بچے کی ولدیت کے تعین کیلیے فریقین کی رضامندی کے بغیر ڈی این اے ٹیسٹ نہ کرایا جاسکتا ہے

 PLD 2024 Lahore 715


Physiognomy, a best circumstantial evidence to assess paternity of a child.
Consent of the parties is essential to decide claim of the parties with respect to paternity of the child. If the parties do not give consent for such DNA examination, then learned trial Court can draw adverse inference as per Article 129 (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and shall proceed to decide the question of paternity on the basis of(naeem) evidence produced by the parties. In this respect, Court can also take help from Quranic verses and Hadith of Holy Prophet.
WP 75322/22
Kaneez Fatima and 1 other Vs Senior CIvil Judge etc

Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (VIII of 1890)-- ----S. 25--Application for custody of minor--Allowed--Entitlement for custody of minor--Refusal of general leave to take .................

 PLJ 2024 Lahore 828
Present: Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J.
SAADIA KHALIL--Petitioner
versus
LEARNED ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and 2 others--Respondents
W.P. No. 27113 of 2024, decided on 27.8.2024.

Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (VIII of 1890)--

----S. 25--Application for custody of minor--Allowed--Entitlement for custody of minor--Refusal of general leave to take minor abroad--Appeal--Turned down--No contribution of father for welfare of minor--Visitation schedule was not observing--Territorial jurisdiction--Appellate Court had not exercised jurisdiction conferred by law to properly consider request of petitioner--It had been ignored that respondent was not taking any interest or contributing for welfare of minor and his complete failure in observing visitation schedule, framed by Guardian Court--It was considered appropriate to permit custodial mother to take minor to USA for education purposes--The petitioner undertake that prior to change of residential address or educational institution, information of same in such eventuality should be given to Guardian Court--The petitioner was allowed to take minor to USA for educational purposes and judgment of Appellate Court to that extent was modified--Petition allowed.  [P. 835] A, B & C

PLD 2012 Sindh 166, PLD 2018 Sindh 377, 2019 YLR 2692 and
2022 SCMR 2123 ref.

Barrister Syeda Maqsooma Zahra Bokhari, Mr. Mubashar Hussain and Ms. Iqra Liaqat, learned Advocates for Petitioner.

Barrister Marryam Hayyat for Amicus Curiae.

Ex-parte vide order dated 05.06.2024 for Respondent No. 3.

Date of hearing: 15.8.2024.

Judgment

The petitioner filed an application, under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (the “Act of 1890”), for the custody of minor Rayyan Muhammad Yamin (the “minor”) born on 28.10.2015 in United States of America (“USA”). Respondent No. 3/father was proceeded against ex-parte due to his failure to pursue the case and thereafter, vide ex-parte judgment dated 21.03.2024 the application was allowed and the petitioner was held entitled for the custody of the minor, however, learned Judge Family/Guardian, Model Town, Lahore (the ‘Guardian Court’) refused the general leave to take the minor abroad and rather a condition has been imposed on shifting the minor beyond territorial jurisdiction. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached the learned Appellate Court through Guardian Appeal No. 38/24. Nevertheless, to the extent of above said refusal or condition the prayer of the petitioner was turned down, hence, this petition.

2. Barrister Syeda Maqsooma Zahra Bokhari (learned counsel for the petitioner) has argued that learned two Courts below have not considered that the minor was not just born in USA but he also has his education institution in USA, therefore the minor cannot be restrained from returning to his place of birth and to resume his education; that the restriction in Section 26 of the Act of 1890 comes into effect when there is a reason or some application from a non-custodial parent who wishes the minor to be close for meeting(s) or adherence of schedule framed by the learned Guardian Court, however, in the present case the respondent-father despite knowledge of the proceedings up-till now has failed to take any interest in the Court proceedings or to observe the visitation schedule or for that matter to take any step for the welfare of the minor. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the law has already been settled by the learned Sindh High Court in cases titled “Dr. Aisha Yousuf versus Khalid Muneer and 2 others” (PLD 2012 Sindh 166) and “Scherazade Jamali versus Hisham Gillani and others” (PLD 2018 Sindh 377) but somehow the learned Appellate Court, instead of following the principle settled or being persuaded from the observations made therein, has refused adhering to the same for the reason that these judgments have not declared Section 26 of the Act of 1890 as ultra vires and this approach adopted by the learned Appellate Court is not tenable. Added that even otherwise, the learned Appellate Court should have granted general leave to the take the minor to USA for educational purposes.

