-Maintainability---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance---Interim maintenance, fixation of---Contention of defendant-father was that...........

 2019 CLC 1635

Ss.5, Sched., 17-A & 14 (3)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance---Interim maintenance, fixation of---Contention of defendant-father was that interim maintenance fixed by the Family Court was exorbitant---Validity---Family Court had jurisdiction to pass interim order for maintenance at any stage of the proceedings in a suit for maintenance---Interim maintenance fixed by the Family Court was too meagre---Defendant had not made bona fide demand for the custody of his minor children---Father of minor children could not expect their mother to keep them as well as to pay all their expenses---Defendant-father was under a legal as well as a moral obligation to maintain and support his children---Impugned order passed by the Family Court was an interlocutory order---Maintenance fixed by the Family Court through impugned order was only temporary in nature---Amount fixed by the Family Court during proceedings of suit for maintenance might be modified and revisited while passing final order---Family Court could increase or decrease the quantum of maintenance after appraising the evidence produced by the parties during the trial---Constitutional petition against order for interim maintenance was not maintainable unless it was coram non judice or based on mala fide---Quantum of interim maintenance could not be made a ground for invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---S.14(3) of Family Courts Act, 1964 did bar appeal or revision against an interim order passed by the Family Court---Aggrieved party could agitate his grievance before appellate forum when the interim order would merged into a final order---Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.

Guardianship to mother was dismissed.

 Guardianship to mother was dismissed.
2021 MLD 817 ISLAMABAD
Side Appellant : Ms. SHAZIA AKBAR GHALZAI
Side Opponent : ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, ISLAMABAD (EAST)

Ss.7, 17, 19 & 41---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Guardian, non-appointment of---Minor (son) was of three months old when his Mother/petitioner left him and went abroad to complete her Ph.D---Minor was looked after by his father/respondent---On her return to Pakistan mother/petitioner sought guardianship of minor but the same was refused by Guardian Court and the order was maintained by Lower Appellate Court---Validity---Father of minor was his/her natural guardian and welfare of child was best served when he/she remained under father's guardianship---Question as to how welfare of child would be best served in appointing a guardian instead of father could only arise when father was either not alive or was determined by Court to be unfit as guardian--- Court was not vested with any authority to appoint a guardian in place of father when father was alive and was not unfit to be guardian--- Even where father was found to be unfit to be guardian and another person was appointed in his place, such other guardian's authority ceased once circumstances leading to father declared unfit had changed and he was no longer deemed unfit by Court--- No one could be appointed guardian in father's place unless father was found unfit to serve as guardian of his child and onus to establish that the father was unfit was on the person bringing such claim--- Father/respondent was natural guardian and welfare of the child was in vesting responsibility of guardianship in him unless he was unfit for the purpose and declared so by a Court--- Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

