceedings Respondent Nazia Aziz moved an application to attach property consisting of land measuring 0-marla and 5-sarsai situated in Chawk No. 61-EB Tehsil Arifwala. This application was allowed by the learned executing Court vide order dated 10.02.2017 and the said property was ordered to be attached. This led the petitioner before this Court to file an objection petition maintaining that he had purchased the said property from his real brother Zainul Abidin (judgment debtor) vide registered sale deed dated 06.09.2016 bearing Mutation No. 20807 and that he was in possession of said property and therefore prayed for the order of attachment dated 10.02.2017 to be recalled. Respondent Nazia Aziz contested this application on the ground that the sale deed resulted out of a sham transaction and since the property was sold after a decree had been obtained by Respondent Nazia Aziz so as to frustrate execution proceedings with respect thereto, the objection petition merited to be dismissed.
7. The executing Court vide order dated 05.01.2018 dismissed this objection petition by relying on the fact that the objection petitioner Muhammad Naeem Shahzad was cited as a witness on behalf of his brother Zainul Abidin, the judgment debtor, in the family suit and he was well aware of the proceedings in the main suit. The executing Court noted that the main suit was decreed on 06.05.2016 and an appeal against the same was dismissed on 23.08.2016 and consequently an execution petition was filed on 17.09.2016. That, interestingly on 03.09.2016 judgment debtor Zainul Abidin acquired the disputed property i.e. 5 Sarsai through inheritance mutation No. 20593 and thereafter within three days i.e. on 06.09.2016 he transferred the disputed property through a registered sale deed dated 06.09.2016. The executing Court noted that since the present petitioner before this Court was a witness on behalf of the judgment debtor and had knowledge of the judgment and decree passed in the main suit, he was therefore well aware of the judgment and decree passed against the judgment debtor and having knowledge about such a decree and being well familiar with the recalcitrance of the judgment debtor in not playing ball it was evident that the sale deed in question was an artificial transaction and had only been executed to frustrate the process of the Court as also to cheat the Court. The executing Court, therefore, dismissed the objection petition and ordered for the registered deed to be cancelled.
8. This led the petitioner Muhammad Naeem Shahzad to file an appeal before the District Court Arifwala and the appellate Court dismissed the appeal by noting as follows:-
Record reveals that respondent Mst. Nazia Aziz instituted suit on 10.06.2014. Said suit was contested by the judgment debtor Zain-ul-Abideen and he submitted list of witnesses and Appellant Naeem Shehzad was mentioned as witness in the said list of witnesses. Said suit was decreed by the learned trial Court on 06.05.2016 thereafter appeal was preferred against the said judgment and decree dated 06.05.2016 in the Court of learned Additional District Judge Arifwala which decided the appeal on 23.08.2016. Thereafter execution petition was filed by the Respondent Nazia Aziz on 17.09.2016. Property in question was acquired by the judgment debtor Zain-ul-Abideen through mutation of inheritance No. 20593 on 03.09.2016 and judgment debtor transferred the said property in name of Appellant Naeem Shehzad who is his real brother on 06.09.2016. The judgment debtor and appellant was fully aware of the decree in execution and it is established that judgment debtor transferred his property to his brother Naeem Shehzad, the appellant, after passing the decree in execution which has not been assailed before any honourable competent Court as per available record as such same has attained finality. It is further held that judgment debtor transferred the said property in the name of his brother just to defeat the execution of decree and process of law. So in these circumstances learned trial Court did not commit any illegality while dismissing the objection petition.
9. This, in turn led the petitioner to file the present constitutional petition which is sought to be decided.
10. Leaned counsel for the petitioner was not present on the last date of hearing i.e. 08.04.2021 and has chosen to absent himself even today despite the fact that his name stands reflected conspicuously in the cause list. There is no intimation available about reasons for his absence. However, since the present constitutional petition has been listed in the red list, it has been taken up to be adjudicated on the basis of the available record and the grounds taken in the constitutional petition.
11. The grounds taken in the petition reveal as follows: That the petitioner is neither a judgment debtor nor party to the execution proceedings and even then his property was not only attached but the sale deed on the basis of which he become owner of the property was declared to be of no legal effect. That it is only the property of a competing party that can be attached for the satisfaction of decree or even a property in dispute can be attached but in his case a stranger’s property has been attached and taken away.
