Law maintains a distinction between custody and guardianship and respective rights and obligations in that regard under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890.

 2023 MLD 1000

Law maintains a distinction between custody and guardianship and respective rights and obligations in that regard under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890. The definition of ‘guardian’ in section 4(2) appears to include the concept of custody, unless the same has been exclusively awarded by the court to a party who is not the guardian of a minor. Custody under the Act involves a right to upbringing of a minor. On the other hand, guardianship entails the concept of taking care of the minor even in situations when the guardian does not have domain over the corpus of the child. A father is considered to be a natural guardian of a minor, since even after separation with the mother, and even when the mother has been granted custody of a minor, he is obligated to provide financial assistance to the minor. The liability to maintain the minor is not only religious and moral but legal. The right of custody of minor is subordinate to the fundamental principle i.e. welfare of the minor. Maintenance of child is the duty of father and the mother cannot be deprived of custody due to her inability to maintain the child for lack of resources.

--S. 10(4)--Khula--Unique right--Determination--Legal differences between talaq and khula--Grant of khula by ordinary Courts of law--

 PLJ 2023 Cr.C. 513 (DB)
[Federal Shariat Court]
PresentDr. Syed Muhammad Anwer, ACJ and Khadim Hussain M. Shaikh, J.
KHURRAM SHEHZAD--Petitioner
versus
FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Ministry of Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and another--Respondents
Shariat Petition No. 11-I of 2022, decided on 7.2.2023.

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--

---S. 10(4)--Khula--Unique right--Determination--Legal differences between talaq and khula--Grant of khula by ordinary Courts of law--Matter has already been decided by Full Bench of this Court--According to Shariah, Khula operates as a single irrevocable divorce, which means that both spouses can contract a fresh marriage with mutual consent, of course if they want to, without any intermediary marriage of wife with another person, which is known as “Halala” and is required in case when a husband pronounces divorce to his wife for third time and that attained finality--This is one of legal differences between Talaq pronounced by husband and Khula sought by wife from her husband--Khula is a unique right given by Islam to women, which is not available to men, that a woman can seek dissolution of marriage on basis of Khula and to remarry same man depends only on her will and consent, if she wants to, without entering into marriage with someone else as is necessary for a man if he once pronounced divorce to his wife, which attained finality, and then he wants to remarry that lady, he cannot do so unless lady marries somebody else and that marriage dissolves in normal course either by divorce or due to death of her second husband and she becomes a widow--Petition dismissed.                    [Pp. 516 & 517] A, B, C & D

PLD 2014 FSC 43, PLD 2013 Lahore 88 & PLD 2010 Karachi 131 ref.

Sayyed Umer Sohail Shah, Advocate for/along with Petitioner

Date of hearing: 7.2.2023.

Order

Dr. Syed Muhammad Anwer, ACJ.--Through the instant Shariat Petition, the petitioner has made the following prayer:

“It is therefore, respectfully prayed that whole of the above-mentioned impugned provision/Section 10(4) of the Family Court Act, 1964 may kindly be examined in the light of Quran and Sunnah and be declared un-Islamic and hence void being repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. It is further prayed that as a consequence thereof the Respondent No. 1 should be directed to amend the above mentioned provision in accordance with the tenants of Islam.”

2. The learned counsel for petitioner has mainly stressed that Khula so granted by the ordinary Courts of law under Section 10(4) of the West Pakistan Family Court Act, 1964 without the consent of husband is quite against the injunctions of Islam. However, the learned counsel has further raised a ground in his petition regarding the dispute of Khula sought by the wife of the petitioner in the following manner:

“It is pertinent to mention here that Respondent No. 2 was got married with petitioner under Muslim Family Laws & Shariat-e-Muhammadi on 12-01-2009, however there is no child does exist/alive of the spouse. The Respondent No. 2 got Khula from the Court of Miss Iram Ali Malik, Learned Judge, Family Court Mandi Bahauddin in Family Suit No. 24/2022 vide judgment/order on 04-03-2022, which order was passed without the consent of petitioner, as being husband the consent of petitioner while granting Khula is essentially required, but no such practice or law is being followed in the country, which is quite illegal and un-Islamic.”

