-𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒇𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒌𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂--

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(𝒂) 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1964)---

----𝑺𝒔. 5, 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 & 10 (4)---𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒅𝒆 (𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1908), 𝑶. 𝑽𝑰𝑰, 𝑹. 11---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏, 𝑨𝒓𝒕. 199---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆---𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂---𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒘𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒌𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂---𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒆---𝑯𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒇𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒌𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂---𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚---𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒏 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒘𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺.10(4) 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964---𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒌𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆---𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒉 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒍𝒂𝒘---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.

𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑵𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒗. 𝑺𝒐𝒉𝒂𝒊𝒍 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 2005 𝑪𝑳𝑪 1472 𝒓𝒆𝒇

(𝒃) 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1964)---

----𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒎𝒃𝒍𝒆---𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒑𝒆---𝑭𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964---𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔/𝑸𝒂𝒅𝒚𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒔.

𝑹𝒊𝒂𝒛 𝑱𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒗. 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒛 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 4 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 2010 𝑪𝑳𝑪 1925 𝒓𝒆𝒍.

(𝒄) 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝑳𝒂𝒘---

----"𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂"---𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈.

𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒒𝒊𝒔 𝑭𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂 𝒗. 𝑵𝒂𝒋𝒂𝒎 𝒖𝒍 𝑰𝒌𝒓𝒂𝒎 𝑸𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒉𝒊 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1959 𝑳𝒂𝒉. 566 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑯𝒐𝒍𝒚 𝑸𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑵𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒍-𝑩𝒖𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒂𝒓𝒊, 5273 𝒓𝒆𝒍.

𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏.

𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒁𝒂𝒉𝒊𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔.

𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 16𝒕𝒉 𝑶𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒓, 2014.

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𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒛𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝑴𝒂𝒛𝒉𝒂𝒓, 𝑱
𝑩𝑨𝑺𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑨𝑻 𝑨𝑯𝑴𝑬𝑫---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓
𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔
𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝑯𝑨𝑴𝑰𝑴 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔---𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.2163 𝒐𝒇 2009, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 29𝒕𝒉 𝑶𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒓, 2014.

𝑱𝑼𝑫𝑮𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻

𝑺𝑯𝑬𝒁𝑨𝑫𝑨 𝑴𝑨𝒁𝑯𝑨𝑹, 𝑱.--𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.2163 𝒐𝒇 2009 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.22312 𝒐𝒇 2010 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒏 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔.

2. 𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 2163 𝒐𝒇 2009 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒂 𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 21.10.2008 𝒂𝒏𝒅 17.12.2008 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑽𝑰𝑰, 𝑹𝒖𝒍𝒆 11, 𝑪.𝑷.𝑪. 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.22312 𝒐𝒇 2010' 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝑪𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 29.9.2010 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅.

3. 𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒏 10.6.2008 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒎 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑩𝒂𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑽𝑰𝑰, 𝑹𝒖𝒍𝒆 11, 𝑪.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 21.10.2008. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑪𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒕 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 17.12.2008. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏.

4. 𝑰𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝑾.𝑷. 2163 𝒐𝒇 2009, 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅. 𝑯𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒎𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑯𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 10 (4) 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 1964 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 29.09.2010 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝑾.𝑷. 22312 𝒐𝒇 2010 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

5. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒚 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑩𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆. 𝑷𝒓𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇.

6. 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆, 𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒔𝒎𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒔, 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒂/𝑸𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒚𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒊𝒏 𝑺𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 1974 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒉𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑸𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒚𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒕 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 1974. 𝑯𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒏𝒐 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒊 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒉𝒊𝒎𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒔 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒊 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂, 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒘𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒘𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒏. 𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒎𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑽𝑰𝑰, 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆 11, 𝑪.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 10(4) 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 1964 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒕 𝒏𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕.

7. 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒗𝒆𝒉𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝑴𝒔𝒕.𝑵𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒗 𝑺𝒐𝒉𝒂𝒊𝒍 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 (2005 𝑪𝑳𝑪 1472) 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒘.

8. 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒈𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒅.

9. 𝑬𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒘𝒐𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔, 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒏- 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒘𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂.

10. 𝑰 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆 𝒂 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆?

11. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑹𝒊𝒂𝒛 𝑱𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒗. 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒛 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 4 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 (2010 𝑪𝑳𝑪 1925) 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕:

"𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒂 1 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑨𝒄𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒔 (𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔) 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝒄𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒘".

𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕 1964 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅.

12. 𝑨𝒅𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂. 𝑰 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕. 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉 𝑵𝒐.5 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆;

𝒂) 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑯𝒂𝒒 𝑴𝒂𝒉𝒆𝒓,

𝒃) 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔,

𝒄) 𝑪𝒓𝒖𝒆𝒍𝒕𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅

𝒅) 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂.

13. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔:

"𝑺𝒐 𝑲𝒆𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 10(4) 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 1964 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂"

14. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂. 𝑰𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆 (𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒆𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔) 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆, 𝒊𝒇 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔. 𝑰𝒏 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝒊𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆. 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒆𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕; 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒈𝒐, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒉𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕.

15. 𝑰𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒊𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒖𝒍𝒈𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒍𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒚 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒂 𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒓. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1959 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 566 (𝑴𝒔𝒕.𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒒𝒊𝒔 𝑭𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂 𝒗. 𝑵𝒂𝒋𝒂𝒎 𝒖𝒍 𝑰𝒌𝒓𝒂𝒎 𝑸𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒉𝒊)

16. 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒖 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 (𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆) 𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒉 𝒃𝒚 𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆.

17. 𝑵𝒐𝒘 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒏 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆/𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔.

18. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒄 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒐𝒍𝒚 𝑸𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒍𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒚 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒔𝒂𝒚𝒔 (𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈):

"𝑨𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒍𝒂𝒘𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒚𝒐𝒖 (𝒎𝒆𝒏) 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌 (𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒚𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒔) 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒚𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝑴𝒂𝒉𝒓 (𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒍-𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆) 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒚𝒐𝒖 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎, 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒌𝒆𝒆𝒑 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒂𝒉 (𝒆.𝒈. 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒏 𝒂 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒓 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔). 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒇 𝒚𝒐𝒖 𝒇𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒌𝒆𝒆𝒑 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒂𝒉, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒔𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎 𝒊𝒇 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒔 𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌 (𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒉𝒓 𝒐𝒓 𝒂 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒕) 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑨𝒍-𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍` (𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆)" [𝒂𝒍-𝑩𝒂𝒒𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒉 2:229]

19. 𝑬𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑺𝒖𝒏𝒏𝒂𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒐𝒍𝒚 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒕 (𝑷𝑩𝑼𝑯) 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑯𝒂𝒛𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝑻𝒉𝒂𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒃𝒏 𝑸𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒊𝒃𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒂𝒔 (𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝒃𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒊𝒎) 𝒄𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒕 (𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒂𝒉 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒎) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅, "𝑶 𝑴𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒂𝒉, 𝑰 𝒅𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒇𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑻𝒉𝒂𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒃𝒏 𝑸𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝑰 𝒅𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒌𝒖𝒇𝒓 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎." 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒕 (𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒂𝒉 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒎) 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓, "𝑾𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒚𝒐𝒖 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒏?" (𝑩𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂 𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑴𝒂𝒉𝒓. 𝑺𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅, "𝒀𝒆𝒔." 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒕 (𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒂𝒉 𝒃𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒎) 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝑻𝒉𝒂𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒕: "𝑻𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌 𝒚𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒏, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒓." (𝑵𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂𝒍-𝑩𝒖𝒌𝒉𝒂𝒂𝒓𝒊, 5273).

20. 𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒚𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝑩𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒌'𝒔 𝑳𝒂𝒘 𝑫𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑶𝒙𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒏 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝑵𝒐𝒏-𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒘𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐 𝒕𝒐 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 10(4) 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 1964 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒏 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒄 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕.

21. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅, 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒏𝒐𝒏-𝒎𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝒘𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒍𝒂 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 29.09.2010 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕/𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒇.

22. 𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝑾.𝑷. 2163 𝒐𝒇 2009 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 1964 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆 1 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑨𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔/𝑸𝒂𝒅𝒚𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒔.

23. 𝑾.𝑷. 22312 𝒐𝒇 2010 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 29.09.2010 𝒊𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆. 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌 𝒕𝒐 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝑪𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒉 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒍𝒂𝒘.

24. 𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝑰 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒍𝒊𝒌𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒓. 𝑲𝒉𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒎 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝑽𝒊𝒓𝒌 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒓. 𝑨𝒅𝒆𝒆𝒍 𝑴𝒂𝒋𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝑸𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒉𝒊 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒄𝒉 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕.

𝒁𝑪/𝑩-31/𝑳 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅.