3. Barrister Maryyam Hayat, learned Amicus Curiae has stated that in case titled “Mst. Sidra Asif versus Additional District Judge and 2 others” (2019 YLR 2692) it has already been observed that in guardianship cases, the Courts exercise parental jurisdiction and stand in loco parentis, thus, the jurisdiction could not be hampered with undue interference of technicalities. Therefore, the Court must perform its legal duties to regulate the custody of the minor in order to ensure his well-being and welfare which should be paramount and dominant consideration. She further stated that it was held in the case titled “Raja Muhammad Owais versus Mst. Nazia Jabeen and others” (2022 SCMR 2123) that Court’s jurisdiction in custody cases is in the form of parental jurisdiction which means that the Courts should not only consider all factors including physical and emotional needs, medical care but also relevant is the parent’s ability to provide a safe and secure home where the quality of the relationship between the child and each parent is comfortable for the child, however, the learned Guardian Court has ignored the same. It is further stated that the intent of the legislature behind Section 26 of the Act of 1890 is to protect interest of the non-custodial parent by imposing limits on removing children from jurisdiction; that the said section is not applicable here as the respondent-father was proceeded against ex-parte in both the forums below, which essentially shows that the respondent-father is not interested in meeting the minor, thus, the protection of Section 26 of the Act of 1890 is not applicable. She has further stated that the respondent-father is resident of USA and does not even reside within the local limits of the Court, therefore, the apprehensions disclosed by the learned Courts below are not rational and judicious. She has apprised that the minor can have better education and financial conditions in USA.

4. Heard. Record perused.

5. In “Scherazade Jamali” case (supra) the learned Sindh High Court resolved the issue as to the restriction on the movement of a ward out of the jurisdiction, as contained in Section 26 of the Act of 1890, while observing that the ward cannot be penalized for the dispute between the parents and if better education facilities or institutions are available in any part of the world including Pakistan, there is no justifiable reason that the ward should be deprived to have access to such institutions or facilities. The same is categorized as psychological trauma to the ward, while further observing that the Courts below should not view the welfare only from the angle that father must not miss the opportunity to see his child but at the same time it should be seen as to whether the child is capable of studying abroad. The Court in the said case concluded as follows:

          “… Welfare of the minor includes his material, intellectual, moral and spiritual well being. In accomplishment of such object it becomes the duty of the Court to take care of the ward’s welfare and shall ensure that the litigating parents are not disputing to settle their own score or to satisfy vanity or even to soothe his/her craving of love and affection for minor as it could only he done if the welfare of the ward demands. Guardian Courts sometime lose sight of the welfare of the ward when love and affection is demonstrated by parents which is considered as overriding effect. True love of mother and father no doubt is important but what is more important is the welfare of the ward and it should not be limited to any one’s right of custody, but a larger view is to be taken from ward’s point of view.

          No doubt father is a natural guardian and any decision that concerns material, intellectual, moral or spiritual well being is always a father’s prerogative, but such can always be maintained and achieved in case the custody remains with mother. There are occasions when both parents or at times even the environment that they have is not considered as conducive for ward, custody and supervision may be entrusted to foster parents ….”

(Emphasis supplied)

6. In the present case, respondent-father has not shown any interest in the visitation schedule framed by the learned Guardian Court. It has been apprised that no concern is being demonstrated by the respondent-father in contributing towards the welfare of the minor. Throughout the case before the learned Guardian Court, learned Appellate Court or this Court the respondent-father has not even joined the proceedings. In “Dr. Aisha Yousuf” case (supra) the custodial parent/mother obtained job in Dubai and she requested the learned Court to permit her to take the ward to Dubai. The learned Court found the request reasonable and permitted her to take the ward out of the jurisdiction, while allowing the Constitution Petition. It will be beneficial to reproduce paragraph No. 12 of the said judgment:

          “12. In the present case two Court below have concurrently held that the custody shall remain with the mother and father has not challenged such findings. Therefore, as far as question of custody of the minor is concerned there does not appear to be any dispute between the parties. Regarding visitation rights the two Courts below have concurrently held that from 6-00 p.m. of alternate Saturday to 6-00 p.m. of following Sunday baby girl will be with the father. It is stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that mother is doctor by profession and she has obtained a job in Dubai and therefore prayed that she be allowed to take the baby to Dubai. The requests seems to be perfectly reasonable. Just as a father cannot be asked to abandon his career if he wants custody of a child, a mother cannot be asked to forsake her career if she wants custody of the child. In these days a woman is equally entitled to pursue a fruitful rewarding and satisfying career. Gone are the day when social norms used to be that a woman is expected to remain within four walls of a house and bring up children and father was free to roam the world in search of livelihood. Mandate’ of the Constitution as contained in Article 25 is that the State can make law for the protection and welfare of women and children. The Supreme Court has in Shrin Munir and others v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Health, Lahore and another, PLD 1990 SC (sic) held that while it is permissible to practice discrimination in favour of women and children but it is forbidden against them. Therefore spirit underlining all the legislation has to be that if anything the Court should lean in favour of weaker sections of society and it does not need any sophistry of arguments to see that women in this society, besides others, are certainly weaker section. Therefore, a female has as much right to roam in search of career and livelihood wherever she finds it more apt and she cannot be deprived of custody of the children for mere reason that she wants to serve abroad. Therefore, in my opinion it would be fair and reasonable to permit the mother to take the child out of Pakistan along with her when she goes to Dubai for her employment.