3. The petitioner has argued the case at length and relied upon the following Ayat of the Holy Quran and Ahadith of the Holy Prophet (SAW):

Surah Al-Baqarah (Verse-237)

وَإِن طَلَّقۡتُمُوهُنَّ مِن قَبۡلِ أَن تَمَسُّوهُنَّ وَقَدۡ فَرَضۡتُمۡ لَهُنَّ فَرِيضَةٗ فَنِصۡفُ مَا فَرَضۡتُمۡ إِلَّآ أَن يَعۡفُونَ أَوۡ يَعۡفُوَاْ ٱلَّذِي بِيَدِهِۦ عُقۡدَةُ ٱلنِّكَاحِۚ وَأَن تَعۡفُوٓاْ أَقۡرَبُ لِلتَّقۡوَىٰۚ وَلَا تَنسَوُاْ ٱلۡفَضۡلَ بَيۡنَكُمۡۚ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ بِمَا تَعۡمَلُونَ بَصِيرٌ

“And if you divorce them before you touch them or settle a bridal gift upon them, then (give them) half of what you have settled unless either the women act leniently and forgo their claim, or he in whose hand is the marriage tie acts leniently (and pays the full amount). If you act leniently it is closer to being God fearing. And forget not to act gracefully with one another, for indeed Allah see all that you do.

Holy Prophet SAW said, Hadees in Sunan Ibn e Maja, Kitab-ul-Talaq, Bab-ul-Talaq al Abad, Hadees # 2081:-

حَدَّثَنَا مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، ‏‏‏‏‏‏حَدَّثَنَا يَحْيَى بْنُ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ بُكَيْرٍ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏حَدَّثَنَا ابْنُ لَهِيعَةَ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏عَنْ مُوسَى بْنِ أَيُّوبَ الْغَافِقِيِّ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏عَنْعِكْرِمَةَ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏عَنِ ابْنِ عَبَّاسٍ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏قَالَ:‏‏‏‏ أَتَى النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ رَجُلٌ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏فَقَالَ:‏‏‏‏ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏إِنَّ سَيِّدِي زَوَّجَنِي أَمَتَهُ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏وَهُوَ يُرِيدُ أَنْ يُفَرِّقَ بَيْنِي وَبَيْنَهَا، ‏‏‏‏‏‏قَالَ:‏‏‏‏ فَصَعِدَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ الْمِنْبَرَ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏فَقَالَ:‏‏‏‏ يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ مَا بَالُ أَحَدِكُمْ يُزَوِّجُ عَبْدَهُ أَمَتَهُ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏ثُمَّ يُرِيدُ أَنْ يُفَرِّقَ بَيْنَهُمَا، ‏‏‏‏‏‏إِنَّمَا الطَّلَاقُ لِمَنْ أَخَذَ بِالسَّاقِ

“A man came to the Prophet () and said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, my master married me to his slave woman, and now he wants to separate me and her.’ The Messenger of Allah () ascended the pulpit and said: ‘O people, what is the matter with one of you who marries his slave to his slave woman, then wants to separate them? Divorce belongs to the one who takes hold of the calf (i.e., her husband).’”

Holy Prophet SAW said, Hadees in Sunan Nisai Hadees # 3463, Sunan Ibn e Maja Hadees # 2056:-

حَدَّثَنَا أَزْهَرُ بْنُ مَرْوَانَ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏حَدَّثَنَا عَبْدُ الْأَعْلَى بْنُ عَبْدِ الْأَعْلَى، ‏‏‏‏‏‏حَدَّثَنَا سَعِيدُ بْنُ أَبِي عَرُوبَةَ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏عَنْ قَتَادَةَ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏عَنْعِكْرِمَةَ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏‏عَنِ ابْنِ عَبَّاسٍ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏أَنَّ جَمِيلَةَ بِنْتَ سَلُولَ أَتَتِ النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏فَقَالَتْ:‏‏‏‏ وَاللَّهِ مَا أَعْتِبُ عَلَى ثَابِتٍ فِي دِينٍ  ‏‏‏‏‏‏وَلَا خُلُقٍ وَلَكِنِّي أَكْرَهُ الْكُفْرَ فِي الْإِسْلَامِ لَا أُطِيقُهُ بُغْضًا، ‏‏‏‏‏‏فَقَالَ لَهَا النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ:‏‏‏‏ أَتَرُدِّينَ عَلَيْهِ حَدِيقَتَهُ؟ ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏قَالَتْ:‏‏‏‏ نَعَمْ، ‏‏‏‏‏‏فَأَمَرَهُ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَنْ يَأْخُذَ مِنْهَا حَدِيقَتَهُ وَلَا يَزْدَادَ.