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M𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒐𝒏, 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆, 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓--

 2011 𝑷 𝑪𝒓. 𝑳 𝑱 1835

𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒅𝒆 (𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1898)---

----𝑺. 491---𝑯𝒂𝒃𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒖𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓/𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒐𝒏, 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆, 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒍𝒚, 𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓, 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 '𝑯𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒕' 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒏 7 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒂 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒊𝒇; 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆, 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒌𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔, 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓; 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓; 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆, 𝒔𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑨𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺.491, 𝑪𝒓.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒎 𝒊𝒏 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅---𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒖 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅---𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑭𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒖 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒍𝒊𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒚 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.

𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑱𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝑼𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒐 𝒗. 𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 𝑼𝒛𝒎𝒂 𝑽𝒂𝒉𝒊𝒅 1988 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1891; 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒗. 𝑺𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝒁𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1997 𝑺𝑪 852; 𝑵𝒂𝒛𝒊𝒉𝒂 𝑮𝒉𝒂𝒛𝒂𝒍𝒊 𝒗. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 2001 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1782; 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒂 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒉𝒎𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑷𝑳𝑫 2004 𝑺𝑪 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑵𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒂 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑨𝒍𝒎𝒂𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐. 127-𝑳 𝒐𝒇 2010 𝒓𝒆𝒍.

𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒂 𝑱𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

𝑪𝒉. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒌𝒃𝒂𝒓, 𝑫.𝑷.-𝑮.

𝑪𝒉. 𝒁𝒖𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒒𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑺𝒊𝒅𝒉𝒖 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2.

𝑹𝒊𝒂𝒛 𝑺.-𝑰.

 2011 𝑷 𝑪𝒓. 𝑳 𝑱 1835
[𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆]
𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒀𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒍𝒊, 𝑱
𝑷𝑨𝑹𝑽𝑬𝑬𝑵 𝑩𝑰𝑩𝑰---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓
𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔
𝑺.𝑯.𝑶. 𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑰𝑪𝑬 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵 𝑺𝑨𝑫𝑨𝑹 𝑴𝑰𝑨𝑵 𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑵𝑵𝑼 𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑻 𝑲𝑯𝑨𝑵𝑬𝑾𝑨𝑳 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓---𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝑵𝒐. 353-𝑯 𝒐𝒇 2011, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 27𝒕𝒉 𝑱𝒖𝒏𝒆, 2011.

𝑶𝑹𝑫𝑬𝑹

𝑴𝑼𝑯𝑨𝑴𝑴𝑨𝑫 𝒀𝑨𝑾𝑨𝑹 𝑨𝑳𝑰, 𝑱.---𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 491, 𝑪𝒓.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2.

2. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 2003 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅𝒓𝒆𝒏 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒛𝒊𝒂 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒃𝒐𝒓𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒏 12-5-2011 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒐𝒐𝒌 𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒖 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒕.

3. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒚 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒓-𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒖 𝒂 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓.

4. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒖. 𝑰𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆.

5. 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 '𝑯𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒕' 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒏 7 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂 𝒇𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒚𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒗. 𝑺𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝒁𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1997 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 852. 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒖 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒍𝒊𝒌𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 491, 𝑪𝒓.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒔𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒍𝒂𝒘. 𝑨 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆. 𝑶𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓. 𝑨 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒂 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒔 '𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒇

(𝒊) 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒌𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒚 𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓.

(𝒊𝒊) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒂 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓.

(𝒊𝒊𝒊) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚.

6. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑱𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝑼𝒎𝒓𝒂𝒐 𝒗. 𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 𝑼𝒛𝒎𝒂 𝑽𝒂𝒉𝒊𝒅 1988 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1891, 𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂𝒓 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒗. 𝑺𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝒁𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1997 𝑺𝑪 852, 𝑵𝒂𝒛𝒊𝒉𝒂 𝑮𝒉𝒂𝒛𝒂𝒍𝒊 𝒗. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 2001 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 1782, 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒂 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒉𝒎𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑷𝑳𝑫 2004 𝑺𝑪 1, 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑵𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒂 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔. 𝑨𝒍𝒎𝒂𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.127-𝑳-2010.

7. 𝑨𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 491, 𝑪𝒓.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒎 𝒊𝒏 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒖 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒈. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒗𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒖 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒐𝒏 12-5-2011 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 14-6-2011. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒌 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒚 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆.

8. 𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.