لاہور ہائی کورٹ، لاہور کی خلع، طلاق اور تنسیخ نکاح پہ ایک خوبصورت ججمنٹ۔۔

 2021 PLD Lahore 757

خاتون نے فیملی کورٹ میں مقدمہ دائر کیا جس میں یہ موقف اپنایا گیا کہ شوہر کا تعلق میرے ساتھ ٹھیک نہیں ہے اور وہ مار پیٹ کرتا ہے وغیرہ وغیرہ لہذا مجھے میرا حق مہر جو کہ تین ملین سے زیادہ ہے اور دیگر جہیز کا سامان یہ سارا واپس کیا جاۓ اور عدالت مجھے خاوند سے طلاق دلواۓ بالفاظِ دیگر عدالت نکاح کی تنسیخ کرے۔
فیملی کورٹ نے فیصلہ کرتے ہوۓ تنسیخ نکاح کے بجائے خلع کا حکم پاس کیا اور خاتون کو حکم دیا کہ حق مہر سے دستبردار ہوجائیں۔ مذکورہ خاتون اپیل میں گئی اور اپیل میں بھی یہی فیصلہ برقرار رکھا گیا جس کے بعد خاتون کو مجبوراً ہائی کورٹ میں رٹ جوریسڈکشن میں جانا پڑا۔
معزز عدالت نے طے کیا کہ خلع بیوی کا شرعی حق ہے یہ عدالت کا اختیار نہیں ہے کہ وہ کسی کو بھی بن مانگے اس کا حق دلوانا شروع کردے اگر خاتون خلع نہیں مانگ رہی بلکہ تنسیخ نکاح کی بنیاد پہ طلاق مانگ رہی ہے تو عدالت تنسیخ نکاح کے بجائے خلع دینے کا اختیار نہیں رکھتی۔ اس صورت میں عدالت کو شہادت میں جانا ہوگا اور پراپر ٹرائل کے زریعے یہ طے کرنا ہوگا کہ آخر کن وجوہات کی بناء پر خاتون کو طلاق دی جاسکتی ہے یا نکاح کی تنسیخ کی جاسکتی ہے۔۔۔
سب سے اہم نکتہ جو معزز جج نے طے کیا وہ یہ کہ معزز جج نے صراحتا لکھا کہ خلع کی صورت میں بھی اگر خاتون خلع کے لیے راضی ہو مگر شوہر کی طرف سے اجازت نہ دی جاۓ تو یہ خلع شرعاً و قانونا جائز نہیں ہوگا کیونکہ شریعت کہتی ہے کہ خلع میں شوہر کی اجازت ضروری ہے۔
اگر خاتون خلع مانگ لے اور شوہر انکار کر دے تو شریعت و قانون میں خلع مؤثر تصور نہ ہوگا اس لیے خاوند کی اجازت یا قبول ضروری ہے (اس کے لیے دیکھیے مذکورہ ججمنٹ کا پیرا نمبر 14)
معزز جج نے مزید یہ کہا کہ خاتون جن وجوہات کی بناء پہ خاوند سے اپنا نکاح منسوخ کرانا چاہتی ہے اگر وہ وجوہات ثابت نہ ہو جاۓ تو اس صورت میں بھی عدالت خود سے خلع کا حکم نہیں دے سکتی بلکہ عدالت کو دیگر وجوہات کی طرف جانا ہوگا اور عدالت کو دیگر وجوہات کی بناء پر فیصلہ کرنا ہوگا کہ نکاح کی تنسیخ کی جاۓ لیکن خلع کی بنیاد پہ نہیں۔ (اس کے لیے دیکھیے پیرس نمبر 12)
مزید اسی پیرا سے آگے پیرا نمبر 15 میں طے پایا کہ خلع کی صورت میں عدالت یک طرفہ(ex parte) فیصلہ نہیں دے سکتی یعنی خاوند کی غیر موجودگی میں خلع کا فیصلہ نہیں کیا جاسکتا۔
اگر شوہر ان شرائط پہ خلع دینے پہ راضی نہ ہو جن پہ بیوی خلع لینا چاہ رہی ہو تو عدالت تب تک خلع کا حکم جاری نہیں کرسکتی جب تک دونوں کچھ شرائط پہ متفق ہوکر خلع کا فیصلہ نہ کردے۔
مزید یہ کہا گیا کہ اگر خاوند کی بیوی کے ساتھ نا بنتی ہو اور خاوند طلاق بھی نہ دینا چاہ رہا ہو بلکہ بیوی کو اس طرز پہ ٹریٹ کر رہا ہو کہ بیوی مجبور ہر کر خلع مانگ لے اور خاوند کو حق مہر بچ جاۓ تو اس صورت میں عدالتوں کو بہت محتاط ہونا چاہیے اور معاملہ کی تہ تک پہنچانا چاہیے کہ آخر غلطی کس کی ہے یا ظلم کون کر رہا ہے۔
مذکورہ ججمنٹ میں قرآن پاک سے اور ہدایہ سے بھی حوالہ دیا گیا ہے۔
PLD 2021 LAHORE 757.

Grant of Khula and ground of dissolution of marriage due to taking additional wife in contravention of the provisions of The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