(Underlining is added)

7. In C.P. No. S-411 of 2022 titled “Gul Mina Afridi versus Rana Abdul Kareem and others” the Sindh High Court referred to a judgment of Karnataka High Court in WP No. 892 of 2023 titled SmtRakshitha vs Sri C C Shashikumar passed on 19 January, 2023, where the permission was granted to mother on the ground that father was indolent and he was uninvolved in the matters of upbringing of the ward. Reliance in the said case was also placed upon the American jurisprudence and case titled Watson v. Watson (Aug 03, 2004 I 2004 Neb. App. LEXIS 190) in which the Court granted mother’s motion to remove minor children from Nebraska to pursue her job opportunity in Maryland. Here, I would like to reproduce Paragraphs No. 8 and 9 of the said judgment:

          “8. Admittedly the world is a global village and countless people are migrating overseas for better opportunities for themselves and especially their children. While so far our legal jurisprudence has sparingly dealt with the situations where the minor was being removed from the jurisdiction of the Court where the consideration remained the protection of the welfare of the minor, however, considering the facts of the present case where the petitioner’s reason of seeking permission for international travel is for her daughter to have intentional exposure, the Courts of law aligned with the international law, in my humble view, are bound to consider that while allowing/denying the permission, whether they are protecting the welfare of the minor or acting otherwise. This responsibility stems from the International Convention of the Rights of Child (“Convention”) which was ratified by Pakistan on 12 November 1990, where Article 3 reinforces the said responsibility in the following words as reproduced herein below:

          Article 3

          1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, Courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best Interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

9. Pakistan is also a party to three other international instruments aiming at directly or indirectly Improving the rights of the child, those being the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ratified in 1996; the Declaration and Agenda for Action adopted at the issue of the World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, signed in 1996, and reaffirmed by the Yokohama Global Commitment in 2001, and the Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Form of Child Labour Convention, ratified in 2001, all of which make the Interest of the child of primary consideration and through which our Family Courts are bound to make decisions that do justice to the principle of welfare of the child.

8. Now coming to the reasoning given by the learned Appellate Court for not being persuaded from the judgments in cases titled “Dr. Aisha Yousuf” and “Scherazade Jamali” (supra) or withholding permission to take the minor abroad. The learned Appellate Court has observed that in these judgments Section 26 of the Act of 1890 has not been declared as ultra vires. Section 26 of the Act of 1890 reads as under:

26. Removal of ward from jurisdiction.--

          (1) A guardian of the person appointed or declared by the Court, unless he is the Collector or is a guardian appointed by will or other instrument, shall not without the leave of the Court by which he was appointed or declared, remove the ward from the limits of its jurisdiction except for such purposes as may be prescribed.

          (2) The leave granted by the Court under sub-section (1) may be special or general, and may be denied by the order granting it.”

(Emphasis supplied)

From a plain reading of above, I do not see any intention of the legislature to place complete embargo on granting permission to restrict ward within jurisdiction. Otherwise, the Courts would not have been empowered to grant leave to take the ward out of the territorial jurisdiction. Sub-section (2) of the above permits the Courts to grant special or general leave and to deny the leave. The learned Appellate Court is correct in its decision that the above provisions are holding the field; however, ignored that the requirement of leave before removing is also for the wellbeing of the ward and protecting the interest of the ward as well as the non-custodial parents. Such leave can be granted, on case to case basis, when welfare of the ward so demands and being exceedingly cautious in using this power. I agree with Barrister Marryam Hayat (the learned Amicus Curiae) who stated that the learned Appellate Court should have proceeded to give findings on merits of the case by considering the request to permit the petitioner-mother to take the minor to USA for education purposes, instead of making the mother or the minor to go through further rigors. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that already harm to the education of the minor has been caused and referring the matter by learned Appellate Court to the learned Guardian Court can further results into damage and/or loss of an academic year.

Description: BDescription: A9. After carefully going through the available documents and hearing the arguments, I am of the opinion that the learned Appellate Court has not exercised the jurisdiction conferred by law to properly consider the request of the petitioner. It has been ignored that the respondent-father is not taking any interest or contributing for the welfare of the minor and his complete failure in observing the visitation schedule, framed by the learned Guardian Court. I do not consider it in the welfare of the minor to deprive him from joining his educational institution in USA, restricting him within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Guardian Court, in the circumstances of the case. It is considered appropriate to permit the custodial-parent/ mother to take the minor to USA for education purposes. Barrister Syeda Maqsooma Zahra has submitted that the petitioner-mother undertakes that prior to change of residential address or educational institution, information of the same in such eventuality shall be given to the learned Guardian Court.

Description: C10. In view of the above, the petitioner-mother is allowed to take the minor to USA for educational purposes and the judgment of the learned Appellate Court to this extent is modified. In case of breach of undertaking or any other relevant condition imposed by learned Guardian Court, respondent-father can approach the learned Guardian Court for cancellation of the permission granted. Petitioner to appear before the learned Guardian Court for intimation about her present residence address and name as well as address of educational institution of the minor in USA.