It was narrated from Ibn ‘Abbas that: Jamilah bint Salul came to the Prophet () and said: “By Allah, I do not find any fault with Thabit regarding his religion nor his behavior, but I hate disbelief after becoming Muslim and I cannot stand him. “The Prophet (said to her: ‘WiIl you give him back his garden?” She said: “Yes.” So the Messenger of Allah () told him to take back his garden from her and no more than that.

Holy Prophet SAW said, Hadees in Sunan Saeed bin Mansoor, Kitab-ul-Talaq, Hadees # 1270:

مالک، عن یحیی بن سعید، عن سعید بن المسیب، انہ کان یقول: الطلاق للر جال، والعدۃ للنساء (سنن سعید بن منصور، کتاب الطلاق، حدیث رقم 1270)

Malik, on the authority of Yahya bin Saeed, on the authority of Saeed bin Al-Musayyib; He used to say: Divorce is for men, and the waiting is for women. (Sunnan Saeed bin Mansoor, Kitab-ul-Talaq, Hadees No. 1270).

4. However, the documents, which the learned counsel has relied upon, relate to the case involving matrimonial dispute decided by the Family Court, Mandi Bahauddin against the petitioner. So far as the point of determination regarding Section 10(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 is concerned, the matter has already been decided by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of “Saleem Ahmad and others v. Government of Pakistan and others”, reported as PLD 2014 FSC 43. The relevant portions of the judgment are reproduced as under:

“…… “Khula” and “Mubarat” operated as a single, irrevocable divorce and even thereafter both the spouses could contract fresh marriage with mutual consent, of course if they wanted to, without any intermediary marriage of the wife with another person.

……

……

Description: Qamoon……

Description: Qawam…… The word used here is (        ) plural of (      ), which means a person responsible for administering managing and protecting the interests of a person or an organization and looks after its affairs. In the context, this verse ‘refers to the responsibilities of the man who is required to protect, safeguard and provide for the needs of those under his supervision. Obviously, there are psychological and physiological differences between the sexes and they have to perform different roles but, admittedly, no one is superior to the other except by Taqwa (i.e. faith and good deeds). In fact they are complementary to each other. No one can ever exist without the other. Both have similar rights/responsibilities with different roles to play in life. Nevertheless Islam affirms their equality as human beings and advocates and duly protects their fundamental rights. All these three verses referred to again and again by the petitioner/counsel/Jurist Consult, thus do not specifically create a bar for Court of competent jurisdiction to decree the case of “Khula” when reconciliation fails. After all what are the Courts of law established for? The Courts are there to dissolve the disputes that arise between the parties. They can decide all type of matters including, admittedly, dissolution of marriage on certain grounds. One wonders why they are not authorized to decide the case of Khula, if a husband does not at all agree to the divorce of his wife and all the reconciliatory efforts fail. In this view of the matter we find that this verse has nothing to do with the subject of “Khula”, in the context as has been agitated and argued.”

