-𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆---𝑴𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚--

 2006 𝑪 𝑳 𝑪 1393

(𝒂) 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1964)---

----𝑺. 5 & 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅.---𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆---𝑴𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑱𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕-𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑨𝒏𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕-𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕---𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕.

𝑺𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝒆𝒉𝒅𝒊 𝑯𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1962 𝑺𝑪 291 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒌 𝒗. 𝑹𝒂𝒊 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1983 𝑲𝒂𝒓. 382 𝒓𝒆𝒇.

𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒔𝒂𝒅 𝑼𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒌𝒉 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒖𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒏 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1978 𝑳𝒂𝒉. 711; 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒛𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑵𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒛 𝑺𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1975 𝑳𝒂𝒉. 739 𝒓𝒆𝒍.

(𝒃) 𝑾𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑽 𝒐𝒇 1964)---

----𝑺. 5 & 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅.---𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒍 𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒔 (𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑿𝑳𝑰𝑰𝑰 𝒐𝒇 1976), 𝑺.3---𝑺𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑺.3 𝒐𝒇 𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒍 𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕 (𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1976---𝑴𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒍 𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒔 (𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1976 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏---𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒂𝒓 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕.

𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑻𝒂𝒛𝒆𝒆𝒍 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒊𝒓-𝒖𝒏-𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂 1995 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 885 𝒓𝒆𝒍.

(𝒄) 𝑸𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒏-𝒆-𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒅𝒂𝒕 (10 𝒐𝒇 1984)---

----𝑨𝒓𝒕. 133---𝑪𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒐𝒚𝒄𝒐𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍---𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆---𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑺𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔---𝑫𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒇.

𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑮𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒊 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒌 𝑨𝒛𝒂𝒎 𝑹𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒐𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕.

𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 7𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒍, 2006.

 2006 𝑪 𝑳 𝑪 1393

[𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆]

𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒌𝒉 𝑨𝒛𝒎𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒂𝒆𝒆𝒅, 𝑱

𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑰𝑴 𝑺𝑯𝑨𝑹𝑰𝑭----𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓

𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔.

𝑰𝑴𝑻𝑰𝑨𝒁 𝑨𝑳𝑰 𝑲𝑯𝑨𝑵 𝒂𝒏𝒅 3 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔----𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔

𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.12592 𝒐𝒇 2002, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 2𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒂𝒚, 2006.

𝑱𝑼𝑫𝑮𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻

𝑺𝑯𝑬𝑰𝑲𝑯 𝑨𝒁𝑴𝑨𝑻 𝑺𝑨𝑬𝑬𝑫, 𝑱.--- 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 25-4-2002 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 23-7-2001 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.

2. 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅. 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒏 5-10-1992 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒇, 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝑴𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒇, 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑨𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆, 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓. 𝑶𝒏 6-8-1997, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅. 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔. 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒊𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒐𝒏. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2. 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒈𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑰𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒂 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔, 𝒂𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆, 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒐𝒚𝒄𝒐𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔, 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑵𝒐 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 23-7-2001, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕, 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2. 𝑨𝒈𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 14 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆, 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 25-4-2002.

3. 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒂𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅.

4. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕, 𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒔𝒎𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒂 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒂 𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 3 𝒂𝒏𝒅 9 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒍 𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒔 (𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔) 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1976, 𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂 𝒇𝒖𝒍𝒍 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈. 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒊𝒔 𝒚𝒆𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘. 𝑰𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓-𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 7-6-2002 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.779 𝒐𝒇 2000 𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆. 𝑰𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑺𝒚𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝒆𝒉𝒅𝒊 𝑯𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1962 𝑺𝑪 291 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒍𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒌 𝒗. 𝑹𝒂𝒊 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒅𝒂 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1983 𝑲𝒂𝒓. 382.

5. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒍 𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒔 (𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔) 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1976 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒂𝒓 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕. 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒇𝒖𝒍𝒍 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍 𝒐𝒇, 𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔. 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔, 𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒓, 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒔. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅. 𝑰𝒏 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒔𝒂𝒅 𝑼𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒗. 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒌𝒉 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒖𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒏 '𝑷𝑳𝑫 1978 𝑳𝒂𝒉. 711; 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒛𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑵𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒛 𝑺𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1975 𝑳𝒂𝒉. 739 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑻𝒂𝒛𝒆𝒆𝒍 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒊𝒓-𝒖𝒏-𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂 1995 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 885.