The terms of a contract of marriage between a man and a woman are contained in the Nikah Nama. The terms and conditions are meant to secure the rights and intentions of both the wife and the husband. The Nikah is a social contract between parties who are competent to enter into a valid marriage contract. It is settled law that a presumption of truth is attached to the Nikah Nama and it enjoys the status of a public document. A strong presumption of truth exists regarding entries recorded in the Nikah Nama. The titles of columns 13 to 16 relate to 'dower'. Column 17 of the prescribed form is titled as 'special conditions if any'. The prescribed form nor the headings of the entries are conclusive for the purpose of ascertaining the intentions of the two parties to the marriage contract. This Court has held in the Haseen Ullah’s case that the Nikah Nama is the deed of marriage contract entered into between the parties and its clauses/columns/contents are to be construed and interpreted in the light of the intention of the parties. The headings are not sufficient to determine the intention of the parties. It is also a settled principle of interpreting a contract that a court cannot imply something that is inconsistent with the express terms and a stipulation not expressed in the written contract can also not be applied merely because it appears to be reasonable to the court. We will now examine what the parties had intended regarding the dower which was settled between them and duly recorded in the relevant entries of the Nikah Nama. It is noted that 'dower' is obligatory because it is an essential requirement of a valid marriage contract. The validity of marriage remains effective even if the dower has not been expressly mentioned in the marriage contract because, in such a case, a reasonable dower, 'Mehr-ul-Misal' is presumed. Dower may be prompt or deferred. In case the parties have not specified the nature of the payment of dower then in such an eventuality it is presumed to be prompt as has been provided under section 10 of the Ordinance of 1961. It can be in the form of cash or property or both. In the case before us, the parties had settled an amount of Rs.500,000/- to be paid as cash 'on demand' and this was recorded in column 13 of the Nikah Nama. In column 14 the nature of dower i.e whether prompt or deferred was not specified Haseen Ullah’s case1 that the Nikah Nama is the deed of marriage contract entered into between the parties and its clauses/columns/contents are to be construed and interpreted in the light of the intention of the parties. The headings are not sufficient to determine the intention of the parties. It is also a settled principle of interpreting a contract that a court cannot imply something that is inconsistent with the express terms and a stipulation not expressed in the written contract can also not be applied merely because it appears to be reasonable to the court.2 We will now examine what the parties had intended regarding the dower which was settled between them and duly recorded in the relevant entries of the Nikah Nama. It is noted that 'dower' is obligatory because it is an essential requirement of a valid marriage contract. The validity of marriage remains effective even if the dower has not been expressly mentioned in the marriage contract because, in such a case, a reasonable dower, 'Mehr-ul-Misal' is presumed. Dower may be prompt or deferred. In case the parties have not specified the nature of the payment of dower then in such an eventuality it is presumed to be prompt as has been provided under section 10 of the Ordinance of 1961. It can be in the form of cash or property or both. In the case before us, the parties had settled an amount of Rs.500,000/- to be paid as cash 'on demand' and this was recorded in column 13 of the Nikah Nama. In column 14 the nature of dower i.e whether prompt or deferred was not specified There are various modes for lawfully dissolving the contract of marriage between a husband and wife. The primary mode is pronouncement of divorce by the husband or in case the right has been delegated to the wife then exercise of such right by her. The Act of 1939 was enacted to consolidate and clarify the provisions of Muslim law relating to suits for dissolution of marriage by women who are married under the Muslim law. Section 2 sets out the grounds for a decree for the dissolution of a marriage. The statute was amended and a new ground was inserted i.e. clause (iia) in the Act of 1939 through Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 (‘Ordinance VIII’). These amendments were made to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission on Marriages and Family Laws. Later section 13 of the Ordinance VIII was omitted through section 3 read with item no.18 of the second schedule of the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance, 1981 (‘Ordinance of 1981’). It is noted that the insertion of clause (iia) in section 2 of the Act of 1939 had taken effect and was enforced. It is an admitted position that the Act of 1939 was not amended nor was clause (iia) of section 2 omitted or repealed there from. The effect of omission of section 13 of Ordinance VIII through the Ordinance of 1981 did not affect the insertion of clause (iia) in section 2 of the Act of 1939. Moreover, it is obvious from the language of section 13 of Ordinance VIII that the insertion made in the Act of 1939 was not intended to be of transitory nature nor that it shall take effect for a limited period. There is nothing in the language to construe that it was intended that the insertion would lapse on a specific date or on the happening of some contingency. The ground of dissolution of marriage inserted in section 2 of the Act of 1939 as clause (iia), i.e taking an additional wife in contravention of the provisions of the Ordinance of 1961, hence continued to be validly enforced and subsisting. This Court in the case of Abdul Majid has observed that the purpose of such omission or repeal was to strike out unnecessary enactments and cannot be construed as having brought any change in the relevant statute which was amended or in which provisions were inserted. The aim of the repeal or omission of those sections through which some other statute was amended was termed by this Court as 'legislative spring cleaning'. Section 7 of the Ordinance of 1981 expressly saved the effect of the repealed laws. It expressly provides that the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment unless a different intent was expressly stated in the law by which the amendment was made. Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act 1897 (‘Act of 1897’) provides that where any Central Act or Regulation repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal. As already noted, it is obvious from the clear language used in section 13 of Ordinance VIII that a different intention cannot be construed. The learned counsel for the defendant has drawn our attention to the judgment of the Peshawar High Court in the case of Rashid Ali4 in support of his contention that clause (iia) inserted in section 2 of the Act of 1939 stood repealed. With great respect, the view taken by the High Court appears to have been formed without taking into consideration the above factors, particularly section 7 of the Ordinance of 1981. The opinion of the High Court is per incuriam.