[emphases added]

5. In addition to above, we would like to highlight a very important point regarding the legal effect of Khula i.e. according to Shariah, Khula operates as a single irrevocable divorce, which means that both the spouses can contract a fresh marriage with mutual consent, of course if they want to, without any intermediary marriage of the wife with another person, which is known as “Halala” and is required in case when a husband pronounces divorce to his wife for the third time and that attained finality. This is one of the legal differences between Talaq pronounced by the husband and Khula sought by the wife from her husband. However, Iddat shall be incumbent upon the wife if she wants to contract marriage with someone else after Khula. Khula is a unique right given by Islam to women, which is not available to men, that a woman can seek the dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula and to remarry the same man depends only on her will and consent, if she wants to, without entering into marriage with someone else as is necessary for a man if he once pronounced divorce to his wife, which attained finality, and then he wants to remarry that lady, he cannot do so unless the lady marries somebody else and that marriage dissolves in normal course either by divorce or due to the death of her second husband and she becomes a widow. This important aspect of Khula has also been discussed by the superior Courts in cases reported as PLD 2013 Lahore 88 (Major Qamar Zaman Qadir v. Judge Family Court, Jehlum and others), PLD 2013 Sindh 209 (Danish v. Mst. Fozia Danish and another), 2011 CLC 1211 (Attiq Ahmed Khan vs. Noor-ul-Saba and another), PLD 2010 Karachi 131 (Muhammad Ayub Khan v. Mst. Shehla Rasheed and another), PLD 2003 Peshawar 169 (Fazli-e-Subhan v. Mst. Sabereen and 3 others), 2000 MLD 447 (Gulzar


Hussain v. Mst. Mariyam Naz) and PLD 1970 Lahore 1 (Mst. Nawab Bibi and 14 others v. Mst. Anwar Bibi and 6 others).

6. In the light of above referred judgments and arguments advanced by the learned counsel for petitioner together with the points he raised from the Holy Quran and Sunnah, we are of the same view as that of earlier held by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Saleem Ahmad and others as discussed supra. Hence, the instant petition having no merit is hereby DISMISSED in limine.

(A.A.K.)          Petition dismissed

Report of Finger Print Bureau clearly mentioned that Nikahnama did not bear the signatures of the respondent.

 2020 CLC 1178

Report of Finger Print Bureau clearly mentioned that Nikahnama did not bear the signatures of the respondent. Respondent in her plaint as well as evidence had categorically denied having entered into nikah with the petitioner and had stated that she was abducted and raped by the petitioner. Petitioner was required to prove the authenticity of the Nikahnama when the same was denied by the respondent. Petitioner himself had appeared in the witness box and had produced his real brother who was also an accused person in the crime. Sole testimony of petitioner's brother was not sufficient especially when the Nikah Registrar and other witnesses were not produced.

Recovery of Dower Amount .

Per Section 10(5) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, in a suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation fails, the Family Court shall immediately pass a decree for dissolution of marriage and in case of dissolution of marriage through khula, may direct the wife to surrender up to fifty percent of her deferred dower or up to twenty-five percent of her admitted prompt dower to the husband.

The house from the petitioner, as mentioned in Nikahnama, is the deferred dower and as per the khula judgment, the respondent is only entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the house (deferred dower). This premise is grounded in Section 10(5) ibid that while obtaining dissolution on the sole basis of khula, the respondent is bound to surrender fifty percent (50%) percent of her share in deferred dower.

C.P.2865/2022
Syed Amir Raza v. Mst. Rohi Mumtaz and others
Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi
05-05-2023








The petitioner (grandfather) was never party to the suit.

There is no cavil that in terms of para 370 of Muhammadan Law by D.F Mulla's, a grandfather in certain circumstances is bound to maintain his grandchildren but obligation of the grandfather to maintain his grandchildren is hedged with certain conditions. In order to understand the matter in issue in better terms, para 370 of Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mulla's. Primarily it is the father who is bound to maintain his children, in case of son(s) until he (they) attain(s) the age of puberty and if there are daughters, till their marriage. In case, the father is poor and incapable of maintaining by his own, the mother would come into picture and if she is in easy circumstances, she would be bound to maintain her children in place of father. The liability of grandfather though starts when the father is poor and infirm and the mother is also not in a position to provide maintenance to her children but such liability of grandfather is dependent upon the fact that he should be in easy circumstances.

After having a glimpse of the survey of law on the subject, I am of the firm view that Family Court can never be helpless to get its decree executed. The process of execution cannot shift towards the grandfather merely on the ground that decree could not be satisfied against the father (judgment debtor). The Family Court cannot assume the role of spectator rather it can adopt the procedure contained in "CPC" for the execution of the decree.