11. Allowed in the above terms.

(Y.A.) Petition allowed

As per nikahnama of the petitioner and the respondent, her dower was settled as Rs.100,000/-, however, in lieu thereof, admittedly,....................

 As per nikahnama of the petitioner and the respondent, her dower was settled as Rs.100,000/-, however, in lieu thereof, admittedly, 7 tola gold ornaments were given to her at the time of marriage that were later on taken back from her, which fact stood proved, when recovery suit was instituted and decree dated 17.12.2016 was passed holding that the petitioner is entitled to recover 7 tola gold ornaments or Rs.100,000/- as their alternate value. During the execution proceedings, the petitioner filed application for recovery of gold ornaments or alternate value at prevailing market rate, which was allowed, however, the said finding was upended by the Appellate Court below and it was held that the petitioner is only entitled to recover Rs.100,000/-. Held that the judgment of the Appellate Court below, during the execution proceedings, is not sustainable inasmuch as the Appellate Court below travelled beyond the decree whereby it was clearly held that primarily, it was 7 tola gold ornaments, which is dower of the petitioner. The word "alternate" used in the decree has special significance. It can be used both as noun or an adjective. In the legal context, when used as an adjective, it describes something that offers or expresses a choice. When used as noun, it describes something that substitutes another. In the context of a decree passed in a case, this choice is vested with the decree holder-the petitioner in present case. In the instant case, dower is very much clear in terms of its weight i.e., 07-Tola gold and is easily available in the market. The petitioner cannot be compelled to accept its alternate value that was settled at the time of Nikah and/or the decree. The ownership of the gold ornaments became vested in the petitioner and any accretion and appreciation of the value of gold ornaments are also to be cherished and enjoyed by the petitioner and she cannot be deprived of such accretion by offering alternate value fixed at the time of her Nikah. It has been further held that the duty of the Executing Court is to carry out the decree and not to add to it or hang it any way. In the instant case, it would be unjust to interpret the decree dated 17.12.2016 in such a manner as put forth by the respondent and justified by the Appellate Court below, during execution, as this would amount to vesting a choice in the judgment debtor (the respondent in present case) to satisfy a decree, which favours him by adopting such means of satisfaction of such decree that are detrimental to the interest of the female the petitioner/decree holder.

WP 3346-18
MST. ZAIB UN NISA ETC VS A.D.J ETC
Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain
20-11-2024
2024 LHC 5824









The Christian Marriage Act 1872 and the Divorce Act 1869 are the principal family laws for Christians in our country. Every church has its precepts but these statutes prevail where there...............

 2024 PCrLJ 2058

The Christian Marriage Act 1872 and the Divorce Act 1869 are the principal family laws for Christians in our country. Every church has its precepts but these statutes prevail where there is a conflict.
This statute consolidated and amended the law relating to solemnizing the marriages of people professing Christianity. It consists of 88 sections. The first three sections are grouped under the heading “Preliminary,” while the remaining sections are divided into eight Parts. Section 3 is the interpretation clause and defines “minor” as a person who has not completed the age of twentyone years and is not a widower or a widow. Parts III, V and VI contain provisions for marriages where one or both parties are minors. In Part III, which bears the heading “Marriages solemnized by Ministers of Religion licensed under this Act”, section 19 enjoins that the father, if alive, or his guardian, if he is dead, and the mother of the minor, if there is no guardian, may give consent to the minor’s marriage. However, such consent is not required if the person authorized to give it does not reside in Pakistan. Sections 20, 21, and 22 describe how the person whose consent to the marriage is required under section 19 can prohibit the issuance of the certificate by the minister and how the latter should proceed when a notice prohibiting the marriage is issued. Part V contains provisions pertaining to marriages performed by or in the presence of a Marriage Registrar. Section 44 stipulates that the provisions of section 19 apply to any marriage under Part V in which either party is a minor. Anyone whose consent is required for such a marriage can enter a protest in the prescribed manner. When such a protest is filed, no certificate will be issued until the Marriage Registrar has examined the case and determined that it should be given. Part VI relates to the marriage of Native Christians, an expression, which as per section 3, includes the Christian descendants of the natives of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent converted to Christianity as well as such converts. Part VII prescribes penalties for various violations and offences under the CMA.
In view of the above, the minimum age for a Native Christian man to enter into a marriage is 16 years and for a woman 13 years in terms of section 60 of the CMA. The consent requirement under section 19 is within the age bracket of 16 to 18 and 13 to 18 years respectively. The marriage can be solemnized in the presence of a person licensed under section 9 in the presence of at least two credible witnesses without the preliminary notice required under Part III. I agree with Mr. Saad Rasool that the CMA does not expressly prohibit the marriage of a minor if it is compliant with section 5 (Persons by whom marriage is solemnized) and does not violate section 88 (Non-validation of marriages within prohibited degrees).
Section 2 of the Majority Act expressly excludes marriage and divorce from its application. A combined reading of this provision and section 11 of the Contract Act would show that they have no bearing on the capacity of a person to act in some matters, including marriage, which are left to be governed by the individual’s personal law – unless the Parliament has enacted a special law in that regard. As a result, the CMA and the Divorce Act of 1869 govern Christian marriage and divorce in Pakistan. The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, does not override them. It is a separate law that punishes those who are responsible for an under-age marriage but does not nulify the marriage.
“Consanguinity” is a relationship by blood while “affinity” is a relationship by marriage. The attitudes of different major world religions towards consanguineous and affinity marriages are diverse. Even in the same religion the practices and beliefs of one community and sect may differ from those of the others. Section 88 of the CMA recognizes that Christians have similar divisions and prohibits validation of any marriage “which the personal law applicable to either of the parties forbids him or her to enter into,” which includes a marriage within the prohibited degree of consanguinity and affinity.
Writ Petition No. 63301/2021 Nasreen Bibi Vs. Station House Officer etc.