6. 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2. 𝑨 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 5 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒔 𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒔:--

"5. 𝑱𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏.--- 𝑺𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑴𝒖𝒔𝒍𝒊𝒎 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑳𝒂𝒘𝒔 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆, 1961 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑶𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆, 161, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏, 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆." "𝑬𝒎𝒑𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅."

7. 𝑨𝒏 𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕-𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔, 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 5 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒅) 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑵𝒐.8. 𝑺𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 5 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒖𝒑 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒇, 𝒊𝒕 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒛𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑨𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝒗. 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑵𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒛 𝑺𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1975 𝑳𝒂𝒉. 739 𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓:

"... 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒍'𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕-𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒊𝒕." 𝑬𝒎𝒑𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅.

8. 𝑺𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒔𝒂𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒉 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒗. 𝑺𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒌𝒉 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒖𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒏 𝑷𝑳𝑫 1978 𝑳𝒂𝒉. 711 𝒂𝒕 714 𝒊𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓:-

"(9) 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕-𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒂𝒕𝒔𝒐𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒆.𝒈., 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓, 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒂 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑰𝒇 𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕-𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒏𝒆, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑨𝒌𝒉𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝑺𝒂𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒂 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒐 𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒖𝒎 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒖𝒎 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓." 𝑬𝒎𝒑𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅.

9. 𝑰𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆, 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕-𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑨𝒏𝒚 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕-𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒍𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒂 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒇 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒔 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑵𝒐.8, 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚, 𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒖𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒆𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒇𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2.

10. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑫𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒍 𝑮𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒔 (𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔) 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1976 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒖𝒏𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒗𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒆𝒙 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑻𝒂𝒛𝒆𝒆𝒍 𝒗. 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒊𝒓-𝒖𝒏-𝑵𝒊𝒔𝒂 1995 𝑺𝑪𝑴𝑹 885 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒊𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 .𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝑨𝒄𝒕 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒖𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒂𝒓 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔

11. 𝑨𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.𝒍 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2, 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒂𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆, 𝒏𝒐 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅, 𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒏𝒐 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏. 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 7-6-2002, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔:

"𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒋𝒆𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒓𝒚, 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.3 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒚 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅. 𝑯𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒆𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒓𝒚 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒘𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒔. 𝑯𝒆 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.3 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒆𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒓𝒚. 𝑰𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒂 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒊𝒇 𝒂𝒏 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒆𝒙𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓."

12. 𝑰𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒒𝒖𝒂 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅.

13. 𝑰𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒇𝒖𝒍𝒍 𝒐𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 .𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓, 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒔𝒂𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒐𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒐𝒚𝒄𝒐𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔, 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒐𝒇. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔-𝒆𝒙𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝒎𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔. 𝑰𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒕, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.

𝑺.𝑨.𝑲./𝑵-48/𝑳??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅.

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DIVORCE (طلاق) CASE LAWS

Zubaida Khatoon V/S Administrator Union Council Uch Gillani (Lah.)

1996 MLD 1689.

S.7. Talaq pronounced by husband to wife thrice …. Right of revocation by husband……. Legality …. Withdrawal of notice of talaq by husband from Administrator, Union Council…. Validity …. Talaq pronounced by husband to wife thrice would become “Bain” and husband would have no right of its revocation as per injunctions laid down in Holy Quran and Sunnah, relating to divorce and its revocation and to that extent provisions of S.7 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, would give its way to those injunctions as enshrined in the constitution.

1998 MLD 486. Mst. Rehmat Ara V/S Mehmoodul Hassan & another (Lah.)

S.7. Husband asserted that period of “Iddat” of 90 days must be counted from date of issuance of notice to Arbitration Council and not from the date of pronouncement of Talaq. Commencement of period “Iddat”… Talaq was validly given by husband on 9-6-1996 when the same was pronounced and period of “Iddat” of three months had expired on 9-9-1996 and talaq became final on said date. Withdrawal of talaq by husband on 21-10-1996 (after it had become final) was inconsequential and ineffective.