Family
52429/20
Muhammad Siddique Vs Amna Bibi etc
Mr. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf
10-05-2023
2023 LHC 2702










Article 103 speaks about the time period of three years by a muslim for exigible dower (mu’ajjal) “when the dower is demanded and refused or where, during the continuance of the marriage no such demand has been made when the marriage is dissolved by death or divorce.”

 2023 SCMR 1072

Article 103 speaks about the time period of three years by a muslim for exigible dower (mu’ajjal) “when the dower is demanded and refused or where, during the continuance of the marriage no such demand has been made when the marriage is dissolved by death or divorce.” Whereas Article 104 speaks about the time period of three years by a muslim for deferred dower (mu’wajjal) “when the marriage is dissolved by death or divorce.” Admittedly, the property was in the exclusive possession of the respondent and the tenants were also paying Ijjara to her. The respondent never said that she did not receive the dower rather it was her claim that she is enjoying the proceeds/fruit of the land. Therefore, the matter in-fact related to wrong entries in the revenue record and the same in no way can be termed as a matter relating to dower. The learned High Court by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court reported as Abdul Sattar Khan Vs. Rafiq Khan (2000 SCMR 1574) and Articles 120 and 144 of the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order, 1984 has rightly held that the period of six years is to be counted from the date when the right to sue accrued. In these circumstances, neither the suit of the respondent can be termed as barred by time nor she had to approach the learned Family Court for redressal of her grievances. The learned High Court has rightly held that respondent was a Parda Nashin Lady and under no circumstances it can be presumed that she had the knowledge that after the Nikah and the Nikah Nama, the registration as well as the incorporation in the revenue record was mandatory. Under the bona fide belief, in our part of the world, the presumption of completeness of transaction, after the execution of Nikah Nama is there and since the Ijjara was being received by her, as such, she was under bona fide belief that during the lifetime of Noor Muhammad as well as after his death, the transaction is complete and she is the owner of the property in question.”

Hindu personal law --- Maintenance --- Grandfather , responsibility of --- Bait - ul - Mal , propose of who were children of his deceased son --

 PLD 2023 SINDH 214

Hindu personal law --- Maintenance --- Grandfather , responsibility of --- Bait - ul - Mal , propose of who were children of his deceased son --- Petitioner was Jurisdiction --- Petitioner was grandfather of respondents / minors directing petitioner to pay monthly maintenance allowance to aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court necessities of life such as food , clothing , housing , education . the minors --- Validity --- It is the State who has to provide basic . and medical relief for all citizens , irrespective of their sex , caste , creed or race , who are permanently or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of sickness or unemployment or circumstances beyond their control --- State is to protect the family , mother and child and has to promote social and economic well - being of people --- Government of Pakistan beside other departments established Pakistan Bait - ul Mal for providing funds or assistance to destitute and needy widows , orphans , invalid , infirm and such other persons to save them from hardship , suffering and to enable them to lead a comfortable / honorable life in the society --- High Court directed Pakistan Bait - ul - Mal to register respondent minors as regular beneficiaries from Pakistan Bait - ul - Mal and to pay Rupees 10,000 / to each minor on monthly basis without fail continuously till their marriage with increase of 10 % annually , through their mother.

Any suit pointing a finger at any entry of the Nikahnama instituted before and pending trial or filed.....

 2023 SCMR 1002

Any suit pointing a finger at any entry of the Nikahnama instituted before and pending trial or filed subsequent to the amendment of 2015 in Family Courts Act shall be deemed to have been filed as a family suit and to be tried or transferred or deemed to have been transferred to a family court if already being tried by such court.

Causes emanating from different jurisdictions cannot be consolidated in a single proceeding---Civil matter cannot be consolidated with a criminal matter, so also it cannot be consolidated with a Family matter.
Nikahnama---Suit challenging the validity of an entry in the Nikahnama---Such suit was to be tried exclusively by the Family Court.