We, therefore, hold that the repeal of section 13 of Ordinance VIII through the Ordinance of 1981 did not affect the validity and enforcement of the insertion made in the Act of 1939 and, therefore, clause (iia) of section 2 of the Act of 1939 continues to be one of the valid, effective and subsisting grounds for dissolution of marriage. Clause (iia) of section 2 of the Act of 1939 enables a woman married under the Muslim Law to obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage if the husband has taken an additional wife in contravention of the provisions of the Ordinance 1961. Section 6 of the Ordinance of 1961 sets out the requirements and procedure which are to be complied with by a husband who intends to take an additional wife. It provides that a husband, during the subsistence of an existing marriage, shall not contract another marriage except with the previous permission in writing of the Arbitration Council. In conformity with these provisions a husband is required to file an application for permission under sub-section 1 of Section 6 of the Ordinance of 1961 to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council, stating therein the reasons for the proposed marriage and whether the consent of the existing wife or wives has been obtained thereto. On receiving the application, the Chairman asks the applicant and his existing wife or wives to nominate their respective representative. After the Arbitration Council is satisfied that the marriage was necessary and just, it may grant permission subject to such conditions, if any, as it may deem fit to impose. In deciding the application the Arbitration Council is required to record its reasons for the decision. Any party may prefer the remedy of revision before the Collector concerned. The consequences for taking an additional wife in contravention of the aforementioned provisions have been expressly described under sub-section 5 of section 6 ibid. In case of contravention the husband becomes immediately liable to pay the entire amount of dower, whether prompt or deferred, due to the existing wife or wives and, secondly, on conviction may be sentenced to simple imprisonment which may extend to one year, or a fine or both. In order to invoke the ground under clause (iia) of section 2 of the Act of 1939 all that the wife is required to show is that the husband had taken the additional wife in contravention of the Ordinance of 1961 as set out in section 6 ibid. In the case before us, the defendant had taken an additional wife while the appeals against the decrees passed by the trial court were pending. An additional ground was taken by the plaintiff and it is obvious from the judgment of the appellate court that such a ground was entertained. It is also apparent from the judgment that the defendant had submitted a reply. It stood established that the provisions of the Ordinance of 1961 had been contravened since neither any application was filed nor the permission of the Arbitration Council was sought in accordance with the requirements set out under section 6 ibid. However, instead of adjudicating this ground, the appellate court had ordered the dissolution of the marriage on the basis of Khula. This form of dissolution was accepted by the defendant as it was not challenged by him before the High Court. The learned counsel for the defendant has argued that the matter should be remanded to the appellate court because it would require recording of evidence. He has also advanced arguments in support of the dissolution of marriage by the appellate court on the basis of Khula. Before we examine the argument regarding remanding the case to the appellate court, it would be appropriate to advert to the question of whether the appellate court was justified in ordering dissolution of the marriage on the basis of Khula.
Khula is one of the modes for dissolving a marriage. It can either be on the basis of mutual settlement/arrangement between the spouses or it can be ordered by a court if the requisite conditions are met. This court in the case of Khurshid Bibi5 has held that Khula is a right and privilege of the wife to seek dissolution of marriage. It is a right which is exclusively conferred on the wife. Khula through judicial order is thus dissolution of marriage by the court/Qazi on the demand of the wife. It authorises the court to dissolve the marriage in an appropriate case against the will or consent of the husband. However, a court on its own cannot order dissolution of the marriage on the basis of Khula when it has not been sought by the wife either expressly or impliedly. It has further been observed that the question of Khula was a subject matter of a specific issue between the parties in the case before this Court. It has been noted in the judgment that the wife in her plaint had consented to the dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula. The learned counsel for the defendant has placed reliance on Muhammad Arif’s case6 in support of his contention that a court is competent to order dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula even though it may not have been sought by or consented to by the wife. We have carefully perused the judgement rendered by a Bench consisting of two hon’ble judges of this Court but, with respect, we have noted that the Bench had not considered the law enunciated by this Court in Khurshid Bibi's case (supra) which was rendered by a larger bench consisting of five hon’ble judges. The appellate court, therefore, fell in error by granting a decree for the dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula when it was not sought by the plaintiff nor had she given express or implied consent thereto as was the case in Khurshid Bibi's case supra. The next question is whether the High Court had validly modified the decrees by ordering the dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty.
The Act of 1939 has set out the grounds which entitles a wife married under the Muslim Law to obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage. Clause (a) provides that a marriage could be dissolved if the husband treats the wife with cruelty i.e. habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable even if such conduct does not amount to physical ill-treatment. Cruelty may be mental or physical. This court, in the case of Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen,7 has dealt with various forms of conduct or behaviour that would entitle a wife to seek a decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. In this case the trial court had framed a specific issue whether the plaintiff was mentally or physically tortured by the defendant. The former could not discharge the onus placed upon her and, therefore, it was decided in the negative. The High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction vested under Article 199 of the Constitution, could not have decided questions involving determination of facts requiring recording of evidence. No further evidence was recorded after the trial was concluded by the trial court. The High Court has also not recorded any reasons in support of its conclusion to order dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. The High Court, therefore, fell in error by ordering dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty.