1998 MLD 85. Farah Khan V/S Tahir Hamid Khan & another (Lah.)

Marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized in accordance with provisions of Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 in Pakistan. Respondent divorced petitioner which was endorsed by Arbitration Council. Validity. Originally both petitioner and respondent were Pakistani citizens and after three years of marriage only respondent had acquired citizenship of USA. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, would extend to whole of Pakistan and applied to all muslim citizens of Pakistan wherever they might be in terms of S.(2) of the Ordinance. Provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, could be invoked where one of the party to marriage was Muslim citizen of Pakistan. Even if it was presumed that Arbitration council had no jurisdiction to entertain notice of talaq given by respondent under provisions of S.7 Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, right of talaq vested in husband under Sharia had not been taken away from any Muslim, irrespective of the country to which he belonged. Despite restrictions contained in Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, husband’s right of talaq would prevail as given to him under Quranic injunctions. Divorce pronounced by respondent had, thus, taken effect under Islamic injunctions even if notice to Arbitration council intimating such talaq or subsequent proceedings taken in that regard and certificate issued by Arbitration council endorsing effectiveness of talaq, were ignored. Constitutional petition also suffered from laches which would not warrant interference by High court at such belated stage when talaq under Sharia had already become effective.

NLR 2002 SD 161. Mst. Ambreen Shah V/S Chairman Union Council etc. (Lahore)

Pronouncement of triple talaq by husband. According to verse 230 of Surah Baqra of the Holy Quran, talaq becomes irrevocable. Husband cannot subsequently revoke such talaq.

PLD 2003 Peshawar 169.Fazli-e-Subhan V/S Sabereen & 3 Others (DB)

S.7 & 8. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 had abolished the practice of disapproved form of :Talaq" and mode prescribed in the ordinance was that of a "Talaq-e-Ahsan" and by the ordinance it had been made mandatory that the notice of "Talaq" would be effected only if efforts of reconciliation would fail. Law prevailing previous to the enforcement of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 had made it obligatory for the couples divorced by any mode of "Talaq" other than "Talaq-e-Ahsan" not to re-marry each other again, unless wife married another man who died or divorced her after actual consummation and she married her first husband after period of "Iddat". Before re-marriage parties had to prove that bar to their marriage was removed by intermediate marriage, consummation and dissolution, otherwise their marriage was not considered valid. Mode of "Talaq" effected under provisions of the 1961 Ordinance being almost that of "Talaq-e-Ahsan, the couples could re-marry without any intervening marriage except where they had been divorced thrice and the third divorce had become effective and in that case they could not re-marry without an intervening marriage. Plain reading of S.7 of the 1961 Ordinance, though had implied that all kinds of "Talaq" had been made revocable without an intervening marriage and could be that its repugnancy to such extent could validly be agitated on the touchstone of Quranic behest and the traditions of Holy Prophet (p.b..u.h.) but neither vires of said S.7 had been challenged nor matter raised in case pertained to all kinds of "Talaqs"-- Matter, in the present case, pertained to "Talaq" obtained by wife through Court decree in shape of Khula".

NLR 2004 SD 190. Shoukat Ali & another V/S The State (FSC).

S.10 Zina Ord. S.7(I) Muslim F.L.Ord.1961, Talaq pronounced by husband in accordance with requirements of Shariah without following the procedure laid down in S.7 would be valid pronouncement of Talaq. Failure to follow procedure laid down in S.7 may entail punishment but would not invalidate Talaq which is conscious and willful pronouncement of Talaq with intention to release wife from marriage bond. CONVICTION SET-ASIDE.