𝑯.𝑩.𝑻./𝑷-9/𝑳 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.

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-Ss. 7 & 10--“Talaq” & “Dower”--Condition of divorce mentioned in Nikahnama--A husband has an absolute right to divorce his wife and in this regard no condition is described in the Sharia as well as in the codified law

 PLJ 2021 Lahore 485

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VII of 1961)--

----Ss. 7 & 10--“Talaq” & “Dower”--Condition of divorce mentioned in Nikahnama--Suit for recovery of dower to the extent of 5-Tolas gold ornaments of Respondent No. 3 was dismissed and house measuring 05-Marlas was decreed and suit for recovery of Rs.5,00,000/- as per stipulation mentioned in Nikahnama was also decreed--Conditions mentioned in Column No. 16 of Nikahnama--Claim of recovery of Rs.500,000/- by the respondent/plaintiff from the petitioner/defendant on the ground of second marriage--it was mentioned in the Clause 19--Allah Almighty in Holy Qur’an has delegated uncovenanted powers to the husband to pronounce Talaq to his wife in order to avoid any transgression of Islamic bounds--A husband has an absolute right to divorce his wife and in this regard no condition is described in the Sharia as well as in the codified

law--The husband has a right to divorce his wife from his free will and no condition can be imposed in this regard--The judgments of the learned Courts below to the extent of Issue No. 4 suffer from patent illegality and are liable to be set aside--Writ petition is hereby partly accepted.

[Pp. 487, 488 & 490] A, B, C, D, E, F & G

Ayat Nos.227-228 of Surah Al- Baqarah, 01st Ayat of Surah At-Talaq, the Sunnah of Holy Prophet from Hadith No. 235 of Bukhari Sharif, Section 105 Chapter XII of the Code of Muslim Personal Law (written by Dr. Tanzil-ur-Rahman, Ex-Judge of Sindh High Court, Volume 1) the Delegation of right of Divorce (Tafwid at-Talaq)

2008 SCMR 186 ; 2012 CLC 837; 2018 CLC 1844

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VIII of 1961)--

----Ss. 7 & 10--“Talaq” & “Dower”--Condition of divorce mentioned in Nikahnama--A husband has an absolute right to divorce his wife and in this regard no condition is described in the Sharia as well as in the codified law. [P. 490] E

2008 SCMR 186

Malik Javed Akhtar Wains, Advocate for Petitioner.

Jam Ghulam Asghar, Advocate for Respondent No. 3.

Date of hearing: 8.2.2021.

 PLJ 2021 Lahore 485
[Multan Bench, Multan]
Present: Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, J.
MUHAMMAD SAJJAD--Petitioner
versus
ADJ etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 1802 of 2019, heard on 8.2.2021.

Judgment

Through this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the validity of consolidated judgment and decree dated 20.10.2017 only to the extent of dower passed by the learned Judge Family Court, Jalalpur Pirwala and consolidated judgment and decree dated 05.05.2018 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Jalalpur Pirwala who partly accepted the appeal of Respondent No. 3 and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner.

2. Brief facts of the case are that Respondent No. 3/plaintiff contracted marriage with the petitioner/defendant on 07.02.2016. Respondent No. 3 filed three suits for recovery of maintenance allowance and dowry articles valuing Rs.5,52,000/-, dower weighing 05-Tola gold ornaments and 05- Marlas constructed house as well as recovery of Rs.5,00,000/- against the petitioner in which the petitioner appeared and filed contesting written statement as well as also filed suit for restitution of conjugal rights. As many as 9 issues were framed which are as under:--

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of maintenance allowance from the defendant as prayed for, if so, on what grounds? OPP

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of dowry articles as prayed for from the defendant, if so, on what grounds? OPP

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover dower from the defendant as prayed for, if so, on what grounds? OPP

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs.5,00,000/- from the defendant because of defendant’s second marriage without permission of plaintiff? OPP

5. Whether the suits of the plaintiff are false, frivolous, and concocted, the same are liable to be dismissed? OPD

6. Whether the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands and estopped by her words and conduct, if so, on what grounds? OPD