C.P.L.A.308-P/2019
Dr. Faryal Maqsood & another v. Khuram Shehzad Durani & others
Mr. Justice Athar Minallah
23-10-2024




















فیملی کورٹ کسی بھی کیس کو منطقی انجام تک پہنچانے کے لیے کوی بھی طریقہ کار اختیار کرسکتی ہے۔۔جب تک وہ طریقہ کار خصوصی طور پر منع نہ ہوں۔۔۔ اجراء کے دوران Executing Court اجراء سے متعلق کوی بھی Issue Resolve کرنے کے لیے Issue frame کرکے شہادت ریکارڈ کراسکتی ہے۔۔

 

👇
Family Court is a quasi-judicial forum which can organize its own procedure and which forum has been implicitly authorized to adopt and pursue any procedure which is not specifically barred or prohibited. Even if the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has not been made directly applicable to the proceedings in a suit filed under the auspices of the Family Courts Act, 1964, it does not at the same time mean that the Code of Civil Procedure is odious insofar as proceedings before the Family Court are concerned and moreso in the case of execution proceedings.
As long as there is no conflict between the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on the one hand and those of the Family Courts Act, 1964 on the other, such provisions can be employed and adopted. The logic behind this rule is rooted in the fact that after all the Family Court has to adopt and pursue some principles and procedure and, therefore, what better than the tried and tested procedure contained in a law that has remained successfully in force since the past 113 years. A Family Court can, therefore, proceed on the premise that every procedure is permissible unless a clear prohibition is forthcoming. As long as procedure so adopted does not compromise the aim and sweep of the Family Courts Act, 1964, which is to provide expeditious relief in matrimonial and family matters there is no reason in law to deny a Family Court to adopt such procedure.
It may be mentioned here that since the Family Court is quasi-judicial forum it partakes most elements and characteristics generally associated with a judicial forum. Naturally, it has to have a procedure it will follow in the event of deciding a particular lis.
The aspect of hearing of parties, the element of passing decisions which are reasoned and speaking, recording and appraisal of evidence etc. make it incumbent on a Family Court to adopt and pursue some procedure in the absence of any specific procedure having been made applicable.
Writ Petition No. 18067 of 2021
Mst. Haseena Bibi Versus Civil Judge Ist Class Vehari and another

فیملی کورٹ کے چند منفرد فیصلے جو روٹین سے ہٹ کر ہیں اور امید ہے آپ کی نظر سے نہیں گزرے ہوں گے