PLD 2004 Lahore 77.Mst. Nazir Fatima Nazim Union Council

S.5 & Schedule Family Courts Act 1964. One of the conditions of the marriage between parties was that husband had delegated the right do divorce wife and try to that effect was made in column No.18 of Nikahnama. Wife in exercise of said right pronounced divorce upon herslef for her husband and a notice was sent to Nazim Union Council concerned. Nazim had intimated wife that husband being not ready to pronounce divorce, wife could approach the court as he could not grant Khula and Nazim sent the case to the Family Court. Nazim was oblivious of legal position as right of divorce could be lawfully delegated by husband to wife and that had happened in the present case and notice was sent by wife in compliance with the terms of S. 7 & 8 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Ninety days prescribed period having expired after receipt of notice issued by wife and reconciliation being not possible between the parties, law as prescribed in S.7(3) & 8 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 would have in course. Nazim would issue requisite document regarding receipt of notice and failure of reconciliation within prescribed time.

PLD 2004 Lahore 316. Mian Arif Mehmood V/S Mst. Tanvir Fatima & another

S.7(3) & (5) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. Divorce pronounced by the husband upon the wife having not been revoked, had become effective after the expiry of ninety days from the date of receipt of notice by the Nazim/Chairman Arbitration Council in view of S.7(3). PETITION PARTLY ALLOWED.

PLJ 2008 Sh.C.(AJK) 55. Bilal Hamza Abbasi V/S Wazir Muhammad & another

Specific mode for dissolution of marriage --- Divorce pronounced on telephonic call. Islam does not prescribe any specific mode for dissolution of marriage. It is an overt act on the part of husband which could indicate a clear intention to annul the marriage to operate as a divorce. No particular form of words is prescribed for affecting a talaq. If the words of Talaq are clear express and very well understood as implying divorce, no proof of intention is required. It is also not necessary that divorce should be pronounced in the presence of wife or even addressed to her. Witness for the respondent told him that appellant tried to hand over the divorce deed to him but he refused to receive the same. Held: Appellant had pronounced talaq through telephonic call by producing cogent, sufficient and reliable evidence. No any non-reading or misreading of the evidence on the part of Family Court. APPEAL DISMISSED.

2009 MLD 1478. Ambreen Afshan V/S Mrs. Idrees Qazu (Lahore)

S.7 Muslim Family Laws Ord. 1961. Divorce--Effectiveness---Husband administered the divorce and notified the same to Chairman of Arbitration/Union Council whereupon certain proceedings were taken and ultimately a certificate for the effectiveness of divorce was issued through the impugned order. Wife was well aware of the fact that husband had pronounced divorce to her for which consequential proceedings before the Arbitration/Union Council had also been taken. Father of the wife had been pursuing the matter before Arbitration Council. Case of the wife who had challenged effectiveness of the divorce was that the submission of divorce deed with a notice before the Arbitration Council could not ipso facto, operate and result into the dissolution of marriage. In the present case it could not be disputed that the period much beyond 90 days had expired from the date of notice of the divorce when impugned certificate of its effectiveness was issued, in the circumstances, especially keeping in view all the relevant facts of service of notice on the Chairman Union Council, the initiation of the proceedings by the Arbitration Council, the repeated appearance of father of the wife who was holding a power of attorney on her behalf in those proceedings and actual knowledge of the wife about the pendency and fact of those proceedings, divorce and its pronouncement had become effective. Failure to send a notice to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council would not render the divorce in-effective in Shariah. Effect of pronouncement of divorce in Shariah would not justify interference with impugned order nor would warrant exercise of discretion in favor of the petitioner/wife under Art.199 of the Constitution.

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گارڈین اور وارڈز ایکٹ کے تحت نابالغوں کی جائیداد بیچنے کی اجازت کے لیے درخواست

(For Urdu Scroll down) 

PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO SELL MINOR'S PROPERTY UNDER THE GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT

In the Court of the District Judge ...............at.......................

In the matter of the Guardians and Wards Act VIII of 1890 And In the matter of s. 29 of the said Act And In the matter of AB, a minor resident at.................. And In the matter of permission to sell the said minor's property. The humble petition of A, the certified guardian of the said minor . The applicant above-named states as follows:

1. That by an order made the ............ day of......... your petitioner was selected guardian of the person and properties of the minor A, which order is still enforceable and petitioner is governing the property of the said minor as his mandatory guardian. petitioner has kept proper account of said property up to date and presented the same in court from by which it is clear that funds in the hands of petitioner is Rs......................... only.