7. Whether the plaintiff has filed suits just to harass and blackmail the defendant, if so, on what grounds? OPD

8. Whether the defendant is entitled to the decree for restitution of conjugal rights as prayed for, if so, on what grounds? OPD

9. Relief.”

Description: AAfter framing of the issues, both parties led their pro and contra oral as well as documentary evidence. The learned Judge Family Court, Jalalpur Pirwala vide consolidated judgment and decree dated 20.10.2017 decreed the suits for recovery of maintenance allowance of Respondent No. 3 declaring her entitled to get maintenance allowance @ Rs.5000/-per month with 10% annual increment from April, 2016 till her legal entitlement. Suit for recovery of dowry article was decreed to the extent of Rs.25,000/- and rest of claim of dowry articles was dismissed. Suit for recovery of dower to the extent of 5-Tolas gold ornaments of Respondent No. 3 was dismissed and house measuring 05-Marlas was decreed and suit for recovery of Rs.5,00,000/- as per stipulation mentioned in Nikahnama was also decreed as prayed for whereas suit of the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights was also decreed subject to payment of dower. Both parties filed appeals respectively and the learned Addl. District Judge, Jalalpur Pirwala partly accepted the appeal of Respondent No. 3 and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner vide consolidated judgment and decree dated 05.05.2018. Hence, this writ petition.

3. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties at some length and gone through the record with their able assistance.

Description: B4. Initial onus of proving the assertion raised in the plaint was placed on the shoulder of the plaintiff/Respondent No. 3. As per Column No. 16 of document of Nikahnama (Exh.P-2) of Mst. Rehana Mai daughter of Haji Muhammad Sadiq it is written as under:-

16۔ پانچ مرلہ پلاٹ محلہ حافظ آباد میں مکان پختہ بنوا کر دونگا۔

The other copy of Nikahnama (Exh.P-3) of the petitioner with Mst. Rehana Mai Column No. 16 whereof also contains stipulation as under:-

16۔ 5 مرلہ مکان بستی ٹھار والی میں مکمل بنوا دیں گے جلال پور پیر والامحلہ حافظ آباد میں مکمل بنوا دونگا۔

But copy of Nikahnama (Exh.P-2) does not contain any cutting or tempering whereas copy of Nikahnama (Exh.P3) of the spouses contain certain cutting and interpolation but in this regard neither objection was raised in the written statement nor objected when it was got exhibited in the evidence by the petitioner whereas both aforementioned documents almost contain the same stipulation regarding Column No. 16 of the Nikahnama. It is also proved on record that house/plot measuring 05-Marlas situated at Hafizabad was settled between the parties. With regard to existence of cutting in Column

No. 16 of Ex.P3 Saeed Ahmad Nikah Khawan/ Registrar (PW-3) has clarified in his statement that in first leaf five marla constructed house situated at Basti Tharwali was mentioned in Nikahnama but later on same was crossed/cancelled and Mohalla Hafizabad City Jalapur Pirwala was mentioned with mutual consent of parties and this part of his statement has not been questioned/shaken in cross-examination which deposition is deemed to be correct/ admitted. As such, the learned courts below rightly passed the impugned judgments & decrees and no illegality has been committed.

Description: C5. As regard the claim of recovery of Rs. 500,000/- by the respondent/plaintiff from the petitioner/defendant on the ground of second marriage is concerned, which controversy is encompassed in Issue No. 4 that:

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 5,00,000/- from the defendant because of defendant’s second marriage without permission of plaintiff? OPP

Description: DThe respondent/plaintiff has contended that at the time of registration of Nikah, it was mentioned in the Clause 19 that in case the petitioner/ defendant divorces the respondent/plaintiff, he will pay an amount of Rs.500,000/-. With regard to imposition of clog on the right of a husband qua pronouncing divorce, Allah Almighty in Holy Qur’an has delegated uncovenanted powers to the husband to pronounce Talaq to his wife in order to avoid any transgression of Islamic bounds. In this regard I seek guidance from Ayat Nos.227-228 of Surah Al- Baqarah, which is as under:

227. But if their intention Is firm for divorce, Allah heareth And knoweth all things.

اور اگر ارادہ کر لیں طلاق کا تو بیشک اللہ ہر بات سننے والا، سب کچھ جاننے والا ہے۔

228. Divorced women Shall wait concerning themselves For three monthly periods. Nor is it lawful for them To hide what Allah Hath created in their wombs, If they have faith In Allah and the Last Day. And their husbands Have the better right To take them back In that period, if They wish for reconciliation. And women shall have rights Similar to the rights Against them, according To what is equitable; But men have a degree (Of advantage) over them. And Allah is Exalted in Power, Wise.

(translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali)

اور طلاق یافتہ عورتیں روکے رکھیں اپنے آپ کو تین حیض تک۔ اور نہیں جائز ہے ان کے لئے یہ کہ چھپائیں وہ اس کو جو کچھ پیدا کیا ہے اللہ نے ان کے رحم میں اگر وہ ایمان رکھتی ہیں اللہ پر اور آخرت کے دن پر۔ اور ان کے خاوند زیادہ حقدار ہیں انہیں لوٹا لینے (اپنی زوجیت میں) اس (مدت) میں اگر وہ چاہیں صلح کرنا۔ اور عورتوں کے بھی حقوق ہیں ویسے ہی جسے ان پر ہیں۔ (مردوں کے) دستور کے مُطابق البتہ مردوں کو عورتوں پر ایک درجہ حاصل ہے۔ اور اللہ غالب ہے بڑی حکمت والا ہے۔

(اردو ترجمہ): مرتبہ: مولانا سید شبیر احمد

Further in 01st Ayat of Surah At-Talaq, Allah Almighty says as under:-

O Prophet! when ye Do divorce women, Divorce them at their Prescribed periods, And count (accurately) Their prescribed periods : And fear Allah Your Lord: And turn them not out Of their houses, nor shall They (themselves) leave, Except in case they are Guilty of some open lewdness. Those are limits Set by Allah : and any Who trans gresses the limits Of Allah, does verily Wrong his (own soul: Thou knowest not if Perchance Allah will Bring about thereafter Some new situation. (translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali)

اے نبی! جب طلاق دو تم عورتوں کو تو طلاق دو تم انہیں اس طرح کہ وہ عدت شروع کر سکیں اور ٹھیک ٹھیک شمار کرو عدت (کے زمانہ) کا۔ اور ڈرو اللہ سے جو تمہارا رب ہے۔ اور نہ نکالو تم انہیں ان کے گھروں سے اور نہ وہ خود نکالیں الایہ کہ ارتکاب کریں وہ کسی کھلی بد کاری کا۔ اور یہ اللہ کی (مقرر کردہ) حدیں ہیں۔ اور جو تجاوز کرے گا اللہ کی مقرر کردہ حدود سے تو درحقیقت وہ ظلم کرے گا اپنی ہی جان پر۔ نہیں جانتے تم شاید کہ اللہ پیدا کردے اس کے بعد بھی (موافقت کی) کوئی صورت۔

(اردو ترجمہ) مرتبہ: مولانا سید شبیر احمد

Further guidance in this regard can be taken from the Sunnah of Holy Prophet from Hadith No. 235 of Bukhari Sharif, which reads as under:-

اسماعیل بن عبداللہ، مالک، نافع، عبداللہ بن عمر سے روایت کرتے ہیں کہ انہوں نے اپنی بیوی کو رسول اللہ صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کے عہد میں بحالت حیض طلاق دیدی حضرت عمر رضی اللہ تعالیٰ عنہ نے نبی ﷺ سے اس کے متعلق پوچھا، تو آپ نے فرمایا کہ اس کو رجوع کرنے کا حکم دو پھر وہ اسکو روکے رکھے، یہاں تک کہ پاک ہو جائے پھر حیض آئے پھر پاک ہو جائے پھر اگر چاہے تو صحبت کرنے سے پہلے طلاق دے یہی وہ عدت ہے جس کے لئے عورتوں کو طلاق دیئے جانے کا حکم اللہ تعالیٰ نے دیا ہے۔

Section 105 Chapter XII of the Code of Muslim Personal Law (written by Dr. Tanzil-ur-Rahman, Ex-Judge of Sindh High Court, Volume 1) the Delegation of right of Divorce (Tafwid at-Talaq) is described which is reproduced as under:

Delegation of the right of divorce: It is lawful for the husband to delegate to the wife the right of effecting divorce. In that event, however, his own right of effecting divorce shall not lapse.