12. In response, learned counsel for the respondents states that since the petitioner is the real biological brother of the judgment debtor who was cited as a witness in the family suit on behalf of the judgment debtor and who allegedly bought the property in issue after the passage of a judgment and decree in favour of Respondent Nazia Aziz, the orders under challenge were unexceptionable and needed no interference.
13. Hence the question before the Court as to the status of a property sold by a judgment debtor during the course of execution proceedings but after the passage of a judgment and decree.
14. Had the judgment debtor sold the property in question to a stranger or to somebody who was not related to him the grounds taken in the petition may have been appealing. However, the relationship between the judgment debtor Zainul Abidin and the present petitioner and the undue haste with which the property in issue was alienated by the judgment debtor i.e. within three days of having inherited the property read with the fact that the property was sold after the passage of the judgment and decree against the judgment debtor restrains this Court from subscribing to the stance taken by the petitioner. What makes the sale deed dated 06.09.2016 even more questionable is the fact that the petitioner was cited as a defence witness by the judgment debtor in the family suit and therefore had adequate knowledge about the passage of the judgment and decree against the judgment debtor and who being his real biological brother was also not in the dark about his brother’s precarious financial condition.
15. These factors noted above can only lead the Court to one conclusion and which is that the transaction of sale was a sham transaction between two real brothers meant only to frustrate the judgment and decree passed by a family Court and only to allow the judgment debtor to wriggle out of the liability legally imposed on him. The relationship between the judgment debtor and the petitioner does not allow this Court to reach any other conclusion.
16. In (2015 SCMR 128) “Amjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others” in which the respondent had filed a suit for maintenance against her father and which suit was decreed on 18.04.1998 and an appeal against which was dismissed and where the respondent filed an execution petition and where the judgment debtor failed to honour the decree and was detained in civil prison and upon his release made Hibah of his residential house in favour of his second wife and where the successful respondent moved an application for recovery of decretal amount by means of sale of residential house so gifted by stating that the Hibah had only been made to avoid the decree and was thus a fraudulent transaction and where the executing Court declared the said Hibah to be unlawful and proceeded to attach the house, it was held at para 6 as follows:
The Executing Court through its order dated 14-5-2011 declared such Hiba to be unlawful and such order of the Executing Court appears to have been maintained by the revisional Court. Once the Hiba itself was declared to be unlawful, any further transaction on the basis of the said Hiba could only be a nullity in the eye of law for that the donee of the Hiba did not have legal title to the house to sell the same to the petitioner. Both Hiba as well as the purported sale in favour of the petitioner were nothing but sham transactions and its purpose was to ensure that the decree is not satisfied. The decree was nothing but for the maintenance of Respondent No. 2's own minor daughter. Unfortunately, the Respondent No. 2 in sheer disregard of his parental obligation has indulged in making all these unlawful transactions. What intent the Respondent No. 2 had in his mind but to starve his own minor daughter of her basic needs for survival. The Court while exercising parental jurisdiction cannot just sit and be a spectator in this unholy and unlawful conduct of the Respondent No. 2.
Description: A17. The honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan went on to hold that the technical trappings of execution provided in the Code of Civil Procedure were not strictly applicable to execution proceedings before a Family Court and that Section 13(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 empowered the Family Court to execute its own decree for payment of money by adopting modes provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue.
18. That, likewise, in (2002 SCMR 1950) “Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabir Sultana” where an agreement to sell and subsequently a sale deed was executed to frustrate a judgment and decree passed by a Family Court, the sale deed was declared to be invalid and it was held that the sale deed was invalid having been effectuated only to frustrate the judgment and decree of the Family Court and was thus a fraudulent transaction.
19. Similarly in (2015 CLC 667) “Saima Perveen and 2 others v. Naeem Ahmad Nasir and 3 others” in which an agreement to sell dated 08.08.2007 and which agreement to sell had been judicially approved vide judgment and decree dated 28.12.2008 was in issue with such transactions taking place subsequent to the decree of maintenance passed in favour of the estranged wife and minor children of the seller who was also the judgment debtor and where the respondents were close relatives, it was held at paragraph 7 as follows:
Undeniably, the alleged agreement to sell, filing of the suit for specific performance and the judgment and decree passed in favour of Respondent No. 1 are all subsequent events to the decree of maintenance allowance passed in favour of the petitioner. I am of the considered opinion that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, closely related, in connivance with each other have tried to frustrate the decree of maintenance allowance passed in favour of the petitioner. Any agreement to sell executed by the judgment debtor regarding his property after the decree passed against him is illegal and unlawful and does not create any right in favour of the subsequent/alleged purchaser.