2. That at the time of appointment the property of minor which having of inter alia one-fourth share in premises No....... was indebted to one B of No. ............ to the tune of Rs. ......... being, his divided share of liability under a mortgage dated ............ executed by the father of minor which now comes to Rs............. including interest calculated up till.......

3. That the said B who filed a suit bearing Title Suit No. ......... of ......... in the court of ......... for enforcing said mortgage and got the preliminary decree for Rs............. on the ......... day of......... is now threatening in applying for final decree for vending of property.

4. That in above stated circumstances and in the best interest /benefit of the said minor, petitioner and other co-sharers of said minor, liable paying three-fourths share of the said debt, have consented to sell the property for Rs. ..................... privately, leaving a margin Rs. ......... with them after paying the mortgage debt out of which a sum of Rs. ............ will come in the hands of petitioner being the proportionate share of the said minor in the surplus sale proceeds. An affidavit by the purchaser of intending property Rs. ......... is filed herewith.

5. That residential house of said minor, i.e., premises No.......... is in immediate repairs without repair the same will be unfit for habitation and until certain urgent repairs are immediate carried on a portion also fall very soon. The likely costs of such repairs are Rs. ......... as will appear from certificate of the engineer hereunto unclosed and marked Z. The minor having no money to execute the said repairs presently as appearing from the account filed as stated above.

6. That the market value of the property desired to be sold would be Rs.......... as given in the valuation certificate annexed and marked B, and the same at present gives no income.

7. That this application is made bona fide with interest of and benefit of minor. Petitioner hence prays:

Leave be granted to your petitioner to sell the undivided one-fourth share of the minor in the property described in Schedule A to .........or any other person or persons at a price not less than Rs............. and to execute and register the compulsory conveyance.

Your petitioner be at liberty to redeem the proportionate mortgage debt of the minor relating the said premises out of the proceeds of such sale and apply the balance towards the costs of repairs to the residential house of the said minor.

Further order or orders be made and directions given, as may appear just and proper and your petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray. THE SCHEDULE Verification I, AB, son of......... aged about ............ years residing at ......... by occupation service do hereby solemnly affirm and say as follows:

I am the petitioner above-named. I know and I have made myself acquainted with the facts and circumstances of this case and I am able to depose thereto. The statements in paragraphs 1 to 7 and the Schedule hereinabove of the petition are true to my best knowledge based on information derived from records in my possession, proceedings before this Learned Court. Orders and Valuation Report and believed by me to be true and that I have not suppressed any material fact. The statements hereinabove are true to my best knowledge.

I sign this verification on this ............ day of............ 1999. Signature …… Signature of Advocate Before me Notary

Note. There shall be two affidavits from two independent persons as to what is the estimated value of the property and advantage/benefit of desired sale.

گارڈین اور وارڈز ایکٹ کے تحت نابالغوں کی جائیداد بیچنے کی اجازت کے لیے درخواست

ڈسٹرکٹ جج کی عدالت میں ..................... پر .......................

1890 کے گارڈینز اور وارڈز ایکٹ VIII کے معاملے میں اور s کے معاملے میں۔ مذکورہ ایکٹ کے 29 اور اے بی کے معاملے میں ، ایک نابالغ رہائشی .................. اور مذکورہ نابالغ کی جائیداد فروخت کرنے کی اجازت کے معاملے میں۔ اے کی عاجزانہ درخواست ، مذکورہ نابالغ کے مصدقہ سرپرست۔ مندرجہ بالا نامزد درخواست گزار مندرجہ ذیل ہیں:

1. کہ ایک حکم کے ذریعے ............ کا دن ......... آپ کا درخواست گزار نابالغ A کی شخصیت اور جائیداد کا سرپرست منتخب کیا گیا ، جو حکم ابھی باقی ہے قابل اطلاق اور درخواست گزار مذکورہ نابالغ کی جائیداد کو اپنے لازمی سرپرست کے طور پر چلا رہا ہے۔ درخواست گزار نے مذکورہ جائیداد کا مناسب حساب رکھا ہے اور اسے عدالت میں پیش کیا ہے جس سے یہ واضح ہے کہ درخواست گزار کے ہاتھ میں فنڈز .................. ہیں۔ ....... صرف.