-Constitutional petition---Guardianship petition--- Territorial jurisdiction of court---Scope---Plaintiff filed an application for the custody of minor---Defendant in reply.........

 2010 YLR 196

Ss. 9 & 25---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 & O. VII, R.10---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Guardianship petition--- Territorial jurisdiction of court---Scope---Plaintiff filed an application for the custody of minor---Defendant in reply filed an application under O. VII, R.10 read with S.151, C.P.C. by challenging the Territorial jurisdiction of the Guardian Court at "L "---Guardian Judge accepted application of the defendant and returned the petition for its presentation before the competent forum---Plaintiff filed appeal which was allowed and the case was remanded to the Guardian Judge with direction to decide the issue of Territorial jurisdiction along with other issues after recording evidence---Contention of the plaintiff was that since desertion the defendant had not been residing permanently at any place, therefore, the last place of her residence i.e. "L" would be deemed as ordinary residence of the minor---Validity---Stance of the plaintiff was against the record---Plaintiff had admitted in his suit for restitution of conjugal rights and in the constitutional petition that since 19-12-2007, defendant had been residing at "R "---Plaintiff could not take any stance over and above the pleadings---Appellate Court had erred in law while remanding the case with a direction to the defendant to prove the admitted fact with evidence---Impugned remanding order was illegal and without lawful authority---High Court accepted constitutional petition with observation that only the Guardian Judge at "R" possessed Territorial jurisdiction in terms of S.9 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 to decide matter of custody of the minor.

Where no specific or definite period is settled for the payment of deferred dower, wife would become entitled to dower at the event of dissolution of................

 Where no specific or definite period is settled for the payment of deferred dower, wife would become entitled to dower at the event of dissolution of marriage or on the death of any of the spouses. If any sum or property is agreed to be paid or given to the wife on the happening of some specified event, the same would become payable on the occurrence of that specified event as a deferred dower.

PLJ 2024 Lahore 891
[Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi]
Present: Shakil Ahmad, J.
Mst. SHAMIM AKHTAR--Petitioner
versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE RAWALPINDI and others--Respondents
W.P. No. 2889 of 2020, heard on 23.10.2024.

Family Courts Act, 1964 (XXXV of 1964)--
----S. 14--Suit for recovery of maitenance allowance and four tola gold ornaments--Partly decreed--Appeals--Partly allowed--Condition for payment of 3,00,000/- in events of second marriage of respondent and divorce to petitioner--Respondent was contracted second marriage and divorced to petitioner--Deferred dower--Challenge to--Entitlement of petitioners--Respondent had contracted second marriage and also divorced petitioner, therefore, petitioner was entitled to decree for dower--Any stipulation or condition agreed between parties mutually and with their free consent cannot be considered as an absolute bar to either pronounce divorce--Any amount agreed to be paid by husband to wife on happening of some future event, by all intents and purposes be construed as a deferred dower to be paid by husband on happening of such event--If any sum or property is agreed to be paid or given to wife on happening of some specified event, same would become payable on occurrence of that specified event as a deferred dower--Respondent failed to substantiate his stance as taken in his written statement qua pronouncing of divorce upon petitioner on her insistence--Appellate Court fell in obvious error while passing impugned judgment and decree--Instant case and connected case are fit cases for interfering in impugned judgment and decree of appellate Court in view of guidelines given in Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen’s case by invoking provisions of Article 199 of Constitution--Petitions partly allowed.
[Pp. 893, 894, 895, 896 & 897] A, B, C, D & E
2022 CLC 963 ref.
Ch. Muhammad Mobeen Shazaib, Advocate for Petitioner.
Mr. Asif Raza Bhatti, Advocate for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 23.10.2024.