A. Whether columns No. 13 and 16 of Nikahnama are to be read separately or in conjunction with each other?

 2023 CLC 1021

Ans. There is no cavil that marriage is a civil contract, which has for its object, the procreation and the legalizing of children and dower or “Mehr” is the sum of money or other property which the wife is entitled from the husband in consideration of the marriage. It is anobligation imposed upon a husband as a mark of respect to the wife and where a claim is made under a contract of dower, the Court should, unless it is provided by any legislative enactment, award the entire sum provided in the contract. The dower may be prompt or deferred. Prompt dower is payable immediately on demand. Where part of dower is described as Mu’wajjal i.e. deferred but no time limit is fixed for its payment, the time of such payment is either death or divorce. Dower may be in any form of property, tangible or intangible. Parties to the marriage contract i.e. bride and the bridegroom have freedom of contract to negotiate and settle the terms of marriage including dower. Dower is thus the only corollary for a valid marriage.
We are mindful of the fact that by virtue of entries in the Nikahnama, it is always bridegroom, who is on the receiving end and he has to be burdened with the liabilities under the entries in the Nikahnama. In view of well settled principles of law, such interpretation to the entries of Nikahnama would be given, which favour the bridegroom. Even otherwise, while interpreting the document, one has to infer plenary meaning therefrom and nothing can be imported beyond the contents of the document.
B. Whether entries in Nikahnama can operate against a person not privy to the document/Nikahnama۔?
Ans.It is reiterated that marriage is a civil contract. It establishes a firm bond of love, confidence, affection and mutual trust interse spouses. Allah Almighty, in Holy describes the re Qur’an lationship between the spouses as raiment worn to cover the body and says that “women were your garments and men are their apparel”. The Nikahnama in the Form annexed with the “Rules 1961” contributes to the confusion leading to reco marriage contract in the wrong columns . r ding of terms of the Manifestly, column No.13 for example seeks information in terms of the amount of dower whereas it is settle d law that dower can be in the form of an amount, tangible or intangible property. This Court has been approached by the parties with claim to the effect that movable and immovable properties specified in column No.13 are not enforceable for the said colum n only visualizes dower in terms of an amount. Column No.16 of the Nikahnama Form on the other hand postulates a question regarding property while treating that to be only in lieu of whole or any portion of the property and value thereof agreed between the parties so that it is clearly stated that the property in column No.16 is for how much part of the dower specified in column No.13 of the Nikahnama Form.
Why is there no specific column in the Nikahnama Form regarding movable and/or immovable property in addition to the amount of dower in column No.13?
If no value of the property is agreed between the parties and specified in the entry in column No.16 of a Nikahnama, can such property be treated to be in lieu of dower or any part thereof?
If so, in lieu of how much part of the dower?
How would intentions of the parties in specifying a property in column No.16 of the Nikahnama be construed where the amount of dower specified in column No.13 was promptly paid in entirety at the time of marriage?
These are few of amongst many, , questions arising from the confusion caused by the manner in which Nikahnama Form has been prescribed and/or filled in. We are mindful of the fact that while making entries in the Nikahnama, oftenly in column No.16, some immovable propert y is incorporated, which sometimes owned by the mother or father of the bridegroom. It is oft repeated principle that no one can be deprived of his property without due course of law. If the property mentioned in Nikahnama is not owned by the bridegroom, rather it is ownership of his father, mother or brother, who is neither signatory to the Nikahnama nor had agreed to transfer the same in favour of bride, entries in Nikahnama cannot be enforced against him/her and he/she cannot be deprived of his/her prope rty.
The situation, however, would become different when on behalf of bridegroom, his father, mother or any other person being owner of such property find mentioned in the Nikahnama becomes signatory of the Nikahanam, he/she binds himself/herself to the terms and conditions and as such, he/she parts with the ownership rights of the property in favour of bride.

--Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dowry articles--Decreed--Appeals--modification in judgment--Maintenance allowance was reduce while value of dowry articles was enhanced-

 PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 58
[Multan Bench, Multan]
PresentSohail Nasir, J.
Mst. SAMAR NASEEM & another--Petitioners
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, VEHARI and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 1995 & 933 of 2016, heard on 4.11.2021.