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

فیملی لاء ایک سپیشل لاء ہے۔ اس میں اجراء کی درخواست کے لیے کوئی میعاد مقرر نہ ہے۔
2018 YLR 1501
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹ کی یہ ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ یکطرفہ ڈگری پاس ہونے کے بعد مدعا علیہ کے پتہ پر ڈگری کی مصدقہ کاپی بھیجے۔
2017 CLC N 69
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
اگر والد کے پاس نابالغ کی پرورش کے لیے ذرائع نہیں ہیں تو والدہ کی ذمہ داری ہے کہ نابالغ کی پرورش کرے۔ اس کے علاوہ اس کیس لاء میں تفصیل سےنابالغان کے حوالےسے والدین کی ذمہ داریوں کا تعین کیا گیا ہے۔
PLD 2013 SC 557
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی عدالت یکطرفہ ڈکری پاس کرنے سے پہلے مدعا علیہ کو نوٹس حاضری بھیج سکتی ہے۔
2017 PLJ Pesh 01
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہیز کیس کے اجراء میں ضامن کی یہ قانونی ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ کسی بھی ڈیفالٹ کی صورت میں جہیز ادا کرے۔
2016 PLD Pesh 109
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
خلع کے علاوہ باقی حقائق کے خلاف درخواست منسوخی ڈگری کی مدت اس وقت شروع ہوگی جب مدعا علیہ/ججمنٹ ڈیٹر کو اس ڈکری کا علم ہوگا۔
2017 CLC N 69
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
بیوی کو حق مہر ادا نہ کرنا بھی ظلم/Cruelty ہے۔ جوکہ خلع کے لیے بہترین گراؤنڈ ہے۔
2018 CLC 93
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کیس میں Interim Order کے خلاف رِٹ پٹیشن نہیں ہوسکتی۔
2018 CLC N 47
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹ کے لیے یہ ضروری ہے کہ وہ فیملی کیس کا 6 ماہ کے اندر اندر فیصلہ کرے۔
2018 YLR 1231
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
باپ اپنے بچے کو خرچہ نان و نفقہ دینے کا پابند ہے۔ اس کا یہ بہانہ نہیں سنا جائے گا کہ اس کے پاس ذرائع آمدن نہیں ہیں۔
2018 CLC N 47
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
بیوی خاوند کی Cruelty ثابت نہ کرسکی۔ عدالت نے حکم دیا کہ بیوی شادی کے تحائف واپس کرے اور شوہر حق مہر ادا کرے۔
2018 PLD Pesh 34
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی لاء ایک سپیشل لاء ہے۔ اس میں خاوند کے لیے Past Maintenance کے لیے کوئی میعاد مقرر نہ ہے۔
2018 YLR 1501
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
پردہ نشیں عورت اپنے والد کے ذریعے اپنی شہادت ریکارڈ کروا سکتی ہے اگر اس کے والد کو کیس حالات کا اچھی طرح سے پتہ ہوتو۔
2002 CLC 1336
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
ہائی کورٹ فُل بینچ نے فیملی قوانین کی تشریح کرتے وقت یہ قرار دیا کہ فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ 1964 اور مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈینیس 1961 کی متعلقہ دفعات غیرقانونی ہیں کہ خلع کی صورت میں بیوی کو حق مہر کی رقم بھی واپس کرنی پڑے گی جبکہ اسلامی اصولوں کے تحت اسے صرف شادی کے تحائف واپس کرنے چاہئیں۔
PLD 2009 Pesh 92
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہاں بیوی/عورت رہتی ہوگی اسی جگہ فیملی کیس دائر کیا جاسکتا ہے۔ علاقائی اختیار سماعت نہیں دیکھا جائے گا۔
PLD 2006 Pesh 189
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
طلاق یافتہ بچی اگر ماں کے پاس ہوتو باپ اس کا خرچہ نان و نفقہ دینے کا پابند ہے۔
2014 MLD 351 Pesh
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
شادی کی تاریخ کے بعد منتقل کی گئی پراپرٹی حق مہر یا گفٹ کے ضمرہ میں نہیں آتی۔
PLD 2012 Lah 43
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
ماں بچے کا خرچہ باپ کو معاف بھی کردے تو باپ دینے کا پابند ہے۔
2014 MLD 351 Pesh
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
نکاح نامہ میں لکھی گئی پراپرٹی حق مہر یا گفٹ کے ضمرہ میں آتی ہے اور فیملی کورٹ اس حوالہ سے ڈکری پاس کرسکتی ہے۔
PLD 2016 SC 613
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
شادی کی تاریخ کے بعد منتقل کی گئی پراپرٹی حق مہر یا گفٹ کے ضمرہ میں نہیں آتی۔
PLD 2009 Lah 227
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہیز کی رقم مدعیہ کے والد کے بنک اکاؤنٹ میں جمع کروائی گئی۔ اب Controversy باپ اور بیٹی کے درمیان ہے۔ خاوند کو اس بات کا ذمہ دار نہیں ٹھہرایا جاسکتا۔ یہ سول کورٹ کا معاملہ ہے فیملی کورٹ کا نہیں۔
2013 YLR 1903
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
شادی کی تاریخ کے بعد منتقل کی گئی پراپرٹی حق مہر یا گفٹ کے ضمرہ میں نہیں آتی۔
PLD 2011 Kar 196
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہاں طلائی زیورات یا انکی قیمت واپس کرنے کی ڈکری پاس ہوجائے تو اس صورت میں قیمت Date of Payment کے حساب سے دیکھی جائے گی۔
2013 SCMR 1049