20. Seen even from a different perspective it is obvious that the dictates of equity and fairness also compel this Court to not to perpetuate the case of the petitioner because the significance of never being oblivious of what would constitute fairness in a situation has been stressed upon by jurists since centuries and in the words of Allahabad High Court in (1973) 89 ITR 190, “even when the Courts step into the world of legal fantasy the principles of equity and justice cannot be lost sight of.”
Description: BDescription: C21. The jurisdiction and judicial power emanating out of Article 199 of the Constitution is conditioned upon principles of equity and fairness. Furthermore, according to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal and others” (2017 SCMR 321), “in terms of law, the proceedings of the learned Family Court, whether as a trial Court or an executing Court, are governed by the general principles of equity, justice and fair play. The circumstances of the present case, namely, delay of more than 12 years in the execution of the decree on the basis of an inapplicable objection cannot under the principles of equity, justice and fair play be allowed to defeat the decree under execution.”
Description: D22. The sale transaction in the present matter reeks of an audacious and unembarrassed attempt to push the already marginalized and persecuted into further misery and thereby dampen liberation and emancipation of women in Pakistan. As the Hon’ble Sindh High Court has observed in “Abdur Rehman and 2 others v. CityBank N.A.” (1990 CLC 686) in the context of a case where innocence is claimed by a party causing loss to the other, “the rule of equity which applies to an innocent person signifies that the one who could prevent the loss must suffer and not the other who was powerless to do so.”
Description: E23. In a written constitutional set up such as ours the Courts are the custodians and guardians of the social contract between the State and its citizens. The Constitution and the right of equal protection of law as also the command for affirmative action in favour of women (Article 25 refers) would become illusory if defeated litigants or those who claim under them are allowed to navigate through technical shelters and deprive the decree holder of her just desserts. Endorsing such a course would tantamount to doing what the Privy Council warned against in (General Manager of the Raj Darbhanga v.
Moharaj Coomar Rampus Singh, (1872) 14 Moor’s Indian Appeals 612), “the difficulties of a litigant in India would begin when he has obtained a decree. …….”
Description: F24. Having considered the matter from all perspectives it is evident that judgment debtor Zainul Abidin only alienated his inherited property to frustrate the judgment and decree passed against him much prior to the sale deed and therefore the entire exercise was nothing but a shabby and synthetic attempt to frustrate the judgment and decree passed by the family Court.
25. In view of what has been noted above, the concurrent findings of the Courts below are unexceptionable and not susceptible to any correction or modification. The same are upheld and this constitutional petition is dismissed.
(Y.A.) Petition dismissedاجراء کے دوران مدعیون کی طرف سے بیچے گئی جائیداد کا سٹسس کیا ہوگا ۔۔۔۔ جانیے اس فیصلے کی روشنی میں
PLJ 2022 Lahore 667
Present: Muhammad Shan Gul, J.
NAEEM SHEHZAD--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ARIFWALA and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 208019 of 2018, heard on 23.6.2022.
West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 13(3)--Suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, recovery of dowry articles--Execution proceedings--Attachment of property--Objection petition--Dismissed--Sale of property by judgment debtor during pendency of execution proceedings--Purchaser of property was defence witness of judgment-debtor--Shame transaction--Concurrent findings--Relationship between judgment debtor and petitioner--Delay of more than 12 years in execution of decree on basis of an inapplicable objection cannot under principles of equity, justice and fair play be allowed to defeat decree under execution--Sale transaction in present matter reeks of an audacious and unembarrassed attempt to push already marginalized and persecuted into further misery and thereby dampen liberation and emancipation of women in Pakistan--Judgment debtor only alienated his inherited property to frustrate judgment and decree passed against him much prior to sale deed and entire exercise was nothing but a shabby and synthetic attempt to frustrate judgment and decree passed by family Court--Petition dismissed.
[P. 674 & 675] C, D & F
1990 CLC 686 ref.
West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 13(3)--Execution proceedings--Section 13(3) of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 empowered Family Court to execute its own decree for payment of money by adopting modes provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue. [P. 673] A
2002 SCMR 1950 & 2015 CLC 667 ref.
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 199--Jurisdiction--Judicial power-- The jurisdiction and judicial power emanating out of Article 199 of Constitution is conditioned upon principles of equity and fairness. [P. 674] B
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--
----Art. 25--Right of equal protection--In a written constitutional set up such as ours Courts are custodians and guardians of social contract between State and its citizens--The Constitution and right of equal protection of law as also command for affirmative action in favour of women (Article 25 refers) would become illusory if defeated litigants or those who claim under them are allowed to navigate through technical shelters and deprive decree holder of her just desserts. [P. 674] E
(1872) 14 Moor’s Indian Appeals 612 & (1973) 89 ITR 190 ref.