2۔ کہ تقرری کے وقت نابالغ کی جائیداد جس کا احاطہ نمبر میں ایک دوسرے کے ساتھ ایک چوتھائی حصہ ہے ....... نمبر کے ایک بی کا مقروض تھا ........... روپے کے لیے ......... ہونے کے ناطے ، رہن کے تحت اس کی ذمہ داری کا تقسیم شدہ حصہ ............ نابالغ کے والد نے پھانسی دی جو اب روپے میں آتی ہے ....... ...... بشمول سود کا حساب لگایا گیا .......

3۔ کہ وہ بی جس نے ٹائٹل سوٹ نمبر ......... کا ......... عدالت میں .......... نافذ کرنے کے لیے مقدمہ دائر کیا۔ رہن اور ابتدائی حکم نامہ ............. کے لیے ......... کے ......... دن پر ملا اب فائنل کے لیے درخواست دینے کی دھمکی دے رہا ہے۔ جائیداد کی فروخت کا حکم

4. کہ مذکورہ بالا حالات میں اور مذکورہ نابالغ کے بہترین مفاد /فائدے میں ، درخواست گزار اور مذکورہ نابالغ کے دیگر شریک شراکت دار ، مذکورہ قرض کا تین چوتھائی حصہ ادا کرتے ہوئے ، روپے میں جائیداد فروخت کرنے پر رضامند ہو گئے ہیں۔ ..................... نجی طور پر ، ایک مارجن روپے چھوڑ کر ......... رہن کا قرض ادا کرنے کے بعد ان کے ساتھ جن میں سے ایک لاکھ روپے ............ درخواست گزار کے ہاتھ میں آئے گی جو کہ زائد فروخت کی آمدنی میں مذکورہ نابالغ کا متناسب حصہ ہے۔ جائیداد کے ارادہ کے خریدار کا حلف نامہ ......... اس کے ساتھ دائر ہے۔

5. مذکورہ نابالغ کا رہائشی مکان ، یعنی احاطہ نمبر .......... بغیر مرمت کے فوری مرمت میں ہے ، یہ رہائش کے لیے نااہل ہوگا اور جب تک کہ کسی حصے پر فوری طور پر مرمت نہیں کی جاتی وہ بھی بہت گر جاتا ہے۔ اسی طرح. اس طرح کی مرمت کے ممکنہ اخراجات روپے ہیں۔ ......... جیسا کہ انجینئر کے سرٹیفکیٹ سے ظاہر ہوگا جو کہ بند اور Z نشان لگا دیا گیا ہے۔ نابالغ کے پاس مذکورہ مرمت کو انجام دینے کے لیے پیسے نہیں ہیں جیسا کہ اوپر دئے گئے اکاؤنٹ سے ظاہر ہوتا ہے۔

6. کہ فروخت کی جانے والی پراپرٹی کی مارکیٹ ویلیو روپے ہوگی .......... جیسا کہ ویلیوایشن سرٹیفکیٹ میں دیا گیا ہے اور بی نشان لگا دیا گیا ہے ، اور فی الحال کوئی آمدنی نہیں دیتا ہے۔

7۔ کہ یہ ایپلی کیشن نابالغ کے مفاد اور فائدے کے ساتھ درست بنائی گئی ہے۔ درخواست گزار اس لیے استدعا کرتا ہے:

آپ کے درخواست گزار کو اجازت دی جائے کہ وہ شیڈول اے میں بیان کردہ جائیداد میں نابالغ کا ایک چوتھائی حصہ فروخت کرے یا کسی دوسرے شخص یا افراد کو روپے سے کم قیمت پر ... .......... اور لازمی ترسیل پر عملدرآمد اور رجسٹر کرنا۔

آپ کے پٹیشنر کو اس بات کی آزادی ہے کہ وہ مذکورہ احاطے سے متعلقہ نابالغ کے رہن کے قرض کو اس طرح کی فروخت سے حاصل کرے اور مذکورہ نابالغ کے رہائشی مکان کی مرمت کے اخراجات کے توازن کو لاگو کرے۔

مزید حکم یا احکامات دیے جائیں اور ہدایات دی جائیں ، جیسا کہ مناسب اور مناسب معلوم ہو اور آپ کا درخواست گزار جو فرض کے پابند ہو کبھی دعا کرے گا۔ شیڈول کی توثیق I ، AB ، بیٹا ......... عمر ............ کے بارے میں ............ سال رہائش پذیر ......... قبضے کی خدمت کے ذریعے تصدیق کریں اور اس طرح کہیں:

میں اوپر نام کا درخواست گزار ہوں۔ میں جانتا ہوں اور میں نے اپنے آپ کو اس کیس کے حقائق اور حالات سے واقف کروایا ہے اور میں اس کو بیان کرنے کے قابل ہوں۔ پیراگراف 1 سے 7 میں بیانات اور یہاں درخواست کا شیڈول میرے بہترین علم کے مطابق ہے جو میرے قبضے میں موجود ریکارڈ سے حاصل کردہ معلومات پر مبنی ہے ، اس لرنڈ کورٹ کے سامنے کارروائی۔ احکامات اور تشخیص کی رپورٹ اور میری طرف سے یقین کیا گیا کہ یہ سچ ہے اور میں نے کسی مادی حقیقت کو دبایا نہیں ہے۔ اوپر بیانات میرے بہترین علم کے مطابق ہیں۔

میں اس تصدیق پر اس ............ دن ............ 1999 پر دستخط کرتا ہوں۔ دستخط …… ایڈووکیٹ کے دستخط میرے سامنے نوٹری۔

نوٹ. دو آزاد افراد کی طرف سے دو حلف نامے ہوں گے کہ جائیداد کی متوقع قیمت اور مطلوبہ فروخت کا فائدہ/فائدہ کیا ہے۔

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-𝑪𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑾𝒆𝒍𝒇𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕-

 𝑷 𝑳 𝑫 2015 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 401

𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑾𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑽𝑰𝑰𝑰 𝒐𝒇 1890) ---

----𝑺. 25---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝑷𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏, 𝑨𝒓𝒕. 199---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏---𝑪𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑾𝒆𝒍𝒇𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑨𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆---𝑴𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚---𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚---𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘---𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 12 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆---𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 5 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍---𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓---𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑪𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅𝒓𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆---𝑾𝒆𝒍𝒇𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕---𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒖𝒑 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕'𝒔-𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕'𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆---𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔.

𝑨𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑪𝒉. 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒋𝒎𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔. 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓.

𝑴𝒖𝒉𝒂𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒅 𝑨𝒓𝒊𝒇 𝑨𝒘𝒂𝒏, 𝑨.𝑨.𝑮.

𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈: 12𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒖𝒈𝒖𝒔𝒕, 2014.

 𝑷 𝑳 𝑫 2015 𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆 401

𝑩𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 𝑲𝒉𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒓, 𝑱

𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝑨𝑼𝒁𝑰𝑨 𝑰𝑸𝑩𝑨𝑳---𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓

𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒖𝒔

𝑭𝑨𝑹𝑯𝑨𝑻 𝑱𝑨𝑯𝑨𝑵 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔---𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔

𝑾𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑵𝒐.15 𝒐𝒇 2014, 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒏 12𝒕𝒉 𝑨𝒖𝒈𝒖𝒔𝒕, 2014.