Even otherwise, Section 7 (1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 deals with Talaq, which is reproduced as under:

“S. 7 ‘Talaq’. (1) Any man who wishes to divorce his wife shall, as soon as may be after the pronouncement of talaq in any form whatsoever, give the Chairman notice in writing of his having done so, and shall supply a copy thereof to the wife.”

Description: GDescription: FDescription: E5. From the perusal of afore-mentioned glorious references of Holy Quran and Sunnah as well as provisions of Section 105 of the Code of Muslim Personal Law written by Dr. Tanzeel-ur-Rehman and Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, a husband has an absolute right to divorce his wife and in this regard no condition is described in the Sharia as well as in the codified law. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported as Muhammad Bashir Ali Siddiqui Vs Mst. Sarwar Jahan Begum and another (2008 SCMR 186) has also declared that the condition/restriction on the right of a husband to divorce his wife, is illegal. The condition if any imposed in the Nikahnama for the award of damages on account of alleged unjustified divorce is against the basic principle of Islamic Law. The husband has a right to divorce his wife from his free will and no condition can be imposed in this regard. Reliance can also be placed on the cases titled as Mst. Zeenat Bibi Vs Muhammad Hayat and 2 others (2012 CLC 837) and Muhammad Asif Vs Mst. Nazia Riasat and 2 others (2018 CLC 1844). As such, the judgments of the learned Courts below to the extent of Issue No. 4 suffer from patent illegality and are liable to be set aside. Therefore, the findings of the learned Courts below on Issue No. 4 are hereby reversed and this issue is decided against the respondent/plaintiff.

6. In view of above, this writ petition is hereby partly accepted only to the extent of findings of the learned Courts below to the extent of Issue No. 4 whereas to the extent rest of the findings, the same is dismissed.

(K.Q.B.) Petition accepted

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-𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓--

 𝑷 𝑳 𝑫 2011 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 334

𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1964)---

----𝑺𝒔. 2(1)(𝒃) & 5---𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑰𝑿 𝒐𝒇 1952), 𝑺𝒔.65(1)(𝒉) & 171---𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒅𝒆 (𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1898), 𝑺.488---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏, 𝑨𝒓𝒕.199---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕---𝑬𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆---𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍---𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚, 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒉𝒊𝒎---𝑷𝒍𝒆𝒂 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺.171 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1952, 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆---𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒛𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆---𝑺𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕---𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔, 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺.488, 𝑪𝒓.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺.65 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1952, 𝒊𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓---𝑬𝒙𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒆𝒕𝒄. 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺.171 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒏𝒂 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1952, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕---𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.

𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑭𝒂𝒛𝒊𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

𝑨𝒕𝒆𝒆𝒒-𝒖𝒓-𝑹𝒆𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝑲𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒊, 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍.

 𝑷 𝑳 𝑫 2011 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 334

𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑰𝒋𝒂𝒛 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅, 𝑱

𝑵𝑨𝑱𝑬𝑬𝑩 𝑨𝑯𝑴𝑨𝑫 𝑨𝑩𝑩𝑨𝑺𝑰---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓

𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔

𝑴.𝑨.𝑮. 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔---𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔

𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.4957 𝒐𝒇 2010, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 31𝒔𝒕 𝑱𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒚, 2011.

𝑶𝑹𝑫𝑬𝑹

𝑰𝑱𝑨𝒁 𝑨𝑯𝑴𝑨𝑫, 𝑱.---𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅.

2. 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 13-10-2009 𝒂𝒏𝒅 3-11-2010, 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕/𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆-𝑰𝑰 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆-𝑰𝑰𝑰, 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒚. 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 50% 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒄 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅; 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓, 50% 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆.

3. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 171 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1952; 𝒑𝒂𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓, 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒉𝒊𝒎. 𝑯𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒃 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒇𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒔𝒐, 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒏.

4. 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅, 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍, 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆-𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏; 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒚𝒆𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒏𝒅, 𝒕𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍 𝒔𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕; 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 171 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1952, 𝒊𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒛𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚, 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964, 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒊𝒎.