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----Ss. 9 & 10--Limitation of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199--Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance and dowry articles--Decreed--Appeals--modification in judgment--Maintenance allowance was reduce while value of dowry articles was enhanced--Obligations of petitioner--Petitioner alleged a considerable amount in dowry articles, she was under obligations to prove financial status of her, her parents or any of her family members--Neither in her examination in chief nor in statement of her witnesses this fact was established but what Pw-2 stated in cross-examination was that father of petitioner was a labourer having a donkey-cart--In his examination in chief by deviating from written statement contesting respondent maintained that few dowry articles were given by her parents to petitioner--Trial Court made a careful analysis and rightly concluded value of dowry articles whereas appellate Court did not assign any good reason for enhancement of value thereof--Order accordingly.        [Para 14, 15 & 16] A, B & C

M/s. Nadeem Ahmad Tarrar and Mansoor Ahmad Sheikh Advocates for Petitioners.

Rana A.D. Kamran Advocate for Respondent No. 3.

Date of hearing: 4.11.2021.

Judgment

A suit for recovery of maintenance etc. was filed by Mst. Samar Naseem (petitioner) against Sajjad Hussain/Respondent No. 3 (contesting respondent) and 2 others where she maintained that she and contesting respondent entered into marriage on 26.03.2010; in the beginning the behavior of contesting respondent was normal which later on was changed who used to torture her besides abusing; she was deserted by contesting respondent, however reconciliation was made and she again resided with her husband and this time an Iqrarnama dated 03.06.2011 was executed; again she was deserted by contesting respondent and she filed a suit for maintenance but due to compromise she had withdrawn the same; third time she again reconciled and started to reside with contesting respondent and she also resigned from her position of Lady Health Visitor; contesting respondent then levelled allegations of bad character against petitioner and started torturing; six months earlier to filing of suit she was deserted by contesting respondent and since then maintenance was not paid to her; according to petitioner at the time of marriage dowry articles valuing Rs. 7,11,020/- (seven lacs eleven thousand and twenty) was given to her by her parents, which was in possession of contesting respondent. She asked for the decree for maintenance at the rate of
Rs. 5000/-per month for past and future as well as dowry articles.

2. In written statement contesting respondent maintained that he did not execute any Iqrarnama, which was result of fraud; petitioner deliberately avoided to reside with him; his income was only Rs. 3000/4000/- and he was also having liability of aged parents, sisters and brothers. He asked for dismissal of suit.

3. From the pleadings of parties following issues were framed:-

1.       Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover maintenance allowance, if so, at what rate and from what period? OPP

2.       Whether plaintiff is entitled to recover dowry articles valuing of Rs. 7,11,020/-? OPP

3.       Relief.

4. In evidence petitioner got her statement recorded as Pw-1 and she also produced Muhammad Miraj Khalid (Pw-2) and Nisar Ahmad (Pw-3),

5. On the other hand contesting respondent made the statement as Dw-1 and produced Muhammad Parvez as Dw-2.

6. Vide judgment and decree dated 14.04.2015 passed by the learned Judge Family Court Vehari the suit was decreed in the manner that contesting respondent was declared entitled for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 5000/-(five thousand) per month as Well as dowry articles and in alternate its price Rs. 1,00,000/- (one lac).

7. Both sides filed independent appeals, which were decided through consolidated judgment and decree dated 19.12.2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Vehari. The decision of learned trial Court was modified by reducing the maintenance from Rs. 5000/-to Rs. 3000/-for the period of Iddat only whereas the value of dowry articles was enhanced from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 3,50,000/-.

8. Petitioner through writ petition (1995 of 2016) has assailed the decisions of both the Courts below on the ground that the value of dowry articles was wrongly assessed whereas contesting respondent filed writ petition (933 of 2016) and according to his counsel it is to the extent of decree of dowry articles in favour of petitioner. Both these writ petitions therefore are being decided by way of this single judgment.

9. Learned counsel for petitioner maintains that at the time of marriage the dowry articles was given by her parents which she proved in evidence, therefore, the learned trial Court as well learned appellate Court wrongly assessed its value. She further maintained that value which she had mentioned in her plaint, that is the correct position.