𝑶𝑹𝑫𝑬𝑹

𝑺𝑯𝑨𝑯 𝑲𝑯𝑨𝑾𝑨𝑹, 𝑱.---𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒍. 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒍. 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 4-11-2013 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1.

2. 𝑩𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑱𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑴𝒓. 𝑺𝒊𝒌𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 5 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒛𝒊𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒖𝒏𝒕 (𝑷𝒉𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊) 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒓𝒅 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒚 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒂 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒖𝒑-𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅-𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒘𝒂𝒔 5 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅, 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒈𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒖𝒔, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒅𝒐𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑨𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉, 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑱𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓-𝒊𝒏-𝒍𝒂𝒘.

3. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒕 12 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

4. 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑱𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 25 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑾𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1890 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒖𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍 𝒃𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑭𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈/𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒂 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝒉𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓.

5. 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒚, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 7 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 17 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑾𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1890 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝑯𝒊𝒓𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍. 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 8-5-2013 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 7 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 17 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑾𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1890 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 25 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑭𝒂𝒓𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝑱𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒏 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 30 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓. 𝑨𝒏 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 14 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕, 1964 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆, 𝑹𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 4-11-2013 𝒖𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆 𝑮𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑯𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏.

6. 𝑰 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒈𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒓𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒍 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔.

7. 𝑶𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒊.𝒆. 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 7-8-2014 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2, 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂 𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒚. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒆𝒚𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒕 1-1/2 𝒅𝒂𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎. 𝑻𝒐𝒅𝒂𝒚 𝒊.𝒆. 12-8-2014 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓, 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒕 12 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒈𝒆, 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆. 𝑺𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔, 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒆𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒚 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 𝑭𝒂𝒖𝒛𝒊𝒂 𝑰𝒒𝒃𝒂𝒍. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑷𝒉𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒊𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒖𝒑 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚 𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒌𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒏, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒆𝒕𝒔 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒅𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒈𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒅𝒖𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑷𝒉𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓.

8. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒊𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒔. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒆, 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒂𝒔 5 𝒅𝒂𝒚𝒔 𝒐𝒍𝒅. 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒊𝒆 𝒊𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒆𝒎𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒚 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒊𝒓 𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒉𝒐 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.2. 𝑰𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒍 2011 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒔𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓. 𝑨𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒍𝒚, 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐.1 𝒇𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒐𝒏 29-10-2011 𝒂𝒕 𝒂 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒑𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒅 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒅 𝒍𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑬𝒗𝒆𝒏 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆, 𝒊𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒍𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒊𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒆𝒔, 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑵𝒐. 1. 𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒃𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒋𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒔𝒕. 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝑩𝒊𝒃𝒊 (𝑵𝒖𝒔𝒓𝒂𝒕 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒆𝒆𝒏) 𝒗. 𝒁𝒖𝒍𝒇𝒊𝒒𝒂𝒓 𝑨𝒍𝒊 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 𝑲𝒂𝒛𝒎𝒊 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔 [(1995 𝑪𝑳𝑪 306 (𝑳𝒂𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒆)].

9. 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒉𝒂𝒗𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒔 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒌𝒆𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏 𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒓 𝒄𝒊𝒓𝒄𝒖𝒎𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉.

10. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒂𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒎𝒆𝒆𝒕 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔. 𝑺𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒍𝒎𝒐𝒔𝒕 1-1/2 𝒅𝒂𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒂𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑺𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒔𝒐 𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2, 𝒃𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒔𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒚 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒃𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒘𝒂𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝑷𝒉𝒐𝒑𝒉𝒊, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓. 𝑻𝒉𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕 𝒃𝒚 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝒃𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒘. 𝑰𝒕 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒅𝒚 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒇𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒘𝒓𝒊𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒔 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒅𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔:--

(𝒊) 𝑩𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒔𝒉 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒋𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒖𝒑 𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓.

(𝒊𝒊) 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝒍𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚 𝒕𝒐 𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓'𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒚 𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒎. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒇 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏, 𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒓, 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔.

(𝒊𝒊𝒊) 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒓 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝑵𝒐𝒔.1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 2 𝒐𝒏 𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒌-𝒆𝒏𝒅, 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒏𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒍𝒚 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔.

(𝒊𝒗) 𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒉𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒅 𝒎𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒃𝒚 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓.

𝑨𝑮/𝑭-27/𝑳 𝑷𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒅.

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