Nemo for Petitioner.
Mr. Tariq Hussain, Advocate for Respondents.
Date of hearing 23.6.2022.
Judgment
Through this judgment the titled constitutional petition is sought to be decided.
2. The question confronting the Court pertains to the status of a property sold by a judgment debtor during the pendency of an execution petition emanating out of a family suit in order to avoid and frustrate enforcement of a judgment and decree.
3. The petitioner before this Court is the real biological brother of judgment debtor Zainul Abidin. It is this aspect of the matter which makes the reading ahead even more interesting.
4. Facts in brief are that a family suit titled “Nazia Aziz etc v. Zainul Abidin etc” was filed on 10.06.2014 and through this suit dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, recovery of dowry articles and payment of delivery expenses was claimed. Since preliminary reconciliation efforts failed the marriage was dissolved on the basis of “Khula”, while vide judgment and decree dated 06.05.2016 the Respondent Nazia Aziz and minor Zainab Bibi were granted maintenance allowance as also delivery expenses.
5. An appeal filed against the said judgment by Respondent Nazia Aziz was allowed and the impugned judgment and decree was modified and the maintenance allowance granted by the trial Court was enhanced from Rs. 3000/-per month to Rs. 6000/-per month. Thereafter Respondent Nazia Aziz filed an execution petition since her former husband Zainul Abidin was not willing to respect and comply with the judgments and decrees in question. Respondent Nazia Aziz filed an execution petition on 17.09.2016.
6. During execution proceedings Respondent Nazia Aziz moved an application to attach property consisting of land measuring 0-marla and 5-sarsai situated in Chawk No. 61-EB Tehsil Arifwala. This application was allowed by the learned executing Court vide order dated 10.02.2017 and the said property was ordered to be attached. This led the petitioner before this Court to file an objection petition maintaining that he had purchased the said property from his real brother Zainul Abidin (judgment debtor) vide registered sale deed dated 06.09.2016 bearing Mutation No. 20807 and that he was in possession of said property and therefore prayed for the order of attachment dated 10.02.2017 to be recalled. Respondent Nazia Aziz contested this application on the ground that the sale deed resulted out of a sham transaction and since the property was sold after a decree had been obtained by Respondent Nazia Aziz so as to frustrate execution proceedings with respect thereto, the objection petition merited to be dismissed.
7. The executing Court vide order dated 05.01.2018 dismissed this objection petition by relying on the fact that the objection petitioner Muhammad Naeem Shahzad was cited as a witness on behalf of his brother Zainul Abidin, the judgment debtor, in the family suit and he was well aware of the proceedings in the main suit. The executing Court noted that the main suit was decreed on 06.05.2016 and an appeal against the same was dismissed on 23.08.2016 and consequently an execution petition was filed on 17.09.2016. That, interestingly on 03.09.2016 judgment debtor Zainul Abidin acquired the disputed property i.e. 5 Sarsai through inheritance mutation No. 20593 and thereafter within three days i.e. on 06.09.2016 he transferred the disputed property through a registered sale deed dated 06.09.2016. The executing Court noted that since the present petitioner before this Court was a witness on behalf of the judgment debtor and had knowledge of the judgment and decree passed in the main suit, he was therefore well aware of the judgment and decree passed against the judgment debtor and having knowledge about such a decree and being well familiar with the recalcitrance of the judgment debtor in not playing ball it was evident that the sale deed in question was an artificial transaction and had only been executed to frustrate the process of the Court as also to cheat the Court. The executing Court, therefore, dismissed the objection petition and ordered for the registered deed to be cancelled.