5. 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅. 𝑰𝒏 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔, 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 2(1)(𝒃) 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔:--

"𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕" 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒂 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕."

𝑻𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 3 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆, 1962. 𝑩𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕, 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉 𝑵𝒐.1(𝒉) 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 65 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1952, 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒎 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒂 𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 (𝑭𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕) 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒉𝒊𝒎 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒂𝒚 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅, 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒆, 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒂𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔. 𝑭𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓, 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 488 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒓.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒊𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒕𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇, 𝒂 𝑴𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒚, 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒏𝒆𝒈𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍, 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒂 𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅. 𝑨𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒔𝒆𝒊𝒛𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝒄𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒔𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆. 𝑰𝒏 𝒎𝒚 𝒉𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘, 𝒊𝒕 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 488 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒓.𝑷.𝑪. 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 65 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1952 𝒎𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒕 𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒓.

6. 𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆, 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒆𝒕𝒄. 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 171 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕 𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.

𝑴.𝑯./𝑵-12/𝑳 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.

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 𝑷 𝑳 𝑫 2015 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 401

𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑾𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑽𝑰𝑰𝑰 𝒐𝒇 1890) ---

----𝑺. 25---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏, 𝑨𝒓𝒕. 199---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑪𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑾𝒆𝒍𝒇𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆---𝑴𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚---𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘---𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 12 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆---𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 5 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍---𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑪𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅𝒓𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆---𝑾𝒆𝒍𝒇𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒖𝒑 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕'𝒔-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕'𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.

𝑨𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑪𝒉. 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒋𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔. 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓.

𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒓𝒊𝒇 𝑨𝒘𝒂𝒏, 𝑨.𝑨.𝑮.

𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 12𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒖𝒈𝒖𝒔𝒕, 2014.

 𝑷 𝑳 𝑫 2015 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 401
𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒓, 𝑱
𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝑨𝑼𝒁𝑰𝑨 𝑰𝑸𝑩𝑨𝑳---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓
𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔
𝑭𝑨𝑹𝑯𝑨𝑻 𝑱𝑨𝑯𝑨𝑵 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔---𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.15 𝒐𝒇 2014, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 12𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒖𝒈𝒖𝒔𝒕, 2014.

𝑶𝑹𝑫𝑬𝑹

𝑺𝑯𝑨𝑯 𝑲𝑯𝑨𝑾𝑨𝑹, 𝑱.---𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒍. 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒍. 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 4-11-2013 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1.

2. 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑱𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒓. 𝑺𝒊𝒌𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 5 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒛𝒊𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕 (𝑷𝒉𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊) 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒓𝒅 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒖𝒑-𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅-𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 5 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑨𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉, 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑱𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓-𝒊𝒏-𝒍𝒂𝒘.

3. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒕 12 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

4. 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑱𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 25 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑾𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1890 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑭𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈/𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝒉𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓.

5. 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 7 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 17 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑾𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1890 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍. 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 8-5-2013 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 7 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 17 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑾𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1890 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 25 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑱𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 30 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓. 𝑨𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 14 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 4-11-2013 𝒖𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏.

6. 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒈𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔.

7. 𝑶𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 7-8-2014 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2, 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒚. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒕 1-1/2 𝒅𝒂𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎. 𝑻𝒐𝒅𝒂𝒚 𝒊.𝒆. 12-8-2014 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒕 12 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆, 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑺𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒆𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒛𝒊𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑷𝒉𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒖𝒑 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒆𝒕𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑷𝒉𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

8. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒔. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 5 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅. 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒊𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2. 𝑰𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒍 2011 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑨𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒏 29-10-2011 𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑬𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆, 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1. 𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 (𝑵𝒖𝒔𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒏) 𝒗. 𝒁𝒖𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒒𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 𝑲𝒂𝒛𝒎𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 [(1995 𝑪𝑳𝑪 306 (𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆)].

9. 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒌𝒆𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒓 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉.

10. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒆𝒆𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔. 𝑺𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒕 1-1/2 𝒅𝒂𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑺𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2, 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑷𝒉𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒇𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔:--

(𝒊) 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒖𝒑 𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓.

(𝒊𝒊) 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒚 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒓, 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔.

(𝒊𝒊𝒊) 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒌-𝒆𝒏𝒅, 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒏𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔.

(𝒊𝒗) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓.

𝑨𝑮/𝑭-27/𝑳 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅.

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