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جس کیس میں مدعیہ صرف طلائی زیورات کی بابت استدعا کرے اور ان کی مالیت کرنسی میں نہ بتائے تو اس صورت میں مدعاعلیہ کے پاس آپشن ہوگی کہ وہ یاتو طلائی زیورات بمطابق وزن واپس کرے یا پھر اتنی رقم ادا کرے جس سے اس وزن کے طلائی زیورات اوپن مارکیٹ سے خریدے جاسکیں۔
2014 CLC 895
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
ہر باپ کا حق ہے کہ وہ اپنے بچے سے ملاقات غیر مشروط طریقے سے کرے۔ ملاقات کے لیے Surety Bonds مشروط کرنا غیرآئینی ہے اور اسے 199 کے تحت چیلنج کیا جاسکتا ہے۔
2014 CLC 1168
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
اگر Pendency کے دوران دعویٰ Partly واپس لیا جائے تو نیا سوٹ فائل کیا جاسکتا ہے۔ اس پر Res Judicata کا اصول لاگو نہیں ہوگا۔
2012 MLD 1795
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
معزز ہائیکورٹ نے مشاہدہ کیا کہ 99 فیصد سامان جہیز کے کیسز میں جھوٹ بولتی ہے کہ لِسٹ شادی کے وقت تیار کی گئی تھی۔ اور 1 فیصد کیسز میں وہ ضِد کرتی ہے کہ وہ جھوٹ نہیں بول رہی۔
2013 MLD 939 Lah
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
خرچہ نان و نفقہ ایک فائدہ نہیں بلکہ حق ہے۔ اگر خلع کے کیس میں خرچہ نان و نفقہ کو بطور شرط معاف کیا گیا تو یہ غیرقانونی ہے اور اسکی کوئی قانونی حیثیت نہیں۔
2012 MLD 1943
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
چونکہ CPC فیملی لاء پر اپلائی نہیں ہوتی مگر پھر بھی جو طریقہ کار CPC میں دیا گیا ہے انصاف کے بہترین حصول کے لیے وہ فیملی لاء میں اختیار کیا جاسکتا ہے۔
2012 MLD 1795
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹس ترمیمی ایکٹ 2015 کے تحت خرچہ نان و نفقہ 10 سے 5 فیصد کیا گیا۔ لیکن اس فیصلہ میں معزز سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان نے دوبارہ خرچہ نان و نفقہ 10 فیصد بحال کردیا۔
2016 SCMR 2069
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
باپ اپنے بچے کو خرچہ نان و نفقہ دینے کا پابند ہے۔ اس کا یہ بہانہ نہیں سنا جائے گا کہ اس کے پاس ذرائع آمدن نہیں ہیں۔
2018 CLC N 47
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
بیوی خاوند کی Cruelty ثابت نہ کرسکی۔ عدالت نے حکم دیا کہ بیوی شادی کے تحائف واپس کرے اور شوہر حق مہر ادا کرے۔
2018 PLD Pesh 34
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی لاء ایک سپیشل لاء ہے۔ اس میں خاوند کے لیے Past Maintenance کے لیے کوئی میعاد مقرر نہ ہے۔
2018 YLR 1501
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
پردہ نشیں عورت اپنے والد کے ذریعے اپنی شہادت ریکارڈ کروا سکتی ہے اگر اس کے والد کو کیس حالات کا اچھی طرح سے پتہ ہوتو۔
2002 CLC 1336
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی لاء ایک سپیشل لاء ہے۔ اس میں اجراء کی درخواست کے لیے کوئی میعاد مقرر نہ ہے۔
2018 YLR 1501
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
ہائی کورٹ فُل بینچ نے فیملی قوانین کی تشریح کرتے وقت یہ قرار دیا کہ فیملی کورٹ ایکٹ 1964 اور مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈینیس 1961 کی متعلقہ دفعات غیرقانونی ہیں کہ خلع کی صورت میں بیوی کو حق مہر کی رقم بھی واپس کرنی پڑے گی جبکہ اسلامی اصولوں کے تحت اسے صرف شادی کے تحائف واپس کرنے چاہئیں۔
PLD 2009 Pesh 92
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
جہاں بیوی/عورت رہتی ہوگی اسی جگہ فیملی کیس دائر کیا جاسکتا ہے۔ علاقائی اختیار سماعت نہیں دیکھا جائے گا۔
PLD 2006 Pesh 189
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔…
2016 PLD Pesh 109
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
خلع کے علاوہ باقی حقائق کے خلاف درخواست منسوخی ڈگری کی مدت اس وقت شروع ہوگی جب مدعا علیہ/ججمنٹ ڈیٹر کو اس ڈکری کا علم ہوگا۔
2017 CLC N 69
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔.................................
بیوی کو حق مہر ادا نہ کرنا بھی ظلم/Cruelty ہے۔ جوکہ خلع کے لیے بہترین گراؤنڈ ہے۔
2018 CLC 93
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کیس میں Interim Order کے خلاف رِٹ پٹیشن نہیں ہوسکتی۔
2018 CLC N 47
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹ کے لیے یہ ضروری ہے کہ وہ فیملی کیس کا 6 ماہ کے اندر اندر فیصلہ کرے۔
2018 YLR 1231
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی کورٹ کی یہ ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ یکطرفہ ڈگری پاس ہونے کے بعد مدعا علیہ کے پتہ پر ڈگری کی مصدقہ کاپی بھیجے۔
2017 CLC N 69
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
اگر والد کے پاس نابالغ کی پرورش کے لیے ذرائع نہیں ہیں تو والدہ کی ذمہ داری ہے کہ نابالغ کی پرورش کرے۔ اس کے علاوہ اس کیس لاء میں تفصیل سےنابالغان کے حوالےسے والدین کی ذمہ داریوں کا تعین کیا گیا ہے۔
PLD 2013 SC 557
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
فیملی عدالت یکطرفہ ڈکری پاس کرنے سے پہلے مدعا علیہ کو نوٹس حاضری بھیج سکتی ہے۔
2017 PLJ Pesh 01