8. This led the petitioner Muhammad Naeem Shahzad to file an appeal before the District Court Arifwala and the appellate Court dismissed the appeal by noting as follows:-
Record reveals that respondent Mst. Nazia Aziz instituted suit on 10.06.2014. Said suit was contested by the judgment debtor Zain-ul-Abideen and he submitted list of witnesses and Appellant Naeem Shehzad was mentioned as witness in the said list of witnesses. Said suit was decreed by the learned trial Court on 06.05.2016 thereafter appeal was preferred against the said judgment and decree dated 06.05.2016 in the Court of learned Additional District Judge Arifwala which decided the appeal on 23.08.2016. Thereafter execution petition was filed by the Respondent Nazia Aziz on 17.09.2016. Property in question was acquired by the judgment debtor Zain-ul-Abideen through mutation of inheritance No. 20593 on 03.09.2016 and judgment debtor transferred the said property in name of Appellant Naeem Shehzad who is his real brother on 06.09.2016. The judgment debtor and appellant was fully aware of the decree in execution and it is established that judgment debtor transferred his property to his brother Naeem Shehzad, the appellant, after passing the decree in execution which has not been assailed before any honourable competent Court as per available record as such same has attained finality. It is further held that judgment debtor transferred the said property in the name of his brother just to defeat the execution of decree and process of law. So in these circumstances learned trial Court did not commit any illegality while dismissing the objection petition.
9. This, in turn led the petitioner to file the present constitutional petition which is sought to be decided.
10. Leaned counsel for the petitioner was not present on the last date of hearing i.e. 08.04.2021 and has chosen to absent himself even today despite the fact that his name stands reflected conspicuously in the cause list. There is no intimation available about reasons for his absence. However, since the present constitutional petition has been listed in the red list, it has been taken up to be adjudicated on the basis of the available record and the grounds taken in the constitutional petition.
11. The grounds taken in the petition reveal as follows: That the petitioner is neither a judgment debtor nor party to the execution proceedings and even then his property was not only attached but the sale deed on the basis of which he become owner of the property was declared to be of no legal effect. That it is only the property of a competing party that can be attached for the satisfaction of decree or even a property in dispute can be attached but in his case a stranger’s property has been attached and taken away.
12. In response, learned counsel for the respondents states that since the petitioner is the real biological brother of the judgment debtor who was cited as a witness in the family suit on behalf of the judgment debtor and who allegedly bought the property in issue after the passage of a judgment and decree in favour of Respondent Nazia Aziz, the orders under challenge were unexceptionable and needed no interference.
13. Hence the question before the Court as to the status of a property sold by a judgment debtor during the course of execution proceedings but after the passage of a judgment and decree.
14. Had the judgment debtor sold the property in question to a stranger or to somebody who was not related to him the grounds taken in the petition may have been appealing. However, the relationship between the judgment debtor Zainul Abidin and the present petitioner and the undue haste with which the property in issue was alienated by the judgment debtor i.e. within three days of having inherited the property read with the fact that the property was sold after the passage of the judgment and decree against the judgment debtor restrains this Court from subscribing to the stance taken by the petitioner. What makes the sale deed dated 06.09.2016 even more questionable is the fact that the petitioner was cited as a defence witness by the judgment debtor in the family suit and therefore had adequate knowledge about the passage of the judgment and decree against the judgment debtor and who being his real biological brother was also not in the dark about his brother’s precarious financial condition.
15. These factors noted above can only lead the Court to one conclusion and which is that the transaction of sale was a sham transaction between two real brothers meant only to frustrate the judgment and decree passed by a family Court and only to allow the judgment debtor to wriggle out of the liability legally imposed on him. The relationship between the judgment debtor and the petitioner does not allow this Court to reach any other conclusion.
16. In (2015 SCMR 128) “Amjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others” in which the respondent had filed a suit for maintenance against her father and which suit was decreed on 18.04.1998 and an appeal against which was dismissed and where the respondent filed an execution petition and where the judgment debtor failed to honour the decree and was detained in civil prison and upon his release made Hibah of his residential house in favour of his second wife and where the successful respondent moved an application for recovery of decretal amount by means of sale of residential house so gifted by stating that the Hibah had only been made to avoid the decree and was thus a fraudulent transaction and where the executing Court declared the said Hibah to be unlawful and proceeded to attach the house, it was held at para 6 as follows:
The Executing Court through its order dated 14-5-2011 declared such Hiba to be unlawful and such order of the Executing Court appears to have been maintained by the revisional Court. Once the Hiba itself was declared to be unlawful, any further transaction on the basis of the said Hiba could only be a nullity in the eye of law for that the donee of the Hiba did not have legal title to the house to sell the same to the petitioner. Both Hiba as well as the purported sale in favour of the petitioner were nothing but sham transactions and its purpose was to ensure that the decree is not satisfied. The decree was nothing but for the maintenance of Respondent No. 2's own minor daughter. Unfortunately, the Respondent No. 2 in sheer disregard of his parental obligation has indulged in making all these unlawful transactions. What intent the Respondent No. 2 had in his mind but to starve his own minor daughter of her basic needs for survival. The Court while exercising parental jurisdiction cannot just sit and be a spectator in this unholy and unlawful conduct of the Respondent No. 2.