Judgment

Titled petition is being decided along with Writ Petition No. 2478 of 2020 through this consolidated judgment as judgments and decrees dated 14.09.2020 and 12.10.2020 passed by learned Judge Family Court and Additional District Judge Rawalpindi, respectively, are under challenge in these petitions by the same parties.
2. For the facility of ready reference, hereinafter Mst. Shamim Akhtar will be referred to as ‘petitioner’ and Farooq Azam will be referred to as ‘respondent’.
3. Facts of the case, in brief, giving rise to the filing of these petitions are that petitioner instituted a suit against the respondent seeking decree for recovery of maintenance allowance, Rs. 300,000/-as stipulated in the Nikah nama and four tolas gold ornaments. The respondent contested the suit by filing written statement. After framing of issues and recording of evidence of the parties, the Judge Family Court, Rawalpindi proceeded to decree the suit in the following terms:-
“1. The plaintiff is entitled to get Rs. 20,000/-per month w.e.f. the date of desertion i.e. 16.12.2017 till expiry of her iddat period i.e. 15.05.2018.
2 The plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 03 lac from the defendant as per column No. 18 of Nikahnama.
3. The claim of plaintiff for recovery of gold ornaments is dismissed”.
Both the parties assailed the judgment and decree of the trial Court by filing separate appeals and Additional District Judge Rawalpindi, vide judgment and decree dated 12.10.2020 decided both the appeals as under:
“The sequel of above discussion is that, appeal filed by Mst. Shamim Akhtar is partly allowed in the manner that she is held entitled to recover the gold ornaments weighing 4 tolas, whereas, the rival appeal of Farooq Azam is partly allowed in terms that Mst. Shamim Akhtar is allowed to recover
Rs. 60,000/-for the period of iddat only and further she is not entitled to recover Rs. 300,000/-from the respondent (defendant) as dower. …”
Being dissatisfied, both the parties have filed instant petitions.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and record so annexed with the petitions perused.
5. Learned counsel for petitioner and the respondent are only objecting to the decrees of Courts below qua dower and gold ornaments, respectively.
6. As regards petitioner’s claim qua recovery of
Rs. 3,00,000/- as stipulated in the Nikah nama, it may be observed that petitioner averred in the plaint that she got married to the respondent in lieu of dower of Rs. 10,000/-. She further claimed that it was also agreed that an amount of Rs. 300,000/-will be given to the petitioner in case respondent pronounces divorce on petitioner or he contracts second marriage and that respondent has contracted marriage with one Sania Nazar on 17.02.2018 and also divorced the petitioner, therefore, she is entitled to recover Rs. 300,000/-. The respondent, in his written statement did not deny specifically qua fixation of
Rs. 300,000/-, however, asserted that all the dower has been paid and he divorced petitioner upon her asking. Before dilating upon the proposition, it seems apt to reproduce hereunder the stipulation as hinted against columns No. 18 to 22 of Nikah Nama:
طلاق کی صورت میں 3 لاکھ روپیہ، ناراضگی کی صورت میں 20 ہزار ماہوار خرچ 'دوسری شادی کی صورت میں بھی یہی شرائط' سارا زیور دونوں طرف سے عورت کا ہو گا۔یہ شرائط اس وقت ہونگی جب غلطی دولہا والوں کی طرف سے ہو گی۔
From the bare perusal of above, it transpires that both the parties agreed upon the stipulation qua payment of Rs. 300,000/-in the events of pronouncing divorce upon petitioner and contracting second marriage by the respondent. Narration given in Nikah Nama qua the amount can legitimately be counted as deferred dower that was to become payable on happening of any of the events so mentioned therein. In the instant case since respondent has contracted second marriage and also divorced the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to the decree for the dower to the tune of Rs. 300,000/-. Needless to observe that the stipulation agreed upon between the parties qua payment of certain amount by respondent to the petitioner on the event of divorce or contracting second marriage, in no way curtails the right of husband to pronounce divorce. Any stipulation or condition agreed between the parties mutually and with their free consent cannot be considered as an absolute bar to either pronounce divorce. In case “Ghulam Shabbir v. Mst. Abbas Bibi and others” 2022 CLC 963) the moot point, whether any condition incorporated in the Nikah Nama qua payment of compensation to wife in case of divorce was contrary to the law and Islamic injunctions or not, was taken up and resolved in the following terms:
“3. …………. The vires and constitutionality of the Muslim Family Law, Ordinance, 1961 and schedule thereto, which included to Nikah Nama, were variously subjected to challenge successfully. Clause 19 forms part of Nikah Nama -Form-II, added in terms of Rules 8, 10, 11 and 12 of the W.P. Rules under the Muslims Family Law Ordinance, 1961.
4. Clause 19 of Nikah Nama in this case is grossly misconstrued. The financial benefits agreed mutually are in the nature of reasonable financial support for setting her free. There is no cavil that terms of Nikah Nama constitutes a civil contract between the parties, both of which are at liberty to agree to the terms of arrangement. Clause-19, as available in Nikah Nama, is not in the nature of absolute bar qua right to divorce. It is not disputed that petitioner had divorced the wife-which manifest that no bar to divorce was imposed.
5. As far as contractual obligation in column 19 is concerned, it was agreed and factum of Nikah Nama is not disputed. The amount agreed in terms of clause -19 of Nikah Nama is spousal support -having all the attributes of alimony -wherein reasonable benefits were offered to enable ex-wife to have dignified and comfortable life. There is no restriction that husband cannot agree to arrange for maintenance or agree to extend fiscal advantage to the wife, even after the divorce. This nature of the benefit/advantage, which is not in any manner is restricting right of divorce, is in fact an act of bestowing benefit or gift upon wife to support her, hence, cannot be termed as illegal or contrary to the spirit of ISLAM and teachings of Quran.”