Divorce--Effectiveness---Husband administered the divorce and notified the same to Chairman of Arbitration/Union Council whereupon certain...........

 2009 MLD 1478.
Ambreen Afshan V/S
Mrs. Idrees Qazu (Lahore)


S.7 Muslim Family Laws Ord. 1961. Divorce--Effectiveness---Husband administered the divorce and notified the same to Chairman of Arbitration/Union Council whereupon certain proceedings were taken and ultimately a certificate for the effectiveness of divorce was issued through the impugned order. Wife was well aware of the fact that husband had pronounced divorce to her for which consequential proceedings before the Arbitration/Union Council had also been taken. Father of the wife had been pursuing the matter before Arbitration Council. Case of the wife who had challenged effectiveness of the divorce was that the submission of divorce deed with a notice before the Arbitration Council could not ipso facto, operate and result into the dissolution of marriage. In the present case it could not be disputed that the period much beyond 90 days had expired from the date of notice of the divorce when impugned certificate of its effectiveness was issued, in the circumstances, especially keeping in view all the relevant facts of service of notice on the Chairman Union Council, the initiation of the proceedings by the Arbitration Council, the repeated appearance of father of the wife who was holding a power of attorney on her behalf in those proceedings and actual knowledge of the wife about the pendency and fact of those proceedings, divorce and its pronouncement had become effective. Failure to send a notice to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council would not render the divorce in-effective in Shariah. Effect of pronouncement of divorce in Shariah would not justify interference with impugned order nor would warrant exercise of discretion in favor of the petitioner/wife under Art.199 of the Constitution.

Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)
Powered by Blogger.

Case Law Search