10. On the other hand, learned counsel for contesting respondent contends that petitioner was not given any dowry articles so question of its return to her does not arise.

11. HEARD

12. Both the parties are having contest only on the dowry articles. In her plaint, petitioner in paragraph No. 5 stated about the dowry articles of Rs. 7,11,020/-(seven lac eleven thousand and twenty) which was given by her parents at the time of marriage on 26.03.2010. In written statement there was evasive denial by contesting respondent in this regard.

13. It is settled proposition by now that the parents in our society, however, weak in financial position is, do prefer to give dowry articles to their daughters so as to avoid social and domestic threats, therefore, simple denial of contesting respondent in this regard has no value.

14. As petitioner alleged a considerable amount in the dowry articles, therefore, she was under obligations to prove the financial status of her, her parents or any of her family members. Neither in her examination in chief nor in the statement of her witnesses this fact was established but what Muhammad Miraj Khalid (Pw-2) stated in cross-examination was that father of petitioner was a labourer having a donkey-cart. It is also an important fact that it was the second marriage of petitioner with contesting respondent. She was earlier married 10 years ago with one Muhammad Sarwar where she resided about 3/4 years and then she was divorced. She admitted that even against Muhammad Sarwar she had taken back her dowry articles, which were also of Rs. 6,00,000/-.

15. It is important to mention here that in his examination in chief by deviating from written statement contesting respondent maintained that few dowry articles were given by her parents to petitioner.

16. Considering the position of both sides, the; learned trial Court made a careful analysis and rightly concluded the value of dowry articles of Rs. 1,00,000/-(one lac) whereas the learned appellate Court did not assign any good reason for the enhancement of value thereof.

17. Concluding the discussion made above the writ petition No. 1995 of 2016 filed by petitioner is dismissed, whereas writ petition No. 933 of 2016 filed by contesting respondent is partly allowed while reversing the finding of learned appellate Court enhancing the value of dowry articles from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 3,50,000/- and upholding the findings of learned trial Court.

(Y.A.)  Order accordingly

In appropriate cases, learned Family Courts to consider principle of appreciation in value of certain dowry articles: In present case, alternate value of car given in dowry was fixed as Rs.2,285,000/- by the learned Appellate Court below

 In appropriate cases, learned Family Courts to consider principle of appreciation in value of certain dowry articles: In present case, alternate value of car given in dowry was fixed as Rs.2,285,000/- by the learned Appellate Court below that is the amount, which was paid by the father of respondent No.3 when the car was booked in the year 2017, when the marriage of respondent No.3 with the petitioner took place. This Court is of the view that primarily a suit for the return of dowry articles, whenever decided, is decreed by the Courts as such with the observation that in case of failure, on part of the judgment-debtor, to return the said articles, as an alternate, the amount equivalent to the price of dowry articles is ordered to be paid and while determining the alternate value of the dowry articles, the Courts consider the depreciation of most of the dowry articles on account of normal and natural wear and tear thereof that takes place over the passage of time since marriage of the parties. The rationale underlying the application of principle of depreciation is that the dowry articles are to be returned in their current position and if the same is not done, their price is to be paid as an alternate and since most of the value of dowry articles put to use during the subsistence of marriage do undergo depreciation on account of said daily use, therefore, while determining the alternate price, it is justifiable that the depreciation in value of such articles is to be taken into account. However, one cannot lose sight of the fact that there may be some articles forming part of the dowry, for instance, the gold ornaments or the vehicles or even few electrical appliances etc., value whereof may appreciate over the years. The car, in the instant case is such an article. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court below erred in not considering the appreciation in the value of the car while fixing/determining the alternate price thereof inasmuch as this is common knowledge that value of Pak Rupees has depreciated over the number of years and the value of new as well as used vehicles, like the car in instant case, is on continuous rise. Therefore, awarding amount spent on purchase of the car in the year 2017 is not justified and respondent No.3 is held entitled to recover the market value of the car as on date of realization of the decree.

WP Family.57778/22
Muhammad Afzal Vs ADJ etc
Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain
26-04-2023
2023 LHC 2845












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