7. It may further be observed that there exists no categorization of the dower either in the Holy Quran or Sunnah.[1] Any amount/property agreed to be paid by the husband to wife on the happening of some future event, by all intents and purposes be construed as a deferred dower to be paid by the husband on the happening of such event. While discussing the scope and nature of prompt and deferred dower, Syed Ameer Ali, a prominent jurist of his age, in his celebrated compilation Mohammedan Law (Volume II) that was published in 1965 by All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore while defining prompt and the deferred dower observed as under:
“Prompt and deferred dower.
As there is nothing in the Koran or in the traditions tending to show that the integral payment of the dower prior to consummation is obligatory in law, the later jurisconsults have held that a portion of the mahr should be considered payable at once or on demand, and the remainder on the dissolution of the contract, whether by divorce or the death of either of the parties. The portion which is payable immediately is called the mahr-i-mu’ajjal, “prompt” or “exigible”; and a wife can refuse to enter the conjugal domicile until the payment of the prompt portion of the dower. The other portion is called mahr-i-muwajjal “deferred dower” which does not become due until the dissolution of the contract. It is customary in India to fix half the dower as prompt and the remaining moiety as deferred or “postponed:” but the parties are entitled to make any other stipulation they choose. For example, they may allow the whole amount to remain unpaid until the death of either of the husband or the wife. Generally speaking, among the Musulmans of India, the deferred dower is a penal sum, which is allowed to remain unpaid with the object of compelling the husband to fulfill the terms of the marriage-contract in their entirety.”
(Underlining is to supply emphasis).
So, any penal sum that has to be paid by the husband on the event of some future happenings as agreed by him although penal in nature yet same may be considered as deferred dower in view of exposition given by late Syed Ameer Ali. Faiz Badruddin Tyabji in paragraph No. 98 of his famous work ‘Muhammadan Law’,[2] defined the terms prompt and deferred dower in the following words:
“Mahr may be (a) either prompt, or exigible (in Arabic mu’ajjal) i.e., payable immediately on marriage if demanded by the wife or (b) deferred (in Arabic muwajjal) i.e., payable on the dissolution of marriage, or the happening of some specified event”.
(emphasis supplied)
In view of above, it can very conveniently be resolved that where no specific or definite period is settled for the payment of deferred dower, wife would become entitled to dower at the event of dissolution of marriage or on the death of any of the spouses. If any sum or property is agreed to be paid or given to the wife on the happening of some specified event, the same would become payable on the occurrence of that specified event as a deferred dower. In the instant case, there was a specific stipulation in the Nikah Nama that in case of divorcing the petitioner or contracting second marriage by the respondent, the respondent would pay an amount to the tune of Rs. 300,000/-to the petitioner. Undeniably, respondent has divorced the petitioner, therefore, petitioner was entitled to recover an amount to the tune of Rs. 300,000/-as stipulated in Nikah Nama by construing the same as a deferred dower. Respondent simply failed to substantiate his stance as taken in his written statement qua pronouncing of divorce upon petitioner on her insistence. Learned Judge Family Court rightly resolved the issue qua entitlement of respondent for receiving
Rs. 3,00,000/-, whereas learned Appellate Court fell in obvious error disentitling petitioner to recover Rs. 3,00,000/-.
8. Adverting to respondent’s claim qua gold ornaments, it may be observed that petitioner in paragraph No. 5 of the plaint claimed that “on 16.12.2017, the defendant after giving severe beatings to the plaintiff ousted the plaintiff in wearing apparels and snatched the gold ornaments”. Respondent controverted petitioner’s stance with the assertion that on the day of alleged snatching, he was abroad. The petitioner during cross-examination negated her version and stated that on 16.12.2017 the defendant was abroad. The relevant portion of cross-examination of the petitioner is reproduced hereunder for the facility of ready reference:
یہ درست ہے کہ مورخہ 16.12.2017 کو مدعا علیہ پاکستان میں موجود نہ تھا۔
From the above deposition, it can very conveniently be observed that petitioner failed to substantiate her claim that the respondent snatched gold ornaments from her. Learned Judge Family Court, thus, rightly proceeded to non-suit petitioner qua her claim of gold ornaments.
9. In view of above discussion, it can very conveniently be observed that the appellate Court fell in obvious error while passing the impugned judgment and decree. In this backdrop, instant case and
the connected case are the fit cases for interfering in the impugned judgment and decree of the appellate Court in view of the guidelines given in Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen’s[3] case by invoking the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution.
10. The upshot of above discussion is that both the petitions are partly allowed and the judgment and decree dated 12.10.2020 passed by the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi to the extent of entitling petitioner to recover four tolas gold ornaments and declining petitioner’s claim to recover Rs. 300,000/-from the respondent, is set aside and judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 14.09.2020 is restored, whereby petitioner was non-suited qua her claim of gold ornaments and was held entitled to receive Rs. 3,00,000/-as stipulated in Nikahnama.
(Y.A.) Petition partly allowed
[1]. “Dr. Sabira Sultana v. Maqsood Sulari, Additional District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi and 2 others” (2000 CLC 1384).
[2]. Third edition published by N.M. Tripathi & Co., Bombay 1940.
[3]. Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another (2023 SCMR 426).