Description: A17. The honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan went on to hold that the technical trappings of execution provided in the Code of Civil Procedure were not strictly applicable to execution proceedings before a Family Court and that Section 13(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 empowered the Family Court to execute its own decree for payment of money by adopting modes provided for recovery of arrears of land revenue.
18. That, likewise, in (2002 SCMR 1950) “Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabir Sultana” where an agreement to sell and subsequently a sale deed was executed to frustrate a judgment and decree passed by a Family Court, the sale deed was declared to be invalid and it was held that the sale deed was invalid having been effectuated only to frustrate the judgment and decree of the Family Court and was thus a fraudulent transaction.
19. Similarly in (2015 CLC 667) “Saima Perveen and 2 others v. Naeem Ahmad Nasir and 3 others” in which an agreement to sell dated 08.08.2007 and which agreement to sell had been judicially approved vide judgment and decree dated 28.12.2008 was in issue with such transactions taking place subsequent to the decree of maintenance passed in favour of the estranged wife and minor children of the seller who was also the judgment debtor and where the respondents were close relatives, it was held at paragraph 7 as follows:
Undeniably, the alleged agreement to sell, filing of the suit for specific performance and the judgment and decree passed in favour of Respondent No. 1 are all subsequent events to the decree of maintenance allowance passed in favour of the petitioner. I am of the considered opinion that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, closely related, in connivance with each other have tried to frustrate the decree of maintenance allowance passed in favour of the petitioner. Any agreement to sell executed by the judgment debtor regarding his property after the decree passed against him is illegal and unlawful and does not create any right in favour of the subsequent/alleged purchaser.
20. Seen even from a different perspective it is obvious that the dictates of equity and fairness also compel this Court to not to perpetuate the case of the petitioner because the significance of never being oblivious of what would constitute fairness in a situation has been stressed upon by jurists since centuries and in the words of Allahabad High Court in (1973) 89 ITR 190, “even when the Courts step into the world of legal fantasy the principles of equity and justice cannot be lost sight of.”
Description: BDescription: C21. The jurisdiction and judicial power emanating out of Article 199 of the Constitution is conditioned upon principles of equity and fairness. Furthermore, according to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal and others” (2017 SCMR 321), “in terms of law, the proceedings of the learned Family Court, whether as a trial Court or an executing Court, are governed by the general principles of equity, justice and fair play. The circumstances of the present case, namely, delay of more than 12 years in the execution of the decree on the basis of an inapplicable objection cannot under the principles of equity, justice and fair play be allowed to defeat the decree under execution.”
Description: D22. The sale transaction in the present matter reeks of an audacious and unembarrassed attempt to push the already marginalized and persecuted into further misery and thereby dampen liberation and emancipation of women in Pakistan. As the Hon’ble Sindh High Court has observed in “Abdur Rehman and 2 others v. CityBank N.A.” (1990 CLC 686) in the context of a case where innocence is claimed by a party causing loss to the other, “the rule of equity which applies to an innocent person signifies that the one who could prevent the loss must suffer and not the other who was powerless to do so.”
Description: E23. In a written constitutional set up such as ours the Courts are the custodians and guardians of the social contract between the State and its citizens. The Constitution and the right of equal protection of law as also the command for affirmative action in favour of women (Article 25 refers) would become illusory if defeated litigants or those who claim under them are allowed to navigate through technical shelters and deprive the decree holder of her just desserts. Endorsing such a course would tantamount to doing what the Privy Council warned against in (General Manager of the Raj Darbhanga v.
Moharaj Coomar Rampus Singh, (1872) 14 Moor’s Indian Appeals 612), “the difficulties of a litigant in India would begin when he has obtained a decree. …….”
Description: F24. Having considered the matter from all perspectives it is evident that judgment debtor Zainul Abidin only alienated his inherited property to frustrate the judgment and decree passed against him much prior to the sale deed and therefore the entire exercise was nothing but a shabby and synthetic attempt to frustrate the judgment and decree passed by the family Court.
25. In view of what has been noted above, the concurrent findings of the Courts below are unexceptionable and not susceptible to any correction or modification. The same are upheld and this constitutional petition is dismissed.
(Y.A.) Petition dismissed
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