سامان جہیز پر بہترین ججمنٹس

 

عدالت نے اجراء میں 12 سال بعد ادائیگی پر سامان جہیز کی موجوہ قیمت ادا کرنے کا حکم دیا
2017 SCMR 321‏
لست سامان جہیز کی تائیدی شہادت موجود نہ ہے دعوی خارج
2004 scmr 1739
لسٹ سامان جہیز داخل کی ہے رسیدات نہ ہے دعویٰ ڈگری ہوا
2008 SCMR 1584
سامان جہیز کی رسیدات سنبھال کر رکھنا مشکل ہوتا ہے اس لیے صرف لڑکی کے بیان پر ہی سامان جہیز ڈگری کر دینا چاہیے
2017 SCMR 393
بیوی کے لیئے ممکن نہ ہے کہ وہ شادی کے وقت سامان جہیز کی لسٹ پر خاوندو گواہ کے دستخط لے صرف ، سامان جہیز بیوی کے ہی بیان پر ڈگری ہو سکتا ہے
2020 clc 380
‏ ‏ صرف بیوی کے بیان پر ہی سامان جہیز کا دعوی ڈگری
2015 clc 632
ہمارے معاشرے میں بوقت شادی سامان جہیز کی لسٹ تیار نہیں ہوتی نہ ہی ان پر خاوند کے دستخط ہوتے مدعیہ کی اپیل منظور شده سامان جہیز مطابق عرضی دعویٰ
ڈگری شده. ‏
2012-MLD 756‏
سامان جہیز کی ٹوٹ پھوٹ کو مد نظر رکھا جائے گا
‏PLJ 2015 LAH 540
سامان جہیز کے دعوی میں شوہر کے والدین اور قریبی رشتے داروں کو بھی پارٹی بنایا جا سکتا ہے جن کے قبضہ میں سامان جہیز ہو
2018 CLC 241
بیوی کے والدین کی مالی حیثیت سامان جہیز کے مقدمہ کو ثابت کرنے کیلیے بنیادی عنصر ھے
2020 Y L R 282
سامان جہیز کو، ثابت کرنے کے لیے، لسٹ سامان جہیز تیار کرنا اور سامان جہیز کی رسیدات پیش کرنا ضروری نہ ہے.
(2012 YLR 2693).
لسٹ سامان جہیز اور رسیدات کی کوئی اہمیت نہ ہے، دعوی سامان جہیز ڈگری شد.
(2013 CLC 698).
اگر مدعا علیہ، جواب دعوی میں، لسٹ سامان جہیز منجانب مدعیہ کو درست تسلیم کرے، تو دعویٰ واپسی سامان جہیز ڈگری ہوگا.
(2015 YLR 1427).
دعویٰ سامان جہیز اور طلائی زیورات کے لیے تین سال کی معیاد مقرر ہے.
(2016 CLC 313).
فیملی کیس میں قانون شہادت کا اطلاق نہ ہوتا ہے، اس لئے سامان جہیز کو ثابت کرنے کے لیے سامان جہیز کی رسیدات اور متعلقہ افراد کو بطور گواہ پیش کرنا ضروری نہ ہے.
(2017 SCMR 393).
سامان جہیز کو بذریعہ پنچائیت واپس کرنےکے لئے کسی تیسرے آدمی سے تحریر لکھوانا لازم ہے ۔
2019 YLR 1900
رواج کے مطابق والدین اپنی بیٹیوں کو اپنی حیثیت سے زائد سامان جہیز دیتے ہیں ۔
2019 YLR 1862 (c)
محض لسٹ سامان جہیز ایگزبٹ نہ ہونے کی بناء پر دعٰوی سامان جہیز خارج نہ ہو گا۔
2019 MLD 1145
دعٰوی واپسی سامان جہیز میں سامان جہیز کی رسیدات کے تحریر کنندہ کو پیش کرنا ضروری نہ ہے ۔
2018 YLR 1642
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